Academic Papers presented at the 2\textsuperscript{nd} IABU Conference
Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Main Campus
Wang Noi, Ayutthaya, Thailand
The International Association of
Buddhist Universities
(IABU)

Buddhist Philosophy and
Meditation Practice

Academic Papers presented at the 2nd IABU Conference
Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Main Campus
Wang Noi, Ayutthaya, Thailand
The International Association of Buddhist Universities

2012 IABU Editorial Committee:

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Preface

Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University (MCU) has been privileged to witness and play an instrumental role in developing and hosting successful UNDV and IABU celebrations, annually. As always, we are all very grateful to the Royal Thai Government for its constant support, and thank the Thai Supreme Sangha Council for its blessings, guidance and support. We are indebted, also, to the United Nations for recognizing the thrice-sacred Buddhist holy day.

We had to delay the 2nd IABU Conference, due to the extreme flooding that shut down MCU for nearly two months. It has been 2600 years since the Enlightenment of our Great Teacher, and we have gathered here from across the globe, from many nations, to again pay tribute to his birth, enlightenment, and death – occurring on the same day in different years. The 2nd IABU Conference is running this year, due to the postponement, with the 9th United Nations Day of Vesak Conference. The IABU Secretariat now plays a major role in our celebrations, particularly in the academic program of the conference.

This publication could not have been possible without the persistence, hard work, and dedication of MCU’s scholars and staff. I wish to thank all members of the International Council for The Day of Vesak and the Executive Council of the International Association of Buddhist Universities, and the other members of the Editorial Committee for their devotion. I am also grateful to our many donors, sponsors, and dedicated volunteers who return year after year to support the IABU and United Nations Day of Vesak Celebrations.

We all truly celebrate the Buddha’s Enlightenment, and hope these words reach the hearts and minds of the readers.

P.D. Kosajarn

The Most Ven. Prof. Dr. PhraDharmakosajarn
Rector, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University
President, ICDV & IABU
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Welcome to the 2nd International Association of Buddhist Universities Academic Conference on Buddhist Philosophy and Praxis. This conference seems like it has been a long time in the making, due to the extensive flooding that ravished Thailand, and certainly left Mahachulalongkorn rajavidyalaya University, our gracious and great host, inundated with almost 2 meters of water. The university, where the IABU Secretariat is currently headquartered, has overcome this difficult situation, and we are now ready to hold this conference. The conference was originally scheduled for 16-18 December 2011, but to make this happen seemed like an impossibility. We are now here for the rescheduled date: 31 May – 02 June 2012. We have noticed that our 2nd IABU Conference coincides with the 9th United Nations Day of Vesak Celebrations – but our aims are different for this occasion. It’s quite fascinating that a single university can host two large international conferences at the same time. We further give our humble respects to the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and to the Thai Sangha Supreme Council for enabling this conference to proceed.

When this conference was in its planning stages, we had initial discussions on the main theme: Buddhist Philosophy – but we did not want papers that just gave idealistic proposals. Instead we aspired to gain papers that demonstrated philosophy in action, or the conversion of an idea into an actuality – and thus we wanted to implement or emphasize the aspect of praxis, into the conference. We had scheduled a practical meditation session, where elected Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana masters would hold a meditation session along with a question and answer period; but due to the merging of the two conferences: the 2nd IABU Conference and the 9th UNDV Conference – there was no longer enough allotted time for the meditation sessions, so it was regretfully eliminated. We hope that the gathering of academics took advantage of this expertise that availed themselves for this august gathering.

As all the scholars can surmise, there are several formats or applications of Buddhism, some are living-systems, and some have become either extinct or have merged with existing systems. Buddhist Philosophy is a vast topic that fills many bookshelves. Most of us have read texts on early-Indian or Vedic-philosophy and have seen the emergence into what we are discussing: Buddhism – but by no means are we holding a singular view of a Buddhism. The overwhelming amount of scholars present here surmise that dependent-origination is probably the supreme-teaching of the Buddha, or the one doctrine that gathers the most attention. The term: ‘praxis’ has caused some confusion amongst our scholars. If the term was defined: we could determine that praxis is the application or process through which the philosophical or doctrinal point becomes actualized or put into place (practiced) – it’s about the endeavor. We might have taken the term from international-socialistic literature, which emphasizes that besides just having philosophy – the point of all of us studying the Buddha’s preserved words is for the sake of improving our world – to eliminate suffering from the social experience. How have we actually done this?
Approximately 160 articles were received the 2nd IABU Conference from around the world. We have selected about 110 of them for presentation at the conference. There are articles from different levels of scholars, ranging from the most senior of professors and on downward to undergraduates. Each of the articles have merits of interest within them. We decided on four programs (sub-themes). This is the volume for Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice.

**PANEL SUMMARY - BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY & MEDITATION PRACTICE:**

In the spirit of the middle way, the apportioning of papers to panels has been conducted in an attempt to find a balance between working with thematic affinity, and trying to juggle time allocations and speaker availability. Papers for this session should have included advanced studies related to philosophical issues in meditation practices; dialogues on meditation differences in the traditions; theological or cosmological issues and any resultant meditative attainments – what is next after these realizations? This panel aimed for a serious discussion of deep philosophical points actualized as possible or beneficial, with evidence of transformation. We hope that serendipity in this instance accords with the planned conceptions, and ultimately, the aims of the panel.

The first paper, by Jason Siff, discusses ‘The Language and Description of Meditative Experiences’. As he points out, we have the Buddha’s words, not his experiencesas his legacy: so the reconstruction of meaning from what has been left behind is an essential process both for meditators and exegetes. By exploring the role of first-person testimonial and questioning as a means of testing the reliability and worth of meditative growth, the author explores ways that the arousing and honest accounting of changed states in meditation can be achieved. From his perspective as a vipassanā meditation teacher, he investigates David Kalupahana’s work in establishing a ‘language of existence’ and a ‘language of becoming’, positing a middle way between these two as helping the expression and development of meditative practice. Arguing that experience, perceived within the stages of knowledge (ñāna) can be articulated, explained and tested through appropriate questioning and wording, he offers his own term, ‘transformative conceptualization’, a means by which meditators can construct their own narratives. Carefully fostered, such narratives, by superseding partial, misleading or dispiriting accounts, can accommodate nuance and discriminatory awareness amongst those practicing within this meditative system.

In ‘Thought and Praxis in Contemporary Korean Buddhism: A Critical Examination’, Assoc. Prof. Jongmyung Kim considers the thought and identity of the Chogye Order. Focusing first on its emphasis on the concept of emptiness, meditative thought, and Flower Garland (K. Hwaŏm; Ch. Huayan; Jp. Kegon) thought the author then investigates the order’s soteriology, concentrating on historical development and procedures, before assessing how these work together in the Order. Taking a historical perspective, the paper explores a number of problems he observes in the Order, its textual roots and the practical implications of these, in a survey that includes the role of devotional and ascetic as well as meditative activities. The author argues for a more varied understanding of the nature of practice and its relationship with theory within the Order, and for a reassessment of its place in modern society. By exploring text and modern academic and practitioner based comment, he asserts that the Chogye Order needs to redefine the notion of Buddhist practice beyond what he terms Kanhwa Sŏn absolutism, as ‘a process of one’s living up to the basic teachings of the Buddha’, and so come to accept a more diverse and inclusive approach to practice and theory.
Ven. Dr. Jinwol Lee’s paper on Seon meditation discusses much of the historical developments of Seon, and sites the writings of Professor Robert E. Buswell, Jr.; however, a number of authors examine innovations within meditative practice in different geographical and historical contexts, exploring ways that new practices, ways of working and doctrines have transformed pre-existing doctrines and practices. The other welcomed contribution to such understanding comes from Prof. Buswell, who, in ‘The Transformation of Doubt (уйиоун) in Kanhwa Sơn'看話禪: The Testimony of Gaofeng Yuanmiao (峰原妙(1238-1295) explores the emergence and increasing influence of new and creative meditative practices, formulation and language, which cannot be attributed to Indian sources, within Eastern Buddhist praxis and doctrine. As part of its critique of Sino-Indic traditions, and as a demonstration of its autonomy, Seon experimented with forms of rhetoric, as well as practice, it considered proleptic and transformative. Paying particular attention to the notion and experience of ‘doubt’, usually discussed in Indian sources as the fifth of the meditative hindrances, Buswell demonstrates how the public case and the hwadu, newly developed Chan/Seon catalytic meditative devices, are used in Korea to provoke and exacerbate a different kind of doubt, that coalesces into a palpable sensation that comes to pervade all of one’s thoughts, feelings, emotions, and eventually even one’s physical body. This doubt (yiqing) plays a crucial role in kanhwa/kanhwa meditation, and is emblematic especially of the Linji 至臨济 school of the classical and post-classical Seon periods. Buswell demonstrates that such doubt, as described in particular with a startlingly eloquent evocation of paradox in the work of Yunmiao, is perceived as a means of engaging a creative dynamic in the body and mind between a painful knowledge of one’s own ignorance and an implicit and equally pervasive faith in an inherent enlightenment. Together, the author notes, those provide an existential quandary whose colliding contradictoriness, experienced within the body and mind of the practitioner, find resolution and fruition through practice, the ‘topic of inquiry’ (hwadu) and the ‘public case’ (gong’an), in the final release of awakening. A strong lay element is also identified in this teaching.

Ms. Pyi Phyo Kyaw explores the ‘The Paṭṭhāna (Conditional Relations) and Buddhist Meditation: Application of the Teachings in the Paṭṭhāna in Insight (Vipassanā) Meditation Practice’, in Burma, a country where the seventh book of the Abhidhamma has always held a particularly key position in doctrine, practice and ritual. In this instance, rather than practice influencing theory, theory is deliberately employed as a means of sharpening, directing and shaping practice. Delineating in brief the twenty-four conditional relations, the author describes how these paccayas, whose formulation is perceived within Southern Buddhism as the most profound Buddhist teachings on interconnectedness, are used both as meditative tools and as a means of understanding experience at both a momentary and sequential level. Directed towards understanding and applying within meditation and daily life, through the agent of wise attention (yoniso manasikāra), the Paṭṭhāna guides those practicing within primarily vipassanā-based traditions. In this capacity, the teaching of the paccayas has exercised an appeal to an unusually strong lay as well as monastic following, for whom the Paṭṭhāna is regarded as the embodiment of the Buddha’s omniscience, the Buddha-sabbaññuta-ñāna.

Ms. Xialoi Lei in ‘A Study on the Development of Meditation in Theravada Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism’, notes the prevalence of mental problems within a global society and records attendant problems such as a stigma attached to mental health issues, the fact that treatment ignores preventative action and a lack of care in addressing the interface between mind and body. Growing interest in a number of Buddhist meditative systems has been evident since the 1960s: this paper
explores some variations in approach and method. Making a survey first of the available literature on different aspects of the subject, the author scrutinizes first vipassanā methods and then Chan, before addressing a comparison between the two and their differing views, for instance, on the reading of texts or the traditional axis of ‘gradual’ and ‘sudden’ enlightenment. She finds some real differences of approach between these two methods, but emphasizes the success both have had in attracting interest in Buddhism.

‘Pragmatic Benefits and Concentration through Ānāpānasati Meditation’, by Kanae Kawamoto, discusses the popularity of a meditation system that has come to be known as ‘vipassanā’ in the West, that the author suggests has found more success than samatha and breathing mindfulness practice. The author argues that the early texts, however, accord samatha a central and integral place within Buddhist practice, noting that the second jhāna of internal peace is also often recommended to the Buddha’s followers after their enlightenment. The paper contends that many gradual teachings (anupubbikathā) within the canon, often to laypeople, are obscured by the ellipses and peyyāla of PTS editions, which often leave out key passages referring to the practice of meditation. Citing for instance the example of Subhaddha, the leper (Ud 38ff), whose mind is described in terms suggesting attainment of the fourth jhāna, the author argues that samatha practice is constantly advocated and taught within the canon, and that there is no justification for the recent appropriation of the word vipassanā from its traditional usage within canon and commentary, to become a term used to describe a complete meditative path.

Dr. Tadeusz Skorupski in ‘Consciousness and Luminosity in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism’ invokes the juxtaposition of the phenomenal world of samsāra and the perfected state of nirvana, noting that they reflect and essentially correspond to the dynamic operating in the Buddhist analysis of consciousness and the propensities of the human mind: the mind produces the factors contributing to rebirth, but is also the primary vehicle in the attainment of salvation. He identifies several key features that permeate early Buddhist doctrine: the pre-eminence of mind, the notion of inherent radiance, the alien nature of the defilements that contaminate the mind, and the interplay of the image of purification and corruption. Starting with a close reading of Buddhaghosa’s interpretations of the nature of luminosity, the author extends his discussion to include the Mahāsaṅgikas, who emphasize the inherent radiance of a mind obscured by adventitious defilements, and the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas, who aver that an inherently radiant mind could not be obscured, for to them it has a propensity, rather than an innate disposition, to luminosity. Delineating various attributes of the description of consciousness according to different schools, the author moves from Pāli Abhidhamma to Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna sources and Bodhicitta doctrine. Alighting on subsequent Indian Tantric theories that posit a fourfold luminosity of consciousness as four kinds of emptiness, he notes that such an understanding of consciousness and luminosity was applied in the Tibetan understanding of the processes occurring during death, as described in the work known as The Tibetan Book of the Dead. The author describes this account of death, as involving the transition through four kinds of luminosity, as unique to Tibet, in particular to the Nyingma and Kagyu traditions. He concludes that although varied schools often disagree in certain features, all concur in the possibility of and access to a purified mind. Tracing the continuity between early Abhidhamma through to the various Mahāyāna schools, the author avers, provides an insightful range of perspectives on luminosity and nature of the mind itself.

Some papers, such as the following, provide exposition of early exegetes and their interpretation of traditional doctrine within the parameters of what were at the time more recent
developments in meditative teaching and practice. ‘Śamatha and its Relation to the Mundane and Supra-mundane Paths According to Geluk Traditions of Tibetan Buddhism’, by James Blumenthal, explores various aspects of Northern śamatha practice in its doctrinal and salvific setting, placing the argument within the parameters of Geluk practice as it is described in particular in the “Śamatha” (Zhi gnas) chapter of Tsongkhapa’s fourteenth-century work, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Byang chub lam rim chen mo, hereafter, The Great Treatise). The author explores three potential paths of the śamatha practitioner: the mundane, and instantaneous and gradual supramundane. Emphasizing the centrality and importance of śamatha in each, the paper demonstrates that the stages of śamatha described by these commentators are aspects of a graduated path, with carefully differentiated stages. The first, the mundane, is always gradual, though partial as no attempt is made to eradicate all defilements, but rather to see the affliction of each level through comparison with the qualities of the one above. The second is gradual, eliminating defilements one by one in a hierarchical manner until the most subtle meditative defilements have been eradicated, going from the sense sphere, to the four form realms and four formless. The third eliminates the afflictions in groups of nine, one from each realm, so that they are simultaneously eradicated in turn in a comprehensive purification encompassing all nine levels of practice. Within these accounts, the various stages of meditation are inextricably linked to the concept of emptiness (śūnyatā, stong pa nyid), and the consequent process of the development of insight. The author argues that practice within such traditions, particularly those who pursue higher meditations and tantric practices, certainly draw upon doctrinal foundations that may be traced to earlier textual sources, but has also widened the scope of both śamatha and vipassanā practice as described in the sūtras. Therefore, Tsongkhapa’s Tantra retains older notions of emptiness, but also integrates and validates new practices within traditional doctrinal understanding.

This paper discusses varied ways that three schools of meditation address the teaching of the four foundations of mindfulness. In ‘Three Practices of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness: An Investigation in Comparative Soteriology’, Thomas A.C. Weiser investigates three sets of meditation practices, both at a theory and a practice level: Southern Buddhist vipassanā, analytic meditation based textually on the ninth chapter of Pawo Tsugla Trengwa Rinpoche’s commentary on Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, and śamatha/vipaśyanā meditation as taught in the chapter ‘The Four Foundations of Mindfulness’ in Heart of the Buddha by Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche. Each follows the teaching known as ‘the four foundations of mindfulness’, with a distinctive approach, orientation towards a soteriological goal and doctrinal framework. Each seemed worthwhile, inviting further pursuit and investigation in distinctive ways: the first, that addressed the examination of characteristics, seemed to the author to work on the axis of greed; the second that explored content, on the axis of hatred; while the process orientation of the third seemed to address the axis of ignorance. The author argues, however, that their teachings are in many ways consonant, and offer complementary rather than contradictory paths.

‘The Theravāda Philosophical Exposition of the Supramundane (Lokuttara) State’, by Dr. H. M. Mahinda Herath, explores various attributes of the moment of path, investigating the subject through the wisdom instrumental in attaining liberation: insight knowledge (vipassanāna) and the knowledge pertaining to the supramundane paths (maggañāna). The first, the author notes, is the direct penetration of the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena - impermanence, suffering and non-self. It takes as its objective sphere the five aggregates (pancakkhandhā) – material form, feeling, perception, volitional formations and consciousness. Because insight knowledge

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takes the world of conditioned formations as its object, it is regarded as a mundane form of wisdom. Insight knowledge does not itself directly eradicate the defilements, but serves to prepare the way for the second type of wisdom, of the supramundane paths, which emerges when insight has been brought to its climax. Exploring the nature of ājñā, the author notes that although its primary function is stabilizing the mind as a prelude or consequence of insights, it is sometimes forgotten that its other functions include providing an object for insight practice: this process is called ‘comprehension knowledge,’ with the ājñā subjected to such treatment termed ‘sammasitajñāna’, ‘the comprehended ājñā’. Though the basic ājñā and the comprehended ājñā will often be the same, the two do not necessarily coincide. A meditator cannot practice comprehension on a ājñā higher than he/she is capable of attaining; but one who uses a higher ājñā as his basis can still practice insight comprehension on a previously attained and mastered lower ājñā. This admitted difference between the two types of ājñā leads to discrepant theories about the supramundane concentration of the noble path. Momentary concentration arises in the one who practices samatha simultaneously with his post-ājñānic attainment of insight, but for the vipassanā practitioner it develops naturally and spontaneously in the course of his insight practice without the fixing of the mind upon a single exclusive object. The author explores these issues.

Joel Walmsley and Ira Greenberg introduce the important perspective of Western philosophical discourse in ‘Mind, Death and Supervenience: Towards a Comparative Dialogue’. Seeking to examine ‘death’ from the perspectives of both Western Analytic philosophy and the Vajrayāna tradition, their intention is to bring the two perspectives into a dialogue concerning mind and cognition as manifest with regard to this undeniable, but not easily definable, event. Rigorously exploring points not only of convergence but also of divergence, they cite the notion of supervenience, a philosophical term designed to provide a positive account of the relationship between mental and physical events, and its application to death, as described within the Western analytic tradition. They suggest it gives an account of the relationship between states, properties and events considered synchronically (i.e., at-a-time), that contrasts markedly with the Vajrayāna account of mind, which, with its strong experiential delineation of the stages of death, they regard as a process metaphysics (i.e., concerned with diachronic, over time relationships). They argue that, for instance, the concept of supervenience, and indeed the associated notion of subvenience, would need to be substantially re-worked, to apply to processes rather than states, for the Vajrayāna view to be successfully represented according to Western models. Strong convergence between the primarily phenomenological and emic accounts of Vajrayāna and the ontologically orientated Western analysis lies, however, in, for instance, the concept of ‘levels’ and a ‘layered picture of reality’ characterizing both models: despite the very different articulation of the constitution of these levels, and thus their interrelationship, they conclude that such resonances suggest that the dialogue between the traditions is fruitful, and hope that their analysis prompts further study in this field.

The use of metaphor in meditative language and its application in daily life is explored by Jeff Waistell, in ‘Mindfulness Meditation and Praxis’. This paper examines mindfulness meditation, as presented in the literature of Zen, focusing on the writings and new formulations of doctrine of Thich Nhat Hanh, whilst also making reference to other Engaged Buddhist authors. It explored the relationship between Buddhist philosophy (especially non-dualism) and praxis, enquiring how meditation effects transformation. The key finding is that Thich Nhat Hanh emphasizes non-duality in mindfulness meditation and thereby is able to relate it to praxis. He does this in two ways; firstly, through emphasizing the non-duality of mind/body, self/other, and self/environment, and secondly,
through explaining his teaching through metaphors that mediate these non-dualities. Most of the metaphors used by Thich Nhat Hanh relate to organic growth in nature, reflecting his caring, nurturing and humanistic Buddhism. It is concluded that Thich Nhat Hanh’s particular privileging of non-dual meditation enables the relationship between meditation and praxis – and that metaphorical discourse is crucial for our understanding of meditation and daily life.

One of the means by which Buddhist principle is tested, examined and purified is through the medium of language: articulation and expression are crucial in the communication of path, in discussion about personal practice, and in the integration of experience and doctrine. Professor Angraj Chaudhary takes the perspective of vipassanā meditation as a medium for understanding and accessing different levels of experience. In ‘The Philosophy of Suffering and the Practice of Vipassanā’, first-person account of meditative practice is linked to doctrinal exposition of the Buddha’s interchanges with Poṭṭhadānd Māluṇkyaputta. The argument is made that the practice of meditation, and vipassanā in particular, provides a realizable means of pragmatically pursuing knowledge. The author notes ‘In no other laboratory outside this fathom-long body can it be proved that sensations cause desire’, and argues on the basis of a reading of these texts, that the Buddha’s understanding and articulation of the interdependence of the four noble truths is firmly based in vipassanā practice, not intellectual understanding.

Charles Pyle, in ‘A Strategic Perspective on Buddhist Meditation’, considers the four noble truths and addresses questions and paradoxes he identifies as lying at the heart of the practice of vipassanā meditation. How can there be so much ignorance if the mind is naturally radiant? How can the goal be found through lack of attachment to a goal? Quoting the work of Ajahn Chah, he argues that Buddhism is a science rather than the religion it has usually been labeled, and, citing extensive support for this hypothesis, stresses that the Buddha is said to have discovered a pre-existent path, not a new one, just as Newton discovered pre-existing laws operating in natural phenomena. Morality, hermeneutics and semiotics are discussed, which the author argues are not incompatible with a scientific approach but essentially linked to its procedures, so that Buddhist practice, its language and its expression, can be seen as a scientific discipline of its own: ‘Meditation is to Buddhism as the microscope is to biology. Living in conflict with the laws of nature causes suffering. Living in harmony with the laws of nature brings happiness.’

For successful communication and transmissions of teaching to take place, there needs, of course, to be a sense of personal contact and interchange. Debates about the manifold doctrines connected to the bKa’ bgyud pa Great Seal (mahāmudrā), especially its paths outside the mantra system, have for some time greatly occupied both academic researchers and Tibetan scholars. But, as Jim Rheingans, in ‘Communicating the Innate: Observations on Teacher-Student Interaction in the Tibetan Mahāmudrā Instructions’, argues, an often crucial factor in such doctrines is the role of the teacher, whose soteriological significance is often overlooked in modern scholarly analysis concerning a teaching where the role of the guru is stressed far more than any particular doctrinal system. In essence, the Great Seal contains immediate instructions for achieving Buddhahood by transcending conceptual thinking (Skt. prapañca, vikalpa) and directly perceiving the nature of mind. But Great Seal interpretations and categorizations differ even among the bKa’ bgyud pa schools and its categorization became a point of continued debate. This paper explores features of the Eighth Karmapa’s Great Seal: that conceptualization is perceived as Buddhahood, that it is taught and explained in highly varied ways in different teachings and that the origin of these is perceived to be the guru. This last feature, the author argues, is the real ‘secret’ of a practice that is completely
dependent on the relationship between the teacher and pupil. On the whole, the concept of *dad pa*, or confidence towards the teacher, and the ensuing practices of *mos gus* and *gsol ’debs*, are a central pillar of the Great Seal as prerequisite, practice, and goal, to the extent, the author argues, that one can see devotion to the teacher as the means for realizing the Great Seal, next to insight. With this emphasis, the author avers that these particular instances of bKa’ brgyud pa Great Seal texts could be termed Vajrayāṇa, to the extent that Vajrayāṇa has the guru and his transmission as a defining characteristic, with the guru being used as means. Thus, the Great Seal of the Eighth Karmapa may be better understood as an adaptable and flexible pragmatic device, where experience and interaction are conceived superior to claims of ultimate truth.

Sumi Lee in ‘Searching for a Possibility of Buddhist Hermeneutics: Two Exegetic Strategies in Buddhist Tradition’, makes thorough scholarly examination of the difficulties associated with testing and verifying religious and meditative experience, both in traditional sources and in modern academic and practitioner based discourse. As he argues, the hermeneutic difficulty in Buddhism, as in other fields of religious studies, comes from the supposition that the object of interpretation is beyond the methodological frame of interpretation, that is, conceptualization. Historically, approaches have adopted different strategies. There is what he terms the ‘negative induction’ method, employed notably by early Southern Buddhists, and with different terminology, the Mahāyānaists, particularly in the Madhyamaka school, who through the collision and encounter of antithetical logical positions establish an intimation of Nāgārjuna’s emptiness, itself, Lee argues, a formulation dependent upon negative induction. Articulation of the four noble truths, the author maintains, provides throughout the history of these schools an ‘interdependent signification’, by means of antidote and an affirmative course of action and response to ‘suffering’ that is knitted into its exposition. This heritage is also evident shaping the finely nuanced distinctions operating in Yogācāra articulations of dependent arising evident in all phenomena. Going beyond the doctrinal to the interpretative and the experiential, Lee tests relativist and Buddhist understanding through application of the principle of the middle way, and examines the Chan gong’an as a non-logical meditative strategy. Whether as a means of understanding ‘ceaseless narratives’ or as part of a process of religious cultivation, the need for the elucidation of features such as dependent arising, he concludes, is implicit in their very articulation: such doctrines challenge the continued work of interpreters to this day, as they will continue to do so in the future.

In ‘The Mind’s ‘I’ in Meditation: Early Pāli Buddhhdhamma and Transcendental Phenomenology in Mutual Reflection’, Khristos Nizamis attempts some points of comparison between what he terms transcendental phenomenology (TP) and early Pāli Buddhhdhamma (EB). Choosing not to posit a notion of self that challenges the idea of non-self, he rather proposes that ‘pure subjectivity’ is an inherent and irreducible property of intentional consciousness (i.e., ‘consciousness-of’), an essential aspect of the actual process of lived conscious experience; and that there is a definite phenomenological sense in which, when everything else has been ‘excluded’ and ‘reduced’, ‘pure consciousness-of remains as an absolutely irreducible principle. But neither pure consciousness-of nor its intrinsic subjectivity can constitute (or be constituted as) a ‘self’ of any kind: they are ‘transcendental’ facts, equivalent to ‘pure emptiness’. Moreover, he avers, if there were no phenomenon whatsoever for consciousness-of to be conscious-of, then, given that consciousness-of already apodictically demonstrates the irreducible nature of ‘being conscious-of’, it could be conscious-of nothing but its own consciousness-of. In other words, this would be a form of absolute cessation. With particular reference to the *Khemaka Sutta*, the author explores problems
to do with the notion of ‘I’ ness in arahats, intriguingly imagining an encounter in which he can pose various questions to a new arahat in order to ascertain the nature of the continuity that exists when ‘I’ making has ceased. By examining Wittgenstein’s notions of ‘I’ ness the author takes a fresh look at some truisms of Buddhist exegesis. He concludes that ‘the first-personal pronoun, ‘I’, ‘aham’ … has not only a ‘use’, but a genuine ‘meaning’: the intrinsic and irreducible pure subjectivity – the “I’-ness’ – of intentional consciousness’.

The following paper argues that the Buddhist delineation of states and stages of meditative practice itself constitutes a kind of science, yet to be appreciated within the conventional parameters of modern scientific discourse. ‘Is It True That Buddhism is Mind-Based Science?’ by Apisin Sivayathorn and Apichai Puntasen, avers that the Buddhist analysis of the mind and its processes are described within Buddhism with a methodology that both defines the problem and provides a means of deliverance, elements both essential to its particular orientation. It argues that the subtleties of the Buddhist path as described within early texts provide a different kind of science, for the practitioner, from modern academic disciplines. It contends that the close delineation of states involved in mundane and supramundane jhāna present a number of debating points for modern scholars and practitioners, but nonetheless constitute a full salvific path, closely described at each stage in a careful and scientific manner.

‘The Pleasant Way: The Dhyāna-s, Insight and the Path according to the Abhidharmakośa’, by Karin Meyers, asks ten basic questions often debated in commentarial literature as well as modern academic and practice based discussion: Is dhyāna essential for path? Does it have a single object? Does the body provide the means whereby the state is experienced? These and other questions are addressed with particular reference to the suggestions made in the Abhidharmakośa, but with extensive allusion to modern discourse on the subject in varied Buddhist schools. A sense of the momentary, simultaneous arising of vitarka and vicāra (the first two factors of dhyāna/jhāna, initial and sustained thought), for instance, is felt difficult by some to reconcile with temporally described processes in the sequential suttanta manner, such as the bee alighting on a flower: indeed Vasubandhu, in contrast to his contemporaries, concludes that the two attributes cannot arise together in one moment. The singleness of the object in dhyāna/jhāna, and whether or not it is also possible to perceive a changing or multiple object in that state is also debated. Her detailed and scholarly study of the Abhidharmakośa understanding of these questions, reveals, as she notes, some surprising conclusions: many of the issues that most concern modern commentators are addressed, but their resolution often defies expectation. Taking the example of the nature of the object in dhyāna/jhāna, she notes that the Abhidharmakośa’s understanding is sometimes radically different from modern practitioners: did Vasubandhu and his contemporaries simply have a different experience, or one we do not yet appreciate, or an approach not primarily based on practice? Whatever the case, she argues that study of the internal logic of the text, and its systematic path structure, may provide some theoretical coherence: she suggests, for instance, that Vasubandhu’s reticence on the subject of bodily manifestation and experience may reflect a deliberate intent to present the path from a non-phenomenological viewpoint. She strongly recommends further pursuit of these issues.

Thanaphon Cheungsirakulvit in ‘Buddhadāsa’s Poetry: the Object of Contemplation on Emptiness’, takes a perspective on language sometimes neglected in modern Buddhist scholarship on meditative literature of Southern Buddhist schools: study of its manifestation in the various literary forms in which meditative experience have been transmitted since the earliest period. Through a careful examination of poetry concerned with meditation, in particular the works of Buddhadāsa,
the author demonstrates that paradox, puzzle and ineffability, natural to the poetic medium, are deployed by Buddhadāsa as a means to communicate essential features of the Buddhist path. Through close textual analysis of Buddhadāsa’s rhythms, play of imagery and skill in language, the author argues that the notion of emptiness as a meditative experience is communicated with an economy and precision other forms of description and analysis cannot emulate.

Dr. Mano Laohavanich, formerly the Ven. Mettanando Bhikkhu, in a paper entitled ‘The Esoteric Teachings of Wat Phra Dhammakaya’, gives a thorough critical examination of the movement to which he was once closely aligned. Contextualizing this rapidly growing movement within traditional Southern Buddhist teachings, he discerns trends he regards as a cause for concern. This paper gives the author’s warnings about the dangers of charismatic leadership, and the appropriation of Buddhist practice and ideals for purposes other than that of following the Dhamma. Briefly outlining some of its doctrines and practices hitherto regarded as esoteric, the paper argues that the strength of the movement lies not, as is popularly perceived, in its land, wealth or impressive organization. Rather, he argues, the layers of teachings and myths act as a powerful binding force for the community, that lend considerable potency to the Dhammakaya ethos. The author of the paper distances himself from the movement but provides also an account of its evolution and an analytical survey of its teachings.

‘Philosophical Perspectives in the Meditational practices of Tantric Buddhism’ by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Uma Shankar, opens with a quote from Nāgārjuna: ‘For whom emptiness is possible, all is possible’. She explores the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism, and the way that their deities, invoked for the sake of perfection and the cultivation of the siddhis, are regarded as emanations of emptiness. The author examines the nature of Vajrayāna, the use of guru yoga in Tantra practice, and the importance of no material gain or fame being involved in the pursuit of practices involving power: these should be employed with great care, and with compassionate intention, not from a wish for self-aggrandizement. Indeed, as she notes, the highest fulfillment and practice of the siddhis is considered to be the purification of the mind and mastery of one’s own will. The various kinds of yoga practice are described and explored, as are other aspects of Tantric practice, such as the role of the teacher. The author concludes by stressing that Tantra practice does not require blind faith, but gives disciplined teachings within a doctrinal framework that protects practitioner and allows the mind to find stillness and wisdom.

Human interaction and ritual practice at important life events may be a means of allowing the mind to integrate and understand the sad, the horrifying or the accidental as part of an individual’s development upon a salvific path. ‘An Anthropological Study on the Rituals Pertaining to Life Crises Events among Sri Lankan Buddhists’, by Prof. Yasanjali Devika Jayatilleke, explores the very nature of ritual, its varied interpretation in modern academic discourse, and its role in supporting crisis events in Sri Lankan Buddhist practice. Categorizing life rituals in three ways, as calendric rituals (recurrent, cyclical), life crises rituals (recurrent, non-cyclical) and life cycle rituals, the paper examines the differing approaches of each in Sri Lankan practice as offering a therapeutic means of understanding, absorbing and recovering from major life crises. A survey of participants and their varied doctrinal understanding reveals an older and often female element amongst participants, a mixed acceptance of the efficacy of such features as astrological divination, but also an almost 100 percent approval of the underlying doctrine of merit and demerit. Buddhist rituals are the most popular, in particular the Bodhi pūja, as a means of coping with stress and unhappy life events; the goddess Paththini is particularly invoked. The author concludes by noting that Sri Lankan life
and practice is supported by an appreciative and richly diverse participation in rituals in all
categories; he found all participants accord in finding healing and deep solace at times of stress
through ritual enactment.

A very physically based contribution is provided by ‘The Philosophical Foundations of
the Tibetan Buddhist Practice of Bodily Preservation’ by Dr. Mark Owen. Explaining mardung
or kudung as a post mortuary state whereby the bodies of advanced Buddhist meditators remain
intact after death. It is possible to divide instances of mardung into two broad categories; revered
practitioners that were ‘artificially’ preserved after death using complex mortuary techniques,
and ascetics and practitioners that have become ‘spontaneously’ preserved as a direct result of their
advanced spiritual attainments (rtogs). However, as the author explains, whilst a convenient division,
‘artificial’ preservation is very rarely seen to preclude the spiritual adeptness or level of attainments
of the individual. Exploring various levels associated with this practice, including the underlying
basis, and issues of altruism, faith and the blessings associated it the author demonstrates the wide
range of philosophical ideas and concepts employed by Buddhists to understand the preservation
process and the agency and authority of the preserved bodies. Whilst ostensibly a subject of relatively
limited relevance, as the burgeoning study of Buddhist relics and relic veneration attests, studies in
this area have the rich potential to offer greater insights into a wide range of Buddhist concepts, and
the complex relationship between Buddhist practice, philosophy and doctrine.

Some papers draw attention to important issues that are involved in transposing Buddhist
meditative practices and doctrine to new contexts, where some aspects of theory and practice are
not yet integrated within the underlying sensibility of the host culture, and so may be marginalized.
So, ‘Dangerous Dharma, Death, and Depression: The Importance of ‘Right View’ for Practicing
Contemplation within a Western Buddhist Tradition’, by Bethany Lowe, warns that contemplation of
features such as death and suffering in a Western context, outside a traditional doctrinal framework
where the perspective of rebirth and salvation are taken as an underlying basis, can produce negative
effects. It argues that some features of the teaching, divorced from a perspective of salvation achieved
over many lifetimes, can be harmful. It raises the crucial issue as to whether it is appropriate to
introduce ideas on impermanence and death without the underlying doctrine of rebirth and karma.
Those suffering from depressive tendencies can dwell upon frightening or negative tendencies in
the teaching, and care needs to be taken that positive and affirmative meditations are offered to those
of this disposition. The author states two antidotes to this problem, based on what the author describes
as a more healthy foundation, that of ‘right view’. The first is that reflections on the negative need
to be embedded within a full salvific path and the context of the doctrine of rebirth and kamma.
All four of the noble truths need to be remembered. The second is that practitioners should be
couraged to find states within their practice that bring genuine contentment, a sense of confidence
in the potential of the human mind, and a complete rather than partial or ‘doctored’ sense of path
that allows the factor of faith to be fully developed. This can be found, the author suggests, through,
for instance, following all the stages of the breathing mindfulness practice, rather than only selected
ones and, in her own experience, through practices that arouse, for those suited by temperament,
the powerful purity and positive features of the radiant mind and its potential. The author stresses
that inherent features of the tradition, such as the emphasis on the immense positive potential of
the human mind in traditional meditative teaching, as well as meditations on the negative aspects
of experience, are needed for a correct and healthy perspective on the human mind, and in order to
arouse faith where it is often sorely needed in Western contexts.
‘The Practical approach to the Enlightenment through Buddhist Meditation’, by Venerable Bhikkhuni Anulā (Kyeong-Hee Yoo), makes an extended comparison between the Southern Buddhist interpretation of enlightenment as described by the eradication of the ten fetters, and the notion of Malhugu in Korean Sŏn Buddhism. After comparing a diversity of ancient and modern accounts of various stages of enlightenment, she argues that the crucial factor for those in the present day who describe experiences that they regard as enlightening seems to be strong wish to find a spiritual path.

‘Buddhist Meditation Practices’, by Dr. Wangchuk Dorjee Negi, discusses resonances and differences in the early ‘eighteen schools’ of Buddhism with regard to meditative teaching and doctrine. Exploring a number of variations in the way meditative teachings are delivered in a number of modern descendants of these schools, the author notes features such as a considerable care and attention devoted to difference of temperament and suitability with regard to meditation objects. The paper demonstrates the great richness and variety of practices involved, for instance, based on the insight section of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryavatāra, the author demonstrates the complex interrelationship of theory, doctrine and practice in varied meditative schools, showing that their underlying perception of the four noble truths is articulated in radically different terms, that nonetheless fulfill a pattern of the possibility of liberation for all beings.

Some modern contexts and their roots in Pāli canonical and commentarial sources are explored in Sarah Shaw’s ‘Breathing Mindfulness: Text and Practice’. Taking the first four instructions of the Ānāpānasati Sutta, the author examines some practical implications of wording and phraseology, demonstrating that variation in technique and orientation are evident from the earliest sources. Investigating three modern schools of breathing mindfulness, as described by Nyanaponika Thera, Boonman Poonyathiro and Ven. Buddhadasa, the author notes that while a great diversity of technique is applied to the first four instructions, there is also strong allegiance to the earliest sources, both canonical and commentarial, in widely differing approaches. The author suggests that features that characterize this practice from the earliest times, such as an inherent flexibility, the possibility of practical adjustments rooted in canonical and commentarial guidelines and an emphasis on teacher contact and adaptability to temperament have all perhaps contributed to its particular and continued centrality within Southern Buddhism.

‘The Training of Satipaṭṭhāna related to 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās’, by Nuengfa Nawaboonniyom and Apichai Puntasen, attempts to illustrate that right training is able to lead the practitioner to the supra-mundane path, through, for example, the experience of the individual or a group or community that has been similarly trained for an extended period. The paper examines in great detail the methods through which the ways of behavior and knowledgescan be seen as tools that can be employed for the elimination of defilements (kilesa) at different levels, from the perspective of the four foundations of mindfulness. It explores the nature of the defilements present at each level of attainment, and the relative efficacy of the caraṇas and the vijjās as they work together to purify the mind. It concludes that each level is described as needing to be carefully differentiated, with attention to the appropriate response to each level of practice. A complex picture emerges, with each level of purification dealing with the associated defilements in slightly different ways.

In ‘Transcending the Limiting Power of Karma —Early Buddhist Appamānas,’ Giuliana Martini explores versions of two texts found in Mūlasarvāstivādin, Sarvāstivādin and Pāli recitative traditions. Concurring with recent scholarship suggesting their common origin, Martini explores their
treatment of the notion of volition (cetanā) and its transformation by means of the immeasurables (appamāṇas), of loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity, stressing in the passages she discusses the close correlation between the arousing of clear comprehension, the purification of intent and the development of the immeasurables as all contributory and mutually supportive in different stages on a gradual path to realisation. In terms of the theory of meditation, a boundless radiation independent from the presence of an object to be aroused and extended in consciousness is described as particularly effective in refining intentionality towards progressively higher levels of freedom. Martini argues that the texts she analyses indicate the way that the immeasurables are recommended not only in specific contexts, with regard to particular beings, but also in an all pervasive sense as a means of loosening the reifying tendency of the mind with regard to the notion of ‘objects’ themselves. In this way, she maintains, they are intended to confer a flexibility and stability of mind that allow the unfettered perception of the rise and fall of conceivings, identifications, and the varied manifestations of the operation of kamma. This then renders their role crucial to final release from identification and mental impurity.

Venerable Dr. Yuanci provides, A Study of the Meditation Methods in the Discourses on the Essential Secrets of Meditation (DESM) and Other Early Chinese Texts. He states that this Yogācārā-Dārstāntika text, from an anonymous meditative author, was first translated by Zhi Qian, and deals with many meditation subjects or techniques have never been revealed. The notable Kumarajiva and other honorable translators have worked on the text. His paper provides curiosity and interesting insight into the characteristics of these systems of meditation. He discusses the structure of the secret essential meditations through discussing the various noble disciples, using more nikaya/agama-literature rather than abhidharma principles. He suggests that the Vimuttimagga and the Visuddhimagga may provide better material for the understanding of these meditation-ideas.

**Brief Conclusion for the Panel on Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation:**

The papers in this panel represent an Indra’s net of study of original text, ancient commentary, exegesis and various perspectives on modern context, ritual and applicability. Reading, editing, conversing with the panelists themselves (in the case of the editor, Dr. Dion Peoples), and surveying them in advance (for all the panel-leaders) is at once a privilege and a seemingly impossible task. Once can never fully digest all the materials within mere weeks of the conference. Many of the presentations in this volume have matured, since their initial submission before the massive flooding that affected Thailand.

The papers in this panel resonate between numerous categories, with completely different arrangements - many, from apparently unrelated schools of Buddhism that deal with comparable issues, such as: the transmission of the teaching, the historical and modern opportunities provided by transporting one form of Buddhism to another region or culture, or the difficulty in expressing meditative experience through language. Many of the papers have been composed with passion and an appreciation of the great challenge in understanding Buddhist meditative practice and theory, and how they relate to one another. Each represents an attempt to communicate this challenge within a shared discourse. Indeed with subjects covering such a great range of geographical and historical contexts, from such a wide diversity of intellectual and scholarly traditions, addressed by contributors, all at different levels of knowledge and training, who employ a variety of scientific and arts based
vocabulary, the papers seem like a slice through all the variety of embodiments of modern Buddhist debate, at many levels. Papers apply theory and practice understanding to many levels of bodily practice, emotional expression, ritual behavior, doctrinal exegesis, textual examination, philosophical debate and scientific discourse. Summarizing them all in a fair and appropriate way has been a difficult task with only a few weeks to prepare the documents for publication. It is hoped, rather in the Huayan manner, that appreciation of one aspect of one paper, will sympathetically allow some sense of the scope of all the others too.

A number of distinctive themes and preoccupations have emerged. Growth from creative adjustments, clashes and fertile exchanges in the evolution of Buddhist practice and theory in new contexts are examined in many papers. Buswell gives us a lucid picture of transformation through tracing the history of specific traditions in the ‘Great Doubt’ in Korean Chan, as does Blumenthal in his investigation of new elements in Geluk Buddhism. Both demonstrate the integration of local developments with traditional interpretation. The transposition and transmission of teaching has aroused considerable interest, becoming the main focus of the discussion in Rheingans’ exploration of the role of the teacher/student relationship in Mahāmudra teachings. Another contribution on Northern lineages and their transmission include Shankar’s study of Tantra, which she situates within an older Buddhist theoretical perspective. Skorupski traces the transformations of understanding pertaining to the innate luminosity of the mind, through a number of periods and locations that link Indian to Tibetan thought.

From the point of view of adaptation to modern global articulation, Walmsley and Greenberg address the need for an intellectually rigorous integration of Buddhist thought with Western models, stressing also that such undertakings should not confine key notions in hermeneutic circles or constricting world-views. From the opposite end of the spectrum and the perspective of different kinds of practice, Siff, Lei and Lowe investigate ways Buddhist practice can adapt, help and be transformed in modern global contexts, but as Lowe indicates, with the need for careful attention to practitioners and their needs so that a whole path is taught. The work of particular orders or groups in the modern world is also critically explored, with Jongmyung Kim examining the Chogye order and Mano Laohavanich the Dhammakaya movement - placing their arguments in the historical and doctrinal context of the respective movement. The richness of various objects for practice is explored by Negi, who provides insight into the highly individualized practices of the eighteen schools, and the implications of this tailoring to the individual in subsequent teachings.

Specific practices are examined in a number of papers, and their relative adaptability in a modern setting. The way theory and practice interrelate in one context is explored by Phyo Kyaw, with reference to meditation related to the seventh book of the Abhidhamma in Myanmar. Kawamoto and Shaw discuss areas of practice and doctrine relating to Breathing Mindfulness meditation, with some attention focusing on the ancient, but still live, tension and interplay between the practice of samatha and that of vipassanā. Nawaboonniyom and Apichai Puntasen examine the subtle differentiations of each stage of development of knowledge and conduct in the light of the four foundations of mindfulness. Martini discusses the immeasurable meditations and their shaping role as a means of effecting as well as balancing insight, providing both the strength and joy for the path and a way of loosening identifications. A systematic exploration of the role of samatha and vipassanā in the attainment of path is discussed through detailed delineation of some descriptions of path, by Herath. Meyers explores the nature of debates and questions concerning the dhyānas/jhānas addressed in the Abhidharmakośa, comparing modern and traditional questions raised as to their content and purpose.
Problems connected with the tension between the authority of the first person and that of the third are explored by Chaudhary in the light of practice, and highlighted by Weiser’s personal research on various schools. Bhikkhu Anulà notes the differences between Chan and Southern schools but sees a crucial first-person sense of search as a key linking feature. Nizamis examines some complex philosophical questions associated with the notion of “self”, reassessing traditional early Buddhist interpretations of the notion in the light of modern philosophical investigation. Sivayathorn and Puntasen argue that Buddhist methodology both defines the problem and suggests a means of deliverance, through experience, rendering Buddhism into what they term a mind-based science. The presentation of such dilemmas as the appropriate use of language also animate ancient difficulties in grappling with the expression of the ineffable or the endless challenge of evoking the middle way in the presence of apparently irreconcilable contradictions. How can one use logic to communicate the non-logical, or the poetic to evoke experiences whose effects could also be subject to scientific scrutiny, for instance?

The difficulties, challenges and creative possibilities of language are frequent themes in the papers addressed in important and distinct ways, or perhaps one could say registers, as different forms of linguistic understanding and articulation are both used and explored. This may be seen in work on individual twentieth-century teachers, such as in Waistell’s reading and analysis of metaphor in Thich Nhat Hanh’s publications, and in Pyle’s examination of the use of paradox by Ajahn Chah. Cheungsirakulvit explores poetic expression as a means of communicating truth, as represented in Buddhadasa’s poetry. From a radically different discipline, Sumi Lee explores the hermeneutics of the encounter of antithetical, logical positions, such as found in Nāgārjuna’s emptiness doctrine, and the ongoing dynamic in narrating and understanding meditative-based insight and experience through such means.

Of course practice is based on the experience of humans, and the human body acts as its ground, object and basis. Owen’s study of the very down-to-earth aspect of the body and the Tibetan practice of bodily preservation after death, offers a glimpse into the way a practice can develop in one area as a kind of distillation of a particular theoretical understanding. From the point of view of living human ritual, the function of blessings ceremonies at crucial life events in Sri Lanka is examined by Jayatilleke, who notes their restorative and therapeutic benefit on a number of practitioners, across social scale and class as practice-based measures encouraging psychological health.

A sense of different levels, or interpenetrating layers, like geological strata, occasionally emerges. A plant that grows well in one level may not thrive at another, but may also do surprisingly well, and the different soils of various arguments show us the meditative traditions and their theories in many ways. Yuanci’s contribution is suggestive when he illustrates that various meditations are better suited for individuals with certain types of personality-characteristics - rather than everyone just performing the same endeavor. The way authors address these many issues sometimes feels like discovering fertile outcrops, minerals or plant life forms at the meeting place of various strata at various points in a cliff side: often the most productive comments emerge when one level meets another. Indeed one writer in the panel observes that Buddhist teaching seems to have been formulated so that interpretation itself is part of the process of fostering elucidation and realization.
Concluding the Conference Collection of Articles:

In this large conference, we have discussed many facets of Buddhism. From teaching Dhamma in places where Buddhism isn’t strongly established; to unifying the diverse Buddhist philosophical views; for Buddhist psychotherapy; and even Buddhist meditation and philosophy – many difficult ideas manifested. It seems the conference was a success. However, to be self-critical: did we miss the mark? It’s a fair question to ask. Did we succeed in discussing Buddhist Philosophy & Praxis; in further discussing Buddhist philosophy and meditation practices? Please take the time to read over all of these articles at your leisure and make these debate-pieces back at your institutions, make these pieces for conversations and for growth. Build upon these ideas for future situations. Are these pieces successful examples of real transformations? Do they transfer well from mere theory to applicable situations? We hope we have taken measures to improve your comprehension of Buddhism, through these multi-variety contributions. We hope we have improved upon Buddhist scholarship. Please enjoy the 2nd IABU Academic Conference and various papers on Buddhist Philosophy & Praxis.
Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice
Language and Meditation

What we have from the Buddha are his words, phrases, metaphors and similes about the types of experiences he found in meditation. We do not have his experiences, the ones he was basing his knowledge on when he used those expressions. Those states of mind perished with him. There is no way to recover those experiences by solely analyzing his words, which creates the situation where a person has to have similar experiences and match the Buddha’s words to them correctly (and what the Abhidhamma texts may say as well). This is a process that is fraught with error and uncertainty, and yet it is seldom examined due to the belief that certain well-respected individuals who speak of meditative experiences and attainments using the Buddha’s language cannot be deceiving themselves and are therefore correct in their conclusions.

Let me begin by making it clear that this is not a paper about questioning the legitimacy of claims to certain attainments by meditation masters and practitioners alike, for I have no access to their privileged inner worlds to determine the exact nature of their experiences; all I have are their verbal expressions. This paper will instead focus on verbal or written descriptions of meditative experiences and attainments and what kinds of descriptions may be considered honest and reliable.

A Language of Existence and a Language of Becoming

In the preface to David Kalupahana’s book, “The Buddha’s Philosophy of Language,” (Kalupahana 1999) distinguishes between a “language of existence” and a “language of becoming,” stating that the Buddha taught using the latter. A language of existence is for those “who look for absolute clarity and precision in the medium of expression,” while a language of becoming “allows room for revisions at the more specific level of explanation or description without having to run into contradictions at the level of generality.” He sees a language of becoming as “a corrective to the language of existence, not a replacement.” A language of becoming in the context of meditative experiences would thus allow for variations in descriptions of experiences within a general category, rather than as definitive experiences that have objective or transcendent reality as they would in a language of existence.1

The area I would like to analyze regarding the use of a language of existence is the system of नाना or “stages of knowledge,” which serve as the basis for interpreting vipassanā meditation experiences and determining a meditator’s progress on the path to becoming a sotāpanna (stream-entry). These sixteen stages of knowledge are conceived as experiences and insights meditation students will have when they practice vipassanā. They will occur in linear order. At some point the student’s reports on her meditation sittings will have to fit into the first stage of knowledge, “when the meditator comes to know the difference between a bodily process and a mental process,”2 and from then on the teacher can both give guidance for each stage he believes she is in.

The main method of meditation that uses this system, the Mahasi Method of Insight Meditation, appears to utilize a language of becoming when giving meditation instructions. The student is instructed to note her experiences using the present continuous tense, though without the personal pronoun or auxiliary verb (e.g. instead of “I am hearing” one notes, “hearing”). The experiences that are being noted are sometimes changing rapidly, especially when bodily movement is involved, and the student is instructed to note each phase of the physical action. When drinking a glass of water for example, the student notes looking at the glass as “looking,” touching it by the hand as “taking,” bringing the glass to the lips as “bringing,” drinking the water as “drinking,” and swallowing the water as “swallowing.” If it was a flavored beverage, one would note “tasting” just after “drinking,” and perhaps how it tasted (e.g. “sweet”). These are basic instructions on how to be mindful of the body and can be applied to any and every bodily activity, since such activity is most often sequential, of short duration, and clearly demarcated from one event to another. The exercise of breaking down continuous bodily movements into parts is not only accomplished by noting in the present continuous tense, but is aided by intentionally slowing one’s movements down to such a degree that they do appear to be separate actions.

When observing anything other than intentional physical movement, such as sense impressions, thoughts, and emotions, using the present continuous tense tends to function as a language of existence rather than one of becoming. The instructions to note “hearing, hearing” is an attempt to train one to replace the experience of hearing a particular sound with the concept of a pure act of hearing. Sayadaw U Pandita states in his book, “In This Very Life,” that “labeling technique helps us perceive clearly the actual qualities of our experience… This direct awareness shows us the truth about our lives, the actual nature of mental and physical processes.” I believe this way of labeling and understanding one’s experience leads to a view of a transcendent reality beneath appearances, even though students are presented with the classic triad of “sense-consciousness, sense-organ, and sense-object.” By focusing on the act of hearing, as such, “hearing” becomes perceived as a true reality underneath the appearances of hearing sounds. One can easily believe it exists in an eternal present moment. The same goes for the other four senses and the mind. So when one is trying to conceive of “knowing, knowing” in this way, one is liable to have the view that there is a permanent, unchanging consciousness beneath all these fleeting thoughts and feelings. This might be seen as conjecture on my part, but I have heard it so often from students who have practiced this method. I believe it is not an intended outcome of the meditation practice, but rather a byproduct of the way language is being used to describe experiences, and shows the pitfall of a language of becoming unconsciously turning into a language of existence. Also, this may help to explain somewhat why so many Western Insight Meditation students, and teachers alike, are drawn to Advaita Vedanta and similar belief systems without experiencing any contradiction.

Returning to the analysis of the stages of knowledge (ñāṇa), the language used in this area is much different than the present continuous statements of the meditation instructions. It involves expression of statements regarding universal truths. When someone uses the terminology of the stages of knowledge, that description shows the experience as exhibiting a quality of a universal truth, otherwise it could not be considered a necessary knowledge for the attainment of sotāpanna.

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3 Sayadaw, Mahasi (1971): pp. 8-16. Here the practice of noting (or labeling) is presented in great detail, with each and every physical movement strictly noted in the present continuous tense. The only exceptions to this form of noting are found regarding sensations, such as “painful,” “tired,” and “giddy.”

What would be the value of having an experience and insight of “arising and passing away” (udayabhayanupassanañāṇa) if it did not connect up with the universal truth of “all constructed things are impermanent”?5

On the point of passing through stages, the system of stages of knowledge looks at a narrow range of a meditation student’s reported experiences in isolation and tries to create a comprehensive picture. The language someone uses to describe a person’s experiences when put into a stage is confined by the parameters of that stage. Anything in the student’s report that might disagree with the stage assessment is disregarded. In fact, what may occur is that the student has to learn the language of the stages in order to communicate her experience in such a way as to fit into the stages that the teacher is looking for.

A truly descriptive language of meditational experiences cannot co-exist with the demands of making experiences fit into certain molds without sacrificing its honesty and integrity. Noting, labeling, and otherwise categorizing one’s experiences a priori do not lead to descriptions of dynamic processes of an inter-dependent nature (dependent arising), but instead support notions of the substantial existence of mental elements. If one has ever wondered how essentialist thinking has managed to infiltrate vipassana meditation teaching and practice, here is one fairly common open doorway.

A Language of Becoming and a Descriptive Language of Meditational Experiences

To illustrate these points, I will explore two questions that might be asked a student to elicit a fuller description:

1. What happened in your meditation sitting that has been categorized in a particular way (e.g., as an experience of “arising and passing away”)?

2. Can you describe this meditative experience in your own words?

Here I will venture into a descriptive language of meditational experiences that is the other extreme from the language of existence, differing from the middle-way language of becoming proposed by Dr. Kalupahana in that it can “run into contradictions at the level of generality,” meaning that the descriptions need not conform to generalizations and may even contradict them. Honest descriptions of one’s experiences may include notions of “permanence, satisfaction, and self” that contradict the “three characteristics of existence” (ti-lakkhaṇa), for by being honest, they will provide a picture as how someone actually thinks rather than what they are supposed to believe when undertaking a vipassanā practice. The teacher may then be able to discuss the dependently arisen nature of such notions within the student’s experience, thus making the interpretation of experiences an area of developing awareness and discernment, rather than providing a “right” interpretation from the outset.

5 Nanarama, M. S. (1983). The Seven Stages of Purification and The Insight Knowledges. Sri Lanka, Buddhist Publication Society: pp. 42-47. The thorough-going description of the stage of knowledge of “arising and passing away” found in this book includes the statement: “All the three characteristics of existence now become clear to him in a reasoned manner.”
I contend that this way of describing meditative experiences in greater detail is absolutely necessary for our further understanding of what actually occurs within people’s meditation sittings. When specific meditative experiences are immediately categorized within an existing taxonomy or summarized by an interpretation, those generalizations become the description of an experience and no further efforts to describe such experiences are called for. This is an unsatisfactory situation when either the teacher or the student is trying to understand the causes and conditions for an experience.

The question, “What happened in your meditation sitting that has been categorized as an experience of arising and passing away?” fits into a language of becoming, since it requires a description that matches and does not contradict the generalization inherent in the statement “an experience of arising and passing away” (udayabbaya). An example of such a reply might be, “I noticed a quick succession of events - hearing a sound, feeling a sensation, a fleeting thought, all of which were arising and passing away quite rapidly. That is what places this experience into the category (stage of knowledge) of arising and passing away.” The words and phrases chosen in this description match what would be expected of it in order to be categorized as knowledge of arising and passing away. But is this an honest description of someone’s experience in meditation?

The question, “Can you describe this meditative experience in your own words?” will then most likely be answered with descriptions that don’t need to fit into a category. Such descriptions may also be more vague and personal than the definite and impersonal descriptions that vipassanā teachers traditionally request (as in the question in the preceding paragraph). An example of this might be, “Sometime during the meditation sitting I heard some birdsong that lasted for a moment, followed by an itch that went away without scratching it, though it lasted several seconds. I had some fleeting thoughts about work during this period, but nothing stuck. There was an overall feeling of ease throughout.”

Let us now suppose that these two replies are in fact referring to the same experience in meditation. The first reply contains a view of linearity, of one isolated event following another, and must be a definitive description of the concept of “arising and passing away” as found in the Mahasi Method of Satipatthana Vipassanā. Since the meditator was instructed to note the sense door at which the experience occurred but not the sense object of the experience, it is a description that excludes a necessary dependently arisen aspect of the experience it is describing, which is the content of the experience. The second reply supports a view that apparently separate events can arise together (fleeting thoughts about work arising along with hearing birdsong and accompanied by an overall feeling of ease) and does not need to match a definitive description of the concept of arising and passing away, though it may be a specific instance of noticing the interplay of mental phenomena. Without the concept of arising and passing away operating as a generalization of this experience, the meditator’s task becomes less about having definitive experiences that prove the concept of arising and passing away (language of existence) and more about noticing what is truly occurring within her experience (a descriptive language of meditational experiences).

This brings me back to a point I made in the first paragraph: “Those experiences perished with the Buddha.” Since we no longer have access to the person who had the experiences upon which the generalizations have been made, what we have are empty generalizations that have to be supported by the experiences of meditators. What I am doing here is working in the direction of more honest and authentic descriptions of meditative states and experiences, and thereby more awareness of what goes on in meditation and more skill in describing what many may have considered
to be ineffable experiences (but perhaps the meditators merely lacked the motivation and training to describe them). These descriptions can be used to support the generalizations, but not because they were generated for that purpose, but rather because what they describe is what may have originally been meant by the generalizations. Here we find a descriptive language of meditational experiences being cultivated through investigation and learning into “a language of wise and skillful becoming.”

**Meditative Experiences in One’s Own Words**

When someone tries to describe things using a foreign language she is just beginning to learn, it is likely that those descriptions will contain several errors due to the person’s lack of knowledge of that language. She may use a word where one of its synonyms would be better suited. She may have difficulty translating some of the concepts from her native tongue to the new language and make faulty assumptions thereby. She may have not been exposed to the use of a word in a variety of contexts, and so holds onto a single definition in all situations. She will be tongue-tied and will fumble with the new language when asked to explain something in depth or to describe things in more detail. This is situation for most Western students of Buddhism who are learning Pali terms and their English equivalents on *vipassanā* retreats and are asked to use this terminology when reporting their meditation experiences.

On top of that most *vipassanā* students are asked about only a small fraction of their meditation experiences—the ones that more neatly fit into the concepts they are learning and can be succinctly expressed in the terminology. So not only is the student trying to learn a new vocabulary to talk about her meditation sittings, she is usually asked pointed questions about specific areas of experience and is discouraged from providing too much “content” in her replies. By content is often meant, personal narratives.

The approach to teaching meditation I have used for the past two decades asks the student to express her meditative experiences in her own words. The student begins with an opening narrative about her meditation sitting, relating anything that she remembers about it and is comfortable sharing with me. The narrative will generally consist of a great deal of personal content, such as what she was thinking about while meditating, not just that she had thoughts and how those thoughts came and went (the common way of describing experiences in *vipassanā* meditation). Thus right from the beginning of the student’s report, no area of her experience is excluded and her language is her own. Without personal narratives being included in the report, a good deal of what occurs in meditation would be missing or glossed over by the use of an acceptable term or phrase.

When a customary *vipassanā* term or phrase is used by a student, I often ask the student to relate what she meant to describe by using that term. After the experience has been described in her own words, it can be compared with the term, if one so chooses, creating a link between the experience and term. The movement towards understanding vital concepts found in Dhamma teachings is thus beginning from a more detailed and authentic description of an experience towards an interpretation of the experience in terms of the Dhamma. This requires the teacher to listen carefully and empathically to the student’s reports in an attempt to understand the student’s way of

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6 Pandita, pp. 15-18
putting words to her experience; the teacher must learn the student’s language, not the other way around. If the teacher fails to comprehend the student’s narratives, then any correlation with an interpretation will be subject to question. At this point in an interview, a dialog with the student to clarify what she is describing is often necessary, so that the teacher does not jump to any premature conclusions. It is critical in this kind of dialog to use the student’s words instead of one’s own, for one’s own words carry with them an interpretation. Let me give you an example of how this kind of interview works.7

Student: Half of the sit was deliberately letting go - resting again and again.
Teacher: What were you doing that you refer to as “letting go”? 
Student: A few times experiencing delicious rest from that tension, a different space that was not filled with fear for my kids. Then I had a bit of a battle between wanting to release the tension and feeling I shouldn’t direct anything. Went with not directing after a while and used patience to be with what was, felt more grounded.
Teacher: So the deliberate “letting go” was you wanting to release the tension?
Student: Yes, and that worked for a while, but there was also a feeling that I shouldn’t direct anything. When I went with not directing my attention and just let the feelings of fear arise and patiently sat with them, I felt more grounded.
Teacher: What was it like feeling more grounded?
Student: Grounded. It literally started with a sensation of the lower body contact with the ground. This came by itself without my willing it. I became more grounded in myself and balanced as I stayed with what was without bias.
Teacher: So feeling grounded was an awareness that came of its own of a sensation of sitting on the ground. And this led you to feeling more grounded and balanced. What do you mean by staying with what was without bias?
Student: It is paradoxical. My desire became stronger once I had experienced the deep peace and I saw a dislike for what was there and a wish for the peace to last. Interesting. I can have both. It doesn’t have to be either peace or not.
Teacher: So being without bias in this context refers to being okay with two types of experience that seem to contradict each other and do not normally arise together?
Student: It would be more accurate to say that I was with my dislike for my fears while at the same time experiencing a deep peace that I desired. So I had desire for one thing and aversion for another going on at the same time.
Teacher: The bias that was absent had to do with a view of only experiencing one thing at a time?
Student: Yes, that’s it. That’s something I understand better now.

As you can see in this type of interview, key terms that would be used to generalize experience are further elaborated on by the student, being filled in by the student’s recall of her experiences and expressed in her own words. Such terms as “letting go,” “feeling grounded”

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7 I do not record interviews with students and so have had to put one together for the purpose of this paper. It is a highly probable interview with a student, faithfully based on the text of one meditation sitting, with my questions added after the fact.
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(though not found in vipassanā meditation per se, it is a term of the common discourse on meditation), “being without bias” (in this case, not having a biased view as to how experience functions) are questioned by the teacher instead of being accepted as adequate and final communication about the experiences they refer to. In this procedure of interviewing, the student comes to a more nuanced understanding of her experience with the fuller description and can move towards generalizations or interpretations of her descriptions, accepting them if they fit, rejecting them if their wrong, and modifying them if necessary. The final say on whether the student’s experience fits in with a generality of the Dhamma rests with the student, though she may get there with the help of the teacher’s knowledge of meditation and the Dhamma.

When it comes to whether a meditation student knows for herself an experience of “letting go” or has a misguided notion regarding it, a teacher’s own understanding of such terms and experiences can help resolve confusion without having to resort to a definitive experience of “letting go.” This depends on how broad or narrow the teacher is willing to define “letting go,” and what examples or references he has for his definition. He could define “letting go” as “abandoning” (pahāna), “renunciation” (cāga), “non-grasping” (anupādāna), or with a more modern concept of “flow.” There is also the question as to whether “letting go” is short for “letting go of (something).” This distinction is helpful in looking at the example from the interview with the student above, for she states two kinds of “letting go”: 1) releasing the tension and, 2) not directing anything. “Releasing the tension” is a letting go of the tension, while “not directing anything” is simply “letting go.” As a meditation teacher, I would define an experience of “letting go” as being closer to “not directing anything,” which lines up more with all of the definitions mentioned above.

Working in the procedure I have outlined above, broad definitions of terms that relate to experiences are more useful than narrow ones. But one can always run into the danger of being too broad, too inclusive in one’s categories, and thereby lose the definiteness we may require from such terms. So how much wiggle-room within the terms is permissible? If there is none, then we have a language of existence dominating the teaching of meditation and our contemporary discourse on it. My tentative solution presented in the preceding paragraph is to do some kind of analysis of the terms found in Buddhist meditation teaching as they pertain to students’ reports on meditative experiences. This analysis includes the students’ use of the terms (or related concepts) in describing her experiences and requires a matching of terms to experiences only after the experiences have been also described in the students’ own language.

Language And Narrative In Regard To Attainments

The problem of rigid definitions of terms and definitive experiences operates at one level when we are talking about a particular experience, such as “letting go,” and at another level when we are talking about a particular attainment, such as sotāpanna. There is not so much at stake in being right or wrong about an experience of “letting go,” and as we can see, we can always explore it; however, there is a great deal at stake in being right or wrong about someone attaining a Noble Path and Fruit (magga-phala), which is supposed to be something “irreversible” and without question.

Since this topic can bring up a host of controversial subjects, I will try to restrict my discussion to the language used in modern-day vipassanā texts, predominately of the Mahasi Sayadaw method, when referring to the attainment of sotāpanna. The progression of insight involves
passing through one ſāna (stage of knowledge) after another. Each stage is known by its particular quality and/or by what is realized and known within it. For instance, one would come to understand “there is no being or person, that there are only mere formations always disintegrating” and then sometime later experience “fearfulness…now that one knows the truth of continuous dissolution.” These are the teacher’s interpretations of the student’s reports, which can be based on astute and careful observations made by the student. The interpretations and observations can be questioned at a later time, though, to my knowledge, this is rarely done. At least, if there is some recollection of the experiences the student has, then each interpretation regarding stages can be questioned as to whether the experience of student actually matches up to the description of the stage. What then about the stages leading up to the attainment of Path and Fruit (magga-phala)? These are said to occur within mind-moments, and mind-moments are believed to happen so fast that they are imperceptible to the mind-body functioning of a human being (though not to a Buddha). So from the launching stage of “Equanimity about Formations” (sankhār’upekkhāna) through to “Fruition” (phala) stages of knowledge (ṁaṇa) occur that one would have no awareness of. Literally, in no time, the three fetters (ṭīni saṇyojanāni) would be dropped, niḥbhāna would be known, and one would become a sotapanna. Fortunately in that system there is a “Reviewing Knowledge” (paccavekkhanaṁ) that arises sometime afterwards that enables one to see the defilements that have been abandoned. There is an additional practice that meditators are told to do, which is to practice nirodha sampatti by setting their intention to enter that state for a certain length of time in their meditation sittings.

These stages and the experiences accompanying them are rigidly defined. There can be no other way for anyone to attain sotapanna than to have these experiences exactly as stated in the proper order at a fortuitous time in one’s journey in samsāra. It is so precise that it can masquerade as a science, but yet at its core is a language of existence. The ṇaṇa exist objectively for each meditator to go through them in precisely the same order: they are an abstract template to plot someone’s course to niḥbhāna. Furthermore, within this model of meditative development, the goal, niḥbhāna, is also turned into something substantial.

What happens when you ask somebody who has been told by his teacher that he is a sotapanna to describe his experience of attaining? First of all, you run into the problem of the actual experience happening so fast that it is essentially imperceptible and incapable of being recollected. Secondly, having the experience already identified before one has described it to one’s self in one’s own words makes any new description suspect. The full description will have to corroborate the interpretation. If not, the interpretation is wrong. The stakes are very high here for any fuller description to match up, for if it doesn’t, one is not a sotapanna (according the rigid definitions and definitive experiences of the tradition). This is a strong disincentive to take a closer look at such attainments. Many such attainments thus become narratives that remain fixed and certain over time.

This brings me to my own theory of an alternative process by which knowledge of the Four Noble Truths arises. I call this process, “Transformative Conceptualization,” and write about it my book “Unlearning Meditation: What to do when the instructions get in the way.” This theory addresses how narratives are built around our experiences and how a significant aspect of our

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meditation practice is seeing into these narratives, abandoning one’s that are faulty, and creating new ones that more closely match what we now know from our investigations. What is transformed in meditation practice, at the level of wisdom, is one’s conceptualization of meditation experiences: they become seen less as self and more as dependently arisen.

The more traditional proponents of vipassanā meditation would probably state the position that once one has realized “the truth of impermanence,” it is no longer a concept. The purpose of the whole enterprise of vipassanā meditation is to know things as they are and not as ideas of them. This is noble, but unrealistic. The methodology, as can be seen in some of my earlier arguments, is one of learning concepts, practicing them conscientiously, applying them to one’s experiences, interpreting one’s experiences through them, and then one day realizing that the truth of one’s experience indeed matches the concept. Besides my doubts as to this process actually working as planned, this methodology is guaranteed to produce new narratives about the nature of one’s experiences that will replace the old ones. We are essentially dealing with the products of experiences and understandings over time, which are the narratives that are built upon them, rather than raw un-narrated (non-conceptual) experiences that have transformed us deeply. Those experiences, like the Buddha’s, have perished within us and are only accessible through recall and expressible through narration (usually by way of language rather than art).

That is not to say that I don’t believe in deeply transformative understandings arising in meditation, but I would prefer to be realistic about meditation practice and what it can accomplish, so I take the position that knowledge of the Dhamma arises through the awareness and discernment of all one’s states of mind and is not dependent on a singular definitive experience of realization. From that point of view, a meditation practice that includes all of one’s experience, on and off the cushion, and is willing to examine each and every narrative that one holds, makes sense. This is not to say that we need to know each and every state of mind and its accompanying narratives to understand dependent arising, but that dependent arising is found in every aspect of experience and that we just need to learn how to see it, not seek a realization of it.

This involves a simple training that is done over time, during retreats and at home. When one sits in meditation, one can do one’s customary practice, or not do it, at any time during the sitting. One may also decide to sit with what comes up in one’s meditation sittings and not be wed to any particular technique. This kind of freedom allows for individual choice in one’s meditation practice, which I believe is an essential element for developing wisdom that is not dependent on another’s knowledge.

Since students are not all doing the same practices, nor do they have the same meditation history and psychological make-up, there is a good deal of variety in their descriptions of what goes on their meditation sittings. Their descriptions will most likely have instances of their views on self and causality; of their desires, hopes, and fears; of their memories and current life situations; of their imaginations and their sense impressions; all of which can be examined in the context of learning the Dhamma. But in this way one learns about the truth of the Dhamma first by speaking honestly about one’s experiences and the willingness to look into the conditions that bring about one’s experiences, sustain them, and allow for them to be let go of.

In this method of vipassanā meditation, the meditation student directly knows her views on self, on causality, and her beliefs in the adherence to rites and rituals. Instead of adopting a view of no-self and practicing it so as to realize it, the student explores how her experiences of self are
constructed and is able to question the narratives of self (and other) as agent, identity, and recipient. This is not a rote method of inquiry to come up with the right answers—it is an open-ended exploration. If someone is trying to prove a hypothesis, such as there is no self, then one’s method moves in a straight line to accomplish it; if, on the other hand, someone is learning to observe something in a different way (such as dependent arising), then one’s method may be highly inclusive, and lead one all over the place, in order to fully comprehend and eventually integrate that new way of seeing.

One may then ask, “Does this method led to the attainment of sotāpanna?” In reply, I would have to say that the term “sotāpanna” is so bound up in a language of existence that I would hesitate to use it in this context. The Buddha did offer other terms to denote someone’s development on the path to full awakening, such as the notion of “sappurisa,” which has a broad meaning of a “good, honest, and worthy person.” In the Cūḷapuṇṇama Sutta, the Buddha says of the sappurisa, “And how is a true man (Bhikkhu Nyāṇamoli’s translation of sappurisa) possessed of good qualities? Here a true man has faith, shame, and fear of wrongdoing; he is learned, energetic, mindful, and wise.” This is not an attainment. When one reads further about the qualities of a sappurisa, one not only finds the qualities of a sotāpanna, but also what would sustain an ongoing practice of cultivation of wholesome qualities and states of mind found within the Buddha’s teaching. Here we have a term that fits into a language of becoming, free of rigid definitions, definitive experiences, and notions of transcendence. It points to a worthwhile and wholesome development in a person’s meditation practice that is not dependent on a progression of stages leading to a particular attainment. A meditator could know from his own honest self-observation that he is a “sappurisa” and would not need to have a teacher confirm it. The descriptions of his meditation experiences would not have to be interpreted to fit into any system—they would just have to exhibit his trust in the process of meditation (or faith in the Dhamma) and his fear of wrongdoing in his life, and indicate that he is becoming learned, interested, aware, and wise. I believe the method of meditation I have outlined in this paper, which I have developed and taught over the past twenty-two years, does lead to this worthy and noble way of being, known as a sappurisa.

**Concluding this paper with a recapitulation of key points:**

A language of existence and a descriptive language of meditational experiences operate at two extremes. A language of becoming is the middle way between these extremes, utilizing the strengths of both and questioning their weaknesses. In questioning the use of terms and concepts that lend themselves to a language of existence in meditation teaching and practice, this paper steers clear of assessments on the validity or verifiability of the meditation experiences denoted by the terms and concepts used. It is my contention that the process of matching meditative states and realizations with set terminology and a system of stages is made less reliable by relying on a “language of existence” divorced from a descriptive language of meditational experiences. We need honest descriptions of meditator’s experiences, which may contain contradictions to general terms, in order to both counteract the tendency to lump disparate experiences into the same general category and to further our exploration into the dependently arisen nature of those experiences.

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11 Majjhima Nikāya, III.23
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Sŏn (Ch. Chan; Jp. Zen) Buddhism has constituted the main current of Korean Buddhism since the ninth century. Korea is also the country where the tradition of Kanhwa Sŏn (Ch. Kanhua Chan; Jp. Kōan Zen) or “Keyword Meditation” (Bodiford 2010:95) or meditation of observing the critical phrase, has been best preserved in the world (KHS 2008:45), which is a great characteristic of Korean Buddhism in comparison with the Chinese and Japanese counterparts (Kim 2009:46). The purpose of this paper aims to examine the relationship between Buddhist thought and praxis in contemporary Korea, focusing on the Chogye Order of Korean Buddhism (Taehan Pulgyo Chogyejong), the mainstream of Korean Buddhism, from the critical point of view.

Scholars in Korea have focused on research on the paths to enlightenment. The Chogye Order also has held international conferences on Kanhwa Sŏn and published books on it and guidelines for its practice for both monks and lay people. However, Buddhist thought and practice in contemporary Korea are not in unity and little study has been done with regard to this issue.

Composed of three sections, the first section of this paper will examine the thought of the Chogye Order, focusing on its emphasis on the concept of emptiness, meditative thought, and Flower Garland (K. Hwaŏm; Ch. Huayan; Jp. Kegon) thought, and the second section will be devoted to investigating its soteriology, concentrating on the historical development and procedure. Finally, the third section will analyze the relationship between the thoughts and the practices of the Chogye Order.

Major references to this research will be scholarly works on the meditative

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* This paper is the first draft, thus not for citation without the author’s permission.
** Romanization: In general, there are two types of the Romanization system for terms in Korean: the McCune-Reischauer system and the revised system by the Korean government. In this paper the former will be employed, unless otherwise specified.
1 With the purpose of exemplifying the Chogye Order’s determination to present Kanhwa Sŏn as its hallmark and to lead a campaign spreading its practice both in Korea and overseas the Order sponsored international conferences in recent years (Dongguk Institute for Buddhist Studies Research 2010; and Institute for the Study of the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism, Dongguk University 2011).
3 The name “Chogye” is the Korean pronunciation of “Caqix,” which is the name of the mountain of residence of Huineng (638-713), the sixth Patriarch of the Chinese Chan tradition, adumbrating the fundamental Zen stance of Korean Buddhism.
4 The Chogye Order is alternately romanized as Daehan Bulgyo Jogyejong. As for its history and impending issues related to it, see Kim 2005a:158-9. As of 2011, several tens of Buddhist orders are registered on a Korean government body. Among these, the Chogye Order holds 13,000 monks and nuns, more than half of the total number of monks and nuns in Korea, and the majority of traditional Korean monasteries, whose total number is more than 1,000.
5 In particular, the book Kanhwa Sŏn (hereafter, KHS) reflects the official view of the Chogye Order on Korean Sŏn Buddhism, including that of Supreme Patriarch (chongjong) of the Order.
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thought of the Chogy Order:

Buddhism was introduced to Korea from China in the fourth century. Thereafter, a variety of Buddhist schools existed on Korean soil. In particular, the Hwaôm school flourished most until the ninth century, when Sôn schools of Korea had their firm roots in Korea. Those Sôn schools were eventually united into one main school, the Chogy Order. However, the Chogy Order emerged twice in Korean history. The first order came to the fore after the twelfth century, but came to a close in 1424 as a result of the anti-Buddhist policy by the Confucian Chosôn (1392-1910) government. The second Chogy Order was a product of the Japanese colonial period from 1910 to 1945. As a response to the colonial policy of that period, the name “Chogy” re-emerged in the Korean ecclesiastical order in 1941 and it was not until 1962 that the Chogy Order of Korean Buddhism was established. Therefore, in terms of history and ideology, both continuity and discontinuity exist between these two different types of orders. The Chogy Order in this paper refers to the latter and its ideological underpinnings are the thought of emptiness, Sôn thought, and the Flower Garland thought.

Emphasis on Emptiness:

The Diamond Sûtra (Skt. Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sûtra) is one of the basic texts of the Chogy Order. Regarding this, the third article of the first chapter titled “The Name of the Order and Its Purport” (chongmyông mit chongji) of its “Religious Charter” (chônghôn) stipulates:

The basic texts of this [Chogye] Order are the Diamond Sûtra (Kûmgang kyông) and…

Regarding this, the “Religious Charter” details as follows:

The reason why the Chogy Order takes the Diamond Sûtra as one of its basic texts is because: the scripture teaches emptiness (Skt. śûnyatā), the Buddhist predicate of existence; Master Huineng [638-713] of Caoqi, the sixth Patriarch [of Chinese Chan school], read it closely; and he also recommended it to his disciples.

7 Bulgyo sinmun (Buddhist Newspaper, http://www.ibulgyo.com), Beopbo sinmun (Dharma Jewel Newspaper, http://www.beopbo.com), and Hyeondae Bulgyo sinmun (Modern Buddhist Newspaper, http://news.buddhapia.com) are representative of their kind. These newspapers have paid keen attention to discourses on Kanhwa Sôn in Korea.
8 http://www.buddhism.or.kr/pGuidance/GuidView.aspx?pcode=01021&ppgm=1 (retrieved October 7, 2011). Other quotations from the “Religious Charter” of the Chogy Order in the following are from the same web information.
This scripture is a short and well-known Mahāyāna sūtra from the *Prajñāpāramitā*, or “Perfection of Wisdom” genre, and emphasizes the practice of non-abiding, non-attachment, and emptiness. This means that the Chogye Order embraces the concept of emptiness in its philosophical system of thought.

**Sŏn Thought:**

The Chogye Order has proclaimed itself to be a Sŏn Buddhist order and the first article of the first chapter of the “Religious Charter” of the Chogye Order records:

This [Chogye] Order originated from the Kajisan School, which was founded by National Master Toūi [d. 825] of Silla [57 B.C.E.-935 C.E.], revived by National Master Pojo [Chinul, 1158-1210] of Koryŏ [918-1392], and took its firm root by National Master T’aego Pou [1301-82] who harmonized diverse Buddhist schools of his time.

According to this quotation, National Preceptor Toūi was the founder of the Chogye Order. The Sŏn monk Toūi, the founder of one of the Nine Mountain Schools of Sŏn (*Kusan Sŏmnun*), introduced Patriarchal Chan (Ch. Zushi Chan; K. Chosa Sŏn), which was the precursor of Kanhua Chan and refers to the Chan tradition transmitted from mind to mind by patriarchs in history (*KHS* 2008:59), to Korea. In addition, National Preceptor Pojo Chinul was its reviver, and National Preceptor T’aego Pou was its settler. The Order’s “Religious Charter” also stipulates dharma talks by eminent meditation masters as one of its basic texts:

The [Chogye] Order takes... the dharma talks which have transmitted the lantern [of the Buddha’s wisdom] (*chŏndang pŏhŏ*) as its basic texts.

With regard to this, the “Religious Charter” details as follows: The transmission of the lamp means the transmission of [the Buddha’s] teaching. It refers to the continuation of the teaching from generation to generation, just like the light of a lantern is put on one by one. Therefore, the dharma talks that have transmitted refer to the teachings of succeeding patriarchs such as Mahā Kāśapa who succeeded the teaching of the Buddha. In fact, Korea is unique in that Buddhist followers are seeking enlightenment primarily through meditative practice.

**Hwaŏm Thought:**

The *Kyo* (doctrinal study) side of Korean Buddhism has been completely dominated by the one vehicle round-sudden teachings of the Hwaŏm school (Odin 1982:189). Primarily due to the monumental efforts of Üisang (625-702),11 the founder of the Hwaŏm school of Korea, Hwaŏm became the predominant doctrinal study school of Korean Buddhism (Odin 1982:xvi). Üisang thought his teaching through his “Dharma-realm chart” (*Pŏkkye to*), a diagram used in Korean

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9 For the history of the Nine Mountain Schools of Sŏn, its development, and characteristics, see Sørensen 1987.
10 The concept of “enlightenment” tends to have been even mystified in contemporary Korea. Regarding a critical discussion of this issue, refer to Kim 2005b:609-39.
Hwaöm doctrine to indicate the complex web of interrelationships governing everything in existence (Buswell 1992:51-2). Even after the solid foundation of the Sŏn thought in Korea in the ninth century, Hwaöm thought has maintained its strong influence in the development of Korean Buddhism. Dharma lectures by eminent Korean Sŏn masters such as Kusan also contained much of Hwaöm imagery for a formal statement about Sŏn understanding, which is distinctively Korean (Buswell 1992:184). The monastic curricular of the three major monasteries in contemporary Korea, T’ongdosa, Haeinsa, and Songgwangsa, each of which is Buddha-jewel Monastery, Dharma-jewel Monastery, and Saṅgha-jewel Monastery, shares similarities in their major content and represent the strong influence of Hwaöm thought.

However, Meditation and Doctrine had been in conflict vying for religious hegemony before the twelfth century, when Chinul emerged. Chinul harmonized the two Buddhist traditions, eventually developing his philosophical system of thought. Chinul sought to develop a comprehensive system of Buddhism in which Meditation would be practiced in tandem with training in the Hwaöm scholastic teachings. He advocated a “sudden awakening and gradual cultivation” (tono chŏmsu) approach to practice, in which the initial awakening engendered by Hwaöm doctrinal understanding was bolstered through gradual cultivation of Meditation and finally verified through direct realization (Buswell 1992:59).

In addition, Chinul’s legacy has been persistent down to the present in terms of monastic curricula, Buddhist precepts, and soteriology. Prospective ordinands in contemporary Korea are supposed to follow a system of postulancy. Postulants, known literally as “practitioners” (haengja), are expected to complete a six-month training period to ordination (Buswell 1992:76). After their six-month postulancies are over, the postulants are ready to ordain as novice monks (sami; Skt. šramaṇera) or nuns (samini; Skt. šramaṇerī). They are supposed to study either in the monastic college (kangwŏn) or in the meditation center (sŏnbang) for four years before full ordination. Chinul’s works, including his magnum opus Excerpts from the Dharma Collection and Personal Notes on Its Special Practice Records (Pŏchip pyŏlhaengnok chŏryŏ pyŏng ip sagi) constitute an important part of these monastic curricular, Buddhist precepts, and soteriology.

Therefore, unlike thus far known in the West, where Zen Buddhism is characterized by such aphorism as “special transmission of Buddhism distinct from the teachings, which is not dependent on words and letters” (Buswell 1992:217), monks of the Chogye Order study doctrinal teachings primarily based on the thought of Chinul as its theoretical prop, which is characterized by the unity of doctrine and meditation. However, the two are not on equal standing in the Chogye Order: Doctrinal study is considered inferior to Meditation and the former just serves as a prerequisite to enter into the latter. In addition, Chinul’s Admonition to Beginners (Kye ch’osim hagin mun) constitutes part of a major work on Buddhist ethics in contemporary Korea and his approach to

12 The chart appears in T 1887 A.4.5.711a. For an English translation of the chart, see Lee 1993:163-4.
13 For Chinul’s harmonization between Sŏn and Hwaöm thought, see Shim 1999:3-158
14 In the Japanese monk Yasutani Hakuun (1885-1973)’s soteriological schema, “sudden enlightenment” or “sudden awakening” is based on tathāgatagarbha and “gradual cultivation” is based on ālayavijñāna (Gregory 2011:106).
15 Before 1945 it was expected to complete a three-year training period before ordination (Buswell 1992:76).
16 The standardized curriculum adopted in Korean seminaries is divided into four levels: The elementary curriculum, or sami kwa (Šramaṇera Course), the intermediate curriculum, or sajip kwa (Fourfold Collection Course), the advanced curriculum, or sagyo kwa (Fourfold Doctrinal Course), and the graduate level, the taegyo kwa (Great Doctrinal Course). A student who completes all four of these curricular would have spent approximately twelve years in study (Buswell 1992:98-9) in the past.
enlightenment represented by sudden awakening followed by gradual cultivation still serves as a major soteriology of Korean Buddhism.

**Kanhwa Sŏn: The Major Praxis of the Chogye Order:**

Kanhwa Sŏn is the Korean version of Chinese Kanhua Chan, which had exerted a significant influence in the formation of Korean Sŏn Buddhism. The Chogye Order has adopted Kanhwa Sŏn to be its major soteriology to attain enlightenment. The Order also regarded Kanhwa Sŏn as the only and best Buddhist practice. In fact, Kanhwa Sŏn is virtually the only type of meditation used in contemporary Korean monasteries (Buswell 1992:220).

It was Chinul, the philosophical founder of Korean Sŏn Buddhism, who introduced Kanhua Chan to Korea. Hyesim (1178-1234), who was National Master Chin’gak and the best disciple of Chinul, and his pupil published Sŏnmun yŏmsong chip (Collection of the Meditation School’s Enlightened Verses), making Kanhwa Sŏn as the representative Buddhist practice of Korea. In particular, the Chogye Order has regarded T’aego (1301-82) as the actual founder of the Kanhwa Sŏn tradition of Korea, a result of efforts of the disciples of Hyujŏng (1520-1604), who made the Kanhwa Sŏn tradition survive during the anti-Buddhist Chosŏn dynasty, eventually making it the main practice of Korean Buddhism up to the present (Kim 2010:712-3).

Kanhwa Sŏn aims to attain enlightenment through the practice of keyword meditation. It is generally practiced in the following order: A practitioner should have a firm faith in the Buddha’s teaching and arouse a firm mind to become a great man of freedom (KHS 2008:311); next, he has to request a teaching from an able master; if admitted, he will be given a hwadu, the subject of meditation, to be observed from the master; the master examines his disciple’s level of spiritual progress; and finally, if the disciple is considered to have attained enlightenment, the master gives him recognition (KHS 2008:369-70).

**Analysis of the Relationship between Thought and Praxis:**

The Chogye Order adopts the thought of emptiness, meditation, and Hwaŏm thought as its theoretical basis and Kanhwa Sŏn as its major praxis. Both Sŏn practice and Kyo study in the Chogye Order make modern Sŏn monastic life in Korea offer a valuable counterparadigm to the usual Western portrayals of Zen (Buswell 1992:223). However, the Order lacks its identity both historically and philosophically (Keel 2000:159-93; Park 2000:43-62). There were two distinctive

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17 For the practice of meditation and training in the meditation hall, see Buswell 1992:149-202.
18 As for the scholarly discussions of various meditative traditions in a global perspective, refer to Eifring 2010. In particular, for the Buddhist meditation, see Eifring 2010:491-731, 861-82. As for books on Korean Kanhwa Sŏn in English, see Chin 2009:7-9.
19 For the collected works of Chinul, see Buswell 1983 and its abridgment Buswell 1991; for Chinul as the philosophical founder of Korean Sŏn Buddhism, refer to Keel 1984.
20 For Hyujŏng’s synthetic vision under Confucian domination, see Buswell 1999:134-59. For Hyujŏng’s approaches to enlightenment, see Kim 2006:78-108 and for Hyujŏng’s soteriological strategies in his magnum opus, refer to Kim 2012:381-98.
21 In this process, doubt is considered important. For the role of doubt, see Buswell 2011:187-202.
types of Chogye Orders throughout Korean history. This is an extremely important issue because it is associated with the search of the exact identity of the school itself, and by extension, that of Korean Buddhism and history. In fact, the Chogye Order holds continuity and discontinuity in history. Korean Buddhist scholars have developed many different theories regarding its lineage. These theories, however, were not based on historical fact, but a product of ideological motives to connect it to the “orthodox” lineage of the Chinese Linji Chan tradition. In addition, the Order professes it to be a Sŏn school. Nevertheless, the Order also allows doctrinal study and recitation of the Buddha’s name22 and incantation within its system of thought. In addition, the Kanhwasa Sŏn tradition, the crux of soteriology of the Chogye Order, also remains problematic in various aspects.23

**Analysis of Thought:**

Simultaneous emphasis on Sŏn and Kyo or Doctrine is a characteristic feature of Korean Buddhism (Buswell 1992:223). However, thought and praxis of the Chogye Order are not in harmony.

**Pursuit of Cupidity against Emptiness:**

As stipulated in its “Religious Charter,” the Chogye Order has emphasized the concept of emptiness. However, this ideal does not fit in with the reality. Religious rituals often tend to be used for economic reasons. In most Chinese Buddhist institutions in the 1990s, Buddhist ritual served as the principal source of income for monasteries (Welch 1973: 207). Likewise, Buddhism for fortune (kibok Pulgyo) serves as a concept to characterize the nature of Buddhism in contemporary Korea24 and Buddhist circles are not free from mercenary affluence.

Ancestor worship ritual in Korea has been a medium through which the living could express filial piety by requiting the ancestors’ favors and keeping their memories alive. Korean Buddhist circles, including the Chogye Order, are not exceptional in this regard. In fact, the Buddhist calendar published from Chogyesa Monastery, the headquarters of the Chogye Order, is fraught with Buddhist memorial services called chae for payment. In addition, Yonghwasa Monastery, which is also affiliated with the Chogye Order, has been well known for those services since the 1960s.25 Therefore, the Chogye Order is not free from non-abiding to material gain.

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22 Recitation of the Buddha’s name was also used in Chinese Kanhwasa Chan. For this, refer to Schlütter 2011:215-40. The Japanese Zen monk Dōgen (1200-53) also embraced various Buddhist practices, including burning incense and repentances (Foulk 2001:16-7).

23 Regarding the impending issues of Korean Kanhwasa Sŏn, refer to Kim 2010:713-6.

24 Jae-ryong Shim views the latter period of the twentieth century as the third paradigmatic period of Korean Buddhism and characterizes it as the continuation of the “Buddhism as state protector” (hoguk Pulgyo) tradition, the maintenance of Buddhism for fortune, and the Buddhist movement for the masses (minjung Pulgyo) (Shim 1999:161-70). In addition, the concepts of “hooligans Buddhism” (chop’ok Pulgyo), and “skirt Buddhism” (ch’ima Pulgyo) are another expressions used to characterize contemporary Korean Buddhism from the critical point of view.

25 For the relationship between the Buddhist memorial services at Yonghwasa Monastery and the modernization of Korea, see Kim 2008a.
The Buddha’s birthday is the highlight of the Buddhist ceremonial year in Korea and lanterns are offered for sale on that day, thus making it one of the largest income-producing events (Buswell 1992:43-6). Scholars of Korean Buddhism already pointed out that commercialization of Buddhism was an impending issue to be resolved in contemporary Korea (Shim 1993:50-6). Korean Buddhist mass media have also reported that some Korean monasteries are using Buddhist memorial ritual as an easy means to raise monastic fund and even went to excess in their commercialization (Nam 2004).

Incongruence with the Spirit of Meditative Buddhism:

The spirit of Meditative Buddhism is characterized by independency and self-supportiveness. However, its Korean version is different, providing the master with absolute authority. The Chogyo Order emphasizes that the master’s recognition of a practitioner’s spiritual advancement has been considered very important in the Kanha Sŏn tradition. However, able masters are very few in contemporary Korea and the master’s criteria for evaluating Sŏn practitioners’ spiritual progress are unclear. It is also taken for granted that all monks, including Sŏn practitioners, should observe Buddhist precepts. However, in reality, many Korean Sŏn practitioners are disinterested in keeping Buddhist precepts and social ethics. Some Sŏn monks are living their monastic life as antinomians even with a mercenary motive (Kim 2010:721-3).

Kanhwa Sŏn or Hwadu Absolutism:

The Chogyo Order emphasizes the simultaneous practice of Doctrine and Meditation. Although Korean monks are literate (Buswell 1992:217-8), they are not much familiar with the basic teachings of the Buddha. Scholars have debated about what the Buddha actually taught. However, they agree that there are the basic teachings of the Buddha, which include the Four Noble Truths, the theory of dependent origination, the three attributes of existence, and the theory of twelve abodes of sensation. In addition, the Chogyo Order adds the Middle Way and six perfections to these. In particular, the Four Noble Truths are considered the most important Buddhist doctrine among others (Kim 2010:725). Nevertheless, the monastic curricular in contemporary Korea do not include any work and course on early Buddhism (Kim 2001:492-9). The late monk Sŏngch’ŏl (1912-93), who assumed the position of Supreme Patriarch of the Chogyo Order and was well known for his soteriological scheme “sudden enlightenment and sudden realization” (tono tonsu) and ascetic life, was not exceptional in this regard. His understanding of early Buddhism was not based on what the Buddha actually taught but on Sinicized form of Buddhist texts (Kim 2006b:75-87).

However, the Order it still sticks to Meditation absolutism to the neglect of Doctrine. In fact, Kanha Sŏn in contemporary Korea is characterized by hwadu absolutism (Ch’ong 2000:6) to the neglect of doctrinal teachings and its practitioners regard verbal interpretation of hwadu as arsenic poison to kill Sŏn Buddhism, probably a typical characteristic of Korean Kanha Sŏn (Pak 2005:16). However, “Kanha Sŏn absolutism” is problematic (Sŏ 2000:93-7). In addition, not all monks agree to the efficacy of Kanha Sŏn and some Korean monks are quite skeptical of its soteriological efficiency (Kim 2010:719).
Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice

Limits of Kanhwa Sŏn as Soteriology:

The Chogye Order has an insufficient practical system and Kanhwa Sŏn in contemporary Korea has several impending issues to be resolved. Depending on the traditional authority, pro-Kanhwa Sŏn practitioners have argued lopsided that it was the best approach to enlightenment. In contrast, scholars and some reform-minded monks tend to show a critical attitude toward the practice. Although the two sides are in conflict, there is no substantial conversation between them (Sŏ 2000:88-90), leaving Kanhwa Sŏn primarily for a small number of Sŏn monks.

In fact, the idea that Kanhwa Sŏn is the best soteriology is not persuasive (Kang 2003:138), but a result of the fossilization of culture, which places absolute trust in the superior culture, but lacking knowledge of it (Wŏn’gyŏng 2003:5-7). The Chogye Order’s exclusive favor for the Kanhwa Sŏn tradition appears to be anachronistic (Sŏ 2006:24) and Kanhwa Sŏn has no reason for being considered the best soteriology in terms of the number of meditative monks, soteriology, and target audience.

A Small Number of Meditative Monks:

Meditative monks are considered elites in Korean monastic circles. However, their number is small. As of mid-1970s, meditation student numbered less than about 5 percent of the total number of monks and nuns ordained in the Chogye (Buswell 1992:167) and there was no significant increase in their number up to the present. The rest are still engaging in non-meditative Buddhist practices.

Non-meditative Practices:

In spite of its profession to be a Sŏn school, the Chogye Order is not exclusively a Sŏn school. Unlike thus far known in the West regarding the characteristics of Zen Buddhism, it also embraces as part of its practical way the invocation of the Buddha’s name, reading and copying of Buddhist texts, bowing in front of the Buddha image, and engagement in Buddhist events, etc. In particular, Korean Sŏn monks also engage in ascetic practices, including eating only raw food, fasting, and never lying down to sleep (Buswell 1992:189-99). Regarding this, the third article of the first chapter of the “Religious Charter” of the Order also stipulates:

This [Chogye] Order’s basic texts are the Diamond Sūtra and the dharma talks that have transmitted lanterns [of the Buddha’s wisdom]. Other Buddhist canonical texts, and recitation of the Buddha’s name (yŏmbul) and incantation (chiju) are also allowed.

Therefore, the Chogye Order allows non-meditative practices, including recitation of the Buddha’s name and incantation in its system of thought, making a Korean approach to Zen quite different from its counterparts: China and Japan. However, these practical elements are distant from the spirit of Sŏn Buddhism (Wŏn’gyŏng 2003:11; Misan 2006:6).
Monks-oriented Practice:

Texts on meditation such as the Platform Sūtra say that people of higher spiritual faculty are qualified for practicing Kanha Chan. Likewise, Kanha Sŏn has been in principle for monastic professionals in Korea and lay people are not much interested in meditative practice. Although some of lay people are often allowed to practice meditation with monks, they are expected to just remain passive participants.

Toward a New Direction:

First of all, the Chogye Order needs to clarify its historical and philosophical identity. In addition, the idea that Kanha Sŏn is the best soteriology is no longer effective in contemporary society, which is characterized by openness and diversity. Meditation was first of all a method for obtaining supranormal powers (Faure 1996:75). Morten Schlütter argues the Chinese Chan traditions must be examined within the context of secular political, social, and economic forces in Song China (Chia 2010:56). In addition, the public cases of Chan also need to be analyzed not just as accounts of historical events or of pedagogical techniques, but also as works of literature, as stories, poems, narratives, and myths (Bodiford 2010:99). In Japan, kôans also played a major role in the ritual process and they tended to become an object of bookish study or they were memorized and became the object of a kind of “fetishism” (Faure 1996:218-9). Now, it is time for Korean Sŏn circles to respond to James Robson’s argument, “Scholars of Zen Buddhism needs to explain deeper questions about why it is that the Linji style of Kanha practice became the prominent style of Chan/Sŏn/Zen practice around the world and particularly here in Korea” (Robson 2010:355).

Conclusion:

The purpose of this paper aimed to examine the relationship between Buddhist thought and praxis in contemporary Korea, focusing on the Chogye Order of Korean Buddhism, the mainstream of Korean Buddhism, from the critical point of view. The ideological underpinnings of the Chogye Order are the thought of emptiness, Sŏn thought, and the Flower Garland thought and its major praxis is Kanha Meditation. However, this research came to a conclusion that the reality of the Chogye Order is in general incongruent with the thought of emptiness vying for material affluence and the spirit of Meditative Buddhism; and the Sŏn Buddhist Chogye Order also allowed non-meditative practices. This research also argues that Kanha Sŏn is no longer effective in contemporary society; and the Chogye Order needs to redefine the notion of Buddhist practice beyond Kanha Sŏn absolutism as ‘a process of one’s living up to the basic teachings of the Buddha’ and accept the diverse ways of practice.26

26  For a discussion of this issue, see Kim 2010:724-6
Glossary:

chae 齋
chiju 持呪
Chin’gak 真覺
Chinui 知訶
Chogyesa 曹溪寺
Chogye (Ch. Caoqi) 曹溪
chôndûng pôbô 傳燈法語
chonghôn 宗憲
chongjông 宗正
Chosa Sûn (Ch. Zushi Chan) 祖師禪
Chosôn 朝鮮
Dögen 道元
Haeinsa 海印寺
haengja 行者
hoguk Pulgyo 護國佛教
Huïneng 慧能
hwadu 話頭
Hwaöm (Ch. Huayan, Jp. Kegon) 華嚴
Hyesim 慧思
Hyujông 休靜
Kajisan 迦智山
kangwôn 講院
Kanhwa Sûn (Ch. Kanhua Chan, Jp. Kôan Zen) 看話禪
kibok Pulgyo 祈福佛教
Koryô 高麗
Kûngang kyöng 金刚經
Kusan 九山

Kusan Sûnmun 九山禪門
Kye ch’osim hagin mun 誠心初學人文
Kyo 教
Linji 臨濟
Pojo 普照
Pöpchip pyölghaengkok chöryo pyöng ip sagi 法集別行錄節要井入私記
Pöpkye to 法界圖
Pou 普愚
sagyo kwa 四敎科
sajip kwa 四集科
sami (kwa) 沙彌(科)
samini 沙彌尼
Sûn (Ch. Chan, Jp. Zen) 禪
sûnbang 禪房
Songgwangsa 松廣寺
Sûnmun yûmsong chip 禪門拈頌集
T’aego 太古
T’ongdosa 通度寺
taegyo kwa 大敎科
Taehan Pulgyo Chogyejong 大韓佛教曹溪宗
tono chômsu 頓悟漸修
tono tonsu 頓悟頓修
Toûi 道義
Üisang 義湘
Yasutani Hakuun 安谷白雲
yômbul 念佛
Yonghwasa 龍華寺
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T: Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (The Newly Revised Tripitaka during the Taishō Era).


Ganhwaseon (看話禪) in Korea: From a Seon Practitioner’s Perspective

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Introduction

It has been a significant occasion, almost every year for the last decade, that Buddhists from various traditions get together to share their thoughts and experiences about Buddhist idea and practice on the UN Day of Vesak celebrations in Thailand, in May. Considering its numbers of participants from different countries and traditions, about 2,000 Buddhist delegates from more than 80 countries, including Theravada and Mahayana tradition, it seems the biggest event of Buddhists around the world in recent years. It is also noticeable that most Buddhists have commemorated and celebrated the 2,600th year of Buddha’s attainment of Great Enlightenment (大覺) since the last year, BE 2555 (2011). We have to review and remind that what is the Enlightenment of Shakyamuni and how Siddhartha attained the Enlightenment. Seon (禪/禅/Zen) Buddhist meditation practitioners believe that Enlightenment means Seeing Nature (見性) of Dharma, or Reality, which is the same as Buddha Nature (佛性) and Nature of Mind (心性) for all Sentient Beings (衆生). Seon practitioners believe that Seon meditation practice is the best way to attain Enlightenment. The characteristics of Seon tradition have been known as: “Without standing on letters [of words] (不立文字), [the Mind] especially transmitted beside the doctrinal (教外別傳), [it] directly points the human mind (直指人心) to see nature [of mind] for attaining Buddhahood (見性成佛).” Seon practitioners also believe that Seon tradition started from the event, so-called “[the Buddha] Held up a flower and [Mahakasapa] smiled (拈花微笑),” when a Buddhist assembly was held on the Spiritual Mountain (靈山會上) for preaching Dharma. According to Seon tradition, the Buddha declared that he transmitted the Correct Dharma of Eye Store (正法眼藏) of him to Mahakasapa at that moment of the smile and therefore, Mahakasapa became the First Patriarch of the tradition. Then, having passed away, Mahakasapa transmitted his Dharma to Ananda who accordingly became the Second Patriarch.

It is significant to appreciate that because of his spiritual quality of enlightenment Ananda could not join the First Assembly of Compiling Buddha’s Teachings (Samgiti 結集) which was held in Rajagriha with 500 Arahats after Buddha’s Parinirvana, the Great Passing Away in peace (善逝入寂/圓寂) completely. It is said that Ananda was an attendant of the Buddha and had remembered all what the Buddha spoke, but he had not attained enlightenment yet by himself before the Buddha’s passing. When Ananda attended the First Assembly, Mahakasapa, who was the convener and in charge, did not allow him to join the meeting, but expelled him with the assignment to attain enlightenment. Then Ananda took an intensive meditation practice for a week and eventually attained enlightenment. Then, he could join the Assembly and played the role to recite what he had heard as the words as “thus what I have heard (如是我聞) [from the Buddha]” which was put at the beginning of the Sutras, Buddhist Scriptures.

1 UN Day of Vesak celebration has been based on a resolution of the 54th General Assembly of United Nations in December, 1999. Visit website http://www.vesakday.mcu.ac.th
2 The spiritual mountain refers to Vulture Peak Mountain (Gridhrakuta), where Shakyamuni Buddha expounded Lotus Sutra.
It is worthy of notice that the chief editor’s remark on *Ganhwaseon: A Way of Practice of Jogye Order* in which he confesses that as a Seon practitioner, he had been hesitant to take a part in the compilation of the book because he thought that Ganhwaseon practitioners had to be serious about practice for having the experience of meditation than the expression of words, so he should refuse the request to make such a book. However, the editorial committee, consisting of senior Seon practitioners, had intensive discussions on the matter and eventually made a decision to join the works to show their intention of the book as “a pointing finger to moon.” In this paper, I would like to share some information of the situation of Ganhwaseon in Korea and my thoughts about the practice with a sense of the same feeling of the editor above mentioned. I will first review and point out characteristics of Ganhwaseon and the situation in Korea.

**Ganhwaseon (看話禪)**

Ganhwaseon is a way of Seon which has developed through various traditions of Buddhist meditation. However, the main practice of Ganhwaseon is to observe and contemplate (看) “Hwadu” (話頭 topic of critical words) in order to comprehend the intention of the speaker who said the words. It is a way to see one’s Nature (性) which is identical with Buddha’s and everyone’s. Therefore, it is also called “Hwaduseon(話頭禪),” Seon of Hwadu. In fact, a Hwadu is not for reasoning, but contemplating. ‘Seon’ is the Korean pronunciation of the Chinese word ‘Chan (禪),’ which in turn is derived from the Sanskrit word Dhyâna, which can be translated as Quiet Meditation (靜慮) or Speculation Practice (思惟修). Seon also refers to a school of Mahayana Buddhism, which was remarkably developed in East Asian situations as a practice-oriented tradition. However, Seon emphasizes mind practice to attain Correct Enlightenment (正覺), which generates Wisdom (智慧) and Compassion (慈悲) for all sentient living beings (衆生). As such, it de-emphasizes theoretical knowledge in favour of intuitive self-realization through meditation practice.

According to the tradition, Seon originated in India as a transcendental non-verbal Dharma as “[the Buddha] Held up a Flower and [Mahakashapa] Smiled” which communicated and transmitted directly by the Buddha to Mahakashapa at Vulture Peak Mountain. Moreover, it is known that the Buddha told Mahakashapa “I transmit to you the light of the pure dharma eye which is birthless, deathless, wondrous, spiritual, the real form of no-form, delicate, the true teaching,” at the end of the event. Therefore, we can say that the story of the event was a Gongan (公案 Public Case) and the critical key words, “Holding a flower and Smiling,” is a Hwadu. In this case of Hwaduseon, the practitioner should comprehend the intention ‘why [the Buddha] Held a flower and why Mahakashapa smiled at the moment.’ And a practitioner should comprehend the intention of the Buddha’s remark and that the meaning of the words that “the light of pure dharma eye,” could be called a Hwadu to question what is the real meaning of the words or intention of the Buddha to say that.

It is known that in Buddhism there the Threefolds Wisdom: Wisdom of Reality (實相般若), Wisdom of Observation (觀照般若), and Wisdom of Letters (文字般若). It can be said that through observing letters (words), one could comprehend reality as to attain wisdom. It is similar that through observing Hwadu, one can attain awakening or enlightenment. To appreciate the Seon tradition, one should remind the well-known statement of the characteristics of the Seon tradition that: “Without standing on the letters, having transmitted outside the Scriptures, it directly points the human mind

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to see one’s true nature as attaining Buddhahood.” These words teach practitioners that they should not attach to scripture and words, but use them as Upaya, or Skillful Means. Seon can be practiced anywhere and anytime because it is dependent on one’s single mind or intention regardless of any particular conditions. It is important to note a well known Seon proverb that says, when a finger is pointing to the moon, “one should not see merely the finger, but the moon.” in terms of the ultimate purpose and communication. Seon stresses on meditation and concentration.

It is said that this tradition of transmission of the Dharma Lamp (法燈) was later taken from India to China by Bodhidharma in the 6th century, where it was subsequently transmitted to other parts of Asia. Seon was introduced into the Unified Silla (統一新羅), Korea, in the 9th century by the Venerable Doeui Myeongjeok (道義 明寂), a Korean Buddhist monk. The Seon Master Doeui, who received Dharma transmission from the Chan Master Xitang Zhizhang (西堂 智藏735-814) in the lineage of Huineng (慧能 638-713), was the first pioneer of The Seon School (禪門) and to be known as the Patriarchal Founder of Jogye Order (曹溪宗祖), which is the major Buddhist order in Korea these days. It is believed that Ganhwaseon is one of the most developed methods for seeing one’s true nature since the time of Shakyamuni Buddha. Moreover, the tradition was transmitted and developed in China and then came to Korea. It is recognized that Ganhwaseon was advocated by Chan Master Tahui Tsungkao (大慧 宗杲 1088-1163) in Song (宋) China and evolved from then onwards. Seon Master Bojo Jinul (1158-1210), in Goryeo, was a pioneer of Ganhwaseon in Korea. Though the traditions have produced several lineages around world, they all share the same principal ideas that reality is essentially empty and stress on the practice of meditation on Hwadu.

Ganhwaseon in Korea: A Brief History and Background

It is known that Buddhism was first officially introduced from China to Korea in 372 CE, and adopted as the official state religion in the Three Kingdoms (Goguryeo, Baekje and Silla) and Unified Silla Kingdom (668-935) which applied Buddhism as the spiritual force for the unification of the peninsula. During the Unified Silla Period, Buddhism was the driving force in cultural development, resulting in the construction of temples, such as Bulguksa (臻糑艔 Temple of Buddha Land), which has been known as a World Cultural Heritage recognized by UNESCO. It is noticeable that during the Unified Silla Period, Seon (Chan) were brought from China and led to the development of the Seon Schools, thereby adding another spiritual dimension to philosophical advance, which had been led by the scholastic Buddhists. During the period from the Unified Silla to the early Goryeo Dynasty (918-1392), the Gusanseonmun (九山禪門 Nine Mountain Seon Schools) were established and dominated the spiritual field of the nation.

During Goryeo Dynasty in general, Buddhism became a unifying factor and the grounds for further national and cultural flourishing. For instance, the Tripitaka Koreana (高麗大藏經 a World Cultural Heritage) was carved into more than 80,000 woodblocks as an offering for national protection from outside forces and invasion. However, in the middle of Goryeo, Seon Master Bojo Jinul established Suseonsa monastery in which he tried to integrate meditative practice and doctrinal
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There he took initiative in Ganhwaseon or Hwaduseon practice. At the end of Goryeo Seon Master Taego Bou (1301-1382), a representative of the period, had practiced Ganhwaseon and promoted it as the main Korean form of meditation. During Goryeo, the number of Buddhist orders diversified and flourished, but eventually integrated into the Jogye Order by the master Taego. However, the increasing economic and political influence of the Buddhists led to condemnation by the common people, and ignored by the aristocracy, Buddhism came in to a period of political repression with the ensuing Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910).

During Joseon, Neo-Confucianism rapidly gained favor, and although royalty continued to practice Buddhism privately, Confucianism ruled administration and society. Under a continuing policy of repression, Buddhism was banished to the mountains and monastics were generally treated harshly. However, this banishment proved to be quite valuable to Buddhism in two respects: the temples became centers for the communal flourishing of Seon practice, and Buddhism established strong bonds with the common people. Among the Seon masters of early Joseon period, Cheongheo Hyujeong (1520-1604) has been recognized as the most important and influential leaders of the Buddhists. He wrote Samgagwigam (Ideal Mirror of the Three Religions) and Seongagwigam (Ideal Mirror of Zen School) which has been a classical Seon text in Korea. In the late Joseon period Seon Master Choeui Euisun (1786-1866) was eminent and popular in the society for his cultural and educational influence including Tea Way with Seon practice.

In the last century, Seon Masters Gyeongheo Seongu (1846-1912) and Yongseong Jinjong (1864-1940) were most eminent as a reviver of the Seon tradition. Most of modern Seon masters were disciples or descendants of them, such as Seon masters Hyewol (1861-1937), Mangong Wolmyeon (1872-1946), Hanam Jungwon (1876-1951), Dongsan Hyeil (1890-1965), Goam Sangeon (1899-1988) and Toeong Seongcheol (1912-1993).

Ganhwaseon in Korea: Recent Situations

Ganhwaseon practice has been recognized in Korea as the best among all Buddhist practices to attain Enlightenment. Seon training emphasizes daily life practice, along with intensive periods of meditation. Practicing with others is an integral part of Seon practice. However, focusing on the Awakening or Enlightenment has always been the ultimate goal no matter where or when one is situated, but should always be aware of being in the here and now. Many Korean monks have few personal possessions and maintain a quiet and simple lifestyle. According to recent reports in Korea, there have been about 1,200 monks and nuns who practiced Seon at meditation halls in more than 100 Seon monasteries around South Korea every summer and in winter retreat periods for

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7 Young Ho Lee (Jin Wol), *Common Themes of the Three Religions (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism): The Samga Kwigam of Hyujong (1520-1604)*, A Master Thesis at University of Hawaii, 1990.
3 months. During the period of the 90 days, the practitioners must not go out of the temple area, but concentrate on the Ganhwaseon.

Sangha seminaries of traditional Buddhist monasteries have taught Jeondeungnok (Record of Transmission of Lamp) and Yeomsong (Panegyric Phrases of Holding-up) with reference texts in graduate curriculums which have been used as encouragement and guidelines for Ganhwaseon practitioners. It is known that Jeondeungnok includes about 1,700 stories related to the Dharma transmission between the masters and their disciples including the Buddha and Mahakasapa. Therefore, we can find out the so-called 1,700 Gongans from the stories of the book. From the Yeomsong we also find out more than a thousand Hwadus based on the Gongans and panegyrics. However, most Seon practitioners have sought their Hwadus from their Seon masters who give a proper one for the disciples.

According to Hyeujeong, Ganhwaseon practitioners should practice with the Live Words and must not practice with the Dead Words. The Live Words here means the Hwadu, which is unthinkable and beyond explaining by reasoning; the Dead Words refer to be a scholastic one. Therefore, it is recommended that practitioners should contemplate on the Live Words with sincerity of mind; questioning likes a hungry person longing for food and a child longing for its mother. Hyeujeong stresses that “In seon practice, one must pass the barrier of Patriarch; to attain Wondrous Enlightenment, one has to completely cut off the way of thinking.” It can be said that Ganhwaseon practice is like an intuitive comprehension of a Hwadu through contemplation with questioning to seek intention of the speaker of the Hwadu. It is well known that Ganhwaseon practitioners must have three things of essential importance: The first is a Foundation of Great Faith for the practice which is possible; the second is Great Zealous Determination of practice to attain enlightenment; the third is a Great Feeling of Doubt on the Hwadu. If one of these is lacking, then it is like a tripod pot with a broken foot and is useless.

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12 Young Ho Lee (Jin Wol), Common Themes of the Three Religions (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism): The Samga Kwigam of Hyujong (1520-1604), op.cit. p.101.
13 Ibid. p.102.
14 Ibid.
Conclusion

These days, among Koreans, the word “Hwadu” has been used not only by Seon practitioners, but also people of society in general in various contexts, such as political, economic, social and cultural. If there is an urgent and critical task or a serious problem for people as well as individuals, they call it as a Hwadu to be solved and overcome. It seems popular that Hwadu stands not only for Seon practitioners, but everyone and institutions, even the government, for their survival or improvement of lives. Their purpose of using the word, Hwadu, is not the same, but similar as Seon Practitioners to concentrate to solve the problem or get an answer for the question of each one’s own task. However, I would say to conclude in short that wherever and whenever, anyone tries to face one’s task or challenge and to solve a problem, it is better that one could use the way of Ganhwaseon practice or spirit. Let us appreciate how Steve Jobs had practiced and used Zen wisdom and power. I guess that Ganhwaseon’s relevance to apply for all situations depend on one’s mind.15

Of those past and present spiritual mentors in India [Western Heaven] and China [This Land] who promoted these teachings, there were none who did anything more than just resolve this one doubt. A thousand doubts or a myriad doubts are just this one doubt. One who resolves this doubt will doubt nothing more. And once one has no further doubts, one will be neither more nor less than Śākyamuni, Maitreya, Vimalakīrti, and Elder Pang, nondual and undifferentiated.

One of the more striking transformations that occurred within Buddhism as it adapted to East Asia was the creation of new, uniquely Chinese systems of meditation practice that had few precise analogs in the imported Indian traditions of the religion. The Sinitic system that has attracted the most attention in the West is that of Chan or Sōn, a school that had always presumed itself to be the repository of contemplative expertise in Chinese Buddhism, as its adoption of the name "Meditation" (Sōn) suggests. From virtually its inception, Sōn sought to create forms of meditation that it could claim exclusively as its own. This process involved both critiquing the practices common to other Sino-Indian schools as being ‘gradual,’ while claiming exclusively for itself putatively ‘subitist’ forms of religious training. Sōn also experimented with forms of rhetoric it considered proleptic and transformative, in order to demonstrate the autonomy of Sōn from the rest of the Buddhist tradition. To simplify a complex process of development, we may say that this parallel evolution in both practice and rhetoric led to the creation of kanhwa Chan/Kor. kanhwa Sōn看話禅 (lit. the “Sōn of observing the topic of inquiry”) during the Song dynasty (960-1279). In this form of meditation, stories about earlier masters - termed “public cases” (Ch. gong ‘an/Kor. kongan/Jpn. k  an公案) - were used by Sōn masters for instructing their students and testing the depth of their understanding. Some teachers even began to assign such exchanges as topics to mull over during meditation.

By the middle of the Song, these "public cases" came to be seen as significant not because they were the repository of Chan's pedagogical lore, but instead because they expressed the enlightened state of mind of the Sōn master involved in the exchange. Students then were taught to use these cases as “topics of inquiry” (Ch. huatou/Kor. hwadu 話頭)—a term sometimes translated as “critical phrase” or “keyword” in Western language sources—so that they too would come to realize, and in turn be able to express, their own enlightened state of mind. Single-minded attention to the hwadu was claimed to create an introspective focus that would eventually lead
the student back to the enlightened source of his own mind—a process referred to as “tracing back the radiance” (Ch. huiguang fanzhao/Kor. hoegwang panjo 追光返照) emanating from the mind, or, in the translation John McRae has suggested, “counter-illumination.” Once the student had rediscovered the source of his own mind through such counter-illumination, he would come to know the enlightened intent of the Sŏn master involved in the public case, and in turn consummate in himself the same state of enlightenment. Through this technique, then, the student patterns his mind after that of the eminent Sŏn masters of old until they think—and ultimately act—as one.

One of the most crucial dimensions of kanhwa Sŏn practice is the emphasis on the need for ‘doubt’ (Ch. yiqing/Kor. ūijong 疑情), which is viewed as the motive force that propels this meditation forward. The notion of doubt appears in Indian meditative literature, but almost exclusively as one of the five principal hindrances (nīvaraṇa; Ch. gai/Kor. kae 蓋) to concentration or mental absorption (dhyāna; Ch. ding/Kor. chŏng 定). Doubt thus plays no constructive role in Indian Buddhist spiritual culture, but was instead an obstacle that must be overcome if progress were to proceed. By the time doubt has been fully appraised and considered in East Asia by Sŏn Buddhist adepts, however, this debilitating mental concomitant has been transformed into the principal force driving one toward enlightenment. This paper seeks to tell the story of this transformation.1

Early Indian Notions of Doubt

In Indian materials, doubt (Sanskrit, vicikitsā; Ch. yi/Kor. ūi 疑) most often appears as the fifth of the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa; Ch. gai/Kor. kae 蓋) to mental absorption, along with sensual desire (kāmacchanda), ill-will (vyāpāda), sloth and torpor (stvānamiddha), and restless and worry (auddhatya-kaukṣṭya). It does not have an affective dimension in Indian materials, but is generally viewed as a debilitation of the intellect: as Buddhaghosa explains in the Visuddhimagga (Path of Purification): “Doubt (P. vicikkicchā)... has the characteristic of uncertainty. Its function is to waver. It is manifested as indecisiveness, or it is manifested as taking various sides. Its proximate cause is unwise attention (P. āyonisomanasikāra). It should be regarded as obstructive of theory (P. patipatti)” (Visuddhimagga, XIV.177).2 Doubt is always associated with unwholesome states of consciousness in the sensual sphere of existence (i.e., it does not exist in the realms of subtle materiality or immateriality) that are rooted in delusion (Visuddhimagga, XIV.89-93). It involves skepticism about various intellectual propositions concerning the state of one’s existence in past, present, and future: viz., Did I exist, or not, in the past? What and how did I exist in the past? Having been something previously, how did I come to exist in the past? (And so, too, for the future and, with slight alterations, the present.) (Visuddhimagga, XIX.6). Because of the uncertainty created by doubt, the mind becomes agitated, thus obstructing sustained thought (vicāra; guan/Kor. kwan 観, Ch. si/Kor. sa伺), and full mental absorption (dhyāna).3 Because of its intellectual dimension, doubt will not be fully removed from consciousness until all wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi; Ch. wangjian/Kor. manggyŏn 妄見) are resolved in awakening: the moment one becomes

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1 This paper is adapted from material that first appeared in my article “The Transformation of Doubt (Yiqing) into a Positive Emotion in Chinese Buddhist Meditation,” in Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature, ed. Halvor Eifring (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 225-236.
2 Translations from the Visuddhimagga are taken from the rendering by Bhikkhu Ñañamoli, The Path of Purification (5th edition, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1991), with slight changes (here switching “uncertainty” and “doubt”).
3 The Visuddhimagga states that these five hindrances are “specifically obstructive” of mental absorption; IV.104.
a “stream-enterer” (srotāpañña; Ch. yuliu/Kor. yeryu 順流) on the path of vision (darśanamārga; Ch. jiandao/Kor. kyŏndo 見道), the meditator achieves a direct insight into the reality of nirvāṇa, which forever vanquishes all mistaken beliefs about the true nature of one’s self and one’s world.

For our subsequent discussion, however, it is important to note that doubt was always viewed by Indian Buddhists in association with sustained meditative practice. This is because the five hindrances, doubt among them, were specifically presumed to stand in opposition to the five constituents that were present in meditative absorption (dhyānāṅga): sensual desire obstructs one-pointedness of mind (ekāgratā), ill-will obstructs rapture (prīti), sloth and torpor obstructs applied thought (vitarka), restless and worry obstruct ease (sukha), and doubt obstructs sustained thought (vicāra) (Visuddhimagga, IV.86). Only by removing these five hindrances would the meditator be able to access the profound meditative state of the first absorption of the realm of subtle materiality (rupāvacaradhyāna).

In order to remove this hindrance, various types of counteragents are taught in Indian scripture. Perhaps the most fundamental way of counteracting this hindrance is outlined in the various recensions of the Satipatthānasutta/Smṛtyupasthānasūtra (Foundations of Mindfulness Sūtra). There, the meditator is taught simply to note mindfully and with full attention the presence or absence of doubt or the other hindrances in the mind: “Herein, monks, when doubt is present in him, the monk knows, ‘There is doubt in me,’ or when doubt is absent, he knows, ‘There is no doubt in me.’ He knows how the arising of non-arisen doubt comes to be; he knows how the rejection of arisen doubt comes to be; he knows how the non-arising in the future of the rejected doubt comes to be.”4 Two purposes of this basic awareness are noted: the operation of the presently appearing hindrance is temporarily suspended; and as the awareness of the hindrance becomes stronger, it will be more difficult for it to arise unrecognized in the future. As Nyanaponika states, “This method is based on a simple psychological fact, which is expressed by the commentators as follows: ‘A good and an evil thought cannot occur in combination. Therefore, at the time of knowing the [doubt that arose in the preceding moment, that negative sense of doubt] no longer exists [but only the positive act of knowing].’”5

Given, however, that the proximate cause of doubt is presumed to be unwise, or unsystematic, attention (ayonisomanaskāra; Ch. buzheng siwei/Kor. pulchong sawi 不正思維, Ch. feili zuoyi/Kor. piri chagūi 非理作意), Buddhist texts teach specific practices and contemplations that areconsidered to be conducive to abandoning doubt. These techniques specifically include systematic attention to such dichotomies as the distinction between wholesome and unwholesome, noble and vile, good and evil, etc., so that meditators would train their minds in correct doctrinal knowledge, viz., wisdom (prajñā; zhihui/Kor. chihye智慧). Continued study and memorization of Buddhist scriptures would also develop wisdom into a spiritual faculty that would further help to control doubt. One of the earliest systematic presentations of Buddhist meditation written in China, Kumārajāva’s (344-413) Zuochan sanmei jing坐禪三昧經 (Book on Sitting Meditation), a compilation of teachings on dhyāna practice deriving from a number of masters in the Sarvāstivāda school of Indian mainstream Buddhism, mentions doubt in this same context, as a product of delusion, which is to be

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overcome through one of the five “inhibitory” or “counteractive” (Ch. zhī/Kor. chi[ち]) meditations, in this case the meditation on dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda).⁶

Even throughout this almost exclusively negative treatment of doubt as an unwholesome mental state, there are a few tantalizing hints in Indian religious texts of the more positive connotations that the term acquires later in East Asian Buddhism. Indian scriptures, such as the Brāhmaṇa-s, for example, recognize the role that doubt can play in prompting religious inquiry. This salutary role of doubt is mentioned, for example, in a few passages where doubt (vicikitsā) leads to questioning about eschatological issues, such as whether there is an afterlife.⁷ These kinds of doubts promote religious questioning and even genuinely philosophical inquiry.

Doubt, therefore, always stands in direct distinction to the more intellectual faculty of wisdom, not the affective faculty of faith. In Indian Buddhism, faith was regarded as one of the five faculties (indriya; Ch. gen/Kor. kūn 柵) crucial to spiritual progress, along with diligence (vīrya), mindfulness (smṛti), concentration (samādhi), and wisdom (prajñā). The faculty of faith, in fact, is usually considered to be the direct counteragent of ill-will, not of doubt, clearly demonstrating its affective dimension. Faith produces the affective aspect of bliss (prāti), which brings about serenity of mind and thought; in addition, faith also produces self-confidence, engendering the conative characteristic of diligence (vīrya).⁸ Faith and wisdom, which were at equal poles from the faculty of mindfulness, were to be kept constantly counterpoised. By balancing them, faith would guard against excessive wisdom, which could lead to skepticism, while wisdom would protect against excessive faith, which could lead to blind, uncritical acceptance. The result was a “rational faith” (Pali: ākāravati saddhā)⁹ that was prompted more by investigation than acquiescence. Preliminary examination of the Buddhist teachings would encourage the student to take up religious practice and, after cultivating those teachings, his initial tacit faith would be confirmed through direct experience. The arrangement itself speaks to the subordinate place faith occupied in Indian Buddhist praxis: faith may serve as the basis of practice, but it had always to be carefully counterbalanced by intellectual understanding. Faith and doubt are therefore part of a continuum of religious practice, doubt promoting critical examination of the teachings, faith resulting from the conviction that comes through understanding and prompting, in turn, further conative energy. Faith is thus the “mental appreciation’ or ‘intellectual joy’ resulting from intelligent study and a clarification of one’s thought”¹⁰ and is a direct result of the resolution of doubt.

The New Conception of Doubt in Sŏn Meditation

Doubt plays a crucial role in the technique of Ch. kanhua Chan/Kor. kanhwa Sŏn (the Sŏn of examining the “topic of inquiry,” keyword,” or “critical phrase”), a style of Buddhist

⁸ N. Dutt, “Place of Faith in Buddhism,” Indian Historical Quarterly 16, p. 639; see the discussion and critique of Dutt’s putative third dimension of faith—as an antidote to doubt—in Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p. 387.
⁹ “The faith of him, which is thus fixed, rooted and established on these reasons, grounds, and features is said to be a rational faith, rooted in insight, firm and irremovable by a recluse or brahmin, a god, Māra or Brahmā, or anyone else in the world.”Vimāṇsaka Sutta (M.i.320); quoted in Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p. 393.
¹⁰ Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p. 386.
mediation unique to East Asia, which becomes emblematic especially of the Linji school of the classical and post-classical Sŏn periods. In Sŏn treatments, doubt is typically called the yiqing/uyjong 疑情: the emotion, feeling, or perhaps best the “sensation” of doubt. Even though the –qing in yiqing is never, so far as I am aware, glossed in the literature, its connotation is clear: qing is a palpable, conative sensation that ultimately serves to pervade all of one’s thoughts, feelings, emotions, and eventually even one’s physical body, with the doubt generated through kanhwa practice.

Modern scholars have often asserted that the evolution of this form of meditation was the product of an internal crisis in Song dynasty Chan, brought about by the degeneration of the tradition after the demise of the charismatic Sŏn masters of the preceding Tang dynasty. As I have detailed in an earlier article, however, I prefer instead to view kanhwa Sŏn as one of several products of the Sinicization of Buddhism. To my mind, kanhwa practice may be viewed as the culmination of an internal dynamic within Chan, beginning in the Tang dynasty and climaxing in the Song, whereby subitist rhetoric came to be extended to pedagogy and finally to practice. Kanhwa meditation thus emerges as a practical application of the “sudden teachings” (Ch. dunjiao/Kor. ton’gyo頓悟) that had been the clarion call of Sŏn since early in its history. Since I have treated the evolution of this uniquely Chinese style of meditation previously, I won’t repeat that discussion now. Let me instead focus here on the sensation of doubt itself.

Early discussions about the place of doubt in proto-kanhwa practice still hone closely to earlier Indian notions of doubt as a hindrance to meditative development. For example, Yuanwu Keqin (Kor. Wŏno Kûkkûn) 圓悟克勤 (1063-1135), an important figure in the transformation of the literary study of gong’an into a meditative system, still treats the sensation of doubt as something harmful to faith, which should be diligently avoided at all times—but especially so in the course of gong’an investigation. When Keqin talks about “cutting through the sensation of doubt with an adamantine sword”14 以金剛劍. 截斷疑情, he explains that doubt must be vanquished because it is an obstacle to faith and thus to understanding.

It is Keqin’s famous disciple Dahui Zonggao (Kor. Taehye Chonggo) 大慧宗杲(1089-1163) who turns Keqin’s view toward doubt on its head, re-conceiving it instead as the principal force driving one toward enlightenment. Since I have discussed Zonggao’s treatment in detail elsewhere,15 I will here focus instead on what I believe is the most systematic, and at times even eloquent, presentation of the role of doubt in mature kanhwa Sŏn meditation found anywhere in the literature: the Essentials of Chan (Ch. Chanyao/Kor. Sŏnyo 禪要), by the important Yuan-dynasty Linji figure Gaofeng Yuanmiao (Kor. Kobong Wŏnmyo) 高峰原妙 (1239-1295). Yuanmiao’s own contribution

12 Editor’s footnote: some people may not know what this is. “The position that awakening or enlightenment is instantaneous, sudden and direct, not attained by practice through a period of time and not the fruit of a gradual accretion or realization.” – see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subitism - accessed on 20 November 2011.
14 Yuanwu yulu 3, T 1997:47.723c12.
15 Buswell, “K’an-hua Meditation,” especially pp. 343-56.
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to kanhwa Sŏn comes not so much from his innovations as instead the clarity with which he explains and systematizes the thought of others. Most of the concepts treated in Yuanmiao’s work derive from his predecessors in the Chinese Linji school. Even so, few other teachers have explored this topic with such perspicuity and insight. Yuanmiao’s descriptions help to remove much of the veil of mystery in which Sŏn practice is often enveloped in Western portrayals of the school. The clarity of his presentation also must account at least partially for the Essential of Chan’s inclusion in the Korean Sa chip (Fourfold Collection), the core of the monastic curriculum in Korea since at least the middle of the Chosŏn dynasty.

One of the most influential features of Yuanmiao’s presentation of kanhwa Sŏn praxis was to systematize its principal constituents into what he termed the “three essentials” (Ch. sanyao/Kor samyo 三要): 1) the faculty of great faith (Ch. daxin’gen/Kor. taesin’gŭn 大信根); 2) great fury, or perhaps “great passionate intent” (Ch. dafenzhi/Kor. taebunji 大憤志); and 3) the great sensation of doubt (Ch. da yiqing/Kor. taeŭiyŏng 大疑情). Yuanmiao’s typology will subsequently be followed in the independent Sŏn traditions of China, Korea, and Japan. In one of the most celebrated passages in post-classical Sŏn literature, Yuanmiao defines each constituent as follows:

If we’re speaking about authentic Sŏn contemplation, there have to be three essentials. The first essential is to have the faculty of great faith: This Matter should be so patently obvious that it is just as if you are leaning against Mt. Sumeru. The second essential is to have great fury, which is just as if you’ve come across the villain who murdered your father and right then and there you want to cut him in half with a single strike of your sword. The third essential is to have the sensation of great doubt, which is just as if you’ve done a heinous act in secret and are about to be exposed.16

I have discussed above the Indian notion of faith as a precursor to insight. Faith in the Sŏn tradition was conceived rather differently. The doctrinal foundation of much of Sinitic Buddhism, and especially the Sŏn tradition, was its claim that enlightenment was immanent in all people, an idea expressed in the term “buddha-nature” (Ch. foxing/Kor. pulsŏng 佛性). As Yuanmiao explains, ultimately all that needed to be done in order to achieve enlightenment was simply to accept that fact—have “faith” in it wholeheartedly—and thereby let go of the mistaken notion that one was not enlightened. Faith was the catalyst for this change of heart. It was seen as a beneficial influence constantly emanating from the enlightened nature, prompting all conscious beings toward enlightenment. The confidence that would be generated by this kind of faith would make it seem that “it is just as if you are leaning against Mt. Sumeru,” the axis mundi of the world itself. Once his faith were sufficient, the student would immediately acquiesce to his original state of mind and “re-cognize” his innate enlightenment. Hence, faith was upgraded in Sŏn Buddhism from a necessary, but decidedly subsidiary, component of praxis, to a principal catalyst of awakening.

16 Gaofeng Chanyao, sect. 16, Xuzangjing (Supplement to the Canon), vol. 122: 257a ff. Since there is no standard edition of this text, I will henceforth cite it only by section number. These three essentials may have been modeled on a similar list of “three states of mind” (sanyin 三心) found in the Guan Wuliangshou jing (Contemplating the Buddha of Infinite Life). That scripture mentions that “rebirth in the pure land occurs through generating three states of mind” (344c11): perfect sincerity (zhicheng xin 至誠心); profound resolve (shenxin 深心), resolving to transmit merit to others (huixiang fayuan xin 禦向法願心). See Guan Wuliangshou jing, T 365:12.344c11-12. The term sanyao is also used, though without clarification, in the Linji lu, T 1985:47.497a15-20.
But Yuanmiao, like many Linji teachers before him, also had a realistic view of the human condition. While people may in truth be enlightened, they have had years—in fact lifetimes, in the Buddhist view—to convince themselves that they were deluded. Therefore, it was perfectly natural to expect that the sincere adept would also have doubts concerning the truth of his innate enlightenment, his capacity to rediscover that truth, and the ability of his teacher to guide him toward that rediscovery. In a striking accommodation to the frailty of human nature, rather than making the perfection of faith alone the prerequisite to enlightenment, the Linji school of Sŏn developed an approach to practice that drew on the very doubts that most religious adherents would inevitably experience.

Yuanmiao seeks to use this natural tension between faith (that promise that I am innately enlightened) and doubt (the reality that I am an ordinary, ignorant person) as the catalyst for the experience of awakening (Ch. wu/Kor. o 悟). In Section 11 of his Essentials of Chan, Yuanmiao treats both factors as being in symbiotic relationship (“It is certain that the more faith you have, the more doubt you will have” 決能便徧信去 便恁麼疑去). He treats faith as the “essence” (Ch. ti/Kor. che 體) of doubt, while awakening is the “function” (yong 用) of doubt, drawing upon a rubric popularized in the Awakening of Faith according to the Mahāyāna 大乘起心論 (Ch. Dasheng qixin lun/Kor. Taesŭng kisillon), an important Sinitic apocryphal treatise that was extremely influential in the evolution of Sŏn ideology and praxis. Religious doubt arises from the deepest recesses of one’s faith. The tension between them creates an existential quandary that ultimately leads to the experience of awakening. All three factors are inextricably interconnected, so that “when faith is a hundred percent, so too will be doubt. When doubt is a hundred percent, so too will be awakening” 信有十分 疑得十分 疑得十分 悟得十分 (Chanyao, sect. 11).

Yuanmiao describes the pervasive effect of this sensation of doubt in an evocative passage of his Essentials of Chan:

Unexpectedly in my sleep I began to doubt [the huatou/hwadu] “the thousand dharmas return to one; to what does the one return?”¹⁷ At that point, the sensation of doubt suddenly erupted. I stopped sleeping and forgot about eating. I couldn’t distinguish east from west and couldn’t tell day from night. Whether spreading out my sitting mat or laying out my bowls, whether defecating or urinating—finally whether active or still, whether speaking or silent, everything was just this “to what does the one return?” There wasn’t the slightest extraneous thought. And even if I had wanted to think of something else, I was utterly incapable of doing it. [My mind] was exactly like something nailed or glued: no matter how hard you shook it, it would not move. Even if I was in a dense crowd of people, it was like no one was there. From dawn till dusk, from dusk till dawn, [my mind was] lucid and profound, lofty and imposing, pristine and flawless. One thought seemed to last for ten-thousand years. The sense realms were tranquil and all persons were forgotten. It was as if I were stupid or senseless. (Chanyao, sect. 1.)

¹⁷ This phrase appears in a famous gong’an involving Zhaozhou Congshen (Kor. Choiju Chongsim) 趙州從(778-897):
“A monk asked Zhaozhou, ‘The myriad dharmas return to one; to what does the one return?’ Zhaozhou replied, ‘When I was in Qingzhou, I made a cloth shirt that weighted seven-jin.’” See Biyan lu 5, case no. 45, T'2003:48.181c17-20; Thomas and J.C. Cleary, Blue Cliff Record (Boulder: Shambhala Press, 1978), vol. 2, p. 318. The phrase appears also in the apocryphal Baozang lun 寶藏論 [Precious storehouse treatise]; T 1857:45.143b-150a; cf. p. 150a2], wrongly attributed to Sengzhao (Kor. Sŏngjo) 僧肇 (374-414), and written sometime between 700 and 815; see Kamata Shigeo, Chogoku Kegon shisōshi no kenkyū (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1965), pp. 375-401. This gong’an is discussed in detail in section eleven of the Essentials of Chan.
The existential doubt created through investigating the hwadu becomes the locus around which all the other doubts experienced in life coalesce. This overwhelming sense of doubt creates intense pressure on the meditator’s intellectual processes and on his own sense of self-identity and self-worth. The coalescence of all the meditator’s thoughts and actions around that doubt produces the courage necessary to abandon himself seemingly to ultimate disaster: his own personal destruction. This courage is what Yuanmiao means by the second of his three essentials, great fury. This fury creates a strong urgency about religious praxis, urgency that is so intense that “is just as if you’ve come across the villain who murdered your father…” This passion sustains the student through the existential crises created by the doubt. Through this fury’s sustaining power, the doubt will not dissipate, but will become increasingly intense. Then, just as a filial son would avenge his father’s death without concern for his own life, so too would the meditator continue to investigate the hwadu until he no longer could resist the mental pressure created by the doubt. At that point the doubt explodes (Ch. po/Kor. p’ā 生), annihilating the student’s identification with body and mind. The bifurcating tendencies of thought are brought to an end and the limiting “point of view” that is the ego is eliminated. One's awareness now has no fixed locus and the distinctions between oneself and others vanish. Consciousness expands infinitely, encompassing the entire universe both spatially and temporally. This is the meaning of enlightenment in the Linji soteriological system. Hence, as in the epigraph to this paper, Yuanmiao can claim that enlightenment means simply to “resolve this one doubt. A thousand doubts or a myriad doubts are just this one doubt. One who resolves this doubt will doubt nothing more. And once one has no further doubts, one will be neither more nor less than Śākyamuni, Maitreya, Vimalakirti, and Elder Pang…” (Chanyao, sect. 11).

Yuanmiao is particularly adept at describing clearly the principal constituents of kanhwa Sŏn, providing detailed instructions on how the technique is to be cultivated in practice, and encouraging lay people who are trying to maintain their religious cultivation amid the distracting secular world. Indeed, the majority of Yuanmiao’s directives are delivered to lay people and his instructions to them illustrate the Chinese penchant to see the ordinary world as the ground of enlightenment. Kanhwa Sŏn sought to foster mental stress, existential quandary, and even emotional anxiety—all states suggested in Yuanmiao’s description of the sensation of doubt as being like “you’ve done a heinous act in secret and are about to be exposed.” It is therefore perhaps no surprise that Yuanmiao considered the laity to be the ideal audience for his directives on Sŏn meditation. The emphasis on doubt in kanhwa meditation encouraged the student to foster all the confusion and perplexity he could muster. For this reason, secular life was the ideal training ground for religious practice because it provided a plethora of situations in which frustration, doubting, and insecurity would appear—all weapons in the arsenal of kanhwa meditation. Moreover the obstacles facing the householder were so ubiquitous and seductive (sex, wealth, fame, and so on, ad infinitum) that a person who was able to withstand them developed a tremendous “dynamism” (Ch. li/Kor. yŏk 力) that was claimed to be superior to that of
the sequestered monk. This dynamism would shake students loose from their attachments and the things with which they identified, and thus help to consummate the radical nonattachment to both body and mind that was the goal of Sōn practice. But it is the peculiarly East Asian Sōn notion of doubt—so radically different from Indian Buddhist interpretations of the term—that plays the pivotal role in transforming the meditator from a deluded ordinary person (prthagjana; Ch. fanfu/Kor. pŏmbu 凡夫) into an enlightened sage.
Consciousness and Luminosity in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism

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The Buddhist teachings on the nature of existence largely concentrate on the taxonomical analysis and exposition of the inner character and propensities of the human mind. The unsatisfactory state of phenomenal existence (sāṃsāra), and the perfected state of emancipation (nirvāṇa), essentially reflect and correspond to the two aspects of the mind in its defiled and purified conditions. In this context, the mind constitutes the primary factor that generates and perpetuates the defiled process and conditions of phenomenal existence, and it is also the primary vehicle and expedient in the process of emancipation from karma and phenomenal existence. As such the mind is asserted to be pure or luminous by nature, but sometime it is contaminated by defilements, and sometime it is purified from them. This paper explores the Buddhist interpretations of the natural or innate condition of the mind. However, it also takes into account the mind’s ethical qualities and some other aspects, which meaningfully contribute to the understanding of its innate propensities. We begin with some of the Buddha’s seminal statements that cast an intellectual scenario and mystic vision for the Buddhist interpretations of consciousness.

The world is led by the mind, and is navigated by the mind. All phenomena (dharma) submit to the power of this single phenomenon, the mind. Monks, the mind is luminous (pabhassara), but sometime it is defiled by adventitious defilements (āgantuka-upakkilesa), and sometime it is cleansed from adventitious defilements. Phenomena are forerun by the mind, have the mind as the best, and are constructed by the mind. If one speaks or acts with corrupted mind, suffering follows one as the wheel follows the footsteps (of the drawing animal). If one speaks or acts with virtuous mind, happiness follows one like one’s shadow that does not dwindle away.

The living beings are defiled through the contamination of the mind (cittasaṃkleśa), and they are purified through the purification of the mind (cittavyavādāna). Avoid all evil (pāpa), Accomplish good deeds (kusala), Purify the mind (citta), Such is the teaching of the Buddhas.

1. In Buddhism there are three principal Sanskrit (and Pāli) terms that are employed to denote what in the west is called mind or consciousness: citta, manas and vijñāna (Pāli viññāna). In western publications these terms are mostly rendered as mind or consciousness, mind, and consciousness. In the Abhidharma sources they are considered to be synonymous. In this paper they are often retained in Sanskrit or Pāli for the sake of clarity and precision, and whenever translated they are rendered as mind or consciousness.

2. Samyutta I, 39; Aṅguttara, II.177; Kośavyākhya, 95.

3. Aṅguttara I, 10.


5. Samyutta III, 151; Vimalakirtinirdesa, 174; Siddhi, 214.

6. Dhammapada, 183.
The first of the above quotations establishes the centrality and supremacy of the mind over all other phenomena. The second quotation asserts the mind’s luminosity, and implicitly indicates that the adventitious defilements do not appertain to the nature of the mind. The third quotations propounds that it is the mind that produces bad and good actions or karma, which respectively generate suffering and happiness. The next quotation is indicative of the two distinct processes that evolve within the mind, the process of contamination and the process of purification. The last quotation stresses the necessity of purifying the mind. Broadly speaking, the Abhidharma and later interpretations of consciousness are largely inspired and rooted in the above statements of the Buddha. Now we proceed to explore specific issues, which are pertinent to the understanding of the nature and condition of the innate mind.

Identity of consciousness as luminosity

The majority of the Abhidharma and later schools do not treat the Buddha’s statement on the mind’s luminosity as a metaphor or simile, but they interpret it as the mind’s innate state and as a category of mystical light. Furthermore, as discussed later, in the Mahāyāna sources the luminous mind is identified with the ultimate reality understood as emptiness, and with the buddha-nature and qualities.

Since in the Buddhist sources the mind is differentiated into different categories, it is pertinent to identify the specific type or layer of the mind that abides as luminosity. As already insinuated above, the Buddhist sources differentiate the stream or flux of consciousness into two intertwined levels or series. In the Theravāda tradition, the flow of consciousness is differentiated into the cognitive series (vīthicitta) and subliminal series (vīthimuttacitta). The Sautrantikas distinguish two levels of consciousness, which they call the subliminal or subtle consciousness (sūksmacitta) and the evolving consciousness (vijñāna). The Yogacāra school divides the flow of consciousness into the store or subliminal consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) and the cognitive consciousness (pravṛtti-vijñāna). In the context of the above differentiations of consciousness into two series or forms, it is the subliminal consciousness that is identified with the mind’s luminosity.

Luminosity of consciousness in the Abhidharma schools

The Pāli Abhidhamma sources primarily provide detailed expositions of the mind’s processes of contamination and purification. Thus the overall aim and scope of these sources is to explain how the mind is defiled, and then to demonstrate how it is purified and liberated from its mundane or kammic entanglement. The Pāli sources do affirm the mind’s luminosity (cittapabhassara), but their interpretation of luminosity is rather restricted in scope. Out of a limited number of references to the mind’s luminosity, we discuss here four passages, which are indicative of the Theravāda position and interpretation of the mind’s luminosity.

In his explanation of the heart as one of the thirty-two parts of the body, Buddhaghosa describes it as being similar to a red lotus bud turned upside down. In the case of those endowed with wisdom this lotus bud is slightly expanded, and in the case of those with sluggish understanding,
it remains merely as a bud. Inside the heart there is a small chamber containing a drop of blood. It is this drop of blood that serves as the support in which the mind-element (manodhātu) and mind-consciousness (manoviññāna) arise and occur. In the people of greedy temperament this drop of blood is red. It is black in those of hateful temperament, murky in those of deluded temperament, and like lentil soup in those of speculative temperament. Finally, in those of wisdom temperament it is bright and pure, and appears brilliant like a washed gem. Thus the inner chamber of the heart, which serves as the physical support of the mind-element and mind-consciousness, is bight and pure in those of wisdom temperament.

In one passage of his commentary on the Dhammasaṅgani, Buddhaghosa refers to the Buddha’s statement on the mind’s luminosity, and explains that the mind is pure and clear (pañcāra) with reference to the subliminal life-continuum (bhavaṅga). Even when the mind is unwholesome (akusala), it is called clear, because it arises from the subliminal life-continuum, just as a tributary of the Ganges is like the Ganges, and a tributary of the Godāvāri is like the Godāvāri. Thus in this passage the mind’s luminosity is clearly identified with its subliminal life-continuum which is asserted to be undefiled.

In the third passage located in the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa explains that in the fourth absorption (jhāna), the mind is made pure by the purity of mindfulness and equanimity. The term purity means that the mind is utterly cleansed in the sense of being luminous (pabhassara). In this passage Buddhaghosa does not explicitly assert the mind’s natural luminosity, but only states that once the mind is purified, its purity is to be understood as being luminous. Then again, in another passage of the same work, he says, “the stain of avarice is one of the dark phenomena (dhamma) that corrupt the mind’s luminous condition (cittapabhassara).” In this passage he reafirms the mind’s luminosity and indicates that it is contaminated by negative phenomena, namely defilements.

The Mahāsāṅghikas maintain that the mind’s nature (cittasvabhāva) is fundamentally pure (mūlavisuddha), but it can be contaminated by adventitious defilements. They further maintained that the proclivities (anuśaya) are not the mind or the mental concomitants (cāitta), and are not associated with the mind (cittaviprayukta). On the other hand the defilements called ensnarements (paryavasthāna) are associated with the mind (cittasaṃprayukta). Since this school asserts the mind’s fundamental purity, it seems that they postulate that initially or primordially the mind is pure, but it becomes contaminated by adventitious defilements.

The Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the mind is not naturally luminous, but it is initially or originally contaminated by defilements, and must be purified by abandoning defilements. For them a primordially luminous mind cannot be contaminated by adventitious defilements. If such a mind were contaminated by adventitious defilements, then these naturally impure defilements would become pure once they become associated with the naturally luminous mind. On the other hand, if adventitious defilements remained to be impure, then a naturally luminous mind would not become defiled by their presence. For them the constantly evolving mind is in possession of defilements. In the first instance, it is necessary to eradicate the final bonds with defilements. Once defilements are eradicated, there arises the liberated mind of an arhat (aśaikṣa).

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10. Atthasālīni, 140.
12. Visuddhimagga, VII.110.
14. E. Lamotte, 1962, 53-54; Kośa, VI, kārikās 75-77 and the commentary.
The above-discussed schools basically agree that the purified mind is luminous. However, there is some salient controversy as to whether the mind is primordially or naturally luminous and subsequently becomes defiled and purified, or whether it is initially defiled and then becomes purified. The Vaibhāśikas controversially assert that the mind is not originally in the state of purity or luminosity, but it is in possession of defilements, and subsequently becomes purified. The other schools reaffirm the Buddha’s statement that the mind is luminous. The Mahāsāṅghikas assertion that the mind is fundamentally pure does implicitly postulate that it is primordially luminous. The Theravāda statement that the mind is pure and clear even when it is unwholesome can be interpreted in the sense that this tradition also considers the mind to be naturally pure.

The Mahāyāna sources refute the perceptions of the mind in terms of contamination and purification as being misconceptions, and firmly assert the mind’s primordial luminosity. They refer to the mind as being prakṛti-prabhāsvara, which clearly means that the mind is primordially or naturally luminous. However, prior to a full discussion of the Mahāyāna position on the mind’s luminosity, we briefly ascertain the Abhidharma exposition of the mind’s ethical qualities.

**Ethical qualities of consciousness in Pāli sources**

In the Abhidharma sources, the ethical qualities of consciousness are not established with reference to consciousness as such or on its own, but rather in the context of its relation to the wholesome (kuśala) or unwholesome roots (akusala-mūla). As discussed above the mind is luminous, but its existential qualities are acquired in cooperation with its concomitants and through interaction with the empirical world.

The Pāli Abhidhamma sources identify eighty-one conditioned dhammas and one unconditioned dhamma, which are divided into four groups or categories: matter (rūpa), consciousness (citta), mental concomitants (cetasika), and nibbāna. In this configuration consciousness is classed as a single dhama, and all other sentient or mental states are classed as concomitants numbering fifty-two. Thus, we have here altogether fifty-three dhammas that encompass all conscious or mental states.\(^{15}\)

In terms of their inner relationship, the consciousness and its concomitants always arise and cease together and have the same object. The overall function of the concomitants is to assist the consciousness in their respective capacities. Some concomitants such as contact, sensation, perception and volition assist it in the process of cognition and in the interaction with the cognized objects. Through contact and sensation the consciousness encounters and experiences the object. Perception perceives and interprets it, and volition denotes the intentional aspect of consciousness, and its function is to accumulate kamma. The above four concomitants can be ethically good or bad, depending whether they arise in conjunction with wholesome or unwholesome cittas. Among all the concomitants, twelve are classed as unwholesome and twenty-five as wholesome. The unwholesome concomitants endow the consciousness with ethically negative qualities, and they include greed, hatred, delusion, wrong views, and conceit. In contrast the wholesome concomitants endow it with ethically positive qualities, and they include non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, faith and mindfulness.\(^{16}\)

\(^{15}\). *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, 23, 76.

\(^{16}\). For a detailed exposition of the fifty-two cetasikas see *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, chapter two.
Having sketched the inner content of the mental complex, we now proceed to consider the ethical qualities of consciousness itself.

Although the Abhidhamma sources classify the citta as one single dhamma, they distinguish a variety of cittas in relation to the three existential spheres (tedhātuka), and to the wholesome and unwholesome concomitants.

In terms of its occurrence or non-occurrence in the three existential spheres, the Pāli sources distinguish four grades or levels (bhūmi) of consciousness: three mundane and one supramundane. Three types of consciousness that occur in one of the three existential spheres are classed as mundane consciousness (lokiya-citta). They are classed in this way because they are ethically qualified in the sense of being existentially conditioned. The fourth type of consciousness that does not appertain to any of the three existential spheres is classed as supramundane (lokuttara-citta).17 This consciousness does not appertain to any of the three mundane spheres, because it is linked with the supramundane path, as discussed below.

Taking into account its ethical qualities (jāti) acquired under the influence of its concomitants, the consciousness is also classified into four categories: unwholesome (akusala), wholesome (kusala), undetermined (avyākata), and supramundane (lokuttara).18

Consciousness is classed as unwholesome when it arises in association with the three unwholesome roots (akusalamūla): greed, hatred, and delusion. This type of consciousness is described as mentally sound, ethically defiled, and productive of negative results. In contrast when it is associated with the three wholesome roots (kusalamūla): non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion, it is classed as wholesome, and is ethically blameless and productive of positive results. In relation to the existential spheres, the unwholesome consciousness is classed as mundane, and it arises only in the Kāmāvacara. The wholesome types of consciousness are classed as mundane or supramundane. The kammically wholesome consciousness is mundane, and it can occur in all three existential spheres. The wholesome consciousness that is refined and purified from defilements and kamma, is classed as supramundane because it does not appertain to any of the three existential spheres.19

The undetermined category of consciousness is subdivided into resultant (vipākacitta) and functional (kriyācitta) types. The resultant types of consciousness are classed as undetermined in order to distinguish them from their causes, which are either wholesome or unwholesome. When they arise in the existential spheres as the results of the mundane types of consciousness, they are classed as mundane, and when they arise as the fruition of the four transcendental paths, they are classed as supramundane. The functional types of consciousness are classed as undetermined, because they are merely mental activities without any kamma potency. These functional types of consciousness denote the mental activities of liberated people such as arhats during their lifetime, and they may occur in all three existential spheres.

The Pāli Abhidhamma sources identify twelve types of unwholesome consciousness, which occur when consciousness is associated in different configurations with one of the unwholesome roots, accompanied by sensation of either mental joy or equanimity, associated with or dissociated

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18. Visuddhimagga, XIV.82, 88; Abhidhammattha-saṅgha, 29.
from wrong views, and prompted by spontaneous or instigated volition. These twelve types of unwholesome consciousness yield seven resultant types of unwholesome consciousness. During the lifetime, these seven types of consciousness occur in the cognitive process as the five kinds of sense consciousness, the mind-element, and the mind-consciousness. At the time of conception, they occur as the rebirth-linking consciousness in one of the unhappy destinies.

In the Kāmāvacara there arise eight types of wholesome consciousness. These types of consciousness are associated with one of the three wholesome roots, accompanied by sensation of either mental joy or equanimity, associated with or dissociated from correct knowledge, and assisted by spontaneous or instigated volition. These types of wholesome consciousness are also called meritorious (puṇya), because they produce good results and inhibit the force of defilements. They arise in good ordinary people, and in the three lower grades of trainees or noble persons. They do not arise in arhats and Buddhas, because they have transcended the cycle of kamma and future rebirths. The above eight types of wholesome consciousness yield eight resultant types of consciousness, which occur in the cognitive series during the lifetime, and in the latent series at the time of conception as the rebirth-linking consciousness in the happy places of the Kāmāvacara. These eight types of resultant consciousness do not arise in arhats and Buddhas. Instead, in their case there arise eight types of corresponding consciousness, which are classed as functional, because they perform their respective functions, but do not generate any kammic deposits.

In the two higher existential spheres there arise nine types of wholesome consciousness, five in the Rūpāvacara and four in the Arūpāvacara. The Rūpāvacara types of consciousness occur in one of the five absorptions, and they are associated in different configurations with the five meditational factors: initial application, sustained application, zest, happiness, and one-pointedness. The Arūpāvacara types of consciousness respectively take as their object the plane of the infinite space and the three higher planes. The above nine types of consciousness occur in the beings reborn in these existential spheres, and in accomplished meditators who are capable of gaining the absorptions and the formless attainments (saṃpatti). The wholesome types of consciousness in these two spheres yield their respective types of resultant consciousness, which occur in the beings reborn in these spheres. In the course of an existence they occur as the rebirth-linking, bhavaṅga and death types of consciousness. The resultant types of consciousness of these two spheres are classed as functional for the same reason as the resultant consciousness in the Kāmāvacara, as explained above.

The supramundane consciousness is classified into eight types: four wholesome and four resultant. These types of consciousness appertain to the process of emancipation from samsāra, and to the attainment of nibbāna. All eight types are expressive of the four stages of spiritual attainment:

21. akusala-vipāka-citta.
23. Visuddhimagga, XVII.180.
27. While in the Pāli suttas there are four basic absorptions (jhāna), the Abhidhamma texts distinguish five absorptions by dividing the second absorption into two.
28. Visuddhimagga, XIV.86; Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha, 52.
29. Visuddhimagga, X.1, 12, 16, 20, 23, 25, 32, 40, 49; XIV.87; Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha, 60-64.
30. Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha, 51, 52, 60, 68; Visuddhimagga, XIV.103, 104.
stream-entry, once-return, non-return, and arhatship. The four types of wholesome consciousness constitute the four transcendental paths called the path-consciousness (*maggacitta*), and the four resultant types of consciousness constitute their fruition called the fruition-consciousness (*phalacitta*). The object of these eight types of consciousness is the same, namely *nibbāna*, but their functions are different. The function of the wholesome types of consciousness is to eradicate specific defilements and impure mental states, and the four types of fruition-consciousness perform the function of experiencing the four corresponding degrees of emancipation. The four paths and their fruitions occur in the cognitive series of consciousness, and are gained through the purification from defilements, and through the development of wisdom. The differentiation into these four paths is largely established and determined in relation to the grades or levels of purification, and also to the degree and intensity of concentration in which the consciousness is purified and refined into these four grades.\(^{32}\)

In summary, the Pāli Abhidhamma identifies eighty-nine types of consciousness: eighty-one mundane and eight supramundane. The majority of the mundane types of consciousness, fifty-four, occurs in the Kāmāvacara, where the flux of consciousness is highly diffused and diversified. In the two higher spheres in which consciousness is concentrated and refined, there are fewer and only wholesome *cittas*: fifteen in the Rūpāvacara, and twelve in the highest sphere. The eight-supramundane *cittas* are also classed as wholesome, but they are mostly referred to as being supramundane, because they do not appertain to any of the three existential spheres.

**Ethical qualities of consciousness in the Sarvāstivāda school**

The Sarvāstivāda school identifies seventy-two conditioned and three unconditioned *dharmas*, which are divided into five groups or categories:\(^{33}\) matter (*rūpa*), consciousness (*citta*), concomitants associated with consciousness (*citta-samprayukta* or *caitta*), concomitants dissociated from consciousness (*citta-viprayukta*), and three unconditioned *dharmas*.\(^{34}\) In this classification the consciousness is also classed as one single *dharma*, and all other mental states are included among the forty-six associated and fourteen dissociated concomitants. In this configuration there are sixty-one *dharmas* that account for all mental states.\(^{35}\) Although this classification is slightly different from the Pāli classification, basically it comprises the same categories of mental concomitants, which assist the consciousness in the process of cognition and influence its ethical qualities. The fourteen dissociated concomitants are an innovation, and they include such factors as the homogeneity of different types of living beings, the life-force, and the four characteristics of the conditioned *dharmas*: origination, persistence, decay and disappearance.\(^{36}\)

\(^{32}\) *Visuddhimagga*, XIV.88, 105; *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, 65-68, 72.

\(^{33}\) *Kośa*, II, 180.

\(^{34}\) *space* (*ākāśa*), cessation through knowledge (*pratisamkhya-nirodha*), and cessation without knowledge (*apratisamkhya-nirodha*). The disjunction from the impure (*sāsrava* *)dharmas* is called *pratisamkhya-nirodha* or *nirvāna*. The cessation without knowledge essentially consists in the obstruction of the arising (*upāda*) of *dharmas* in the future. It is not gained through the knowledge of the four noble truths, but it occurs because of the insufficiency of causes of rebirth (*pratyayasamkalyya*). *Kośa*, I, 19-22.

\(^{35}\) *Kośa*, II, 185, 209.

\(^{36}\) For a detailed exposition of the Sarvāstivāda concomitants see *Kośa*, II, 185-95. A convenient listing of the Sarvāstivāda classification of *dharmas* is compiled in Th. Stcherbatsky, 1979, 96-107.
While the Pāli sources identify eighty-nine types of consciousness, the Sarvāstivāda masters identify only twelve types: four in the Kāmadhātu, three in the Rūpadhātu, three in the Ārūpyadhātu, and two types of pure consciousness. It cannot be explained here in detail but only indicated that although the Sarvāstivāda taxonomic principles differ in several respects from the principles of the Pāli sources, they are broadly similar. It is the flavor and impact of the associated concomitants that determine the ethical quality of consciousness.

In addition to the classification of consciousness in relation to its concomitant, the Sarvāstivāda has another taxonomic principle, which determines how all phenomena (dharma) are wholesome or unwholesome.

According to the Kośa, the dharmas are wholesome or unwholesome in four different ways: in reality (paramārtha), by nature (svabhava), by association (samprayoga), or by instigation (utthāna).

The state of deliverance (mokṣa) is said to be wholesome in reality. The state of nirvāṇa as the final cessation of suffering is a state of perfect peace, and hence it is wholesome in reality. The remaining categories of the wholesome things are not wholesome in an absolute sense, but only in the following three ways. The wholesome roots are wholesome by nature, regardless of their association or cause. Volition and other concomitants (caitta) associated with the wholesome roots are wholesome by association. When they are not associated with these three roots, they are not qualified as wholesome. Finally, bodily and verbal actions are wholesome by instigation when they are prompted by the dharmas that are wholesome by nature and by association.

The unwholesome dharmas are said to be the opposite of the wholesome dharmas, and they are also classified in the same four ways. Samsāra as the process of all suffering is unwholesome in reality. The unwholesome roots are unwholesome by nature. Volition and other concomitants associated with the unwholesome roots are unwholesome by association. Finally, bodily and verbal actions are unwholesome by instigation when they are prompted by the unwholesome roots and the dharmas associated with them.

In conclusion to the expositions of the ethical qualities of consciousness in the Pāli and Sarvāstivāda sources, some general observations may be offered.

The ethical qualities of consciousness are essentially established in its cognitive series, and in relation to its concomitants. When consciousness is associated with wholesome or unwholesome roots, it is respectively classified as wholesome or unwholesome. Similarly, it is classified as wholesome or unwholesome, depending whether it is associated with wholesome or unwholesome concomitants. However, the above studied sources do not say anything concrete about the subliminal consciousness and its relationship to the cognitive consciousness. As we have seen above, consciousness is said to be luminous, and it is understood to be the subliminal consciousness. On the other hand the purification of consciousness is achieved by eradicating defilements in its active or cognitive condition. Once the consciousness is purified, the Pāli sources classify it as supramundane, and the Sarvāstivāda

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37. Kāmadhātu: 1. wholesome (kuśala), 2. unwholesome (akaśala), 3. tainted-undetermined (nivṛta-avyākṛta), 4. untainted-undetermined (anivṛta-avyākṛta); Rūpadhātu: 5. wholesome, 6. tainted-undetermined, 7. untainted-undetermined; Ārūpyadhātu 8. wholesome, 9. tainted-undetermined, 10. untainted-undetermined; pure (anāsraya): 11. trainee (śākṣa), 12. arhat (aśākṣa). Kośa, II.195, 357. We can only indicate here that these twelve cittas are further subdivided into twenty. Kośa, II, 362.

38. Kośa, IV, kārikās 8-10 and the commentary.
masters referred to it as the arhat’s consciousness. However, since ultimately there is only one consciousness, it is not explicitly evident how the consciousness is concurrently luminous and ethically qualified as wholesome or unwholesome, or how the subliminal and cognitive types of consciousness can be coextensive and how they correlate. The Mahāyāna sources spot this ambiguous situation and attempt to resolve it in different ways, as discussed in the sections that now follow.

Luminosity of Consciousness in Mahāyāna sources

While the Abhidharma sources largely analyzed the character of consciousness in terms of its ethical qualities, the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna pay more attention to the innate propensities of consciousness. In its innermost condition, the consciousness is understood as being pure or luminous irrespective of the ethical qualities that it may acquire. Considered in its innate condition, it is said to abide in a state of non-duality, but when it is defiled, it arises and functions in the form of duality. Its appearance in a dual form is attributed to ignorance (avidyā) as the main source of defiled or erroneous misconceptions. The ultimate goal is not just the purification of consciousness from discursive misconceptions, but also the attainment of omniscience by awakening its pristine potentialities. Doctrinally the state of omniscience is largely understood as the elimination of all conceptual polarities, and as the attainment of the buddha-attributes (buddhadharma) in order to benefit all living beings.

We begin our exploration of the innate character of consciousness by quoting once more the Buddha’s statement on the luminosity of consciousness, which has profoundly influenced the Mahāyāna interpretations of consciousness. In Mahāyāna sources the term prabhāsvara is qualified by the term prakṛti, which clearly indicates that consciousness is naturally or primordially luminous.

Monks, this mind is naturally luminous (prakṛti-prabhāsvara-citta), but sometimes it is contaminated by the adventitious defilements, and sometimes it is purified from them.

Although this statement of the Buddha is recorded in the canonical sources, as we have seen apart from a number of meaningful comments and clarifications, the Abhidharma sources do not really offer theoretical elaborations on the luminosity of consciousness. By contrast the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna theories of consciousness are largely based on the presupposition of its natural luminosity. Let us see some examples of how the Mahāyāna texts interpret the luminosity of the mind. In the Pañcavimsatī it is interpreted in the following way.

This mind (citta) is no-mind (acitta), because its natural character is luminous. What is this state of the mind’s luminosity (prabhāsvaratā)? When the mind is neither associated with nor dissociated from greed, hatred, delusion, proclivities (anuśaya), fetters (saṃyojana), or false views (drṣṭi), then this constitutes its luminosity. Does the mind exist as no-mind? In the state of no-mind (acittatā), the states of existence (asti) or non-existence (nāsti) can be neither found nor established... What is this state of no-mind? The state of no-mind, which is immutable (avikāra) and undifferentiated (avikalpa), constitutes the ultimate reality (dharmatā) of all dharmas. Such is the state of no-mind. Just as the mind is immutable and undifferentiated, in the same way the five aggregates, the twelve bases, the eighteen elements, the dependent origination, the six perfections, the thirty-seven limbs of
enlightenment (bodhipakṣika), the attributes of the Buddha (buddhadharma), and the supreme and perfect enlightenment are immutable and undifferentiated.39

In this quotation, the mind’s luminosity is asserted to be the mind in the state of-no-mind. Then it is explained that the state of no-mind, being immutable and without mental differentiations, constitutes the ultimate reality of all phenomena. Then again it is asserted that the Buddha qualities and enlightenment are immutable in the same way as the mind, which would suggest that they are the same.

In the Bhadrapāla-sūtra, the consciousness is metaphorically compared to the wind element and to the sunrays. This text explains that although formless and imperceptible, the wind element exists and manifests itself when it shakes trees or blows cold or warm air. It carries pleasant and unpleasant fragrances, but as such it remains stainless and formless. Similarly, although it is formless, the element of consciousness (vijñānadhātu) accomplishes all forms and penetrates all things. Due to its power there arise sensations and volitions, and through them the realm of phenomena (dharma-dhātu) classified as wholesome and unwholesome. However, as such consciousness is pure, and although it penetrates all things, it is not clad in them. While it operates through the sense faculties and the five aggregates of clinging, it is perceived as defiled, but as such it remains unaffected by bad karma, just as the stainless sunrays remain undefiled by any impurity.40

This sūtra postulates that consciousness generates the realm of phenomena, and that when it is entangled and operates through the defiled aggregates, it is perceived as being defiled. However, as such it is not polluted by defilements, but remains stainless like the wind or the sunrays.

While the Pañcaviṃśati provides a philosophical exposition of the mind’s luminosity, and while the Bhadrapāla-sūtra explains its purity through metaphors, the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra explicitly equates the buddha-nature (tathāgagārba) with the store consciousness. This text says that the buddha-nature is luminous and pure, and that it is endowed with the thirty-two major marks (lakṣaṇa). It is however disguised in the body of all beings, like a gem wrapped in a dirty piece of cloth. It is enveloped by the aggregates, and stained with the impurities of greed, hatred, delusion, and false imagination.41 It holds within itself the cause (hetu) of the wholesome and unwholesome things, and it produces all forms of existence (jānмагati). Since it is covered with the latent permutations (vāsanā), it is identified with the store consciousness and its retinue of the seven vijñānas.42

According to the Yoga Tantra class, Śākyamuni Buddha as Siddhārtha attained the supreme enlightenment through the visualization of his mind as a lunar disc (candra), and through a set of five mystical realizations (abhisambodhī).43 Commenting on Siddhārtha’s enlightenment, Indrabhūti provides the following interpretation of the mind as a lunar disc.

Being luminous by nature, this mind is similar to the moon’s disc. The lunar disc epitomizes the knowledge (jñāna) that is luminous by nature. Just as the waxing moon gradually emerges in its fullness, in the same way the mind-jewel (cittaratna), being naturally luminous, also fully emerges in its perfected state. Just as the moon becomes fully visible, once it is freed from the accidental obscurities, in the same way the mind-jewel, being pure by nature

39. Pañcaviṃśati, 121-122. For insightful comments on this passage, see Haribhadra, 37-40.
40. Bhadrapālasṛṣṭiparipṛcchā-sūtra, T.T.P., vol. 24, 169.5.4-170.4.2.
41. Laṅkāvatāra, 77-78.
42. ibid., 220-24.
43. Sarvatathāgatattvasamgraha, 7-8.
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(prakṛti-pariṣuddha), once separated from the stains of defilements (kleśa), appears as the perfected buddha-qualities (guna).\(^{44}\)

In the tantras the lunar disc essentially denotes a category of mystical light or luminosity. It is from this light that the yogis summon perfected Buddha images with which they identify themselves, in order to acquire their buddha-qualities and attributes. Thus viewed together, the above texts do not regard the mind’s luminosity as merely a metaphor, but they firmly consider it as its innate condition, and equate it with the buddha-nature and qualities.

**Consciousness as bodhicitta**

The concept of bodhicitta (enlightenment-mind) is central to the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna theory and practice in terms of its paramount importance for the realisation of enlightenment. Fundamentally the bodhicitta is the seed of buddhahood, which is brought to its efflorescence during the Bodhisattva career.

In Mahāyāna sources the concept of bodhicitta incorporates a pair of complementary factors, such as aspiration for enlightenment and its implementation, emptiness and compassion, wisdom and means, and its conventional (saṃvṛti) and absolute (paramārtha) forms or aspects.\(^{45}\)

The above pairs are said to incorporate all the requisites that are necessary to attain the state of buddhahood. Commenting on the first pair, the texts explain that the bodhicitta as an aspiration for enlightenment consists of an intense volition (cetanā) to become a Buddha and to benefit living beings. Essentially, this aspirational thought (pranidhīcitta) encapsulates the seminal cause or potentiality of enlightenment. It is the mind that arouses its pristine energies that are necessary to attain buddhahood. The implementation basically amounts to the gradual maturation of enlightenment during the Bodhisattva career. In connection with this pair the texts identify twenty-two varieties of bodhicitta. The twenty-second and final bodhicitta is said to be associated with the absolute body (dharma-kāya), which reveals itself as the manifested body (nirmāṇakāya) in order to benefit living beings.\(^{46}\) Prajñākaramati says that the aspirational citta is volition in the form of a wish for buddhahood and the benefit of other beings, and that its implementation is the progress towards buddhahood.\(^{47}\)

In the next two pairs, the components of emptiness and wisdom denote the perfection of wisdom, and the components of compassion and means incorporate the other five perfections. The texts also speak of the Bodhisattva’s accumulation of merit and knowledge (punya-jñāna). In this configuration the accumulation of merit consists in the practice of the first five perfections, and the accumulation of knowledge focuses on the perfection of wisdom. The conventional and transcendent aspects of bodhicitta have variant interpretations, but in terms of the Bodhisattva path,

\(^{44}\) Indrabhūti’s Jñānasiddhi, 82.

\(^{45}\) In some texts the bodhicitta is said to be fourfold: all the samayas are comprised in the bodhicitta which is fourfold, namely bodhicitta, anuttara bodhicitta, Samantabhadra’s bodhicitta, and vajrabodhicitta. Dipankarasṛjñāna, TTP, vol. 81, 211.3. In another text it is said that the benefit of monastic vows is the attainment arhatship, that of bodhicitta is the attainment of buddhahood, and that of the vidyādharā vow is the attainment of buddhahood in this very life. Vibhūtisundra, TTP, vol. 81, 215.3.6.

\(^{46}\) For more details see Haribhadra’s Āloka, 16-27, and Prajñākaramati’s Pañjikā, 11-13.

\(^{47}\) Prajñākaramati, 11-12.
the conventional bodhicitta accumulates merit and knowledge, and the transcendent bodhicitta denotes the ultimate insight into emptiness as the ultimate reality of all phenomena.48

Which type of consciousness occurs at the time of cittotpāda? According to Vimuktisena, it is the manovijñāna that grasps all pure dharmas, and becomes aware of the mind’s ultimate realization (cittādhigama).49 Asaṅga says that cittotpāda is a volition of mighty enthusiasm, initiative, purpose, outcome, and a double objective (dvayārtha): the supreme enlightenment and the benefit of other beings.50 Commenting on Asaṅga’s statement, Haribhadra explains that cittotpāda denotes the citta grasping a pre-eminent object in association with volition as a concomitant consisting of zest. He further explains that it is the citta grounded in an earnest wish characterised by zest for all wholesome dharmas.51

The above sources firmly stress that cittotpāda is the mind unwaveringly set on buddhahood. When one takes into consideration the two components of bodhicitta, they seem to broadly correspond to the cognitive and latent aspects of consciousness. Ultimately, emptiness denotes the attainment of enlightenment and dharmakāya, and the practice of compassion accumulates the merit for the attainment of a physical buddha-body (rūpakāya). Thus, while the defiled consciousness erroneously perceives the nature of existence and produces karma, which in turn produces mundane bodies, the bodhicitta abides in wisdom and compassion, and strives to mature them in the form of omniscience and buddha-attributes. It is thus the transcendent merit and knowledge that supplant the workings of mundane karma and ignorance.

In the tantras, the bodhicitta is predominantly interpreted as a mystical experience, which consists in the union or blending (samyoga) of wisdom and means. In these texts, the pair of wisdom and means is identified with a number of specifically tantric pairs such as vajra and bell, or male and female. The bodhicitta is also described as the melting of the male and female deities, or it is hypostasized in the form of Vajrasattva as the supreme deity epitomizing the ultimate reality. Consciousness as bodhicitta is also identified with the innate forces circulating within the body, such as psychic channels (nāḍī) and centers (cakra), or as semen (bindu). Essentially, the tantras emphasise the yogic experience of bodhicitta within the body. The ultimate character of bodhicitta is described as the inexpressible reality, beginningless and endless, neither existent nor non-existent, non-substantial like emptiness and space, as the essence of the Tathāgatas or Samantabhadra. Since there is the non-substantiality and sameness of all dharmas, the bodhicitta is unborn, devoid of existence, nondual, vajra, luminosity, enlightenment, and Vajrasattva.52

The above discussion of bodhicitta basically shows how the innate energies and potentialities of consciousness can be aroused and directed towards the attainment of the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna forms of enlightenment. These two traditions recognize the need to eradicate defilements and ignorance as mental misconceptions, but otherwise they essentially focus on the arousal and maturation of the pristine propensities of consciousness in the form of perfected enlightenment.

50. Mahāyānasūtṛāṇāṃkāra, IV.1.
51. Haribhadra, 24.
52. Anāṅgavajra, chapters II.29 and IV.17. For a set of different descriptions of bodhicitta see chapter two of Guhyasamāja. See also Indrabhūti’s Jñānasiddhi, in particular pages 82-84 where he quotes a number of sources.
Consciousness as fourfold luminosity

Some of the tantric masters in India formulated an ingenious theory, which propounds a fourfold luminosity of consciousness as four kinds of emptiness. This theory is largely based on the Yogācāra exposition of the aggregate of consciousness as being threefold: store consciousness (ālayavijñāna), contaminated mind (kliśṭa-manas), and six kinds of cognitive consciousness (vijñāna). Succinctly stated the inner character and propensities of these three categories of consciousness are explained as three characteristics or natures (svabhāva): perfected (parinispāna), dependent (paratantra), and imagined (parikalpita). These three aspects are briefly explained in the next section on the nonduality of consciousness.

The above three natures or aspects of consciousness are correlated with three kinds of luminosity and three kinds of emptiness. A fourth category of luminosity and a fourth category of emptiness are added to epitomize the ultimate and nondual character of consciousness. Below we quote a selection of verses from the tantric Nāgārjuna’s Pañcakrama, which sketch the correlations of the four sets of luminosity and emptiness, and outline the basic process leading to the final realization.

- Emptiness (śūnya), extreme emptiness (atiśūnya), great emptiness (mahāśūnya), these three, and universal emptiness (sarvaśūnya) as fourth, are differentiated by cause and effect (hetuphala). (4)
- Through the union (samāyoga) of wisdom (prajñā) and means (upāya) the realization is attained, and from this attained realization there emerges the luminosity (prabhāsvara) of the universal emptiness. (5)
- The purity of the causal process (hetukrama) derives from the application of the three states of consciousness (vijñāna), and through the union of the three kinds of emptiness there is gained the supreme stage (anuttarapada). (6)
- Emptiness is radiance (āloka), wisdom (prajñā), and the mind (citta) in its dependent aspect (paratantra). Next I explain the effulgence of its natural state (prakṛti). (7)
- The extreme emptiness is explained as the effulgence of radiance (ālokābhāsa), as the means (upāya), as the imagined (parikalpita), and as the mental complex (caitasika). (15)
- The Buddhas explained the state of the great emptiness as being both the perception of radiance (ālokopalabdhi), as well as what is perceived. It is the perfected (parinispāna), and is called nescience (avidyā). (23)
- The mind is said to be threefold as radiance (āloka), effulgence of radiance (ālokābhāsa), and perception of radiance (ālokopalabdha), and thus its foundation (ādhāra) is established. (29)
- One imagines the self-nature of wisdom (prajñāsvabhāva) as a lunar disc (candra), and one also perceives the mind itself as having the form of the moon. (45)
- Then focusing on the moon, one should perceive the sign of the vajra. This is identified as the means of the yogis who practice the generation of the vajra and the rest. (46)
- Through the union of the moon and the vajra there results the union of the mind (citta) and mental concomitants (caitta), and through the union of wisdom (prajñā) and means (upāya) there arises the form of the deity (devatā). (47)
• After executing the four attitudes (mudrā), and assuming the pride of the deity, the mantrin endowed with the process of generation (utpattikrama) should constantly persist. (48)

• Now comes the explanation of the perfected yoga (parinispellavayoga). It is luminosity (prabhāsva) that constitutes the purity of the first three kinds of emptiness. The stage of the universal emptiness arises through the purity of the three aspects of knowledge (jñāna). (50)

• It is the stage of pure knowledge (jñāna), the ultimate reality (tattva), and supreme omniscience (sarvajñātva). It is immutable (nirvikāra), unmanifested (nirābhāsa), nondual (nirdvanda), supreme (parama), and peaceful (śiva). It is neither is (asti) nor is not (nāsti), as it is not within the sphere of words (vākyagocara). (51)

• It is from this pure luminosity that arise the three aspects of knowledge in the form of one who is endowed with the thirty-two major marks (lakṣana) and the eighty minor marks (vyañjana). And thus is born the omniscient one (sarvajña) endowed with all the perfected attributes (sarvakāra). (52)

The above excerpt is somewhat terse, but it does neatly outline the stages of visualizing and understanding the three aspects of consciousness, and then merging them and bringing consciousness to its ultimate state. It is a particular kind of mental vision, which focuses on the luminous mind as emptiness, and aims to achieve the fusion of mental polarities, which culminates in the attainment of the Buddha attributes.

In Tibet the above fourfold configuration of consciousness as luminosity and emptiness has been adopted to explain the process of dissolution at the time of dying. It is impossible to deal here with the complex history of the teachings on the process of dying, which eventually culminated in the composition of the so-called Tibetan Book of the Dead. We limited our discussion to explaining the central stages in the process of dying and dissolution of consciousness.54

The relevant texts distinguish four intermediate states of consciousness. In Tibetan these intermediate states are called bardo: bardo of lifetime, bardo of dying, bardo of reality, and bardo of becoming reborn. We are concerned here mainly with the bardo of dying.

The bardo of dying denotes the interval between the first moment of dying and the moment when the inner breath is cut off. During this interval there occur two dissolutions, one coarse and one subtle. The coarse dissolution basically consists of the body’s physical death, although consciousness still remains in it.

The subtle dissolution consists of four consecutive appearances or visions of white, red, black, and luminous lights. These four light appearances are identified with four categories of emptiness. It is explained that they do not come from anywhere, but are forms of consciousness itself. The retrogression of consciousness through these four appearances is correlated with the movements of the three vital channels and the white and red essences. The three channels are the well-known tantric channels located within the body: central channel (avadhūti), right channel (rasanā), and left channel (lalanā). The white and red essences constitute the energies of the right and left channels.

53. Pañcakrama, chapter II.
54. For a doctrinal background and history of The Tibetan Book of the Dead, consult B.J. Cuevas, 2003; and for its comprehensive study, refer to F. Fremantle, 2001.
Initially all the energy channels within the body dissolve into the right and left channels. Then the white and red essences gather above and below the central channel, and appear in the forms of A and Ha.

White appearance. At this moment the white essence descends into the heart, and there arises a white appearance similar to the cloudless sky flooded with moonlight. This is called the experience of appearance, because this appearance is pure brightness. This moment is called the luminosity of emittance, or emptiness as luminosity. The subtle mind is no longer discursive, but it is still subtly conceptual and dualistic. The coarse objectivity or awareness of the external world is suppressed.

Red appearance. This time the red essence ascends into the heart, and there arises a red appearance, which resembles the sky at sunrise or sunset. As the mind shines with greater intensity, this appearance is called the experience of expanded appearance. This moment is called the luminosity of extreme emptiness. In this experience the coarse subjectivity or the sense of subjective identity is suppressed.

Black appearance. As the white and red essences meet inside the heart, the energy of the life-channel becomes suppressed. This time there arises a black appearance like a pitch-black night, and it is called the experience of the attained appearance in the suppressed consciousness. This moment is called the luminosity of great emptiness. At this point all coarse dualities of consciousness become fully suppressed, and consciousness utterly loses the sense of identity.

Luminosity. In the fourth and final moment, the letters A and Ha become dissolved, and there arises luminosity similar to a cloudless sky. This luminosity is boundless and has no center or parameter, and is called the luminosity of universal emptiness. It is also called the luminosity of death, and it constitutes the actual moment of death. As such, this moment is referred to as the luminosity of reality (dharmatā), the absolute body (dharmakāya), or the great bliss (mahāsukha). The texts explain that the luminosity of death is experienced by all beings, as all beings are endowed with the seed or potentiality of enlightenment. If at this moment the consciousness is able to act in conformity with the training and instructions received during the lifetime, it never re-emerges from this luminous and non-discursive state. It realizes the state of buddhahood, and abides in the ultimate realm (dharmadhātu).

It is said that ordinary people may remain in the state of luminosity for up to four days, and that some accomplished yogis may remain in it for much longer. After that the consciousness leaves the dead body. In the case of the people who fail to recognize the luminosity of universal emptiness, because of the intervention of karmic forces, a slight vibration occurs in the luminosity, and the reverse process of consciousness begins to evolve. Next there follows the bardo of reality in which the consciousness has visions of peaceful and wrathful Buddha manifestations. These Buddha manifestations attempt to redirect the consciousness back to the state of luminosity. If the consciousness fails to understand those visions, it progresses to the bardo of becoming, and is reborn in a new body.55

It is fairly apparent that the above fourfold luminosity of consciousness is a form of mystic light or propensity, which is experienced in meditation or in the process of the subtle dissolution of consciousness at the time of dying. During the life time the luminous mind can be visualized

and awakened to its natural purity. This particular type of visualizing the mind as luminosity and emptiness is peculiar to the tantric method of meditation called evocation (sādhana). In the course of such evocations, skilled meditators disperse light from their consciousness located in the heart into space conceived as emptiness, evoke from it perfected Buddha manifestations, and then identify themselves with their Buddha attributes and qualities. The theory of dying as the transition through four kinds of luminosity is unique to Tibet, in particular to the Nyima and Kagyu traditions. According to these traditions one can train to re-enact in meditation the process of dying. Then at the time of dying one transfers the consciousness to the realm of luminosity or into one’s chosen deity.56

Duality and Nonduality of Consciousness

The Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna concept of nonduality is largely rooted in their doctrinal assumptions, which assert that all discursive differentiations into polarities such as impurity and purity, subject and object, or samsāra and nirvāṇa are defective, because they do not correspond to the true state of existence. In the context of consciousness, its duality and nonduality are largely explained with reference to citta and caittas, or citta, manas and vijnāna. In addition to what has been said about the nonduality of consciousness in the previous sections, we present here a more elaborated interpretation based on selected texts from Yogācāra sources.

In chapter one of the Sandhinirmocana the Buddha states that all phenomena are without duality: the conditioned phenomena are neither conditioned nor unconditioned, and similarly the unconditioned phenomena are neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The term conditioned is metaphoric and imaginary, and it is an expression of ordinary experiences or mental imaginations, which do not correspond to anything absolute, and hence the conditioned phenomena do not exist. The same is said to hold true for the unconditioned phenomena.

There is however an inexpressible or ineffable nature of phenomena (anabhilāpya-dharmatā) about which the noble persons have perfected knowledge. But, in order to teach others about the true reality of phenomena, they forged the term unconditioned. The ordinary people who have no wisdom and no vision of the ineffable nature of phenomena, when they are confronted with conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, they assume that such phenomena exist. Relying on what they experience or hear, they affirm the phenomena as real or false. By contrast those who have wisdom and vision of the ineffable nature of phenomena, they postulate that the conditioned and unconditioned phenomena do not exist, and that they are mental fabrications labelled as conditioned and unconditioned.

The noble persons know the ultimate reality (paramārtha) through intuition, but among the profaners it is the subject of speculations. The ultimate reality is the domain without characteristics (animittagacara); it is ineffable and escapes ordinary experiences. By contrast speculations are the domain with characteristics (nimittagocara), and appertain to the domain of speech and to the domain of ordinary experiences.

Having explained that the terms conditioned and unconditioned are mental constructs, and having demonstrated the difference between the ultimate reality and speculations, the Buddha proceeds to explain that the identity or distinction between the ultimate reality and the mental

56. For two brief expositions of the transference of consciousness, see T. Skorupski, 2001, 145-54.
formations (sāṃskāra) is tenuous and inadmissible. In the context of the Buddha’s discourse, the ultimate reality clearly denotes the true state of consciousness.

Since its character is profound, the ultimate reality transcends the identity with the mental formations or the difference from them. The arguments for their identity or difference are erroneous, because it is impossible to understand and realize the ultimate reality. If the ultimate reality and the mental formations were identical, then all profaners would perceive the truth and gain nirvāṇa, but they do not see the truth and do not gain nirvāṇa. If they were different, then the truth seekers would not become separated from the character of mental formations, from the bonds of that character, and from the bonds of negative dispositions (dausthulya). Thus they would not become enlightened, and yet they do discard and eliminate the above bonds, and gain nirvāṇa and enlightenment.

Then again, if the absolute reality and the mental formations were identical, then the absolute reality would be classed among defilements together with the formations. If they were different, the absolute reality would not constitute the common character of all formations. However, it does constitute their common character, but it is not classed among defilements. Once again, if they were identical, the formations would be classed as undifferentiated, just as the absolute reality is undifferentiated in the formations. Consequently, the absolute reality and the formations are neither identical nor different, and it is erroneous to assert their identity or difference.57

In the above discourse the main thrust of argumentation is to demonstrate that the treatment of phenomena in terms of dualities, such as conditioned and unconditioned, is flawed, and that the ultimate reality and mental formations cannot be considered to be identical or different. Their nonduality is implied and demonstrated as the impossibility of determining their relationship in terms of oneness and plurality, because the ultimate reality is not susceptible to dual differentiations. In the Yogācāra treatises, this negatively peculiar strand of the Sandhinirmocana thought is recast into positive expositions of the nonduality of consciousness, as discussed below.

In the Yogācāra treatises, the nonduality of consciousness is explained as an integral part of their expositions of deceptive ideation, the three forms or aspects of consciousness, and its three natures. We begin with the treatment of deceptive ideation.

It is said in the consulted sources that in the case of ordinary beings, the deceptive ideation (abhūta-parikalpa) is synonymous with the defiled stream of consciousness (saṃtāna), and that in the context of the entire existence, it is saṃsāra.

In terms of consciousness the deceptive ideation includes ālayavijñāna, manas and viṣṇāna. The store consciousness constitutes the subliminal aspect of consciousness, and serves as the foundation of all karmic potentialities, which give rise to manas and viṣṇāna. From the perspective of karma, the manas is called the stained mind (kliṣṭamanas), because it perceives the store consciousness as the ātman.58 From the perspective of perception, it is the mind-element (manodhātu), which serves as the support of the six viṣṇānas. The six viṣṇānas essentially cognize the empirical world, and jointly with manas produce karmic propensities (vāsanā).

57. Sandhinirmocana, 169-177.
58. Manas denotes the sense of selfhood and is associated with four defilements: view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi), delusion of self (ātmamoha), pride of self (ātmamāna), and attachment to self (ātmasneha). Mahāyānasamgraha, II, 16; Siddhi, 225.
In terms of its existential permutations, the deceptive ideation is said to encompass the three natures (trisvabhāva): perfected (parinispanna), dependent (paratantra), and imagined (parikalpita). In this configuration the deceptive ideation corresponds to the dependent nature. The perfected stands for emptiness, nirvāṇa, and the dharma-nature of consciousness (cittadharmatā). The dependent basically denotes the stained manas as a living entity obscured by ignorance and controlled by the law of dependent origination. The imagined denotes the empirical world that is illusory. As for duality, it is the deceptive ideation that appears in the form of subject and object. The dependent is the egocentric subject, and the imagined is its unreal and imaginary object. This apparent duality does not exist, but emptiness exists in the deceptive ideation, and conversely the deceptive ideation exists in emptiness. In some passages it is said that the deceptive ideation corresponds to the defiled process (samkleśa) and samsāra, and emptiness to the purification process (vyavādāna) and nirvāṇa. In some other passages, it is said that the dependent in its conditioned state is the imagined or samsāra, and in its unconditioned state it is the perfected or nirvāṇa.59

According to one text, the nonduality of the three natures consists in the expulsion of the imagined from the dependent, and the infusion of the dependent into the perfected. In this text the actual exposition of their nonduality is given with reference to the ultimate reality itself (paramārtha), which is said to be nondual (advaya) in five ways. In terms of existence and non-existence, it is not existent from the perspective of the dependent and the imagined natures, and it is not non-existent from the perspective of the perfected nature. In terms of oneness (ekatva) and plurality (nānātva), it is not one because there is no oneness of the perfected with the dependent and the imagined, and it is not varied because the perfected is not different from the other two. In terms of production and cessation, it is neither produced nor destroyed, because the absolute realm (dharmadhātu) has no characteristic of creativity (anabhisaṃskṛtatva). It is neither increased nor decreased, because it remains as it is amidst the production and cessation of defilement and purification. Finally, it does not become purified, because its nature is naturally stainless (prakṛty-asaṃkliṣṭatva), and yet it is not entirely without purification, because it is released (vigama) from the adventitious defilements.60

The realization of nonduality is chiefly explained as the transmutation or transformation of the foundation of consciousness (āsrayaparāvṛtti), namely of the store consciousness. This transmutation of consciousness occurs in the dependent nature, and essentially it consists of the expulsion of its defiled process (samkleśa) and the transformation into its purified state (vyavādāna).61 All the conditioned dharmas are the dependent nature, and the store consciousness is the foundation or support of both the defiled and undefiled dharmas, which respectively correspond to the imagined and perfected natures. The transmutation of the support consists of a double operation: the expulsion of the imagined which is in the dependent, and through the acquisition of the perfected which is also in the dependent. Through the removal of the obstacles of defilements, one acquires the mahāparinirvāṇa, and through the elimination of the obstacles to knowledge, one realises the supreme enlightenment (mahābodhi).63

59 . Mahāyānasamgraha, II, 87-125; Madhyāntavibhōga, chapter one; Siddhi, 90, 225, 514-33.
60 . Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, VI.1 and the commentary.
62 . the obstacle of defilements (kleśāvarana), and the obstacle to knowledge (jñeyāvaranā). Siddhi, 566-574.
63 . Siddhi, 610-612; 661-667.
The nonduality of consciousness is also reflected and integrated into the exposition of the nonduality as one of the attributes of the absolute body (dharmakāya). In this configuration the nonduality of the absolute body is explained in three ways: with reference to existence, conditionality, and diversity. The absolute body is not existent because the dharmas do not exist, and it is not non-existent, because the emptiness as the ultimate reality does exist. It is not conditioned because it is not produced by karma and defilements, and yet it has the power to manifest itself in the guise of the conditioned dharmas. Thirdly, as the support of all the Buddhas, it is undivided (abhinna), and yet countless streams of consciousness (saṁtāna) gain the state of enlightenment.64

In the tantras the state of nonduality is gained through the mystic union of wisdom and means, as briefly discussed above in the section on bodhicitta. Here we only provide two representative quotations, which aptly encapsulate the spirit of the tantras.

One’s mind (svacitta) is primordially unborn and empty by nature, because due to its sameness with the selflessness of dharmas, it is immune from all existences, and divested of the aggregates, bases, elements, subject and object. These existences are not arisen; there are no dharmas and no dharmatā. Selflessness is similar to space, and this is the unwavering course of enlightenment.65

The union of wisdom and means denotes the union of citta and caittas undifferentiated into internal and external. It is the union of emptiness and compassion, the union of vajra and lotus, the union of diffusion (prapañca) and fusion (samgraha), and the union of Heruka and Nairātmyā. It is the undivided reality of samsāra and nirvāṇa, and it does not have the dual form of man and woman. It is the unity of the conventional and ultimate realities, and the knowledge that is naturally luminous (prakṛti-prabhāsvara-jñāna).66

In the Sandhinirmocana, as discussed above, the Buddha asserts the nonduality of phenomena, but his argumentation aims to demonstrate that ultimately it is impossible to explain the nature of phenomena in terms of polarities of identity and difference. It is difficult and indeed futile to make dualistic distinctions because as such the ultimate reality is not susceptible to being differentiated. Then again, as the ultimate reality constitutes the common character of all phenomena, the ultimate reality and phenomena are coextensive, but it is difficult to grasp or explain their relationship in terms of identity or difference.

The Yogācāra sources do not dwell on the difficulties voiced by the Buddha. Instead they endeavor to explain the character of consciousness in terms of its composition or duality, and then they demonstrate how the bifurcated strands of consciousness can be transformed or transmuted into the state of nonduality. The Yogācāra exposition of the nonduality of consciousness as the expulsion of the imagined from the dependent, and the infusion of the dependent into the perfected, is ingenious and sophisticated. However, it is questionable whether it resolves the difficulties raised by the Buddha.

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64. Mahāyānasamgraha, II, 271-272.
65. Guhyasamāja-tantra, II.4-5.
66. Indrabhūti’s Samпутatilakatīkā, TTP, vol. 55, 5.2.3-5.
Conclusion

As we have seen the Buddha said that the mind is luminous, but sometime it is contaminated and sometime it is purified from adventitious defilements. In his statement the luminosity of consciousness is firmly established, and further confirmed by the fact that defilements do not appertain to the innate character and condition of consciousness. Since defilements are qualified by the term ‘adventitious’ (āgantuka), it follows that their occurrence in the flow of consciousness is accidental, and that they can be removed. The innate purity of consciousness is further confirmed in an implicit manner in the context of the Abhidharma method of establishing its ethical qualities. Since the consciousness acquires its ethical qualities by association with or dissociation from good or bad concomitants, it is reasonable to assume by inference that as such it remains pure, although the Abhidharma sources do not always explicitly say that this is the case. There is some disagreement in the Abhidharma sources as to the initial point in time at which the consciousness becomes contaminated. Some Abhidharma schools affirm the natural luminosity of consciousness, but the Sarvāstivāda school disagrees and postulates that initially it is contaminate and subsequently purified. The Mahāyāna schools admit that from the perspective of mundane conventions, the consciousness is considered as defiled or purified. However, ultimately its innate character is primordially or naturally pure and luminous. Apart from the Abhidharma ‘controversy’ about the initial state of the luminous mind, and apart from some other disagreements discussed in the body of this paper, the Abhidharma and Mahāyāna interpretations of the mind’s nature and luminosity are ingenious and insightful, and provide a magnificent but diversified wealth of information on its innate permutations.
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The achievement of śamatha, a state of meditative-stabilization marked by single-pointed concentration and mental and physical dexterity signifies a critical juncture in the Buddhist paths according to Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) and his followers from the Geluk (dGe lugs) tradition of Tibetan Buddhism.¹ Their path-system literature indicates that the achievement of śamatha signifies the beginning point of the first dhyāna or meditative absorption (Tib. bsam gtan, Pāli. jhāna) of the form realm (Skt. rūpadhātu, Tib. gzugs kyi khams, Pāli rūpaloka). The achievement of such a state, while not unique to Buddhism, opens new potential avenues of practice for Buddhists including those that lead to liberation. Tsongkhapa argues that such a path – one leading to liberation - is not possible before the achievement of śamatha. In this short paper I will briefly describe three potential avenues of practice a Buddhist might take upon the achievement of śamatha according to Tsongkhapa. In the process this paper will examine some of the psychological, philosophical, and soteriological issues at stake according to Tsongkhapa and his followers, thus drawing out aspects of the relationship between theory and practice in his system. The three potential avenues of practice are described as the mundane path, which is not entirely unique to Buddhists, and two types of supermundane paths; gradual and simultaneous, both of which are said to be unique to Buddhists and lead to liberation.

This paper primarily draws from the “Śamatha” (Zhi gnas) chapter of Tsongkhapa’s monumental work, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Byang chub lam rim chen mo, hereafter, The Great Treatise) and aims to present and discuss these topics as represented in that text specifically, though at points I will draw from the larger body of Geluk commentarial literature.² Tsongkhapa’s work draws heavily on both sūtra and śāstra literature from his Indian predecessors including frequent citations from figures such as Śāntideva, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Kamalaśīla, and Ratnakaraśānti among others.

According to Tsongkhapa one is only able to successfully engage in either the mundane or supermundane approaches to the path described in his treatise after the achievement of śamatha. It is only on the basis of a concentrated, single-pointed mind-state that one can maintain the sort of focus and mental dexterity required to progress further along the path. Although the achievement of śamatha alone is not said to be an exclusively Buddhist achievement, according to Tsongkhapa one can only fully successfully engage in vipaśyanā and hope to achieve a direct realization of selflessness (anatman, bdag med pa) or emptiness (śūnyatā, stong pa nyid), the basis upon which liberation

¹ While one would be well-advised to not presume univocality within the Geluk tradition on matters of doctrine or the interpretation of Tsongkhapa’s ideas, there is general agreement across the Geluk tradition found on the topics at hand in this paper. The most famous contemporary figure from the Geluk tradition is His Holiness the Dalai Lama XIV.

² See fn. 1.
is possible, by having first cultivated śamatha. One can realize selflessness conceptually before cultivating śamatha, but cannot cultivate a direct realization without a stable mind.\(^3\)

The three potential paths upon which a Buddhist may choose to embark upon achieving śamatha are framed in the context of Buddhist psychological/cosmological descriptions of the three realms: the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm, the later two of which are each divided into four successive levels of meditative absorptions. I will begin by giving some theoretical background to help contextualize Tsongkhapa’s way of presenting the three meditative options for a yogi on achievement of śamatha. Tsongkhapa describes each of the four levels of the form realm and four levels of the formless realm as divided into preparatory and actual levels. At the first achievement of śamatha, the yogi is said to have achieved the preparatory level of the first dhyāna of the form realm. The yogi who achieves this state has choices to make regarding the type of practice of the path s/he intends to pursue going forward. Drawing from fundamental path system descriptions of the mind such as found in Abhisamālāṅkāra and its commentaries\(^4\) and Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas, Tsongkhapa explains that there are nine different levels of mental dispositions. There is one in the desire realm, four in the form realm, and four in the formless realm. The desire realm is further divided into nine meditative stages, often referred to as the nine stages of training culminating in śamatha, but we will have to leave the details of the nine stages for another time.\(^5\)

Having progressed through the nine stages, when śamatha is then first achieved, that is said to mark the beginning point of the first meditative stabilization\(^6\) of the form realm. According to Tsongkhapa even in this desire realm life, our mental state can be that of the first dhyāna of the form realm once śamatha is achieved. In other words, though we may still physically be in this human body, once we have achieved actual śamatha, our mental state is that of a higher level such as the first meditative stabilization of the form realm. Thus our mind or mental state is then part of, or associated with the upper realm.

In distinguishing between the mental states of the preparatory and actual levels of the form and formless realms, Tsongkhapa does not intend to imply that the “preparatory meditative stabilization” is not a part of the first dhyāna. Once one has achieved śamatha, that mind is a mind of the first dhyāna by definition. But it differs from the actual in that after attaining the actual mental state which is also part of the first meditative stabilization, then you can use that to start to remove afflictions like desire, hatred, jealousy, pride, and so forth from the root.

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\(^3\) If śamatha is held by the thought of renunciation, that primary motivation which is striving for complete liberation from samsāra including all its fleeting pleasures - from the depths of the so-called hell realms to the peak of cyclic existence – it is said to be a Buddhist path. Renunciation is cultivated by proper understanding of the faults of samsāra, all of which are based on the self-centered, egotistic view. Thus wisdom realizing selfless or emptiness will ultimately be necessary for liberation. When a person has renunciation, if they use śamatha it becomes the real path, one of the five paths (paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, mediation, and no more learning) of the Buddhist path system. If the mind holds the thought of bodhicitta, the altruistic, compassionate mind that wants to obtain Buddhahood for the purpose of being maximally beneficial and effective in assisting others on the path to liberation, then it becomes a Mahāyāna path.

\(^4\) The most commonly cited of the twenty-one Indian commentaries on the Abhisamālāṅkāra by Tsongkhapa and his followers are those by Haribhadra: Sphujīrthā and Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka.


\(^6\) dhyāna, jhāna, bsam gtan

\(^7\) kleśa, nyon mongs. This term is frequently translated as “afflictive emotions”, “delusions”, “disturbing emotions”,
The first of the three approaches described by Tsongkhapa in the “Śāmattha” chapter of *The Great Treatise* is what he refers to as the mundane path (‘jig rten pa’i lam). The type of preparatory practice meditation that is utilized for this purpose on the first dhyāna is called a “mundane” path because it merely temporarily subdues the afflictions that belong to the desire realm, but this practice does not culminate in the lasting peace of liberation from samsāra. Thus while first preparatory practices of the first dhyāna are very effective for temporarily subduing these afflictions, they are unable to remove the afflictions from the root or seed (bīja, sa bon) because that requires a realization of emptiness. The seeds of the afflictions still remain during the preparatory stage. From the achievement of śamatha, until that point where all nine desire realm afflictions are removed, it is called the preparatory level of the first dhyāna.

The mundane path is a path that utilizes a form of meditation that compares the relative ease and peace of the first dyāna with the gross, negative qualities of the desire realm. The rough afflictions of the desire realm can be subdued on the first dyāna temporarily by use of this type of comparison meditation even without very deep realizations such as the realization of emptiness, the lack of an inherent enduring nature (svabhāva, rang bzhin) in phenomena. The faults of the desire realm are said to include misery, suffering, short lifespans, ugliness, impurity and an undesirable environment. The first dhyāna, while not perfect is immensely better than the desire realm. Qualities of the first meditative stabilization include: long life, a more subtle body, freedom from physical misery, purity, relative peacefulness, and so forth. The afflictions in the desire realm like desire and hatred are explained to be much rougher and cause more profound suffering than the afflictions of the upper realms.

When contemplating the differences in meditation, the attachment to desire realm will slowly lessen due to understanding the comparative superiority of the first dhyāna. Slowly the nine types of afflictions of the desire realm like hatred, jealousy, attachment to wealth, and so forth are lessened in this preparatory level. Finally by way of this comparison meditation, the yogi will subdue all these desire realm afflictions. They are thoroughly suppressed, though only temporarily since they have not yet been removed from the root. Once the desire realm afflictions are subdued in this way through comparison meditation, the yogi proceeds to do a similar comparison meditation by comparing the relative peace of the second dhyāna compared with the first. They can then temporarily subdue the afflictions of the first dhyāna in that way. This comparison method can be utilized all the way up to the highest level of the formless realm. However, since this method merely compares one part of samsāra with another and because there is nothing more pleasant in samsāra to use for comparison purposes once one is at the fourth and highest formless level, there is no way to subdue those afflictions. For this reason, and because it does not remove these afflictions from the root, thus leaving the yogi incapable of being liberated from samsāra by relying only on this method, it is called a mundane path. The afflictions can only be removed from the root on the basis of applying a stabilized mind with a direct realization of emptiness according to Tsongkhapa. When a yogi removes the nine desire realm afflictions from the root through the realization of emptiness, then this is called the “actual first meditative stabilization”. The same would be true for the other progressive levels. The mundane path only leads to preparatory levels all the way through the form and formless realms according to Tsongkhapa.

“deluded afflictions,” “dysfunctional tendency” and so forth. It refers to the disturbing emotional states that are grounded on a fundamental ignorance that grasps at the self as enduring and is likewise mistaken about all phenomena and the nature of reality.
The two supermundane methods approach the path in an entirely different manner according to Tsongkhapa. The supermundane path does not merely subdue afflictions by comparing them with something better in *samsāra*, but removes them from the root by turning to emptiness as the object of meditation. One is described as a noble being or ārya when they have cultivated a direct realization of the four noble truths, emptiness, and so forth. According to Tsongkhapa this realization is first achieved on the preparatory stage of the first dhyāna of the form realm. The preparatory stage of the first dhyāna is said to have two divisions: contaminated and uncontaminated. All the preparatory stages for the subsequent levels of the upper realms are only contaminated. The reason is that the first preparatory meditative concentration has an ārya path which is a supermundane path, in addition to the corollary mundane path. They are distinguished based on the objects of meditation. If the object is selflessness or emptiness, it is supermundane. If it is another sort of object, then it is mundane. The rest of the preparatory meditative concentrations have only mundane paths because those who take the supermundane route on the first preparatory level proceed directly to the actual states of each of the subsequent form and formless levels, bypassing preparatory stages from that point onwards. They are able to do this because actual states are achieved on the basis of removing afflictions from the root which they can do by way of meditation on emptiness, but followers of the mundane path cannot accomplish by means of mere comparison meditation. In other words when one attains the actual first meditative concentration of the form realm, one uses that instead of second or third preparatory stages for progression upward. Non-āryas can utilize these preparatory stages, but once one is on the ārya path and has achieved the actual first dhyāna, there is no reason for such āryas to utilize the preparatory stages at the levels of the higher meditative stabilizations any longer since those only temporarily subdue the corresponding afflictions. On the supermundane path, one just proceeds from the actual first dhyāna of the form realm to the actual second concentration of the form realm, as so forth. It is only on the first dhyāna that the preparatory level can be utilized to transition from the mundane to supermundane level. This is why the preparatory level of the first dhyāna has an uncontaminated aspect to it. When that achieved level of concentration is utilized to cultivate a direct realization of selflessness or emptiness, then it is uncontaminated and part of a supermundane path. The realization of emptiness does not change at higher levels. There is no further wisdom. The object of that meditation on emptiness changes, but the realization does not.

As mentioned above, there are two approaches to the supermundane path that can be utilized on the basis of meditation on emptiness which uproots the afflictions: the gradual approach and the simultaneous approach. According to Tsongkhapa practitioners taking a non-Mahāyāna path who achieve the state of an ārya by direct realization of the four noble truths, and so forth, and then meditate on selflessness, gradually remove the afflictions belonging to the desire realm. When all nine are removed, then when s/he dies, s/he does not need to be reborn in the desire realm again. If one achieves this while still in a desire realm body, one cannot change the body immediately because that body is the fruit of past karma. You cannot control the fruits that have already become manifest. But they will not be compelled to take desire realm rebirth again at death because they are no longer under the power of desire realm afflictions. They then proceed through each of the four form realm levels and formless realm levels removing each respective affliction one by one until eventually all are removed and they achieve the liberated state of an arhat. This is the gradual supermundane approach.

Tsongkhapa argues that the sharpest yogis can remove deluded afflictions of the desire realm, form, and formless realms at once through the application of a direct realization of emptiness. They are called, "the ones who abandon all afflictions simultaneously". A bit of background may be
required to explain this variety of the supermundane approach. Drawing from *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and its commentaries and related literature, Tsongkhapa explains that in the desire realm and each of the four levels of the form realm and four levels of the formless realm there are nine afflictions, constituting eighty-one altogether. They are frequently described simply as big, medium, and small. The big or gross ones are further divided as big-big, big-medium, and big-small. The medium and small afflictions are similarly subdivided into three (e.g. medium-big, medium-medium, medium-small, and so forth). Thus when sharp yogis are referred to as the ones who abandon all afflictions simultaneously, it means that they first remove all the biggest or grossest afflictions (i.e., the “big-big” afflictions) from the desire realm, the four levels of the form realms, and the four levels of the formless realm simultaneously. They remove nine afflictions (one each from the desire realm and each of the eight levels of upper realms) at once. Then, they remove all the nine big-medium ones simultaneously. In this way they remove the eighty-one afflictions in nine steps beginning with grossest of each of the nine levels of the three realms and with each step removing the progressively more subtle ones from each of the realms. This way of uprooting the afflictions is said to be much faster than the alternative method, which is to first eliminate desire realm afflictions one at a time, then the form realm afflictions one at a time, and finally the formless realm afflictions one at a time. They do not remove all eighty-one afflictions at once, but rather in groups of nine. When sharp yogis utilize this quicker method and all eighty-one are finally removed by removing the most subtle afflictions from all nine levels and they obtain the actual first *dhyāna* they really achieve all the *dhyānas* and formless realms levels at once. This is the case because the last and most subtle of the desire realm afflictions is removed (and the first form realm level is achieved) simultaneously with last and most subtle of afflictions from all the other realms.

To summarize, there are both mundane and supermundane approaches to the path upon the achievement of *śamatha* according to Tsongkhapa. The mundane approach is always a gradual approach and utilizes comparison meditation. It compares the characteristics of the lower level of *samsāra* with the relatively better qualities of the level immediately above it. In this way the practitioner is able to temporarily subdue the afflictions of the lower level by lessening attachment to them. It is called a mundane approach because it does not serve to cultivate renunciation of *samsāra* altogether, but just lessens attachment to one part of *samsāra* in comparison with another. Because it is not based on a direct realization of the nature of reality it is unable to completely uproot the afflictions and thus unable to lead to liberation. In contrast the supermundane approaches are based on a realization of the nature of reality, do uproot the afflictions, and thus do lead to liberation and arhatship. There are two ways to go about this according to Tsongkhapa, by means of a gradual approach and by means of what is referred to as a simultaneous approach. The gradual approach uproots the afflictions one-by-one in order from the desire realm up through the last, most subtle affliction of the highest level of the formless realm. Thus the meditator achieves each of the nine levels of the three realms in order from grossest to most subtle. The simultaneous approach removes nine afflictions at a time, one from each level. Thus the practitioner who utilizes the simultaneous method achieves each of the actual levels and is actually liberated simultaneously.

The methods described by Tsongkhapa in the soteriological movement to liberation draw heavily from theoretical descriptions of psychological or mental states of achievement as one progresses on the path. Philosophical descriptions of the nature of reality, emptiness (*śūnyatā, stong pa nyid*), and the means by which such insight facilitates liberation are inextricably tied to his presentation and understanding. The relationship between these theoretical descriptions found in
Tsongkhapa’s work and those of his Geluk followers and what they actually do in terms of meditation practice in the real world are interesting. The higher meditation practices and tantric yogas utilized extensively in the tradition certainly draw from the theoretical grounding found in expositions like those I have attempted to explain here, but practically utilize ideas and techniques that stretch far beyond the common bounds of *samatha* and *vipassanā* as found in sutra expositions. For Tsongkhapa the correct sutra view, the view of the emptiness of an inherent nature in all phenomena (for him expressed in his *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka* presentation) and the view and practice of tantra are utterly compatible and point to the same fundamental nature and realizations. Perhaps it is best left for another day to discuss the precise relationship between *sūtra* theories and tantric practices of the Geluk tradition.
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The Paṭṭhāna (Conditional Relations) and Buddhist Meditation: Application of the Teachings in the Paṭṭhāna in Insight (Vipassanā) Meditation Practice

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This paper will explore relevance and roles of Abhidhamma, Theravāda philosophy, in meditation practices with reference to some modern Burmese meditation traditions. In particular, I shall focus on the highly mathematical Paṭṭhāna, Pahtan in Burmese, the seventh text of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, which deals with the functioning of causality and is regarded by Burmese as the most important of the Abhidhamma traditions. I shall explore how and to what extent the teachings in the Paṭṭhāna are applied in insight (vipassanā) meditation practices, assessing the roles of theoretical knowledge of ultimate realities (paramattha-dhammā) in meditation. In so doing, I shall attempt to bridge the gap between theoretical and practical aspects of Buddhist meditation.

While scholars writing on Theravāda meditation - Cousins, King and Griffiths for example - have focused on distinction between insight meditation (vipassanā) and calm meditation (samatha), this paper will be the first to classify approaches within vipassanā meditation. Vipassanā meditation practices in contemporary Myanmar can be classified into two broad categories, namely, the theoretical based practice and the non-theoretical based practice. Some Burmese meditation masters, Mohnyin Sayadaw Ven. U Sumana (1873-1964) and Saddhammaransī Sayadaw Ven. Ashin Kunḍālabhivāmsa (1921-) and Pa-Auk Sayadaw Ven. Ācīṇa (1934-) for example, teach meditators to have theoretical knowledge of ultimate realities. While these meditation masters emphasize theoretical knowledge of the ultimate realities, other meditation masters such as the Sunlun Sayadaw Ven. U Kavi (1878-1952) and the Theinngu Sayadaw Ven. U Okkatha (1912-1973) insist on actual meditation practice, i.e. meditation sittings, without any prior theoretical training. My investigation in the present paper will focus on the theoretical-based meditation practice.

In the eyes of Burmese Buddhists, the philosophical teachings in the Abhidhamma play a crucial role in meditation practices. Kornfield, writing on Buddhist meditation masters in Myanmar and Thailand, rightly observes that “there is probably more emphasis and made use of the Abhidhamma teachings in [Myanmar] than in any other Buddhist country”. Moreover, Braun, working on the Ledi Sayadaw’s biography and works in relation to the modern insight meditation movement,

1 See below on detailed explanation of the ultimate realities.
3 King 1980.
6 See Kyaw (forthcoming) on discussion with regards to how Sunlun Sayadaw and Theinngu Sayadaw transformed their lives through their meditation practice with no formal teaching on theoretical aspect before and during their practice.
8 The Ledi Sayadaw (1846-1923) was an influential Burmese monk. He is well-known for his scholarly works and vipassanā meditation method. It is believed that the British authorities in Burma arranged through Rangoon University College, then under Calcutta University, to award D.Litt to Ledi Sayadaw in 1911, the same year he was conferred on
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highlights that “Abhidhamma, in Ledi’s view, is a vital part of the practice of meditation which is open to all and from which all, at least to some degree, can benefit”. Thus, Ledi Sayadaw and other meditation masters in contemporary Myanmar advocate people to learn the Abhidhamma teachings - mainly through the Abhidhammatthasangaha, Thingyo in Burmese - to the best of their abilities. Based on my research into the living tradition of Abhidhamma in contemporary Myanmar, a majority of Burmese Buddhists, following advice from such meditation masters, places emphasis on the study of the Abhidhamma. Therefore, the study of the Abhidhamma is pervasive within the scholarly circle of both monastic and lay literati.

To accurately assess the ways in which the Abhidhamma study is helpful for meditation from anthropological perspective is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it challenges the argument proposed by some people that Buddhist philosophical teachings have no practical value. Kalupahana writing on the Buddhist causality and philosophy of relations (i.e. the Paṭṭhāna) in the 1960s argues that the Buddha and his immediate successors were not interested “in the way or manner in which things are related [as described in the Paṭṭhāna] but only in the things themselves which are so related [as given in dependent origination]”. (See below for detail explanation of the Paṭṭhāna.) This is because, according to Kalupahana, “the Buddha must have thought of the futility of discoursing on the analysis of the various ways in which phenomena are related one another”. Hence, he sees Paṭṭhāna as arising from the development of scholasticism that was reacting against the Brahmanical schools after the final enlightenment of the Buddha. Although this view is a viable analysis from the historical and philosophical perspectives, it poses two implications for the traditional Theravāda Buddhists. First, it implies that the Abhidhamma-piṭaka and hence the Paṭṭhāna are not the words of the Buddha, i.e. not Buddha-vacana, which challenges the traditional view. Second, Kalupahana’s view of Paṭṭhāna as a philosophy of relations with no practical and meditative values contrasts sharply with the living tradition of Paṭṭhāna in Burmese Buddhism, where Paṭṭhāna is applied in meditation practices as we will see below.

The Paṭṭhāna: the teaching of the anattavāda by highlighting how dhammas are interrelated through infinite permutations of conditional relations

Before I explore how the teachings in the Paṭṭhāna are applied in meditations, I shall briefly outline the place of the Abhidhamma texts in the Theravāda canon, the Tipiṭaka, and explain what the Paṭṭhāna section of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka teaches. The Abhidhamma Piṭaka is one of the three main divisions of the Tipiṭaka; the others being the Sutta Piṭaka, the Collection of Teachings, and the Vinaya Piṭaka, the Collection of Discipline. It contains what Gombrich calls “systematic philosophy.”12 That is, the systematization of the teachings that emerged from a refined analytical approach is one of the features of the Abhidhamma. Along with philosophical systems, “the writings

9  Braun 2008: 338.
11  Ibid. 183.
12  Gombrich 2006: 5.

the aggamaha-pandita title. Ledi Sayadaw was among the best known scholars of his generation; he wrote 105 books in total in both Burmese and Pāli. He wrote two works on the topic of Paṭṭhāna: Paṭṭhānuddesa-dīpaṇī in Pāli and the Burmese translation of Paṭṭhānuddesa-dīpaṇī-nissaya.
[in Abhidhamma] include metaphysics, discussion of causality, psychology and cosmology”.13 There are seven texts in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the Paṭṭhāna is the last of these. The Burmese Tipiṭaka edition of Paṭṭhāna consists of five volumes in total, while Siamese Tipiṭaka edition comprises six volumes.14 Exegeses of the Paṭṭhāna include the Pañcappakaraṇa-āṭṭhakathā and the Pañcappakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā and Pañcappakaraṇa-anuṭīkā.15 Three main sections of the Paṭṭhāna are the Paccayuddesa, the ‘Enumeration of the [24] Conditions’, the Paccayaniddesa, the ‘Analytical Exposition of the Conditions’, and the Paṭinīdēsa (lit. trans. ‘coming back to a subject again’). The Paṭinīdēsa makes up the rest of the Paṭṭhāna and explains the interrelations between phenomena in a great detail. The Paccayuddesa and Paccayanīdēsa are well known amongst the lay people and ritualistically recited by most Burmese Buddhists, while the Paṭinīdēsa is the focal of scholastic study in Paṭṭhāna studies.

Mula-paṭṭhāna Sayadaw Ven. U Nārada of Myanmar, an expert in the Paṭṭhāna, explains the teachings in the Paṭṭhāna as follows.

“In the methods of the Four Noble Truths and Dependent Origination, only the manifested causes and effects [i.e. phenomena such as avijjā, taṭṭhā etc.] are considered. But, in Paṭṭhāna, the forces [i.e. 24 conditions] that bring about the relations between the causes and effects are also taken into account and it is with these forces that this subject [i.e. Paṭṭhāna] is primarily concerned”.16

In order to understand Paṭṭhāna, it is crucial to see it through the lens of Abhidhamma themes. That is, in the Theravāda Abhidhamma, there are four ultimate realities (paramattha-dhammā): consciousness (citta), mental concomitants (cetasika), matter (rūpa) and nirvana (nibbāna).17 Although ‘paramattha-dhammā’ is translated as ‘ultimate realities’, it does not mean as a ‘reality’ in sense of having some kind of ontological status. It should be understood as a part of a process, which reflects the Theravadins’ view of dhamma as “less reified, more experiential kind”.18 Moreover, according to Karunadasa, the description of dhammas as paramattha is understood in terms of their objective existence (paramatthato vijjamānata).19 This refers to the fact that the mental and material dhammas represent the utmost limits to which the analysis of empirical existence can be stretched.

In the Paṭṭhāna, the final analysis of any relationships between the conditioning states (paccaya-dhammā)20 and conditioned states (paccayupanna-dhammā) resorts to the four ultimate

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13 Crosby 2005a: 47.
14 Nyanatiloka 1983: 114
16 Nārāda 1969: xi.
17 The four ultimate realities are broad categories given in the Abhidhammatthasāṅgaha, (see Bodhi 2000: 25-27). The first three ultimate realities can be analyzed into a more refined dhammas. For example, there are 89 cittas, 52 cetasikas and 28 rūpas, and they can then be analyzed further.
19 See VsmṬ 227; Mvn 258; ItiA 142 cit. in Karunadasa 1996: 14.
20 Although I have translated dhamma as ‘phenomenon’ in other sections, when explaining the concept of the Paṭṭhāna I shall translate it as ‘state’ because the word ‘state’, I think, is more in line with the concept of the momentariness - i.e. constantly arising and dissolution of cittas, cetasikas and rūpas. Moreover, Gethin suggests that dhammas as “the basic mental and physical ‘state’” (2004: 516), and that dhammas are “qualities that constitute experience or reality is to be related to the usage of dhamma at the end of a bahuvrahi compound in the sense of a particular nature or quality possessed by something”. (2004: 533) In this context, where dhamma is used at the end of a bahuvrahi compound, it is more appropriate to translate it as ‘state’. ‘Paccaya-dhammā’ is thus understood as ‘conditioning states’, highlighting ‘qualities’ or ‘functions’ possessed by the ultimate realities or dhammas.
realities. Nibbāna in the Abhidhamma terms is expressed as ‘unconditioned element’ (asaṅkhatā-dhātu) - i.e. that which is not produced by any cause or condition. By definition, it cannot be a conditioned state. The other three ultimate realities – citta, cetasika and rūpa – can be both conditioning states and conditioned states. In other words, the Paṭṭhāna explains specific relations and correlations between the four ultimate realities by highlighting the conditioning forces involved in and acting on these relations.

The table below gives a simplified description of the basic elements of Paṭṭhāna.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditioning states (paccaya-dhammā)</th>
<th>Conditioned states (paccayuppanna-dhammā)</th>
<th>Conditioning forces (satti)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- X refers to conditioning states, where X can be any of the four ultimate realities. A ‘conditioning state’ is a cause on which its effect is dependent.
- Y refers to conditioned states, where Y can be any of the three ultimate realities, except nibbāna. A ‘conditioned state’ is the effect that results from a cause.
- Z represents conditioning forces, where Z is any of the 24 conditions, e.g. root condition (hetu-paccaya), object condition (ārammaṇa-paccaya) etc., in the Paṭṭhāna. (See Table 1 for explanation of the 24 conditions.) In other words, the 24 conditions are conditioning forces (satti) that act on the conditioning states in order to cause conditioned states. A ‘conditioning force’ is something that has the power (Pāli: satti, Burmese: that-ti) to bring about or accomplish or cause the effect to arise. The distinct feature of the method of Paṭṭhāna is the 24 conditioning forces - i.e.: the functions of the 24 conditions. Through these 24 conditioning forces, the conditioning states give rise to conditioned states. However, the 24 conditioning forces are not separate entities from the conditioning states. “Just as the hotness of chilies is inherent in the chilies and cannot exist without them, so too the conditioning forces inherent in the conditioning states and cannot exist without them. All conditioning states have their particular force, and this force enables them to cause the arising of the conditioned states”.

Here, X and Y are related by Z. For example, considering the first condition of the 24 conditions, the root condition (hetu-paccaya), in the Paccayanīddesa, it is stated that “The roots are related to the states which are associated with roots, and the matter produced thereby, by root condition”. In this relation, the ‘roots’ - i.e. three wholesome dhammas (non-greed, alobha; non-hatred, adosa; non-delusion, amoha) and three unwholesome dhammas (greed, lobha; hatred, dosa; delusion, moha) - are the conditioning states, X. The ‘states which are associated with roots, and the matter produced thereby’ - namely, 71 rooted cittas, 52 cetasikas, rooted mind-produced matter and rooted...

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24 Out of 89 cittas, 71 of them are called rooted cittas because they have wholesome and unwholesome dhammas as their principle causes, or roots. See footnote 37 on unwholesome rooted cittas.
rebirth-kamma-produced matter\(^{25}\) - are the conditioned states, \(Y\). These causes (\(X\)) and effects (\(Y\)) are related singly by the root condition (\(Z\)).\(^{26}\) Root condition is a condition where a conditioning state, lobha for example, functions like a root by imparting firmness and fixity to the conditioned states, e.g. cittas rooted in lobha, their associated cetasikas and matters. Here, lobha is both a conditioning state and a conditioning force, for a conditioning force is not a separate entity from the conditioning state, as shown above. In other words, lobha causes the arising of cittas rooted in lobha and their associated cetasikas and rūpas through its special force, namely, grasping and clinging. Therefore, a conditioning force is inherent characteristics of the dhammas.

According to Mula-pahtan Sayadaw and Karunadasa, the Paṭṭhāna is the teaching of the doctrine of no-self, anattavāda. The Paṭṭhāna explicitly rejects the doctrine of ‘self’ (attavāda) at two levels. First, the Paṭṭhāna emphasizes multiplicity of interrelationships between conditioning states and conditioned states through 24 conditions. Thus, the arising of the conditioned states is “not at the will and mercy of any being [i.e. a creator or a ‘self’]”.\(^{27}\) Second, the interrelatedness and interdependence of these dhammas are not explained on the basis of the dichotomy between conditioning states and conditioning forces. Such dichotomy “leaves the door open for the intrusion of the doctrine of a substantial self (attavāda)”\(^{28}\). Any given dhamma can be both a conditioned state and a conditioning force, as we have seen above. This non-duality between conditioning states and conditioning force accentuates that there is no independent creator or ‘self’ that may influence conditioning states to give rise to conditioned states. In other words, if conditioning states and conditioning forces are separate entities, then we could say that an independent entity, which might be attributed as a ‘self’, is acting on a relation between a conditioning state and a conditioned state. Thus, we can say that the Theravāda Abhidhamma, viz., the Paṭṭhāna leave no loophole for the attavāda to exist.

\(^{25}\) Out of two types of mind-produced matter, namely, rooted mind-produced matter (sahetuka-cittajarūpa) and non-rooted mind-produced matter (ahetuka-cittajarūpa), only rooted mind-produced matter is applicable here. In terms of kamma-produced matter (kammajarūpa), i.e. current kamma-produced matter (pavatti-kammajarūpa) and rebirth kamma-produced matter (paṭisandhi-kammajarūpa), the conditioning states of 6 roots give rise to only the rebirth kamma-produced matter. Since there are two types of rebirth kamma-produced matter: rooted and non-rooted, rooted rebirth kamma-produced matter are caused by the 6 roots.

\(^{26}\) In the Paṭimiddesa, we find that the relationships between \(X\) and \(Y\) are determined by many different, and in some sense infinite, permutations of conditioning forces.

\(^{27}\) Nārada 1996: xiii.

\(^{28}\) Karunadasa 1996: 7.
Table 1: Brief explanation of the 24 conditions in the Paṭṭhāna²⁹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions, paccayas</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Root condition, hetu-paccaya</td>
<td>A condition that is the firm foundation of conditioned states, like a root.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object condition, ārammaṇa-paccaya</td>
<td>A condition that is the prop or support of conditioned states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominance condition, adhipati-paccaya</td>
<td>A condition that is the predominant factor for conditioned states to arise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity condition, anantara-paccaya</td>
<td>It is a condition for phenomena to arise again and again in succession without interval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity condition, samanantarā-paccaya</td>
<td>According to the Visuddhimagga (XVII, 74), anantara and samanantara are different in name, but the same in meaning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-nascence condition, sahajāta-paccaya</td>
<td>Sahajāta means that which has arisen together. Thus, a conditioning state, on arising, causes the conditioned states to arise simultaneously with it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutuality condition, aññamañña-paccaya</td>
<td>Just as three sticks of a tripod give each other consolidating support, some phenomena condition one another reciprocally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support condition, nissaya-paccaya</td>
<td>This condition refers to phenomena which are arising together with the phenomena they condition, and to phenomena which have arisen previously to the phenomena they condition by giving support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisive support condition, upanissaya-paccaya</td>
<td>It refers to a phenomenon assists another phenomenon by being a powerful inducement or a decisive support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-nascence condition, purejāta-paccaya</td>
<td>It refers to a relation where something that has arisen earlier becomes a support to something else which arises later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-nascence condition, pacchājāta-paccaya</td>
<td>It refers to a relation where something which having arisen later becomes a support to something else which has arisen earlier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repetition condition, āsevana-paccaya</td>
<td>It is where a phenomenon helps towards the competency and strength of the succeeding phenomena by way of repetition, just as all the preceding applications to study etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamma condition, kamma-paccaya</td>
<td>Kamma is volition, which is a mental concomitant that arises with each citta. Therefore, it refers to a relation where volition directs the associated dhammas to accomplish their functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kammic-result condition, vipāka-paccaya</td>
<td>A condition that assists other associated karmic-resultant phenomena by its passive nature - i.e. not have other activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutriment condition, āhāra-paccaya</td>
<td>It is when a conditioning state maintains and supports the growth and development of the conditioned states. Just like the physical nutriment sustains the physical body, the three mental nutriments, i.e. contact, volition and consciousness, sustain the mental activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁹ This brief description of the 24 conditions are based on the works by Nyanatiloka (1983), Karunadasa (2010) and Gorkom (2010).
Theoretical based vipassanā meditation traditions in contemporary Myanmar:

We have seen above that Ledi Sayadaw stresses importance of having the knowledge of the ultimate realities for meditation. Along with Ledi Sayadaw, the Pa-Auk Sayadaw teaches the meditators to have the theoretical knowledge of the matter, mental concomitants and consciousness in order to be used in the meditation. To attain enlightenment, “we must comprehend the impermanent, suffering, and non-self nature of mentality-materiality and their causes. Without knowing mentality-materiality and their causes, how can we comprehend that they are impermanent, suffering, and non-self? How can we practice Vipassana?”30 Hence, according to the Pa-Auk tradition, one must first ‘know’ the dhammas (through intellectual acquisition) and then ‘see’ the emptiness of the dhammas by the three contemplations as mentioned in Visuddhimagga.31 In addition to advocating the intellectual acquisition of the dhammas prior to meditation practice by these meditation masters, the Mogok vipassanā meditation tradition, founded by the first Mogok Sayadaw Ven. Vimala, teaches the law of dependent origination to practitioners in order to help them with their meditation practice. According

30 Ng, W. K. 2000: 72.
31 Kyaw 2011: 5.
to Mogok Sayadaw, one must listen to the dhamma talks given by meditation teachers, while one is reflecting on one’s own aggregates (khandhā). Therefore, these vipassanā meditation masters teach theoretical knowledge of the dhammas as a core foundation for the practice.

**The Paṭṭhāna and Vipassanā: the works of the Mohnyin Sayadaw, the Saddhammaransī Sayadaw and the Bamaw Sayadaw**

Turning to meditation teachers who combine the Paṭṭhāna and meditation, the Mohnyin Sayadaw is one such teacher. He is well-known not only for his scriptural learning but also for his meditation practice. Thus, he is known amongst the Burmese Buddhists as both gantha-dhura (vocation of books) and vipassanā-dhura (vocation of meditation). According to Mohnyin meditation method, the prior knowledge of the ultimate realities will help meditators to direct their attention to the true nature of all dhammas in a precise and clear way. This means that having proper attention (yonisomanasīkāra) with regard to the true nature of all dhammas - namely, the conditional relations between dhammas and the arising and dissolution of these dhammas - is important for vipassanā meditation. In starting vipassanā, the meditator must microscopically examine his modes of moving and changes of posture. The meditator must have proper attention with regard to changes in one’s body and sensation as ‘changing’, i.e. anicca. Thus, he can see the three characteristics - i.e. impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and non-self (anatta) - very clearly. The Mohnyin’s approach begins with the contemplation of body (kāyānupassanā), and progresses through to sensation (vedanānupassanā) and mind (cittānupassanā). The meditator should contemplate the experience of the dissolution of mental and physical phenomena contained in the body. Therefore, his approach gives emphasis on seeing all phenomena as anicca.

‘The Practice of Paṭṭhāna and Vipassanā’ is one of many works produced by Mohnyin Sayadaw. Moreover, the following stanza composed by him illustrates the vital role of the Paṭṭhāna in his teaching.

“By forming a proverb:
‘Literary Paṭṭhāna’, ‘Village Paṭṭhāna’ and ‘My Paṭṭhāna’;
Let’s turn the literary Paṭṭhāna in books into village Paṭṭhāna [through communal recitation].
But do not be contented with just the village Paṭṭhāna;
Strike to develop it into my Paṭṭhāna [through insight meditation]”.

(My translation)

Mohnyin Sayadaw encourages people to progress from learning the Paṭṭhāna as literary work to celebrating the communal recitation ceremonies of the Paṭṭhāna to seeing the interrelatedness of dhammas thus internalizing the Paṭṭhāna.

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32 Kornfield 1996: 194.
In his book on the Paṭṭhāna and vipassanā, Mohnyin Sayadaw explains the Paccayaniddesa section of the Paṭṭhāna in plain Burmese so that wider lay audience can understand the Paṭṭhāna. Moreover, he writes how a specific condition of the 24 conditions can be used when practicing vipassanā. Since he is an Abhidhammadika, learned in Abhidhamma, his writing on vipassanā in relation to the Paṭṭhāna is highly technical and detailed. Therefore, I shall cover an important concept in the Abhidhamma, namely, the cognitive process (cittavīthi), before turning to specific examples of how 24 conditions are related to vipassanā practice.

According to the Abhidhamma, a cognitive process that occurs through eye-door (cakkhuvāravīthi) for example consists of seventeen mind-moments (cittakkhaṇa) as outlined in the chart below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Past life-continuum, atitabhavaṇa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vibrational life-continuum, bhavaṅgacalaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Arrest life-continuum, bhavaṅgupaccheda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Five-door adverting, pañcadvāravajjana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Eye-consciousness, cakkhuviññāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Receiving consciousness, saṃpaṭicchana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Investigating consciousness, santīrana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Determining consciousness, votṭhapanā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-15</td>
<td>Javana kammically active or neutral: wholesome, kusala or unwholesome, akusala or indeterminate, ayyākata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Registration, tadārāmmana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Registration, tadārāmmana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here, if a visible form as object, having passed one mind-moment (1), enters the avenue of the eye, the life-continuum\[^{34}\] vibrates for two mind-moments and is arrested (2 and 3). Then, a five-door adverting consciousness arises and ceases adverting to that same visible form as object (4). Immediately after that, the following consciousnesses arise and cease: eye-consciousness\[^{35}\] sees that visible form (5), receiving consciousness receives it (6), investigating consciousness investigates it (7) and determining consciousness determines it (8). Following this, javana, i.e. active phase of the cognitive process, occurs for seven

\[^{34}\] Bhavaṇa or life-continuum is the function of consciousness by which the continuity of the individual is preserved. Bhavangacittas arise and pass away every moment during life when there is no active cognitive process taking place. Arising and perishing at every moment during this passive phase of consciousness, the bhavaṇa flows on like a stream, without remaining static for two consecutive moments. Thus, it is called ‘life-continuum’. (Bodhi 2000: 122-123)

\[^{35}\] There are six types of consciousness, namely, eye-consciousness (cakkhuviññāna), ear-consciousness (sataviññāna), nose-consciousness (ghānaviññāna), tongue-consciousness (jivhāviññāna), body-consciousness (kāyaviññāna) and mind-consciousness (manoviññāna). Each of the consciousness has corresponding bases (vatthu) and objects (ārammaṇa). For example, for an eye-consciousness to arise visible form (rupārammaṇa) must come in contact with eye-sensitivity (cakkhupasāda). See Bodhi 2000: 150-152 on the six types of cognitive processes.
mind-moments (9-15). After the javanas, two registration resultants arise accordingly (16-17). In the context of Abhidhamma, javana is a technical term used to refer to the active phase of the cognitive process, and it is often left untranslated. Javana literally means ‘running swiftly’. From the chart above, we can see that the seven javana mind-moments consist of a series of kusalacittas or akusalacittas or abyākatakacittas. The rate of the occurrence of any of these cittas is very fast at that stage, and hence, it is called javana. Moreover, if the 9th mind-moment is kusala for example, the rest of the javana mind-moments will be kusala. This is because the 9th javana becomes decisive support for the 10th javana, and so on. Therefore, kusalacittas will occur repeatedly during the javana stage as it progresses toward the 15th javana mind-moments. In addition, apart from the seven javana mind-moments, the rest of the 10 mind-moments are kammically indeterminate, that is, consciousness which cannot be determined in terms of the dichotomy of wholesome and unwholesome. Therefore, “the javana stage is the most important from an ethical standpoint, for it is at this point that wholesome or unwholesome cittas originate”.36 Thus, it can determine kammic quality of the cognitive process.

Bearing this in mind, we will see how Mohnyin Sayadaw relates the teachings in the Paṭṭhāna to vipassanā practice. For the root condition, there are three wholesome roots - aloha, adosa, and amoha - and three unwholesome roots - lobha, dosa, and moha, as shown above. Mohnyin Sayadaw relates these roots to everyday experiences as follows.

When one encounters pleasant things [e.g. sees pleasant sight], lobha and moha would arise given that one has improper attention (ayonisomanasīkāra).37 Similarly, encountering unpleasant things would lead to arising of dosa and moha if there is ayonisomanasīkāra. Finally, when one experiences neutral things, moha would arise if there is ayonisomanasīkāra. Thus, unwholesome javana (akusala javana) [i.e. unwholesome kamma in the sense of intention] would occur in the relation to the cognitive process.38

Therefore, if one has ayonisomanasīkāra when one encounters any kind of daily experiences, unwholesome javanas could arise. Thus, unwholesome roots will cause unwholesome consciousness, i.e. akusala-citta. In order to have wholesome consciousness, according to Mohnyin Sayadaw, one must have yonisomanasīkāra. Based on the writing of Mohnyin Sayadaw, it is not yet clear to me how one should develop yonisomanasīkāra. In this regard, the writing of Saddhammaransī Sayadaw on how the Paccayaniddesa section of the Paṭṭhāna is applied in insight meditation practices may shed light on what it means to have yonisomanasīkāra. Saddhammaransī Sayadaw explains how to develop yonisomanasīkāra in relation to object condition (ārammaṇa-paccaya) as follows.

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37 According to the Abhidhammatthasangaha, those states of consciousness in which greed is the principal root are termed “cittas rooted in greed”, and there are 8 of them. Those states of consciousness in which hatred is the principal root are termed “cittas rooted in hatred”, of which two are enumerated. Those states of consciousness in which delusion is the principal root are termed “cittas rooted in delusion”, of which two are enumerated. In those cittas rooted in greed and in those rooted in hatred, delusion is also found as an underlying root. Therefore, greed or hatred is always accompanied by delusion. (Bodhi 2000: 33)
38 Sumana 1982: 46-47.
When we encounter pleasant objects (iḍṭhārammaṇa), we should see them as a result of our past good actions. ...Having done good actions in the past, we experience good things at present. In order to have better life and achieve nibbāna in the future, it is best to do good actions. This is how we have to develop yonisomanasīkāra.39

Here, yonisomanasīkāra can be understood in terms of having a thorough attention or pondering in order to see the causes or nature certain experiences.40

Both Mohnyin Sayadaw and Saddhammaransī Sayadaw teach the meditator to have yonisomanasīkāra and develop vipassanā meditation. Based on the writing of Saddhammaransī Sayadaw, I shall highlight how to practice both yonisomanasīkāra and vipassanā with regards to sensation (vedanā) in relation to co-nascence condition (sahajāta-paccaya). Sensation (vedanā) is one of the four mental aggregates, and others being perception (saññā), volitional formations (saṅkhāra) and consciousness (viññāṇa). These mental aggregates arise together and condition each other reciprocally, which is given in the Paccayaniddesa as “cattāro khandhā arūpino aṅnamaṅgaṇaṃ sahajāta-paccayena paccayō”. For instance, if one feels unpleasant sensations such as intense pain during a meditation sitting, one may become frustrated by the pain. By mentally rejecting the pain, the degree of aversion increases, which in turns creates the perception of intensified pain. Here, painful sensation (vedanā) causes consciousness of such pain (viññāṇa), and by reacting to the pain (saṅkhāra) one perceives that the pain has increased (saññā). Although I have explained this process in sequential order, the arising of these aggregates occurs simultaneously. Moreover, we can see that, here, vedanā is conditioning state and the other mental aggregates are conditioned states. The conditioning state and conditioned states are related to each other through sahajāta-paccaya. In this example, we can see that by rejecting the pain the meditator is developing ayonisomanasīkāra.

Having yonisomanasīkāra, on the other hand, when faced with such pain would involve acknowledging the pain, and patiently observing and investigating it. Thus, one would be able to willingly accept it. By embracing the pain, one could investigate it further so that an understanding that ‘pain’ or ‘suffering’ (dukkha) is an inherent part of life would arise. By having yonisomanasīkāra, one would be able to see the truth of pain (dukkha-sacca), which is - according to Buddhist teaching - inherent in all experiences. In terms of vipassanā practice, Saddhammaransī Sayadaw explains that as one investigates the painful sensation in depth by directly looking at it, the degree of pain may increase to its climax. After that, the degree of pain will begin to diminish. By maintaining one’s mindfulness of the pain, one will see that the pain will move from one part of the body to another part of the body. Through nonjudgmental mindfulness and concentrated mind, one would be able to see the arising and dissolution of the painful experiences in different parts of the body as soon as one looks at the pain.41 According to Saddhammaransī Sayadaw, as the mind become more concentrated and mindful, one would be able to see changing nature of the pain in three-fold way. That is, one would see arising and dissolution of 1) the painful sensation itself, 2) the awareness of the pain, and 3) the mental notification of the pain as ‘pain’.42 It seems to me that such in-depth understanding of anicca is achieved through concentrated and meditative mind, rather than as a result to the knowledge of the teachings in the Paṭṭhāna.

40 Yoniso is ablative form of yoni, which is defined by Rhys Davids as ‘origin’, ‘place of birth’ and ‘nature’, and is given as “down to its origin or foundation - i.e. thoroughly, properly etc. Manasīkāra is defined as attention or pondering (Rhys Davids 1921-5: 560; 521).
41 Kuṇḍalābhivāṃsa 2010: 238-239.
42 Ibid. 240.
Although Saddhammaransī Sayadaw shows how to develop vedanānupassanā step-by-step in his writing, he does not explicitly say how the development of insight relates to the study of the Paṭṭhāna. For him, the mere fact that the four mental aggregates are mentioned in the context of sahajāta-paccaya implies that meditation on sensation and mind can be developed. Nonetheless, we can say with certainty that the Paṭṭhāna study helps meditators to develop an understanding of their own meditation practice in the context of the teachings in the Paṭṭhāna. For example, he explains predominance condition (adhipati-paccaya) in the context of one’s meditation practice.

Having determination to practice vipassanā until enlightenment is attained has desire (chanda), as predominant factor. [With such determination, one enters a meditation center.] Once at the meditation center, one puts continuous effort to develop mindfulness and practice vipassanā meditation. This is vīriyādhipati, [i.e. effort as predominant factor.] When difficulties are encountered as one progresses along the path, one does not become discouraged and disheartened because a strong mind [to achieve the goal] becomes a predominant factor (cittādhipati). As one develops insight knowledge, wisdom becomes predominant factor, i.e. vimāṃśādhipati has been developed.43

That is, there must be predominant factors - i.e. desire, effort, mind and wisdom - when one is practicing vipassana. As one’s practice has become established, one will encounter various difficulties. These difficulties will be overcome by having predominant factors. Through the understanding of the place and importance of predominant factors, meditation practitioners will be able to analyses their own meditation practice. More importantly, they will be able to change their attitude by recognizing the predominant factors that they may lack or need while practicing meditation. Here, such understanding of the Paṭṭhāna terminology not only helps meditators in their meditation practice, but also assists them to analyses their own path.

The emphasis on the meditative aspects of the Paṭṭhāna is not only present in the literature, but also apparent in dhamma talks given by monks. In a series of dhamma talks given by the Bamaw Sayadaw Ven. U Kumārābhivaṃsa (1929- ) on the Paccayaniddesa section of the Paṭṭhāna, he highlights four stages of progression along the Buddhist path. These stages are:

1. to listen to sermons and recitations of the Dhamma by others (sotenasunāti)
2. to recite the Dhamma by oneself (vacasāpāṭhitā)
3. to consider or reflect carefully about the Dhamma (manasānupekkhitā)
4. to contemplate three characteristics - i.e. contemplation of impermanence (aniccānupassanā), of suffering (dukkhānupassanā), of not-self (anattānupassanā) - with reference to all dhammas.44

He encourages people to progress along these stages of the path using the Paṭṭhāna as a meditative tool. We can see that this scheme of the path encompasses all three types of kamma - i.e. bodily action (kāyakamma), vocal action (vacīkamma) and mental action (manokamma), and assumes that the first two actions - listening to and reciting the Paṭṭhāna - are necessities in order to develop vipassanā meditation. Thus, the theoretical knowledge about the Paṭṭhāna is acquired through listening to and reciting the Paṭṭhāna. Here again, the third and fourth stages correspond to yonisomanasikāra and vipassanā meditation practice respectively.

43  Kuṇḍalābhivaṃsa 2010: 115.
44  Kumāra (Bamaw Sayadaw) 05 June 2009.
In sum, all three Paṭṭhāna teachers focus on the Paccayaniddesa section of the Paṭṭhāna in their works. These works - i.e. two books and dhamma talks - are targeted for wider audience of lay people. Therefore, these teachers mainly relate the teachings in the Paccayaniddesa to vipassanā meditation practice. These teachings are used to encourage meditators to develop yonisomanasikāra and insight knowledge (vipassanā-ñāna). In doing so, the theoretical knowledge of the dhammas are used to develop an understanding of one’s own meditation practice.

**Dangers of theoretical based meditation practice**

Although the theoretical knowledge of ultimate realities can be helpful in encouraging meditators to develop yonisomanasikāra and vipassanā-ñāna, such knowledge, according to Theinngu Sayadaw, may create hindrances along the path to liberation from suffering. This is because one may mistake one’s prior knowledge of the dhammas as one’s direct experience. That is, one may perceive the knowledge of the dhammas acquired at the intellectual level as one’s direct experience of the true nature of the dhammas. In other words, during the meditation sitting, one may imagine that ‘knowing’ the dhammas intellectually as ‘seeing’ them experientially. Such imagination of the dhammas could lead to philosophizing phase - i.e. just thinking about the philosophical teachings - during meditation sittings. This philosophizing phase occurs when mindfulness is absent. Therefore, it is crucial to combine the contemplation of the dhammas - e.g. contemplating the interrelations of the dhammas as described in the Paṭṭhāna - with mindfulness. Thus, mindfulness must be present in order to prevent the ‘philosophizing phase’ from arising.

**Conclusions**

In the context of some Burmese meditation traditions, philosophical teachings have practical usages in relation to vipassanā meditation practices and daily life experiences. Such prior theoretical knowledge of the dhammas helps to develop an understanding of one’s meditation practice in terms of the teachings in the Paṭṭhāna. Moreover, the philosophical teachings in the Abhidhamma are transmitted to wider lay audience through dhamma talks. The dhamma talks on the Paṭṭhāna not only teach the lay people about the interrelations of the ultimate realities, but also enhance devotion (saddhā) towards the Buddha. This is because the Paṭṭhāna is regarded as the embodiment of the Buddha’s omniscience, the Buddha-sabbaññuta-ñāṇa.

In addition to such roles, we have seen that these philosophical teachings are used in the practical aspects of meditation. Prior knowledge of the dhammas helps to develop yonisomanasikāra during meditation sittings and daily life. Combined yonisomanasikāra with non-judgmental mindfulness of the mental and physical phenomena, transformation of one’s knowledge of the dhammas into a direct experience of them occurs. That is, one has transformed from ‘knowing’ the dhammas into ‘seeing’ them through the theoretical based meditation practice. Therefore, the theoretical knowledge of the dhammas is instrumental in meditation practice, thus of importance for achieving the liberation from suffering.

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45  This is based on a series of dhamma talks given by Theinngu Sayadaw in 1965.
46  My thanks to Kate Crosby for informing me that Ven. Veera of Wat Rajasiddharam in Bangkok, who teaches the boran kammatthana method of 18-19th century Sangharaja Suk Khai Thuen, regards study, and especially a prior understanding of the Pali terms, problematic because it leads one to project experience. (Personal communication on 03 Oct 2011)
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Burmese Sources


Audio Sources

Introduction:

Along with the coming of 21st century, which also means the fast development of the society, our human-beings have been undergoing an enriched but fast-pace life. In the meantime, all kinds of depression appear and enter our life, which bring various physical and psychological diseases, making many people desperate or totally collapse. Our heart gets weaker and weaker, like a taut string, which would snap at any time. The traditional medicine and psychotherapy are inclined to find therapy only after the disease was found, that is to say, if the problem or disease is not exposed, no attention will be paid on it and no therapy will be given. In this mode, the seed of some serious suffering will be neglected, and have a long time to grow to a big tree. On another hand, in some countries, especially some traditional Asian countries, people still pay more attention to the physic health and are not able to accept the psychological therapy, or even regard it as something humiliating - as attending a psychological therapy almost equals telling others that you are psychotic. Traditional medicine and psychotherapy, therefore, cannot satisfy our human-beings any more.

In the 1960s, western psychologist began to show their interest in some traditional eastern thoughts and practices, believing that they would help psychology to study human being more objectively and completely.1 Thus, meditation, which is a significant practice in Buddhism from the Buddha’s time, is noticed and applied to modern medicine and psychotherapy, became an important adjuvant therapy. Meditation, such as Transcendental Meditation, Tranquil meditation, Insight meditation, Chan (Zen), etc., attracts more and more people gradually. So, in my opinion, it is meaningful to figure out how these Buddhist practice come up, how they differ from each other and if they can continue to develop to benefit our life together.

Review of the literature:

Like I mentioned above, there are so many kinds of meditation in Buddhism, so I will only focus on the development of insight meditation and Chan meditation here. In order to find out the history and present situation of them, much existent literature should be read first. Here, there are two primary kinds of literature I will read: the first are some relevant suttas, commentaries and some works written by outstanding meditation masters; the second is academic research results by scholars.

Referring to the suttas and commentaries, actually, not so many ones concentrate on meditation, but still, some scriptures like The Satipattana Sutta and The Visuddhimagga must be studied. Then, there are so many works written by meditation masters or edited by their followers.

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As my topic will cover the meditation in Theravada Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism, works by insight meditation masters, which are mainly in English (or some already have been translated into Chinese) and by Chinese masters, which are mainly in Chinese, will be involved. For Theravada Buddhist meditation, we get the ones such as Mahasi’s *The Satipatthana Vipassana Meditation* and *Discourse on The Basic Practice of The Satipatthana Vipassana*, Goenka’s *The Art of Living*, Pa Auk Sayadaw’s *The Way of Right Mindfulness*, as well as Luangpor Teean’s *Manual of Self Awareness*. For Chan meditation, like Huineng’s *The Platform Sutra* and some Chan Masters’s quotations are indispensable materials. All of this literature introduces us to the meaning, methods and theoretical principles of meditation - aiming to teach meditation skills.

In the academic circles, I find, it is the western scholars who firstly paid attention to insight meditation, which can date back to the 1960s and 1970s, when insight meditation had already spread to many countries. At that time, the scholars paid more attention on the relation between insight meditation and politics, neglecting the methods and theoretical principle of insight meditation. Coming to the 1980s and 1990s, scholars researching on insight meditation increased greatly, such as Bond, Houtman, Jordt, Gombrich and so on. In those decades, scholars started to attend insight meditation courses, connecting personal experience to academic studies. Their research covered all the aspects of insight meditation, with its origination and development discussed. They communicated with the practitioners and some even converted to meditation masters. For example, Houtman’s *Traditions of Buddhism Practice in Burma* (1990) illustrated the difference between insight meditation centers and normal monasteries, basing on his personal investigation and experience from that. Or Cousins’s *Traditions of Buddhist Practice in Burma* (2004) described its historical development and lineage of meditation masters, as well as introduce us the different existent meditation methods. Entering the 21st century, scholars continue the previous methods to research on insight meditation, so that a lot of researchers and research results come into our view, and the works of the previous researchers are being republished.

Coming to Chan meditation, there are already so many books and articles existing in Chinese academic circles. After reading these works, we can easily find the development from Tathagata Chan (如来禅) to Patriarchal Chan (祖师禅), though the argument about the exact time of the appearance of Patriarchal Chan still bother us. Anyway, scholars and Buddhist masters never lose their interest in the studies on Chan meditation. To say nothing about the former scriptures, such as Huineng’s *The Platform Sutra* (compiled by his followers), Zongmi’s (宗密) *Preface to the Collection of Chan Sources* (禅源诸诠集都序) and Yanshou’s *The Record of the Mirror of Orthodoxy* (compiled in 961, 宗镜录), in the modern time, there are a lot of scholars who research on this topic from different angles - for example, Ven.Taixu (太虚), Ven.Yinshun (印顺), Hu Shi (胡适), Chen Yinke (陈寅恪), Lu Cheng (吕澂), Tang Yongtong (汤用彤) as well as some Japanese scholars. Until nowadays, studies on Chan are still popular, like the famous scholars----Fang Litian (方立天), Ge Zhaoguang (葛兆光), Lai Yonghai (赖永海) have written some articles on it. For example, Fang Litian’s Tathagata Chan and Patriarchal Chan illustrates the development of these two types of Chan and discusses the difference between them. In addition, Ge Zhaoguang’s *History of Thought in Chinese Chan* (中国禅思想史, 1995) talks about the development of Chan from the 6th century to the 9th century.
From all above, we can find easily that no matter insight meditation or Chan meditation, there are a large number of scholars or meditation masters paying a lot of attention on it. However, in my reading, I have not found any articles or books which make a comparison between them, which I think is a valuable topic as they really have something in common. In addition, when I was writing my Master degree thesis, some of my teachers also advised me to make a comparison study between them in the future.

The development of insight meditation

1. The meaning of insight meditation

As far as we know, insight meditation is the basic way to practice in Buddhism and is one of the world’s most ancient techniques, which is firstly practiced by the supreme Gautama Buddha. Insight meditation, vipaśyanā in Sanskrit and Vipassanā in Pāli, means insight into the nature of reality, radically, is the insight into the three marks of existence, namely, impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and non-self (anattā). It is an attempt to probe into the essence of our life, requiring to be aware of what is happening to us every moment, without indulging in any joyful feeling or painful one. As Irons illustrates in the Encyclopedia of Buddhism, The aim of vipassana is the development of insight into the nature of perceived reality through full awareness of the mind and body.²

According to Buddhism, there are two aspects of meditation, samatha (tranquil meditation) and vipassana (insight meditation). For Buddhists, samatha, which is shared with other religions, is commonly practiced as a prelude to and in conjunction with wisdom practices.³ It is talked about in the Encyclopedia of Buddhism:

In this context, the word samadhi denotes a family of techniques shared by other religious systems of India, but normative Buddhist literature generally regards these techniques as preparatory or foundational, and not as aims in themselves. Although, in practice, many even today pursue states of samadhi for their own sake, the higher, normative goal is insight, which is believed to lead to liberation.⁴

Houtman also said in his book,

Nevertheless, samatha is what the Buddha practiced prior to his enlightenment while he had not yet found the vipassana path, both in previous lives and in his life as Gautama before the age of forty. As a Buddha, competent in all forms of mental culture, he also practiced samatha after his enlightenment.⁵

From all above, we can easily make a conclusion that the practice of samatha is indispensable during the practice of insight meditation or vipassana. For example, Houtman finds, in all Burmese

vipassana methods, samatha must be included, but not all samatha traditions need include vipassana. What is more, the aim of samatha is only concentration, while for insight meditation is the wisdom, with which we can liberate from the suffering or samsara.

2. The major method to practice insight meditation

For Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism, they share an idea that the Four Foundations of Mindfulness (Satipatthana) is a practice taught by the Gautama Buddha, and also a basic way in insight meditation. It requires to maintain moment-by-moment mindfulness and develop mindfulness through meditation. It includes four aspects:

a. mindfulness of the body (Kaya-nupassana).
b. mindfulness of feelings (Vedana-nupassana).
c. establishing mindfulness of mind (Citta-nupassana).
d. mindfulness of mental objects (Dhamma-nupassana).

As there are already so many books and articles introducing or explaining the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, with which we are able to understand it in depth, I will not elaborate on it here anymore.

3. The development of insight meditation

Like the above mentioned, insight meditation is one of the world’s most ancient techniques, which is taught by the supreme Gautama Buddha personally. Buddha, as we all know, saw the ultimate reality and got the enlightenment under the bodhi tree by insight meditation, after he realized that enlightenment is unavailable by enjoying luxury or ascetic life. So, in fact, it seems that Buddhism is a religion which emphasize religious practice from the beginning. Insight meditation, the special method of practice, is narrated in several suttas, like the Mahasatipattana Sutta, the Satipattana Sutta, as well as the Anapanasati Sutta. Scholars also hold the idea that the Buddha paid a lot of attention to insight meditation when he was live. Just as Kaw said, “In the moments prior to his passing away, the Buddha had admonished his followers to diligently practice insight meditation which is the prime means of reaching nibbana and entails mindfulness of all mental and physical phenomena.” In the mid-fifth century, the Buddhaghosa went to Sri Lanka and finished the famous book - Visuddhimagga, in which he introduced insight meditation in detail. Thanks to it, we can deduce that insight meditation was quite prevalent at that time.

However, later, the attention to Buddhist practice was shifted to scripture or doctrine study and attending rituals. The popularity of insight meditation was not there anymore. It was not only practiced by limited population but also the people from limited background. And it was only preserved in some villages or some remote forest. What is worse, in the colonial period, along with the declination of Buddhism, insight meditation was challenged even more, being on the edge of extinction.

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6 Ibid, p. 308.
In the 19th century, however, along with the revival of Buddhism, insight meditation attracted more and more attention, though it was still limited in the forest meditation centers at the beginning and was still strange to ordinary people. In the 1980s, Ven. Ledi began to popularize it to ordinary people, making it a popular practice method. Later, more and more famous meditation masters appeared, like Mingun, U Ba Hkin, Mahasi, Goenka, Pa-Auk as well as Luangpor Teean, all of whom made insight meditation more and more popular.

Nowaday, insight meditation is very prevalent, which is not only practiced by people from Theravadin countries, but also from western countries and other Mahayana countries. In some places, insight meditation even develops into a movement, which some scholars defines as “Insight Meditation Movement”, or “Mass Lay Meditation Movement”.

The Development of Chan (Zen):

As mentioned above, we can find the development from Tathagata Chan to Patriarchal Chan in Chinese Buddhism, though the argument about the exact time of the appearance of Patriarchal Chan still bother us. But in fact, it is popular for scholars to discuss about the origination of Patriarchal Chan and talk about the difference between Tathagata Chan and Patriarchal Chan. In this article, I will conclude and introduce some representative opinions, on the base of giving the meaning of Patriarchal Chan.

1. What is Patriarchal Chan

Nowadays, when we talk about Chinese Buddhism, Chan is the first thing we can recollect. Some scholars regard Chan as the essence of Chinese Buddhism, which decides the rise and fall of Chinese Buddhism. Zongmi said, “the learners of three vehicles, who are eager for enlightenment, must practice Chan, except which no way will be effective.”

In the existent Chinese scriptures, we can find Tathagata Chan was first talked in the (The Lankavatara Sutra), which was translated by Gunabhadra in the Southern Dynasty (420 A.D—589 A.D). In this sutta, Tathagata Chan, which possesses the wisdom to enlighten by oneself, is considered as the perfect meditation. Later, Zongmi, a Chinese monk and Buddhist scholar who first summarize the history of Chan sect systematically, also regarded Tathagata Chan as the perfect Chan. He said:

If realized suddenly that our original mind is pure, sufferingless, and also had the uncontaminated nature, this mind is right [like] the Buddha. In essence, there is no difference. The method of practice following this way is the perfect kind of Chan, or also named Tathagata Pure Chan.  

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So at first, Chinese Chan was famous for Tathagata Chan, but later Patriarchal Chan is more and more popular, even overtake the Tathagata Chan. The word “Patriarchal Chan” comes from The Jingde Period Record of The Transmission of the Lamp (景德传灯录). As it is promoted by Chan masters, it was named Patriarchal Chan, though the Buddhists also stressed that it was from the Buddha’s teaching. Ven. Taixu (太虚) had said as follows:

Tathagata Chan is practiced gradually while Patriarchal Chan aims at realizing the Buddha nature suddenly, that is to say, Tathagata Chan is a method which should be developed step by step, while Patriarchal Chan directly. Though both of them aim at realizing the wisdom, the methods they follow are different. The characteristic of Patriarchal Chan is entering the wisdom directly without depending on any Buddhist teaching or scriptures.13

So we can see, the aim of the Patriarchal Chan is to realize the pure nature suddenly, which does not depend on any theory. Patriarchal Chan does not require to establish any words and letters as they think it is not a must to read any scripture before practicing. Thus they believe that no matter if someone is an intellectual or illiterate, anyone can practice Patriarchal Chan. In a word, Patriarchal Chan is a special way to teach which is transmitted outside the scriptures.

2. The Development of Patriarchal Chan

As Fang Litian said, in the history of Chinese Chan Sect, the period between the confirming of Tathagata Chan as the perfect Chan and the rising of Patriarchal Chan mirrored the polarization and evolvement of Huineng’s Chan sect.14 So Huineng is quite important in judging the real time of the appearance of Patriarchal Chan, as in Chinese academic circle, someone consider Huineng as the founder of Patriarchal Chan, while some one think that Patriarchal Chan appear before Huineng, or even for the Buddha’s time. In this part, I will introduce some significant opinions about the origination of Patriarchal Chan in Chinese academic circle. Some of the scholars think that the Patriarchal Chan can date back to the Buddha’s time. There is a story in the sutta:

When the Tathāgata was preaching the dharma on Numinous Mountain, the devas presented him with flowers. The World-Honored One took a flower and showed it to the assembly. Kaśyapa smiled. The World-Honored One announced to the assembly, “I have a treasury of the eye of the true dharma, the wondrous mind of nirvāṇa, the reality transcending all forms, the supreme and subtle teaching, no reliance on written scripts, and transmission outside the scriptures. I bequeath it to Mahākāśyapa. In the future, do not let its propagation be cut off.” In addition, he entrusted Kaśyapa with his gold-brocade saṃghāti robe, to await Maitreya.15

As the Buddha taught Kaśyapa without depending on any scriptures and any words, and the teaching was transmitted from heart to heart, someone regarded it as the origin of Patriarchal Chan.

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14 Fang Litian (方立天). Tathagata Chan (如来禅) And Patriarchal Chan. Social Sciences In China (中国社会科学), 2000,05. p130.
15 The Assembling of Five Lamps (五灯会元), X80, 0028b.
Someone thought that the Patriarchal Chan was practiced since the time of Bodhidharma. Wu Limin illustrated in his article, the Chan Sect is set up from Bodhidharma, but the Chan they refer to is not Tathagata Chan which was practiced following The Three Practices (三学) and The Six Perfections (六度). It is Patriarchal Chan which aims at realizing the pure nature and is transmitted outside the scriptures.

But master like Zongmi already denied this opinion in his time, as he said: “the (Chan) which spread from Bodhidharma is this kind of Chan (Tathagata Chan).”

Because Huineng belongs to the lineage of Bodhidharma. A lot of people regard Huineng as the founder of Patriarchal Chan. Huineng is significant in Chan Sect or even in Chinese Buddhism, because from him, the different method to practice was more and more popular in China, which claims sudden enlightenment or realization of pure nature without the dependence on scriptures.

Some of the scholars think that the Patriarchal Chan is from Yangshan Huiji (仰山慧寂), who is one of founders of Weiyang Sect, a Chan sect deriving from Hongzhou Sect. Fang Litian said, Huiji first brought forward the word “Patriarchal Chan”, which was the antithesis of Tathagata Chan, and also regarded Tathagata Chan as a method which was inferior to Patriarchal Chan. It is recorded in the sutta:

The master (Yangshan Huiji) asked Xiangyan: “brother, how about the situation of your views recently?” Yan answered: “it is hard to say. There is a poem, the poor last year is not the real poor while the poor this year is the real poor; last year is too poor to have the place to put the awl while this year is even too poor to own the awl.” Master Huiji said: “you only get the Tathagata Chan, but not the Patriarchal Chan.”

This conversation is so significant when talk about the question of Tathagata Chan and Patrichal Chan. It will be quoted nearly each time. From this conversation, I can find that Xiangyan’s view of poor developed from last year to this year, during which the change was gradual as it was from no place to no awl. So Huiji thought that it was not Patriarchal Chan but Tathagata Chan and he believed that Patriarchal Chan was superior to Tathagata Chan. Fang Litian described that from the Yangshan Huiji’s time, the idea of the division of Tathagata Chan and Patrichal Chan was accepted widely.

A comparison between insight meditation and Patriarchal Chan

In my reading, I find there are more common ground between insight meditation and Patriarchal Chan, so I will only make a comparison between them, but not refer to Tathagata Chan here. Both of insight meditation and Patriarchal Chan are method to practice in Buddhism, especially one in Theravada Buddhism and one in Chinese Buddhism. In the meaning, though as the way to practice, both of them should show their views on Buddha teaching. So in this part, I will compare each other in two points, the view of practice theory and the method to practice.

17 "师问：何名信人？师答：久处静境，识未被杂，乃有几言：去年贫未是贫，今年贫始是贫；去年贫无卓锥之地，今年贫锥也无。师曰：汝合得如来禅，未得祖师禅。” The Jingde Period Record of The Transmission of the Lamp (景德传灯录), T51, 0283b.
1. The views on scripture study

As we know, traditional Buddhism pays a lot of attention to scripture study, as they think being familiar with the scriptures is the basic capability to be an ordinary Buddhist layman. To Buddhist monks, it is even more important to study the Buddha teaching, because they are regarded as the people to plant the seed of Buddha teaching. The former insight meditation and Chinese Buddhism also value the scripture study, but refer to the present insight meditation and Patriarchal Chan, things seem different.

Coming to insight meditation, as I have mentioned above, it got a revival in 1950s, from which there are a great number of meditation masters appearing. In 19th and 20th century, most of the masters teach insight meditation and write some books at the same time, spending a lot of time to study scriptures, such as Mahasi, who began to study Buddha teaching and Pali from his renouncement of family life. Nevertheless, when they started to teach insight meditation to the public, almost all of them denied the necessity to read some scripture before or during insight meditation. Like Goenka and Luangpor Teean, they teach insight meditation with understandable and easy words on the ground of personal experience, and they don’t require to read scripture or other letters. Luangpor Teean said: “we needn’t pore scripture, because they are just words or letters, which cannot lead to enlightenment.” Goenka even are against the reading of scriptures before insight meditation, because he think it will push the practitioners to gain some results during practice, which are actually not available for them at that stage, thus it will be harmful to the practitioners.

Patriarchal Chan, likewise, claims that it is not necessary to read scripture, or we even should discard them. They think Buddhist practice is not dependent on any scriptures. The most important thing is to realize the pure mind by practicing.

Huike (慧可) said “Please, Master, put my heart at ease.” The Master (Bodhidharma, 达摩) replied, “Hand me that heart, and I will put it at ease,” Huike said, “Search as I will, I cannot find my heart to give you,” The Master replied, “If it can be found, it is not your heart. I have now put it at ease,” then he added, “Now that I have put it at ease, do you see?” Huike had a sudden realization, So he said to the Master, “Now I see, all things are ultimately nonsubstantial, and the way to Bodhi, to Wisdom, is not a matter of distance. That is why it does not take the bodhisattvas any time to reach the sea of wisdom, and it does not take them any time to reach the shores of nirvana.” The Master said: “That is so, just so.” Huike then asked, “Master, your way of teaching… is it recorded in written words?” Damo replied, “My way is taught through the mind, not through the written word.”

So we can see, from the Bodhidharma, he think the Buddha teaching it spread by heart to heart, but not by the means of words. Ven. Huineng also said, “The wonderful mysteries of Buddhist enlightenment have nothing to do with the written word.” He also said, “if we judge the Buddha teaching according to words, it is not the Buddha’s opinion.” In a word, Chinese Patriarchal Chan believed that the enlightenment of pure mind and wisdom is not dependent on words or reading scriptures.

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18 A Collection from the Halls of the Patriarchs (祖堂集), vol. 2.
2. The views on enlightenment gradually or suddenly

We all know, the traditional Buddhism requires his followers to practice obeying the order “sila, samatha, panna”, so we can say, it seems like a karma-collection religion but not a nirvana religion. Collecting karma is a long-term work, so it is different to collect enough karma for enlightenment in this life. Nirvana is far away from us, which we only can be closer and closer to by practicing gradually. We should take nirvana or Buddhist practice as a long-term job. Insight meditation and Patriarchal Chan, however, are different from traditional Buddhism.

Insight meditation masters believes that the practitioners are able to get enlightenment in this life. In addition, if we practice accurately, it will be very fast to reach the enlightenment. As Mahasi said, “it will not take a long time to reach this goal (nirvana), maybe a month, maybe 20 days, or 15 days; or in some occasion, someone can even get it in 7 days.”

As for Patriarchal Chan, it even can be named Sudden Enlightenment Sect (顿悟宗). Sudden enlightenment is an important way to practice in Chinese Chan Buddhism. It is firstly promoted by Zhu Daosheng (竺道生), and later Huineng even regards it as a basic way to lead to enlightenment. As for Huineng himself, he got enlightenment suddenly when he heard someone reciting the Diamond Sutta. In the Platform Sutta, it is said, “when the sudden enlightenment is not available, Buddha is right the ordinary people; while enlighten suddenly, all will became Buddha… realize the pure nature suddenly.” The Chinese Patriarchal Chan holds the idea that enlightenment is fast, convenient, and it don’t need to be pursued following any stages. They think the suffering is just like the cloud, which can be dispelled suddenly, after which the clear sky will reappear, like the pure mind will reappear after the sudden enlightenment.

In addition, both the Insight meditation and Patriarchal Chan believed that it is not necessary to retire the family life to practice. We can practice both at home and in the temples. Staying in remote forest is not a must.

Conclusion

From all above, we can easily see that Insight meditation and Patriarchal Chan develop very fast in their own environment and are really different from the traditional Buddhism in some sense.

In my opinion, there are two reasons for their difference from the traditional Buddhism. At first, find an easy way for the public to practice Buddha teaching. The Buddhist scriptures, quite a lot of which are recorded in obscure words, are not easy for normal people. If we require them to read the words seriously, they will lose their interest in Buddhism. And if the problem of scripture reading is gotten rid of, both the intellectual and the illiterate are able to join in the queue of Buddhism. In the other hand, some people will lose hope to the traditional Buddhism, because it teaches a gradual way to practice which cannot lead to the final enlightenment in this life. So the idea of sudden enlightenment are able to attract their attention. What is more, the idea of practicing in the family life is more feasible for ordinary people.

22 The Platform Sutta (坛经). T48, 0351a.
In a word, the change or revolution of Insight meditation and Patriarchal Chan is to attract more and more people to accept Buddhism and spread Buddhism in an easy way. Actually, I think, we cannot deny the influence of these transformations, because both of them are popular in their own areas.
Pragmatic Benefits and Concentration through Ānāpānasati Meditation

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1. Introduction

Ordained as a Theravādin nun, I practiced ānāpāna meditation from 4 o’clock morning to 8 o’clock night for one month at a branch of Pa-Auk meditation center in Myanmar, which is well known for its samatha-focused techniques which fundamentally adhered to the Visuddhimagga.

I improved my concentration gradually. One day, while meditating with my closed-eyes, apparently all the people whom I have even seen in my life came up to my mind one by one, tracing my memory back to the past. Hundreds of people seemed to appear there. Some of them were those I liked, did not like, some hurt me, or I hurt; but all appeared as illusions. The inner visions were simply like a movement of a shadow-picture lantern or a film with a distance, not like an actual scene that I saw directly.

Neither anger, sorrow, nor longing arose. I felt I would like to forgive any of those people and let any memory go because I preferred to soak myself into such a peaceful status of mind, rather than disturb myself by such passions. A well-concentrated mind brought extraordinary serenity to my mind - absolutely far from distraction and confusion. The mind reaches the waveless-ocean-like calmness. I grasped the attainment of such a state - that is: one of the great benefits through my own samatha practice.

In the last 50 years or so, however, there has been a large proliferation in groups, largely of Burmese origin, offering and promoting what has come to be called vipassanā meditation - despite the fact that there is little or no mention of such a practice in the canon. At the same time, emphasis on more traditional types of practice, such as samatha and ānāpānasati seem to have declined.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify “Buddhist” meditation and to share importance of concentration (samatha) practice from my direct experience of ānāpānasati and also verifiably with some references of Pāli canon.

2. Problems in the Current Vipassanā-oriented Meditation

The Buddha personally practiced samatha through his life, from the moment of enlightenment to that of death. Jhāna is undoubtedly to complete the entire Buddhist path to help to progress more steadily culminated to a doorway of vipassanā. Practice of ānāpānasati is repeatedly encouraged by the Buddha in a number of suttas throughout his lifetime. Nonetheless, only vipassanā “mindfulness” practice has come to wider prominence today, while samatha appears to gain less attention. There must be misconception about samatha meditation.
Some have suggested that certain individuals feel that the practice of samatha brings with it the danger of becoming obsessed with psychic powers or stuck in blissful states. Others might suggest that samatha was a pre-Buddhist practice and thus not a specifically Buddhist one. A more likely possibility is that these days we live in a busy society which demands instant results by the shortest possible route, and that modern man does not share the same view of time as his Indian predecessor, who saw time as a long drawn out cyclical process, allowing plenty of opportunity for gradual progress.

This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper, whose purpose is to show the central role played by samatha in both the Buddha’s own path to enlightenment and that advocated by him to his followers. Moreover, samatha and the practice of jhāna was a constant recourse of the Buddha and his followers whom were told that they should spend their time in the attainment of jhāna.

According to the Buddha’s instruction, the purpose of meditation for Buddhists is to attain Nibbāna. The Buddhist meditation consists of samatha and vipassanā. They play individual role. As jhāna states are synonymous to right concentration (sammā-samādhi), samatha practices is further linked to the concepts of eightfold noble path and four noble truths.

The main purpose of samatha is to achieve deep concentration - jhāna states, and begin to discriminate jhāna factors such as joy and happiness. The sequence of the result of regular samatha practice enables to overcome of desires and bring purification of mind. Samatha requires only one meditation subject in each case; therefore, focusing upon only breath in, breath-out (ānāpānasati bhāvanā) is one of the most representative meditations for samatha practitioners. Furthermore, meditation of loving-kindness (mettā bhāvanā) enables them to go up to the third (or fourth in Abhidhamma classification) jhāna state. Therefore the experience of happiness is a highlight of jhāna fruits. On the contrary, vipassanā practice requires seeing things clearly with understanding three lakkhana (anicca, dukkha, anatta). In observance of three lakkhana, vedanā must be neutral feeling (upekkhā). Sati, the key factor of vipassanā means “to be aware” or, “to mind”, or “to remember.” Different from the jhāna states, there must be no happiness (sukha) in such an observant state of mind.

Originally the term vipassanā represents tevijjā (three knowledge) and samatha represents a specific sort of training and practice for samādhi states. Here knowledge signifies not only general knowledge of secular matters but knowledge superior to them.

Without the strong concentration of jhāna, ordinary people (puthujjana) may know some verbalized concepts such as: “Life is suffering”; “Negative thought is unwholesome kamma”; “Be mindful”, and so forth. Those understanding are, however, not associated with tevijjā yet. Such knowledge will not help whatever is suddenly happening and befalling upon them because their knowledge has nothing to do with firm concentration. When they fear and become agitated, their minds are really neither stable nor mindful. It is highly possible to misjudge right decision. Therefore, simple logical understanding is still useless to deal with three lakkhana. Unless holding a calm mind, how can they be aware of the things that really are (satipaṭṭhāna)? An undistracted mind is necessary.
3. Evident Importance of Jhānas through Ānāpānasati in the Canon

Jhāna or samādhi had been already practiced by the Buddha before his enlightenment. When as a young child he slipped into the first jhāna during his father’s participation in a ploughing festival.¹ And that later Alāra Kālāma taught him up to the seventh jhāna, Uddaka Rāmaputta up to the eighth jhāna. The ascetic Gautama, however, thought there must be still further states to go and he also sought other means.

Therefore, on the night of his enlightenment he returned to practice of the jhānas after partaking of Sujāta’s milk-rice.² Having resolved not to move without attaining the goal he was seeking, he entered jhānas 1-2-3-4 through ānāpānasati. Then with his mind purified³, he directed his mind to knowledge of his own former dwelling (pubbe-nivāsanussatiññā), the births of others (dibbacakkhuññā), and destruction of the āsavas (āsavakkhayānāññā). Here it is remarkable this is no mention of the term “vipassanā,” but actually after the jhāna, the Buddha attained “tevijjā.” Anyway it is not same as the currently practiced vipassanā techniques.

Similarly during parinibbāna,⁴ the Buddha ascended until the attainment of jhānas 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8, and descended jhānas 8-7-6-5-4-3-2-1, again ascended jhānas 1-2-3-4, and leaving the fourth jhāna, and finally entered Mahāparinibbāna.⁵

For instance, about anupubbikathā in the progressive talk of Udāna⁶, people gained the dhammacakkhu or became sotāpannas by the Buddha raising their state of consciousness into the fourth jhāna whereupon they became enlightened. It is, therefore, clear that the traditional path both for the Buddha and his sāvakas to enlightenment was by way of the jhānas. We don’t know which arahant became enlightened by either vipassanā or jhāna.

It is quite curious why modern practitioners should have abandoned this procedure and replaced it with vipassanā which seems to lack proven cases. Probably the only possible role for vipassanā in the Pāli canon might be the one to argue that the Buddha, on the night of the enlightenment after attaining the fourth jhāna emerged from there as he did prior to attaining saupādisesanibbāna and then turned his mind to the tevijjā.

The tevijjā were in fact a consequence of post-jhānic vipassanā but even if this could be shown, there seems no evidence for this either canonical or commentarial. This would be still a far cry from vipassanā as it is practiced today and still depends on prior practice of samatha in the form of the various jhānas.

“Tisso vijjā – pubbenivāsa-nussatiññānaṃ vijjā, sattānaṃ cutūtpaṭeññānaṃ vijjā, āsavānaṃ khayaññānaṃ vijjā.”⁷

¹ Ja I 58  
² Ja I 68  
³ M I 21-23f  
⁴ D II 156f  
⁵ catutthajhānaṃ vuṭṭhahahitvā taṃ samanantarā bhagavā parinibbāyi  
⁶ Ud 49 F  
⁷ D. III, 220
The tevijjā were in fact a consequence of post-jhānic vipassanā, though this could be shown, there seems no evidence for this in either canonical or commentarial material. This would be still a far cry from vipassanā as it is practiced today and still depend on prior practice of samatha in the form of the various jhānas. The Buddha in the last moment of Mahāparinibbāna, practiced 4 arūpājhanās, and then descended from 4th jhāna to 1st jhāna again developed from 1st jhāna to 4th jhāna. At the state of first jhāna taking 24 samatha meditation subjects\(^8\); 13 subjects at the state of second jhāna and third jhāna\(^9\); 15 subjects in 4th jhāna.\(^10\) In each jhānas ānāpānasati are included as a subject. Clearly, all the facts demonstrate that the Buddha was a supreme samatha practitioner.

Originally vipassanā means no more and no less to see things separately and clearly. When a meditator observes and differentiates minute things, it must also need the support of well-sharpened and well-deepened concentration. Indeed, such careful concentration is based on and developed through samatha.

4. Benefits of Ānāpānasati in Samatha Practice

As describe above, there were no specific usage of term such as “vipassanā” and “samatha” but merely “tevijjā” and “jhāna” in the Pāli canon. What the Buddha did for Nibbāna of was fulfill the sequence of jhāna to tevijjā. Currently said, samatha and vipassanā are actually a unit of mutually complementary path. They are intertwined and support one another\(^11\) as parallel paths. Therefore it is essential to make their balance and practice both.

From my personal experience, I realized that samatha practice offer individual and unique practical benefits for our everyday life.

Firstly: ānāpānasati meditation is recommendable for everyone with a busy life because it requires no external material to practice. Everyone has a nose and then can start it; and it requires no particular posture: either sitting, walking, lying down. So you can practice ānāpānasati anytime, anywhere. Or, you can think of how the Buddha tried ānāpānasati hard throughout his life as well as you do, it can arouse your sympathy and motivation.

Secondly: for the benefit of samatha or jhāna, when absorption is successful, there is no room for confusion and distractions that other disturbances perform. You are surrounded by numerous head-aching miscellaneous problems of business, family, economy, and so forth. It can trap you in a nervous mental-state, easily. Whenever your mind becomes unstable, it originates from worrying, disturbing and capturing your mind and taking somewhere else unsuitable where the mind should stay. In fact, achievement of deep concentration is not facile task. The power of concentration can resist such agitation and enables to run away from such dangers, just as I felt when the people whom I have seen from a distance during the meditation experience.

You can experience true serenity solely inside of your mind. It feels a soundless mirror-like surface of the transparent ocean. What is different from vipassanā is that you cannot feel such hap-

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\(^8\) D A II 594, 24 are: asubha (10), 32 kāra (1), kasiṇa (8), mettā, karuṇā, muditā (3), ānāpāna (1), paricchedākāsa (1).

\(^9\) 13: kasiṇa (8), mettā,karuṇā, muditā (3), ānāpāna (1), paricchedākāsa (1).

\(^10\) kasiṇa (8), upekkhā (1), ānāpāna (1), paricchedākāsa (1), arūpajhāna (4).

\(^11\) Bhante Henepola Gnaratana, Beyond Mindfulness In Plain English, (Wisdom Publication, Boston), 2009
piness during practicingvipassanā but after doing, you can reflect how happy you were in such state; but during samatha, you can feel bliss and purification in your mind at the very moment of meditation.

“Life is suffering,” of course - every Buddhist knows and remembers this truth verbally. Well-sharpened and stable concentration will first make you experience happiness. The bliss and purification of mind will encourage and motivate you to practice so that you can prolong this blissful state more and more through meditation improvement. The happiness from samatha never escapes from the realities of the world. After you maintain the stable and undistracted mind deepened through samādhi, finally the mind will be ready to see suffering and two other lakkhanas culminate to the final liberation. Therefore, the practice of samatha through ānāpānasati meditation offers a sequence of progressive improvements in our daily life in parallel with vipassanā training.
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Theravada Buddhist philosophy’s exposition of the supramundane involves drawing a distinction between the terms mundane (lokiya) and supramundane (lokuttara). The term mundane applies to all phenomena comprising the world (loka) form subtle states of consciousness as well as matter to virtue as well as evil, to meditative attainments as well as sensual engagements. The term supramundane, in contrast, applies exclusively to that which transcends the world, that is, the nine supramundane states: Nibbāna, the four noble paths (magga) leading to Nibbāna, and their corresponding fruits (phala) which experience the bliss of Nibbāna.

The word lokuttara, supramundane, is derived from loka (world) and uttara (beyond) or transcending it. The concept of world is threefold: The world of living beings (sattaloka), the physical universe (akasaloka) and the world of formation (sankaloka). That is the totality of conditioned phenomena, physical and mental. The notion of the world relevant here is the world of formations that comprises all mundane phenomena included within the five aggregates of clinging. That which transcends the world of conditioned things is the unconditioned element, Nibbāna.

The goal of the Buddhist path, complete and permanent liberation from suffering, is to be achieved by practising the full threefold discipline of morality (sīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (paññā). The meditational absorptions, jhānas, comprising the four fine-material jhānas and the four immaterial jhānas, pertain to a stage of concentration, which is of an extremely intensified degree. However, taken by themselves, these states do not ensure complete deliverance, for they are incapable of cutting off the roots of suffering. The Buddha teaches that the cause of suffering, the driving power behind the cycle of rebirths, is the defilements with their three unwholesome roots - greed, hatred and delusion. Concentration at the absorption level, no matter to what heights it is pursued, only suppresses the defilements, but cannot destroy their latent seeds. Thence bare mundane jhāna, even when sustained, cannot by itself terminate the cycle of rebirths. On the contrary, it may even perpetuate the round. For if any fine-material or immaterial jhāna is held on to with clinging, it will bring about a rebirth in that particular plane of existence corresponding to its own kammic potency, which can then be followed by a rebirth in some lower realm.

A fundamental distinction that is drawn between two terms crucial to Theravada philosophical exposition, refer to ‘mundane’ (lokiya) and ‘supramundane’ (lokuttara). The term ‘mundane’ applies to all phenomena comprised in the world (loka) - to subtle states of consciousness as well as matter, to virtue as well as evil, to meditative attainments as well as sensual engrossments. The term ‘supramundane’, in contrast, applies exclusively to that which transcends the world, that is, the nine supramundane states: Nibbāna, the four noble paths (magga) leading to Nibbāna, and their corresponding fruits (phala) which experience the bliss of Nibbāna. According to the Paṭisambhidāmagga the meaning of the word ‘lokuttara’ is that:
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1. To go beyond this world through the Eightfold Path is *lokuttarā,*
2. Advantage resulting from Samanāship (*Samaññaphalāni*) and Purification (*nibbāna*) are beyond this world. So it is called as *Lokuttara."

*Lokiya* means mundane, worldly, not only of this world but all experience and knowledge of any world, any existence, and represents all that is conditioned. *Lokuttara* means supramundane, beyond worldliness, and represents the unconditioned. The meaning of the word ‘supramundane’ is usually understood as being above the world. However, ‘above the world’ is often open to interpretation, as in the meaning of something not quite ordinary, like excellent virtue and discipline. For a better understanding of ‘supramundane’ it is better to look at the doctrines that are subsumed under supramundane (*lokuttara*) state. They are:

1. The four foundations of awareness or mindfulness (*satipatthāna*),
2. The four right efforts (*padhāna*),
3. The four roads to power (*iddhi-pāda*),
4. The five spiritual faculties (*indriya*),
5. The five spiritual powers (*bala*),
6. The seven factors of enlightenment (*bojjha*),
7. The Noble eight fold path (*Ariyo aṅgiko maggo*),
8. The Four Paths (*cattāro ariyamaggā*),
9. The Four Fruitions (*cattāri sāmaññaphalāni*),
10. Nibbāna

- Four frames of reference (*satipaṅñhāna*)
  1. Contemplation of the body (*kayānupassanā*)
  2. Contemplation of feelings (*vedanānupassanā*)
  3. Contemplation of consciousness (*cittānupassanā*)
  4. Contemplation of mental qualities (*dhammānupassanā*)

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1 *Ariyamaggā lokāti uttarantāti lokuttārā,* Pts, 166
2 *Samaññaphalāni nibbānañca lokato uttiññāti lokuttarā.* Ibid, 166
3 *Cattāro satipaṭṭhānā, cattāro sammappadhānā, cattāro iddhipādā, pañcindriyāni, pañca balāni, satta bojjhaṅga, ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, cattāro ariyamaggā, cattāri ca samaññaphalāni, nibbānañca – ime dhammā lokuttarā. Cattāro satipaṭṭhānātādayo sattatimsa bodhipakkhiyadhāmā yathāyogam maggaphalasampayuttā. Te bujjhanāththena bodhi evamladdhanāmassa ariyassa pakkhe bhavattā bodhipakkhiyā nāma. Pakkhe bhavattāti upakārabhāve thitattā.* Ibid, 166
• Four right exertions (sammappadhāna)⁵
  1. Exertion for the non-arising of unskilfull states
  2. Exertion for the abandoning of unskilfull states
  3. Exertion for the arising of skilfull states
  4. Exertion for the sustaining of skilfull states

• Four bases of power (iddhipāda)⁶
  1. Will (chanda)
  2. Energy (viriya)
  3. Consciousness (citta)
  4. Discrimination (vāmamsa)

• Five faculties (indriya)⁷
  1. Faith (saddhā)
  2. Energy (viriya)
  3. Mindfulness (sati)
  4. Concentration (samādhi)
  5. Wisdom (paññā)

• Five powers (bala)
  1. Faith (saddhā)
  2. Energy (viriya)
  3. Mindfulness (sati)
  4. Concentration (samādhi)
  5. Wisdom (paññā)

⁵ cattāro sammappadhāna Pañcāhanti etenāti padhānaṃ, sobhanaṃ padhānaṃ sammappadhānaṃ, sammā vā padahanti etenāti sammappadhānaṃ, sobhanaṃ vā taṃ kilesavirūpavapavattavirahitato padhānaṅca hitasukhanipphādakāṭṭhena setṭhabhāvāvahanato padhānabhāvavakaranato vāti sammappadhānaṃ. Viriyassetam adhivacanan. Tāya vapaṃnāmpanānaṃ akulasānaṃ pahānānupattikiccaṃ, anuppannuppannānaṅca kusalānaṃ uppattīthitikiccaṃ sādhayāti ti catubbidham hoti. Tasmā cattāro sammappadhānāti vuccati. Ibid, 618

⁶ cattāro iddhipāda Nipphattipariyāyena ijjhānāṭṭhena, ijjhanti eteyasa sattā iddhāvuddhāukkaṃsagatā hontīti iminā vā pariyaṃsaya iddhi, tassā sampayuttāya pubbaṅgamāṭṭhena phalabhūtāya pubbabhāgakāraṇāṭṭhena ca iddhiyā pādoti iddhipādo. So chandaviyacittavīmāṃsāvase na catubbidhova hoti. Tasmā cattāro iddhipādāti vuccati. Ibid, 618

⁷ pañcindriyāni pañca balānī Assaddhiyakosajapamādavikkepasammoḥanam abhībhavanato abhībhavamasānkhātena adhipatiyaṭṭhena indriyām. Assaddhiyādihi anabhībhavaniyato akampiyaṭṭhena balā. Tadubhavampi saddhāviriyaśatisamādhipahīvaṃsena pañcavidham hoti. Tasmā pañcindriyāni pañca balānīti vuccanti. Ibid, 618
• Seven factors of Enlightenment (bojjhaṅga)\(^8\)
  1. Mindfulness (sati)
  2. Investigation (dhamma vicaya)
  3. Energy (viriya)
  4. Joy (pīṭṭi)
  5. Tranquility (passaddhi)
  6. Concentration (samādhi)
  7. Equanimity (upekkhā)

• Noble Eightfold Path (Ariyo aññhaṅgiko maggo)\(^9\)
  1. Right View (samma nāsakappa)
  2. Right Intention (samma sankappā)
  3. Right Speech (samma vāccā)
  4. Right Action (samma kammanta)
  5. Right Livelihood (samma ājīva)
  6. Right Energy (samma vāyāma)
  7. Right Mindfulness (samma sati)
  8. Right Concentration (samma samādhi)

• Four paths of stream-entry (cattāro ariyamaggā),
  1. The path of stream-entry (sotapatti-magga),
  2. The path of once-returning (sakadagami-magga),
  3. The path of never-returning (anagami-magga),
  4. The path of arahatship (arahatta-magga),

• The Four fruitions (cattāri sāmaññaphalāni)
  1. The fruit of stream-entry (sotapatti-phala),
  2. The fruit of once-returning (sakadagami-phala),
  3. The fruit of arahatship (arahatta-phala),
  4. The fruit of never-returning (anagami-phala),

There are forty six Lokuttara Dhammas in Buddhism such as the four foundations of awareness or mindfulness (satipatthāna), the four right efforts (padhāna), the four roads to power (iddhi-pāda), the five spiritual faculties (indriya), the five spiritual powers (bala), the seven factors of enlightenment (bojjhaṅga), the Noble Eightfold Path (Ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo), the Four Paths

\(^8\) satta bojjhaṅgāti Bujjhanakasattassa pana anāgabhāvena satiādayo satta dhammā bojjhaṅgā, Tena vuccati satta bojjhaṅgāti. Ibid, 618

\(^9\) ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo niyānaṭṭhena ca sammādiṭṭhiādayo aṭṭha maggaṅgā honti. Tena vuccati ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggoti. Ibid, 618
Wisdom has the specific characteristic of penetrating the true nature of phenomena. It penetrates the particular and general features of things through direct cognition rather than discursive thought. Its function is to abolish the darkness of delusion which conceals the individual essences of states and its manifestation is non-delusion. Since the Buddha says that one whose mind is concentrated knows and sees things as they are, the proximate cause of wisdom is concentration.

The wisdom instrumental in attaining liberation is divided into two principal types: insight knowledge (vipassanā) and the knowledge pertaining to the supramundane paths (maggañāna). The first is the direct penetration of the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena - impermanence, suffering and non-self. It takes as its objective sphere the five aggregates (pancakkhandhā) - material form, feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness. Because insight knowledge takes the world of conditioned formations as its object, it is regarded as a mundane form of wisdom. Insight knowledge does not itself directly eradicate the defilements, but serves to prepare the way for the second type of wisdom, the wisdom of the supramundane paths, which emerges when insight has been brought to its climax. The wisdom of the path, occurring in four distinct stages, simultaneously realises Nibbāna, fathoms the Four Noble Truths, and cuts off the defilements. This wisdom is called supramundane because it rises up from the world of the five aggregates to realise the state that transcends the world, Nibbāna.

The Buddhist disciple, striving for deliverance, begins the development of wisdom by first securely establishing its base - purified moral discipline and concentration. He then learns and masters the basic material upon which wisdom is to work - the aggregates, elements, sense bases, dependent arising, the Four Noble Truths, etc. He commences the actual practice of wisdom by cultivating insight into the impermanence, suffering and non-self aspect of the five aggregates. When this insight reaches its apex it issues in supramundane wisdom, the right view factor of the Noble Eightfold Path, which turns from conditioned formations to the unconditioned Nibbāna and thereby eradicates the defilements. For a meditator following the vehicle of serenity the attainment of jhāna fulfils two functions: first, it produces a basis of mental purity and inner collectedness needed for undertaking the work of insight contemplation; and second, it serves as an object to be examined with insight in order to discern the three characteristics of impermanence, suffering and non-self. Jhāna accomplishes the first function by providing a powerful instrument for overcoming the five hindrances. As we have seen, for wisdom to arise the mind must first be concentrated well, and to be concentrated well it must be freed from the hindrances, a task accomplished pre-eminently by the attainment of jhāna. Though access concentration will keep the hindrances at bay, jhāna will ensure that they are removed to a much safer distance.

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10 Iti vitṭhārato sattatimsabodhipakkhiyacatunaggacatuphalanibbānānaṃ vasena chaṭṭāḷīsa lokuttaradhammā, tato sankhepana catunaggacatuphalanibbānānaṃ vasena nava lokuttaradhammā, tatopi sankhepana maggaphalanibbānānaṃ vasena tayo lokuttaradhammāti veditabbam. Sati-padhānānaṃ maggaphalānaṃcā lokuttarate vutte tamsampayuttānaṃ phassādānapi lokuttaratam vuttameva hoti. Padhānadharmavasena pana satipaṭṭhānādaya vuttā. Ibid, 618
11 Vism.438; pp.481
In their capacity for producing concentration the jhānas are called the basis (pāda) for insight, and that particular jhāna a meditator enters and emerges from before commencing his practice of insight is designated his pādakajjhāna, the basic or foundational jhāna. Insight cannot be practised while absorbed in jhāna, since insight meditation requires investigation and observation, which are impossible when the mind is immersed in one-pointed absorption. But after emerging from the jhāna the mind is cleared of the hindrances, and the stillness and clarity that then result conduce to precise, penetrating insight.

The jhānas also enter into the samathayānika’s practice in a secondary capacity, that is, as objects for scrutinization by insight. The practice of insight consists essentially in the examination of mental and physical phenomena to discover their marks of impermanence, suffering and non-self. The jhānas a meditator attains provide him with a readily available and strikingly clear object in which to seek out the three characteristics. After emerging from a jhāna, the meditator will proceed to examine the jhānic consciousness and to discern the way it exemplifies the three universal marks. This process is called sammasanañña, ‘comprehension knowledge,’ and the jhāna subjected to such a treatment is termed the ‘sammasitajjhāna’ ‘the comprehended jhāna’. Though the basic jhāna and the comprehended jhāna will often be the same, the two do not necessarily coincide. A meditator cannot practise comprehension on a jhāna higher than he is capable of attaining, but one who uses a higher jhāna as his pādakajjhāna can still practise insight comprehension on a lower jhāna which he has previously attained and mastered. This admitted difference between the pādakajjhāna and the sammasitajjhāna leads to discrepant theories about the supramundane concentration of the noble path, as we will see.

Whereas the sequence of training undertaken by the samathayānika meditator is unproblematic, the vipassanāyānika’s approach presents the difficulty of accounting for the concentration he uses to provide a basis for insight. Concentration is needed in order to see and know things as they are, but without access concentration or jhāna, what concentration can he use? The solution to this problem is found in a type of concentration distinct from the access and absorption concentrations pertaining to the vehicle of serenity, called ‘momentary concentration’ (khanika samādhi). Despite its name, momentary concentration does not signify a single moment of concentration amidst a current of distracted thoughts, but a dynamic concentration which flows from object to object in the ever-changing flux of phenomena, retaining a constant degree of intensity and collectedness sufficient to purify the mind of the hindrances. Momentary concentration arises in the samathayānika simultaneously with his post-jhānic attainment of insight, but for the vipassanāyānika it develops naturally and spontaneously in the course of his insight practice without his having to fix the mind upon a single exclusive object. Thus the follower of the vehicle of insight does not omit concentration altogether from his training, but develops it in a different manner from the practitioner of serenity. Without gaining jhāna he goes directly into contemplation on the five aggregates and by observing them constantly from moment to moment acquires momentary concentration as an accompaniment of his investigations. This momentary concentration fulfils the same function as the basic jhāna of the serenity vehicle, providing the foundation of mental clarity needed for insight to emerge.

12 Vism. 607-11; PP.706-10
ABBRIVIATIONS

Psm  Paṭisambhidāmagga
Psm  Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭakathā
Vism  Visuddhimagga

References


Three Practices of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness: An Investigation in Comparative Soteriology

Thomas A C Weiser

Abstract

This paper investigates three sets of meditation practices each of which follows a distinct approach to the Buddhist teaching known as “the four foundations of mindfulness.” The philosophical framework, or view, of these meditation practices is explored, but the primary focus of the paper is the method of practice of the instructions and the perceived result of that practice. Practice and result are investigated primarily through participant observation.

This investigation illuminates the soteriological process or path of each of these sets of practices, and inquires into their consonance with each other, thus it is an essay in comparative soteriology. The paper observes that although aspects of these practices overlap one another, each of the sets of practices addresses most effectively one of three varieties of mental disturbance that are recognized to be the roots of suffering in Buddhist literature. The paper concludes that these sets of practices are complementary, not contradictory, and that one set of practices does not supersede another.

Introduction

This paper is a summary of the Master’s thesis that I submitted to Naropa University in May 2011 in partial completion of a Master’s degree in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. This degree program is based on the traditional pedagogy of the shedra or monastic college of the Kagyü lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. In this pedagogy, a distinction is drawn between the Hīnayāna (small vehicle) [better known since 1950, as Theravada, see footnote #2] and the Mahāyāna (great vehicle). The term Hīnayāna was an historical invention of the schools that consider themselves Mahāyāna. It is a somewhat derogatory [antiquated] term; many Mahāyāna texts speak of the lesser attainments of Hīnayāna practitioners and the greater attainments of Mahāyāna practitioners. Within this two-level hierarchy, the shedra tradition recognizes a further four-fold division into the “four schools” of Buddhism – the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, Yogācāras, and Mādhyamikas. The schools of the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas are represented as Hīnayāna [extinct schools] and the schools of

1 Thomas A.C. Weiser, Three Approaches to the Four Foundations: An Investigation of Vipassanā Meditation, Analytical Meditation and Śamatha/Vipaśyanā Meditation on the Four Foundations of Mindfulness. (Master’s Thesis, Naropa University 2011)
2 Editor’s Footnote: With all apologies to the author, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hinayana - the term should no longer be used, and that people still discuss the term, in whatever context shows their disregard for historical circumstances. Such usage still propagates the negativity. Respectful Buddhist scholarship since 1950, should replace the term. Here in this article, because of the way Thomas Weiser uses it, it cannot be edited out and replaced with: Theravada.
3 Andrew Skilton, A Concise History of Buddhism (Birmingham: Windhorse, 1994) 93
4 For example, Jamgön Mipham Rinpoche, Gateway to Knowledge, Volume III, (Boudhanath: Rangjung Yeshe, 2002) 186 - 189.
the Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas are represented as Mahāyānists. The four schools are presented as progressive stages of understanding, starting from the (error-ridden) Vaibhāṣikas and leading to the “correct” view of the Mādhyamikas: each “higher” school refutes the errors of the view “below” it.5

In the course of my studies, I noticed that I was never presented with texts of the lower schools. Instead, I was directed to memorize a collection of truth statements attributed to those schools. These truth statements seemed at best a biased summary of the views of that school and at worst a caricature those views. It took me a while to recognize that this presentation is meant to serve as a pedagogical device, and is not meant to be an accurate historical presentation of the schools in question.6 The “lower” schools presented in this way are all dogs, not meant as representations of valid wisdom tradition but rather representations of certain kinds of failures of Mādhyamikas.

I argue that this style of teaching is appropriate within a lineage; it identifies errors and pitfalls that have been identified by practitioners within that lineage. By projecting those errors out onto other (historically questionable, perhaps even fictional) schools, the lineage promotes confidence in its own root teachings. This is a useful strategy in the cloistered environment of a monastery, where students are not in contact with those other schools. But it’s not as useful when trying to establish dialog between lineages, nor is it useful in establishing reasonable comparisons between lineages.

At this time, lineages are coming into contact with each other in unprecedented ways. Not only are lineages of Buddhist teachings likely to be geographically proximate to one another in large cities, they are virtually proximate through the widespread exchange of information fostered by digital technology. It is less and less likely that students of any given lineage will remain insulated from contact with other lineages. In this environment, the pedagogical strategy of projecting an error on to an external school becomes quite dangerous, because students can determine the accuracy of such a projection. If the inaccuracy of that projection is glaring enough, it might cause the student to question the validity of the teachings in toto. This was certainly my experience: my first reaction to the pedagogy of the four schools was that it seemed to be a very poor example of comparative scholarship.

In this way, the contact between lineages represents a danger to an established pedagogical method. But this very contact also represents an unparalleled opportunity; rather than looking for error, Buddhist lineages could consult one another for their wisdom. This paper represents an attempt at the approach of comparative soteriology, which encourages the discovery of commonality of efficacious practice across lineages.

5 This is the approach taken by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso in Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, (Australasia: Zhyisil Chokyi Ghatsal, 2001). It is also fundamental to the approach of the Nitartha Institute, which is under the guidance of the Dzogchen Pönlop Rinpoche, who is a student of Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso. For examples of Nitartha’s presentation of the four schools, see The Gateway That Reveals the Philosophical Systems to Fresh by the Dzogchen Pönlop Rinpoche and Acharya Lama Tenpa Gyaltser (Canada: Nitartha Institute, 2001) and Acharya Sherab Gyaltser’s commentary on that work entitled Hīnayāna Tenets (Canada: Nitartha Institute, 2001)

6 As Karl Brunnhölzl asserts in The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 2004.), 862 n, 137.
Methodology

This paper uses introspective inquiry in the form of participant observation to compare three sets of meditation practices, each of which represents a distinct approach to the commonly held Buddhist teaching known as “the four foundations of mindfulness.” In the course of my research, I practiced vipassanā meditation in the tradition of the Insight Meditation community, analytical meditation in the tradition of the Tibetan Kagyü lineage, and śamatha/vipaśyanā meditation as practiced by the lineage of Shambhala Buddhism. Each of these practices cites one or more texts as scriptural basis. My practice of vipassanā meditation was based on the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta (in the translation of Bhikkhus Nanamoli and Bodhi); my practice of analytical meditation was based on the text of the ninth chapter of Pawo Tsugla Trungwa Rinpoche’s commentary (in Karl Brunnhölzl’s translation) on Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, and my practice of śamatha/vipaśyanā was based on teachings on the Four Foundations of Mindfulness given by Trungpa Rinpoche in 1973 and 1974.

I relied on contemporary meditation instructors to guide me in my practice. I followed the instructions of Gil Fronsdal in my practice of vipassanā meditation. (I followed recorded instructions from Fronsdal, and instructions given to a group class by Burton.) I followed instructions given to me personally by Lama Tenpa Gyaltse in my practice of analytical meditation. I followed the instructions given to me personally by Gaylon Ferguson in my practice of śamatha/vipaśyanā meditation. I practiced each of these sets of instructions for a fifteen-week semester and kept journals of my experiences. These journals are a source of my research materials.

After each of these semesters of practice I undertook a meditation retreat. After practicing vipassanā meditation, I took part in a ten-day group vipassanā retreat following the recorded instructions of S. N. Goenka. After practicing analytical meditation, I undertook a five-day solo practice intensive following instructions given by Lama Tenpa Gyaltse. After practicing śamatha/vipaśyanā meditation, I took part in a thirty-day dathün following the instructions of Allyn Lyon. I kept journals of my experiences during the solo intensive and the dathün (I was not permitted to keep a journal during the vipassanā retreat). These journals are also a source of my research materials.

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8 Translation of this commentary is found in Karl Brunnhölzl’s The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 2004.)
10 Gil Fronsdal is a senior teacher at the Insight Meditation Center in Redwood City. For biographical information see http://www.insightmeditationcenter.org/teachers/.
11 Lloyd Burton is a senior teacher at the Insight Meditation Center of Denver for biographical information see http://www.insightcolorado.org/teachers/index.html.
12 Lama Tenpa Gyaltse is a faculty member of Naropa University and a senior teacher in the Nalandhabodhi Sangha. For biographical information see http://www.rebelbuddha.com/profiles/acharya-lama-tenpa/.
13 Gaylon Ferguson is a faculty member at Naropa University and a senior teacher in the lineage of Shambhala Buddhism. For biographical information see (www.shambhala.org/teachers/acharya/gferguson.php).
14 S. N. Goenka is a student of Sayagyi U Ba Khin of Burma (Myanmar). For biographical information see http://www.dhamma.org/en/goenka.shtml.
15 Allyn Lyon is a senior teacher in the lineage of Shambhala Buddhism. For biographical information see http://www.shambhala.org/teachers/acharya/alyon.php
It is clear that my research represents only a first foray into this style of comparative soteriology; it is by no means conclusive. However, I hope that my research will provide valuable groundwork for others and that the framework of such appreciative comparison will be a benefit to the Buddhist community at large.

Summary of Research Findings

Vipassanā Meditation:

Textual Basis for the Practice of Vipassanā Meditation

The textual basis for my practice of vipassanā meditation was the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta, a discourse of the Buddha contained in the Majjhima Nikāya, which I read in translation. The Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna sutta, also in translation, provided an additional textual basis. The Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna sutta is found in the Dīgha Nikāya and includes, in addition to the full text of the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta, a more extensive treatment of the Four Noble Truths. I also consulted writings by the Theravāda masters Anālayo, Sayadaw U Sīlānanda, Nyanaponika Thera, and S. N. Goenka, as well as Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh, as supplementary research. As can be inferred from the large number of commentaries available, the Satipaṭṭhāna and Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna suttas are considered fundamental teachings in Theravāda Buddhism.

Following Anālayo’s analysis, I note that the sutta is composed largely of thirteen subsections separated by a repeated refrain. Each of these subsections describes one of the four satipaṭṭhānas. Six of the subsections describe mindfulness of body (kāya); one of the subsections describes mindfulness of feeling (vedanā); one describes mindfulness of mind (citta); and the remaining five describe mindfulness of mental objects (dhamma).

The Satipaṭṭhāna sutta is often interpreted as a compendium of practice instructions. Gil Fronsdal hypothesizes that it is not the record of a teaching delivered in its entirety at any one time, but rather a collection assembled from a variety of teachings. This hypothesis links the composition of the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta with that impulse toward systemization of the Buddha’s 1

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20 Nyanaponika Thera The Heart of Buddhist Meditation (San Francisco: Weiser Books, 1965)
24 Anālayo, 17.
25 In support of Fronsdal’s thesis, we find sections of the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta extent in the Satipaṭṭhānasamyutta, Āṇāpānasati sutta and Āṇāpānasamāyutta, Kāyagatāsati sutta, Sāmaññaphala sutta, and Poṭṭhapāda sutta.
extensive teachings that may also have resulted in the creation of the abhidhamma literature. Each of the subsections of the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta highlights a different practice, and therefore, ostensibly a new object of meditation. In practice however, some traditions use a single object of meditation for all of the practices included in the sutta, or a limited subset of practices included in the sutta.26

The sutta describes the practice of the four foundations as ākāyāna, a single or direct path, which leads to the cessation of suffering. It predicts that one who develops the foundations will achieve “either final knowledge here and now, or if there is a trace of clinging left, non-return.” Therefore, the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta characterizes the four foundations of mindfulness as a practice that, in itself, is sufficient to bring the practitioner either to the completion of the Path or near to that completion.

**Practice Instructions for Vipassanā Meditation**

For my primary practice instructions, I used a series of fourteen dharma talks given by Gil Fronsdal to the California Insight Meditation Community (August 25 - December 15, 2003).28 Fronsdal’s talks concentrated on explication of the text, but they also gave sufficient instructions for me to practice. I supplemented Fronsdal’s instructions with a series of four dharma talks given by Lloyd Burton to the Denver sangha of the Insight Meditation Community of Colorado (October 4 - 25, 2009.) I attended these teachings in person.

Fronsdal and Burton are both practitioners in the Insight Meditation tradition, which is in the lineage of Theravāda Buddhism via Mahasi Sayadaw of Burma; Burton acknowledges Fronsdal as one of his teachers. Fronsdal notes that the Insight Meditation tradition is ecumenical in its approach: it embraces many different techniques of cultivating mindfulness, although it finds its main root in the teachings of Mahasi Sayadaw.29 Both Fronsdal and Burton bring additional influences to their teachings: Fronsdal is also a Soto Zen priest and a Stanford PhD; Burton has a Master’s degree in counseling and guidance.

Fronsdal asserts that the practices of the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta cultivate awareness of those psychophysical processes and states of mind that lead toward suffering, and those that lead away from suffering.30 In the course of the practice, one places bare attention on these processes and states of mind; one experiences them without judgment and storyline.31 One becomes familiar with the quality of them; one learns what the mind is like when they are present and when they are not; one develops a “felt sense” of them.32 As one engages in this process, one recognizes that certain states hinder the mind from experiencing happiness. One naturally gravitates toward states of mind free of such hindrance; one begins to relinquish attachment and clinging, and begins to experience the seven factors of enlightenment more and more clearly. By completely relinquishing attachment and clinging, one achieves liberation from suffering. This non-attachment is not a frosty detachment: as the practitioner’s mind becomes less hindered by unhelpful mental states, it contacts sensory

26 For example, S. N. Goenka uses bodily sensation as the object of meditation throughout the four foundations, and Thich Nhat Hanh uses the breath as the object of meditation throughout the four foundations.
27 MN i.63, p 155.
29 Fronsdal 8/25/03
30 Fronsdal, 11/24/03
31 Fronsdal, 10/06/03, 10/13/03
32 Fronsdal, 11/03/03
experience directly, unobscured by concept: the practitioner becomes more intimate with the world.\(^{33}\)
The experience of such a practitioner is suffused with energy, interest and joy.

The objects of meditation - which Fronsdal characterizes as “processes and states of mind”
above - correspond to many of the familiar enumerations of the abhidhamma (such as the five skandhas,
the six ayatanas, mind and mental factors, etc.). Here, I agree with the Judith Simmer-Brown’s
assertion that we should understand that the goal of the abhidhamma is not primarily ontological, but
soteriological: the abhidhamma is “the notebook of the practice tradition.”\(^{34}\) The Satipaṭṭhāna sutta is
a soteriological guide -- a collection of instructions that address a wide array of mental disturbances.

Fronsdal’s practice instructions closely followed the text of the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta and were
inclusive in their approach: when he explicated sections of the sutta, he would often offer several
alternate practice instructions based on that text.\(^{35}\) Sometimes, he would note that in his training he
had not practiced a certain technique, but would nonetheless offer that technique as a practice that
might be beneficial. Fronsdal’s instructions stressed the application of bare attention, but not all of
the instructions he presented were simply observation: he also included meditations that were meant
to soothe and calm the body;\(^{36}\) contemplations on cause and effect;\(^{37}\) and visualizations.\(^{38}\)

At the end of my semester-long practice of Fronsdal’s and Burton’s instructions, I undertook
a vipassanā retreat in the tradition of S. N. Goenka at the Dhamma Dharā center in Shelburne, MA.
Goenka studied under the Burmese Theravādin teacher Sayagyi U Ba Khin. The practice instructions
given by Goenka were recorded on DVD and played to the participants of the retreat. (This is
the standard procedure for Goenka’s vipassanā retreats.)

In Goenka’s view, suffering is a result of mental reactions, \textit{saṅkhārā}\(^{39}\), that arise on the basis
of sensations (vedanā) that occur when consciousness makes contact with an object.\(^{40}\) We take
the sensations and their accompanying reactions as accurate feedback about the nature of the object.
But in reality, the feelings we experience have much more to do with our response to our own
saṅkhārā than they do with our direct experience of the object.\(^{41}\)

Through this process, we create more and more saṅkhārā and become imprisoned by them.
Since the process by which saṅkhārā proliferate is based on sensations, we can only liberate ourselves
by cultivating equanimity to all sensations.\(^{42}\) When the mind truly rests in equanimity with regard
to sensation, it does not create any new saṅkhārā,\(^{43}\) and older saṅkhārā can emerge from the depths
of the mind up onto its surface.\(^{44}\) If the practitioner rests in equanimity with regard to the arising of

\(^{33}\) Fronsdal, 9/15/03
\(^{34}\) Judith Simmer-Brown, lecture from course “First Turning”, Naropa University, Fall 2009.
\(^{35}\) For example, his treatment of the “breath body” 8/25/03.
\(^{36}\) For instance, using the breath to tranquilize bodily formations, 9/1/03.
\(^{37}\) For instance, contemplation of the arising and ceasing of mental hindrances 11/10/03.
\(^{38}\) Fronsdal offers this interpretation of the practice of corpse meditation 9/29/03.
\(^{39}\) Goenka defines \textit{saṅkhārā} narrowly, as “reactions” to begin his presentation but opens it later to include both
reactions and the mental states that result from those reactions. I personally find it useful to think of \textit{saṅkhārā}
as psychophysical complexes.
\(^{41}\) Goenka, \textit{Discourse Summaries}, 70
\(^{42}\) Goenka, \textit{Discourse Summaries}, 41.
\(^{43}\) Goenka, \textit{Discourse Summaries}, 40.
\(^{44}\) Goenka, \textit{Discourse Summaries}, 49.
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these old saṅkhārā, they too dissipate. In Goenka’s view, the continued dissipation of old saṅkhārā leads to purification of the mind and is the path to liberation.

Where Fronsdal’s approach is inclusive, Goenka’s approach is exclusive; it always takes bodily sensations, vedanā, as its object of meditation. Fronsdal offers many different practices to address many different needs; Goenka stresses consistency of practice in order to deeply affect the mind: students are cautioned against practicing other forms of meditation (not because they are “bad” but because they may interfere with the process that Goenka teaches.) During Goenka retreats, practitioners are also prohibited from practicing any other kind of meditation technique, and any yoga or other “energy work.”

Perceived Results of Vipassanā Meditation

After practicing vipassanā meditation, I found myself much more interested in and appreciative of the details of my physical and mental experience, particularly in my experience of my body. I felt more comfortable in my body, and much more able to endure physical and mental discomfort with equanimity. I felt more cheerful, and experienced a natural renunciation of “non-virtuous” actions - I naturally avoided actions that caused myself pain. I had an experiential understanding of the way in which I created suffering by – paradoxically – moving toward unpleasant thoughts in order to ward off anticipated pain. I developed an appreciation for the efficacy in “non-doing” as embodied in the practice of bare attention. I developed a felt sense that the teaching of the khandhas is accurate – that I am actually composed of parts. Prior to this practice, my understanding of the khandhas was theoretical and a bit threatening. After practicing I felt that being composed of parts is not a frightening state of affairs, but actually rather interesting.

Analytical Meditation

Textual Basis for the Practice of Analytical Meditation

The textual basis for my practice of analytical meditation was a selection from the ninth chapter of Pawo Tsugla Trengwa Rinpoche’s commentary on Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, translated by Karl Brunnhölzl. I found an additional textual basis in the transcript of a talk given by the Drupön Khenpo Lodrö Namgyal (a lama and retreat master of the Kagyü lineage of Tibetan Buddhism), given to the Nalandabodhi sangha in Boulder, Colorado on June 7 through June 9, 2002. This talk closely followed Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary. In addition, I consulted Kunzang Pelden’s commentary The Nectar of Manjushri’s Speech, which parallels Pawo Rinpoche’s

45 Goenka, Discourse Summaries, 56, 69.
46 Goenka, Discourse Summaries, 49.
49 For biographical information see (http://www.nalandawest.org/teachers/western-teachers/karl-brunnholzl).
commentary, and the Dzogchen Pönlop Rinpoche’s article “The Four Foundations of Mindfulness,”52 which integrates Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary with Trungpa Rinpoche’s presentation of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness.

Pawo Rinpoche (1504 -1562) was a student of the Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje. Karl Brunnhölzl notes that Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary is considered a fundamental text in the scholastic tradition of the Karma Kagyü lineage53 Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary on the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra is divided into two sections: one entitled “the general topic”, and one entitled “the meaning of the text”. The section entitled “the general topic” concentrates on refutations of the faulty views of purity, pleasantness, permanence and Self. Each of these faulty views is associated with one of the foundations of mindfulness. (The body is not pure, feelings are not pleasant, mind is not permanent, phenomena have no Self)54 In this section, Pawo Rinpoche does not refer to Śāntideva’s text, but uses Asaṅga’s Abhidharma Samuccaya as his textual basis.55 He follows Asaṅga in distinguishing the path of the lesser vehicle from the path of the greater vehicle. The second section of Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary, entitled “the meaning of the text,” is a close interpretation of Śāntideva’s text. In this section Pawo Rinpoche explicates logic that demonstrates that none of the objects of the four foundations are truly existent.

The expected soteriological path is not specifically delineated in this section of Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary, but I suggest that it conforms to the model adumbrated in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākrama: that śamatha is necessary for stability of mind, but it is insight (specifically insight into emptiness) resulting from vipaśyanā that ultimately liberates the practitioner. Śāntideva himself supports such an interpretation: “Penetrative insight joined with calm abiding / Utterly eradicates afflicted states.”56

Penetrative insight may begin by positing a right view that negates a wrong one, but when all wrong views have been negated, the need for any view at all falls away by itself.57 Thus, the predicated fruition of this practice is the ability to rest non-conceptually in a mind that does not cling to anything.

Practice Instructions for Analytical Meditation

I received practice instructions in one-on-one sessions with Lama Tenpa Gyaltsen. Lama Tenpa is a Vajrayāna practitioner and senior teacher, or ācārya, in the Karma Kagyü lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. He studied with Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtsos at the Kagyü shedra (monastic college) at the Karma Shri Nalanda Institute at Rumtek monastery; the Drupön Khenpo Lodrö Namgyal and the Dzogchen Pönlop Rinpoche were both fellow students. Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary on

53 Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky, 613
54 Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky, 713
55 In Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky, 713, Pawo Rinpoche cites “The higher abhidharma” as his source. Karl Brunnhölzl elucidates this, “‘Higher abhidharma’ refers to Asanga’s Compendium of Abhidharma (P 5550, fols. ii4b.3 - 4). In the great vehicle [Mahāyāna], the presentations in Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Abhidharma are considered “the lower abhidharma.” Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky, 951, n. 1681.
56 Śāntideva, 110 (8.4)
57 Śāntideva 9.34 p 142
the Bodhicāravatāra was among the texts Lama Tenpa studied in shedra while earning his ācārya degree.

In Lama Tenpa’s view, the goal of analytical meditation is to enable the practitioner to wake up from confusion. In order to do so, the practitioner must understand that this confusion is the result of thoughts that have taken on weight and solidity. Through analytical meditation, the practitioner examines these solidified thoughts in order to come to the realization that they are not actually solid at all, and that they are not the reliable guides they seem to be. In the technical language of analytical meditation, these thoughts are the object of negation of the analysis. Analytical meditation is always targeted toward a specific object of negation: the practitioner performs analysis not to determine the nature of reality, but to let go of a particular incorrect thought.

In the process of analytical meditation, thoughts seem to proliferate, but these thoughts are lighter, less monolithic than the solidified confusion mentioned above, and therefore they are easier to see through. Eventually the practitioner no longer believes the solidified thought, and can relinquish it. This process of relinquishing confusion in the form of solidified thoughts is understood to be the path to liberation. Eventually the practitioner may arrive at a state free from clinging to any thought or view.

I assumed that in the course of the semester we would follow the sequence of analyses found in Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary. But as we progressed, Lama Tenpa presented me with analyses that diverged quite a bit from those found in Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary. He added the following practices and analyses:

• Experience feelings without associating them with “Me” 58
• Analyze “permanent” and “self.” What is your view of permanence? What is your view of a Self? Does this view cause you any suffering? 59
• Can you imagine something that your mind can’t think of that might not be impermanent? 60
• Does a Generally Characterized Phenomenon have any inherent characteristics? 61 (This analysis refers to the pramāṇa teachings of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, which I had previously studied with Lama Tenpa.)
• What is the source of your most disturbing emotion (klesha)? 62
• How does “best” exist? (This question is a response to my discovery that my greatest klesha involves a fear of not having “the best” experience.) Is “best” separate from the experiencer? 63
• What exactly is the Self of Phenomena (the object of negation of the second turning)? 64

I found these instructions very helpful and illuminating (particularly the exploration of the nature of concept). But I also became somewhat concerned because we seemed to be departing

58 Weiser, Meditation Journal, 9/29/10
59 Weiser, Meditation Journal, 10/6/10
60 Weiser, Meditation Journal, 10/15/10
61 Weiser, Meditation Journal, 10/20/10
62 Weiser, Meditation Journal, 10/27/10
63 Weiser, Meditation Journal, 11/3/10
64 Weiser, Meditation Journal, 11/10/10
from the text, and the text was, I had thought, the basis of my research. It seemed to me that Lama Tenpa was giving to me were related to those found in Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso, Lama Tenpa’s teacher. At one point I asked Lama Tenpa whether we were following Pano Rinpoche’s commentary or that of Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso. He replied (I paraphrase) “I’m keeping both of those texts in mind, and I’m helping you clarify those things that you personally need to clarify.” This was the hallmark of Lama Tenpa’s work with me: he insisted that rather than go through some standard procedure, I should find the appropriate object of negation for myself. He told me that it was possible that “textbook” meditations might not always be appropriate to my particular case. This assertion raises the issue of the proper relationship of text and oral instruction. Lama Tenpa asserted that while the root text is always honored as the most important, generally it was acknowledged that oral instruction was the most helpful. (My experience studying within the Tibetan tradition has generally confirmed this. The bulk of the study tends to be on commentary, not on original texts. For instance, in my work with Lama Tenpa, I received oral instruction on a commentary on a doha referring to a sutra, where the sutra was ostensibly considered primary, since it contained the words of the Buddha, but the words of the sutra were completely obscured by the levels of commentary above.)

In the traditional language of Tibetan Buddhism, one could say that the practitioner applies the antidote of analytic meditation to the object of meditation. Lama Tenpa stressed that an antidote need not express the truth: truth is, in any case, beyond expression. The antidote merely helps dissolve the unhelpful concept. Clinging to the antidote as truth is another problem (and will require another antidote).

Perceived Results of Analytical Meditation

As a result of practicing the analytic meditation approach, I experienced a greater interest in and understanding of the effect of concepts. I realized that concepts were both the main hindrance and the main vehicle for progress on the Path. I became convinced that simple concepts arise naturally and spontaneously and could be employed usefully; that no concept is in itself problematic -- rather the problem lies in our relationship to concepts, particularly in our clinging to the belief that certain concepts are “true.” I realized that even the most useful concept could not be true in itself, and began to see that any view, even the most helpful view, could not possibly be ultimately true. I began to understand the nature of my own habitual clinging to view, and I opened up to the use of “untrue” views as antidotes. Since one of my prime areas of clinging is view, this understanding had quite an impact on me.

My appreciation of the use of concepts led me to a greater appreciation for textual study, and in particular for the style of contemplative analysis that I undertook during retreat; I saw how textual analysis could be of enormous help in combating pernicious concepts. I also saw how an emphasis on conceptual exploration could lead to an excited, ungrounded mental state. This led me to an appreciation of the assertion that vipaśyanā must be grounded in śamatha.

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65 In Confession of a Buddhist Atheist, (New York: Random House, 2010), p 45, Stephen Batchelor mentions his disenchantment at debates and logical analyses that seemed only to confirm foregone orthodox conclusions. This was not my experience with Lama Tenpa – he insisted that I come to my own conclusions. (Of course, he would debate me on those with which he disagreed.)

66 Weiser, Meditation Journal, 9/17/10
Through my exploration of the nature and use of concept, I achieved a greater understanding of the teachings on emptiness, particularly the way in which objects are neither existent nor non-existent, but nevertheless appear clearly and can be used functionally.

**Śamatha/Vipaśyanā Meditation**

**Textual Basis of Śamatha/Vipaśyanā Meditation**

The textual basis for my practice of śamatha/vipaśyanā meditation is the chapter “The Four Foundations of Mindfulness” in *Heart of the Buddha* by Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche. This chapter is based on the lecture series entitled “Techniques of Mindfulness” given by Trungpa Rinpoche at Karme Chöling in August 1974 and edited by Judith Lief for publication first in *Garuda* magazine (issue IV) and later in *Heart of the Buddha*. I also referred to transcripts of the Vajradhatu Seminary led by Trungpa Rinpoche in Jackson Hole, Wyoming during the months of September through November, 1973, as well as audio files of the lecture series entitled “Training the Mind” given by Trungpa Rinpoche at Rocky Mountain Dharma Center in August 1974, and audio files of the lecture series entitled “Techniques of Mindfulness” mentioned above. I consulted Gaylon Ferguson’s *Natural Wakefulness* as additional research. (In this text, Ferguson integrates Trungpa Rinpoche’s teachings with those of Trungpa Rinpoche’s dharma heir, Sakyong Mipham Rinpoche, as well as with the teachings of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.)

Although Trungpa Rinpoche prefaced his article in *Garuda IV* with an abridged version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, his presentation of the four foundations differs significantly from the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta: in place of the four traditional foundations -- body, feeling, mind and mental objects --Trungpa Rinpoche presents the foundations of body, life, effort, and mind. Trungpa Rinpoche asserts that his teaching is “taken from the treasury of the living oral tradition,” and shows “the essence of each of the four foundations, the inner key to its practice.” This assertion connects his presentation of the four foundations with *upadeśa*, pith instructions, rather than the collections of sūtra (*Kangyur*) or shastra (*Tengyur*).

Trungpa Rinpoche does not identify a specific source for his teaching. This is not uncommon among Buddhist teachers —teachings are often given without any citation of the textual basis for those teachings. It is possible that Trungpa Rinpoche received this teaching in its current form from one of his teachers. It is also possible that he received these teachings in a different way: within the Shambhala lineage, Trungpa Rinpoche is understood to be a tertön, a discoverer of terma, or hidden dharma teachings. Given that Trungpa Rinpoche refrains from citing any underlying sutra or commentary, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that his teachings on the four foundations teaching might be terma.70

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67 Gaylon Ferguson, *Natural Wakefulness: Discovering the Wisdom We Were Born With* (Boston: Shambhala, 2009)
68 For instance, as mentioned above, the Drupon Khenpo Lodrö Namgyal never mentioned that his presentation was a summary of Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary.
70 Gaylon Ferguson has mentioned to me in conversation that he finds these teachings to be “virtually terma”. (Private correspondence 7/12/10)
Trungpa Rinpoche did not teach extensively on the four foundations of mindfulness, nor does his successor, Sakyong Mipham Rinpoche. However, Trungpa Rinpoche’s presentation of the four foundations of mindfulness is still taught regularly by senior teachers, or *acharyas*, and other teachers within the Shambhala Lineage.

Trungpa Rinpoche uses the outgoing breath as the primary object of meditation throughout his presentation of the four foundations. On the inhalation, the practitioner is directed to let go of the object and allow for a space or gap. Rather than encouraging concentration, this technique fosters a lightness that Trungpa Rinpoche characterized as *touch and go*: “You focus on the object of awareness, but then, in the same moment, you disown that awareness and go on.” In the process of Trungpa Rinpoche’s four foundations, the practitioner is encouraged to develop awareness of aspects of experience in addition to the object of meditation.

In Trungpa Rinpoche’s first foundation, mindfulness of body, the practitioner develops mindfulness of his relationship to and confusion about his own body. The meditator comes to realize that what he normally thinks of as “body” is in reality a complex of projections about the body. This *psychosomatic* body is not rejected; instead, it is accepted as the basis of practice.

In the practice of the second foundation, mindfulness of life, the practitioner identifies the fundamental activity of mind, the “survival instinct.” The survival instinct incessantly categorizes objects as attractive, threatening, or neutral. As we have seen in the presentation of Goenka above, this activity could be understood to be the basis of the three *kilesas*, or disturbing emotions, passion, aggression, and ignorance which are traditionally held to be the roots of suffering. But Trungpa Rinpoche’s approach does not aim at uprooting this process. Instead, the meditator is instructed to harness the survival instinct. As a result of accepting and harnessing the survival instinct, the practitioner can integrate all the facets of his life with meditation. The practitioner does not need to retreat into a yogic cave to practice (nor should he pretend that he has so retreated).

In the practice of the third foundation, mindfulness of effort, the practitioner develops an awareness of the way in which the mind moves. Trungpa Rinpoche characterizes this movement, as sudden, non-conceptual and effortless. The easiest way for the meditator to notice this effortless movement of mind is to track the moment when he realizes that he’s lost the primary object of meditation (which, as noted above, continues to be the breath throughout the four foundations.) Once the meditator loses the object, he has the opportunity to witness the spontaneous effort of the mind that notices and returns to the object. There is no work involved in this spontaneous effort, but there is work involved in maintaining the discipline of the practice that makes the spontaneous...

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71 My research has uncovered only three instances in which Trungpa Rinpoche gave formal teachings on the four foundations of mindfulness: at the Hinayāna/Mahāyāna Seminary given at Jackson Hole in 1973; at the seminar entitled “Training the Mind” given in Rocky Mountain Dharma Center in August, 1974; and the seminar entitled “Techniques of Mindfulness” given at The Tail of the Tiger in August, 1974. I have found only one instance of the Sakyong, Jamgön Mipham Rinpoche teaching on the topic: 1999 Seminar Transcripts: Teaching From the Sutra Tradition – Book Two, (Halifax: Vajradhatu Publications, 2000) 177 – 180. In this transcript, the Sakyong’s teaching does not refer to Trungpa Rinpoche’s presentation of the four foundations, but is consistent with the Mahāyāna portion of Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary.

72 See http://www.chronicleproject.com/CTRlibrary/training_the_mind.html, for a discussion of this.

73 Trungpa, *Heart of the Buddha*, 33.

74 “The process of meditation has to take into account that the mind continually shapes itself into bodylike attitudes.” Trungpa, *Heart of the Buddha*, 30.

effort evident. I suggest that this is a reason that Trungpa Rinpoche advocated the technique of light awareness on the outgoing breath: this technique provides enough structure for the meditator to be aware of breath as the object of meditation, and enough openness so that it is very likely that the meditator will lose that object of meditation, and therefore have the opportunity to witness the movement of mind.

In the practice of the fourth foundation, Mindfulness of Mind, the meditator develops awareness that encompasses all aspects of experience. Trungpa Rinpoche characterizes this panoramic awareness as the fruition of the practice of the four foundations. In its fruition, mindfulness of mind dispenses with the dualism of noticing the experience and embraces the non-dualism of being the experience. I maintain that the fruition of Trungpa Rinpoche’s approach to the four foundations of mindfulness is the experience of a mind that rests in the non-dual, spontaneous activity of awareness. This is the union of śamatha and vipaśyanā.

In the preface to his article in Garuda IV, Trungpa Rinpoche cites the Tibetan convention of a three yana path — Theravada, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna — and places the practice of the four foundations of mindfulness within the practices of the Theravada. Based on this, we might assume that these practices are appropriate only for the beginning of the path and that they would be superseded by “higher” Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna practices as the practitioner progressed along the path. However, at the very beginning of the 1973 seminary, (during which he taught publicly for the first time this version of the four foundations of mindfulness) Trungpa Rinpoche asserted that it is not the specific practice, but the quality of involvement and inclusiveness of that practice that determines realization. Above, I noted that we could reread Trungpa Rinpoche’s definition of the fruition of the practice of the four foundations, mindfulness of mind, as “mind that rests in the spontaneous play of unadorned non-duality.” This is tantamount to the realization of the Mādhyamikas, a realization appropriate to the end of the path, not the beginning. I suggest that it is consistent with nature of mind teachings that “preliminary” instructions point to the same fruition as do the highest teachings.

Practice Instructions for Śamatha/Vipaśyanā Meditation

Gaylon Ferguson was my meditation instructor during my semester-long practice and Allyn Lyon was my meditation instructor during dathūn. Both Ferguson and Lyon studied with Trungpa Rinpoche directly and both are acharyas, senior teachers, within the Shambhala lineage. Ferguson’s meditation instructions corresponded to the text of Trungpa Rinpoche’s presentation on the four foundations of mindfulness as well as meditation instructions found in Trungpa Rinpoche’s Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior. In his book Natural Wakefulness, Ferguson integrates Trungpa Rinpoche’s teaching and the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta presentation of the four foundations. However, in his instructions to me he did not stress the teachings of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta; instead, he made a connection between Trungpa Rinpoche’s four foundations and the Kagyü teachings on nature of mind practices, Mahāmudrā and Maha Ati.

76 “Mindfulness is the level of the Hīnayāna…” Trungpa, Garuda IV, 15
77 For biographical information, see note 15 above.
78 For biographical information, see note 17 above.
The treatment of the breath as object of meditation given in Trungpa Rinpoche’s presentation on the four foundations of mindfulness correspond closely to the treatment of the breath as object of meditation in the introductory levels of Shambhala Training. The structure of the Shambhala Training levels might seem to imply that there is an introductory style of meditation in which one uses the breath as an object of meditation, and a more advanced style of meditation in which one rests without an object of meditation. In his instructions to me, Ferguson advised me not to make this inference, asserting that if I developed a sense that resting with an object was a problem, I might develop a tendency to turn away from the world in favor of some formless meditative state. This would be contrary to the spirit of śamatha/vipaśyaṇā meditation, since Ferguson asserts that the result of the practice of the four foundations is integration with society, not separation from it.

Ferguson rejected the notion that the practices of the four foundations of mindfulness necessarily lead toward a specific level of realization. Instead, he asserted that these practices were a set of tools, and that the result of the practice depended on the way in which they were used: in his view it was possible, through the practice of Trungpa Rinpoche’s four foundations, to arrive at realizations normally associated with “higher” practices. (This is consistent with my assertion above.)

Ferguson urged me to not to pursue any specific fruition of my practice. Rather, he urged me to relax and not strive so hard; to allow myself to be “dumber”; to allow myself to be bored and to cease trying to make any particular discoveries. In Natural Wakefulness, Ferguson characterizes this relaxed, “not too tight” approach to meditation as demonstrating faith in the fundamentally awakened nature of mind. Ferguson’s meditation instructions to me as well as his scholarly approach support an interpretation of Trungpa Rinpoche’s four foundations as concordant with Mahāmudrā “nature of mind” practices.

Ferguson’s approach is consistent with the approach Allyn Lyon took in her meditation instructions to me during the Summer 2010 dathūn. In her talks during this retreat, Lyon made a link between the teachings of the Satipatthāna Sutta and Trungpa Rinpoche’s presentation. Her presentation of Mindfulness of Body stressed awareness of physical sensations -- for instance, she instructed me to drop my awareness into my torso. Like Goenka, Lyon presented Mindfulness of Body as a purification practice: she said that traumas get buried in the body; that meditation allows them to emerge again; and that non-doing (equanimity) allows them to unwind. She presented Mindfulness of Feeling as the “pleasure/pain meter” (I like it/I don’t like it/I don’t care), which corresponds to the extremely simple nature of vedāṇā presented in the Abhidhamma.

In her instructions to me, Lyon referred to the text of Trungpa Rinpoche’s presentation, but did not hold rigidly to it. In the course of the retreat, the meditation instructions she gave to me shifted from stressing the śamatha aspect of the practice to stressing the vipaśyaṇā aspect of the practice, and she asked me to contemplate what she called the Mahāmudrā questions: where do...
thoughts arise, where do they dwell, where do they go? Lyon encouraged me to become lighter and lighter with the technique; like Ferguson she encouraged me to have faith in my awakened nature.

**Perceived Results of Śamatha/Vipaśyanā Meditation**

As a result of practicing the śamatha/vipashyanā approach, I developed the aspiration to connect with and integrate all parts of my experience. I became quite interested in the specificity of each moment of experience and interested in the way in which I experienced a given moment of mind as quite distinct -- even discontinuous -- from the next. I became interested in how appearances coalesce into *mandalas* -- coherent and meaningful arrangements -- and I became interested in the process by which, upon perceiving such an arrangement, I habitually attempt to solidify it into some sort of stable ground. I particularly noticed that I attempt to solidify by elaborating a view or explanation of the mandala. I developed the aspiration to refrain from such explanations and instead rest in the groundlessness of constant new arisings. I became more confident in allowing openness to permeate my interactions with my environment and with others, and in allowing things to “self-liberate.” I became more open to the experience and use of non-ordinary reali

**Conclusion**

Each time I finished a semester-long practice and retreat, I felt that I could continue practicing that approach quite profitably for an extended period. None of the three practices seemed as if it were in error; none seemed likely to lead me toward greater suffering; all three helped me alleviate my own suffering; none seemed to be in conflict with the others.

When I had contemplated my research, I noticed that each of the practices addressed habitual patterns of mind in a different way. Vipassanā meditation focuses on examining certain *characteristics* of mental states and psychophysical processes. These characteristics correspond to categories of the Abhidhamma teachings. Practicing vipassanā meditation led me to natural renunciation of actions of body, speech and mind that result in painful mental states, and cultivation of actions of body, speech and mind that result in mental states conducive to happiness. Analytical meditation focuses on the *content* of conceptual mind. It examines concepts, particularly those that have solidified into views. It targets these solidified concepts by way of logical reasoning that corresponds to the analyses found in the Madhyamaka teachings. Practicing analytical meditation led me to an understanding that such solidified views are not reliable, that they lead to suffering and not to happiness, and therefore to the renunciation of such views. Śamatha/vipaśyanā meditation focuses on the *process* of mind, particularly the process whereby the meditator creates rigid distinction between Self and that which is perceived as Other. It encouraged me to include into my awareness that which cannot be characterized (space/gap) as well as to notice the effortless movement of mind that is beyond his control. It shares this interest in “unconditioned phenomena” with the teachings on Buddhanature. Śamatha/vipaśyanā meditation led me to a renunciation of the habit of making separations between myself and environment and myself and others.

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At the risk of oversimplification, I note that each of these three approaches can be understood to address most effectively one of three fundamental types of mental disturbance – greed, hate and ignorance – that are traditionally understood to be the roots of suffering.

Vipassanā meditation most effectively addresses the mental disturbance of desire. It helped me clarify the way in which I cling to those actions of body, speech and mind that I mistakenly believe will relieve my discomfort and give me pleasure. As a result of the practices of vipassanā meditation, I developed a felt sense of the suffering that this clinging causes, and therefore developed natural renunciation. Analytical meditation most effectively addresses the mental disturbance of ignorance. It helped me clarify the way in which I create views in the attempt to establish a stable and reliable description of reality. I cling to these views as trustworthy guides that will enable me to successfully manipulate my physical and emotional environment. As a result of the practices of the analytic meditation approach I understood better the baselessness of such descriptions of reality. I developed greater flexibility of view, and understood better the nature and use of concept. I understood that views and concepts have no inherent value and might best be understood as antidotes. Šamatha/vipaśyanā meditation most effectively addresses the mental disturbance of aggression. It helped me clarify the way in which I create separation between parts of my experience, and attempt to cling to one part of that experience and banish another. As a result of the practices of Šamatha/vipaśyanā meditation I was better able to integrate all parts of my experience, even those parts that cannot be characterized as “My” experience. I was better able to see that the goal of the path is not separate from wherever I am right now: wisdom is present in neurosis; mental confusion, samsāra, and liberation from that confusion, nirvāṇa, are inseparable.

At the end of my research, I was convinced that all of these practices are quite complementary. I agree with Karl Brunnhölzl when he writes:

Given that all Buddhist teachings are meant as a help for beings in their individual situations in life, the question is not what is absolutely right or politically correct, but what makes sense and is beneficial for a certain time and place in life. Needless to say, that can be the exact opposite of what is good for somebody else.88

In the introduction to this paper, I noted that there is an opportunity that has arisen as a result of the unprecedented contact between lineages that is taking place at this time: lineages of practice can enrich their praxis by comparing and learning from one another. In order to enjoy such enrichment, practitioners must be willing to adopt an attitude of non-sectarianism. A model for this kind of non-sectarian interchange of praxis can be found in the Ri-me movement that flowered in nineteenth century Tibet. In her article “Without Bias - The Dalai Lama in Dialogue,” Judith Simmer-Brown lists four characteristics of the Ri-me movement:

1. The Ri-me advocated that all traditions of meditation practice are to be appreciated, valued and preserved, regardless of the lineages or schools from which they have come.

2. Ri-me’s abiding interest was in meditation and contemplative practice as the ground of spiritual life.

3. Meditation is not to be regarded with naive passivity; rather, intelligent investigation and inquiry are crucial supports to a mature meditation practice.

4. The Ri-me movement was not merely an academic or elite spiritual movement, it also had a strongly popular side.89

I suggest that the practice of comparative soteriology informed by the above four characteristics could lead to a strengthening of praxis within lineages. I also suggest non-sectarian dialog could further clarify the particular strengths of each method of practice, and help identify populations that might best be served by these methods. In this way, effective praxis developed by one lineage could be available to help alleviate the suffering of practitioners of another lineage, and to alleviate the suffering of non-Buddhists as well.

The Philosophy of Suffering and the Practice of Vipassana

Professor Angraj Chaudhary

The philosophy of suffering propounded by the Buddha is not speculative but it is born out of his own experience. It was the direct experience not of a common man but of a very sensitive and pure man, who was free from defilements like greed, aversion, jealousy, anger etc., which he had annihilated by practicing Vipassana.

His philosophy, therefore, is not based on abstractions. It does not speculate on ‘empty first principles’ in the words of Robert N. Beck - a pragmatic thinker. Buddha’s attitude to speculative philosophy becomes clear from what he says to Poṭṭhapāda and to Mālunkyaputta.

When Poṭṭhapāda put ten questions relating to the world and the soul like ‘Is the world eternal or not eternal, is the world finite or not finite, Does the Tathāgata live after death or not and so on, the Buddha did not answer these questions. Why? Because he called them indeterminate questions. Answering such questions, according to him, is not ‘conducive to the purpose, not conducive to Dhamma, not the way to embark on the holy life, it does not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to calm, to higher knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna’.

Instead he explained the four Noble truths because their enunciation ‘is conducive to the purpose, conducive to Dhamma, the way to embark on the holy life; it leads to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to calm, to higher knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna.’

From this it is clear that the philosophy propounded by the Buddha is not speculative but pragmatic. This is also clear from what he says to Cūḷamālunyaputta who also like Poṭṭhapāda wanted to know from him the answer to such speculative questions. The Buddha said to Mālunkyaputta that to insist on knowing the answer to such questions before one agrees to lead the holy life is as foolish and fruitless as a man pierced with a poisoned arrow not agreeing to have the arrow taken out by a surgeon until he knows all about the arrow and the person who shot it. What would be the result? The result would be that he would suffer great pain and die but the questions would remain unanswered.

The Buddha was a different kind of philosopher. The philosophies propounded by other philosophers are based on logic and reasoning. They, therefore, may be controversial and may not be logical. And certainly they are not useful at all for solving the existential problems of human life.

He was not like Leibnitz nor like Heraclitus. Leibnitz talks about monad - the indivisible simple entity. But how this concept of monad can enable one to end his suffering, which is the greatest truth and an incontrovertible fact of life? Heraclitus said that one cannot step twice into the same

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2 D. (Poṭṭhapāda Sutta)
3 M. (Cūḷamālunyka Sutta)
5 Ibid.,
6 M. (Cūḷamālunyka Sutta)
7 Walpole Rahulā: What the Buddha Taught”, footnote #1, p. 26: “You cannot step twice into the same river, for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you…”
river and he definitely understood that all things are in a constant state of flux. But this he realized at the intellectual level. Had he, like the Buddha realized it at the experiential level, he would also have become the Buddha by developing non-attachment to worldly things, which attract one and cause desire in him. One’s desires are not always fulfilled because the things, which one longs for are not permanent. Therefore when they change they cause suffering in him. Had Heraclitus realized the impermanent nature of things at the experiential level and trained his mind not to long for those impermanent things he would have definitely gone the Buddha way.

The Buddha wanted to grapple with the problem of suffering which is ubiquitous and universal. Suffering is an existential problem not only of mankind but also of all living beings. No being is free from it. All are subject to different kinds of suffering, physical and mental. One who is born is subject to old age, disease and death. He is also separated from one he likes. This is suffering. He also has to live with somebody he does not like. This is also suffering. He does not get what he wants. This is also suffering. All these are sufferings from which no body is free. The Buddha saw it very sensitively and wanted to find a way out to end it.

This is from where he started. He started with the real problem that faced mankind, with nothing abstract and speculative. He saw the problem facing him starkly. He saw the disease. His effort was to know the cause of disease and find out its medicine as also how and when to take the medicine to be completely free from the disease.

In his spiritual journey he learned from his own experience. While practicing meditation he went deep into it and realized that one’s suffering is caused by one’s desires for the things he likes. His desires are never fulfilled because the things he desires are not permanent. They are in a constant state of flux. This realization came to him after practicing meditation. This was a sort of ‘eureka’ for him.

For practicing meditation concentration of mind is a sine qua non. The Buddha realized this while practicing meditation that so long as mind is not free from defilements like greed, aversion, jealousy, hatred etc., it cannot be concentrated. This was another big discovery. He thus concluded that in order to drive out defilements from mind observation of precepts (siła) is necessary. Gradually he learned that observation of siła helps one to achieve concentration of mind and with the help of this concentration one realizes the true nature of the objects of the world.

When one comes to know the true nature of things, ignorance goes away and he begins to see their true nature. In other words, true knowledge dawns upon him. He sees the objects of his attachment impermanent, becomes disillusioned and concludes that if the objects he longs for are transient and impermanent how can they make him happy? This again is a great realization born out of his direct experience.

Thus the Buddha concluded that one’s suffering is caused by one’s desires and one has desires for things the real nature of which he does not know. There is an in-built dynamo inside everybody. So long as one is ignorant of the real nature of the objects of the world the dynamo within him fuelled by desires keeps on generating desires. And multiplication of desires causes endless suffering. But once he comes to know the real nature of the objects he hankers after he begins to develop non-attachment for them. Practice of Vipassana meditation helps him a lot. Whenever he practices Vipassana he experiences that what arises passes away. Nothing is permanent. So he
Conference experiences impermanence (anicca). And whatever is impermanent is dukkha (Yad anicca tām dukkhāṁ). Thus he either reduces his desires and reduces his suffering proportionately or he completely annihilates his desires and completely eradicates his suffering. Practice of Vipassana helps one understand this law as it had helped the Buddha.

The Buddha thus realized the cause of suffering. It was then just the second step for him to know that suffering can be eliminated by removing the cause. Thus he propounded the philosophy of suffering from his own experience. He had realized the great importance of observing moral precepts in concentrating his mind. He had also experienced the great role of a concentrated mind in seeing things sharply and clearly as they are and by practicing Vipassana he had seen how cravings are caused and how they can be eliminated. By practicing Vipassana it became clear to him that ‘wherever in the world there is anything agreeable and pleasurable, there this craving arises and establishes itself.’

It did not take the Buddha long to conclude that cravings can be eliminated by eliminating the cause of cravings. And what is the cause of cravings? The agreeable and pleasurable in the world are the causes of cravings. By practicing Vipassana he knew that even the most beautiful objects of the world are impermanent. They do not last forever. The natural question was then why crave for them? Thus he trained his mind to see the transitory nature of objects and give up his craving for them. In this way by practicing Vipassana he ended his suffering. It means that anybody can end his suffering by practicing Vipassana.

Because he had realized how suffering is caused and also because he had realized the role of morality (sīla) in eliminating it so while propounding the philosophy of suffering he ethicized it. He was also a great psychologist. He saw the role of our mind in causing craving, he also saw how to tame this monkey mind, which now craves for this object and now for that.

The Buddha thus propounded his philosophy of suffering with his bhāvanāmayā paññā, (experiential wisdom) which is yathābhūtānaññadassana (wisdom arising from seeing the truth as it is). Bhāvanāmayā paññā means insight wisdom developed at the experiential level. There is no question of its being false or speculative or abstract. It is experiential knowledge. With this paññā he saw the cause of suffering. The philosophy of suffering propounded by the Buddha, therefore, is based on his direct experience. Anybody can see for himself where craving is caused, where suffering arises and how craving and suffering can be ended if he practices Vipassana.

The Buddha realized all this at the experiential level by practicing Vipassana and developing his paññā (insight wisdom or understanding based on his direct experience).

He propounded the four noble truths of suffering viz. suffering, its cause, its cessation and the way leading to its cessation and preached them to the first five disciples. He explained three aspects of each truth. One should know the first Noble Truth. This is the first aspect of the first noble truth. The first noble truth of suffering should be comprehended (pariññeyam). This is called kicca nāṇa i.e. knowledge gained while doing. This is its second aspect. When it is thoroughly comprehended (pariññātām) it is called kata nāṇa i.e. knowledge gained when done. This is its third aspect. Similarly the rest of the truths should also be known comprehensively. The second noble truth of suffering should be abandoned (pahātabbam). This is kicca nāṇa and when it is completely abandoned (pahīnām) it is called kata nāṇa. The third noble truth should be realized (sacchikātabbam).

This aspect of this truth is kicca नाना and when it is realized (sacchikataṃ) it is called kata नाना. The fourth noble truth should be developed (bhāvetabbaṃ). This is called kicca नाना and when it is developed (bhāvita) it is called kata नाना.

All the four noble truths are interdependent. That is why the Buddha says, ‘he who sees dukkha sees also the arising of dukkha, sees also the cessation of dukkha, and sees also the path leading to the cessation of dukkha.’

One may know these four noble truths at the intellectual level, but this knowing is not of great help in eliminating suffering. When these four noble truths are respectively comprehended, abandoned, realized and developed then one understands them thoroughly. And this is not possible without practicing Vipassana, without realizing these truths at the experiential level. For this one has to develop bhāvanāmayā paññā (experiential wisdom).

The Buddha propounded the philosophy of suffering by developing his bhāvanāmayā paññā. Therefore his philosophy of suffering can be understood by developing bhāvanāmayā paññā for which practice of Vipassana meditation is inevitable.

For practicing Vipassana the nature of mind has got to be understood. Mind is very fickle and unsteady. This is Psychology. And for concentrating mind observation of sīla is inevitable. Sīla comes under Ethics. When one understands the true nature of the objects of the world for which one craves, this is Metaphysics. Apart from these Vipassana also means training one’s mind to give up the old habit pattern of reacting to sensations that arise on one’s body. Thus Vipassana is a very comprehensive practice to know the nature of mind and nature of reality. Besides, it is also an effective tool to train one’s mind to learn to behave in a particular way.

Practicing Vipassana the Buddha propounded the Law of Dependent Origination, which explains how one creates sāṅkhāras in ignorance, how sāṅkhāras give rise to consciousness, consciousness to nāma-rūpa… and how bhava gives rise to jāti and jāti gives rise to old age, disease, death and all sorts of sorrows and suffering. The Buddha also concluded that as effect has a cause and as it can be eliminated by eliminating its cause, so suffering can be extirpated by eliminating cravings. (Yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ), but how to eliminate cravings - the cause of suffering?

The Buddha came out with an action-plan. The fourth noble truth i.e, walking on the Noble eight-fold path is the action-plan. This is how one can live this philosophy propounded by the Buddha, root out the causes of cravings, end one’s suffering and live a peaceful life. This path consists of sīla, samādhī and paññā, which are inter-related. They are the three legs of a stool which keep it stable. Out of the eight constituents of this path, right action, right speech and right livelihood come under sīla, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration come under samādhī and right view and right resolve come under paññā. Samādhī cannot be achieved without observing precepts (five precepts) and paññā, which enables one to see the true nature of things, cannot be developed without achieving concentration of mind.

But how can the mind be concentrated without driving out defilements that agitate and disturb mind? For getting rid of defilements observing precepts is a sine qua non.

9 Walpola Rahula (1959) What the Buddha Taught (quoted from p. 27)
When mind is concentrated one can see the true nature of things. By practicing Vipassana one can see it again and again and come to realize that all things are impermanent. Because they are impermanent, so they cause suffering called vipariṇāma dukkha.

While practicing Vipassana one sees the true nature of things again and again and realizes at the experiential level that things, however beautiful they look, are not permanent. Thus he develops non-attachment and gradually he develops no craving for them. When cravings end, sufferings end.

Thus the philosophy of suffering propounded by the Buddha is based on his experience. It is born out of his knowledge of truth as it is (Ñāna-dassana). Whether this philosophy is true or not can be proved by practicing Vipassana. The veracity or otherwise of the Law of Dependent Origination can be proved in no other laboratory than in one’s fathom-long body.

But there is a basic difference between the physical laws and the laws connected with the four noble truths. In no other laboratory outside this fathom-long body can it be proved that sensations cause desire. This will be possible only when one who wants to prove it lives a pure life, practices Vipassana and observes his sensations. He will see that he wants to have more of pleasant sensations and none of the unpleasant ones.

Physical laws can be proved in outside laboratories by anybody. He may be of greedy temperament. He may have several defilements. It does not matter. But the laws relating to suffering propounded by the Buddha can be experienced and proved by those, who live a virtuous life i.e. observes sīla, practice samādhi and are on the way to develop pañña.

The first requisite of being able to practice Vipassana meditation is to live a virtuous life. Only when one lives a virtuous life one can attain concentration of mind with which he can attain pañña. Pañña enables him to see the impermanent nature of things, which in turn makes him develop nirveda (non-attachment). Practicing this meditation one becomes able to see that even pleasant sensations do not last forever. They change. Realizing their true nature again and again at the experiential level one learns not to crave for them anymore. Realization of impermanence at the intellectual level is not enough. It has got to be realized at the experiential level. Only then one develops non-attachment and thus learns to remain equanimous.

This goes a long way in eliminating one’s desires. One stops craving for things and thus stops creating desires. By practicing Vipassana one knows at the experiential level, not only at the intellectual level, that both the things he likes and does not like, cause his suffering. This experience becomes a ‘eureka’ for him. Once he realizes how desires arise and how sensations give rise to desires (vedanā paccayā tañhā) he comes to realize how desires can be eliminated. He learns not to react to sensations either positively or negatively but learns to remain equanimous. It is, of course, not easy, but he learns not to give importance to sensations (vedanā), because he has realized that they are in a constant state of flux. Light of knowledge dawns upon him and gradually he is transformed. At least he does not crave as much as he used to do before when he was ignorant and did not know the real nature of things. A sure step towards reducing his desire has been taken. Vipassana helps one develop insight, understanding (bhāvanāmayā pañña). It goes a long way in reducing one’s suffering if not completely annihilate it.

I practice Vipassana and I can say with confidence that it has enabled me to understand the philosophy of suffering clearly. I have also understood how I can reduce my suffering if not
completely eliminate it. I have also learned not to be overpowered by defilements like anger and
greed. There was a time when I used to be overpowered by anger. I used to burn for hours together.
I used to be angry with those who had harmed me. But practicing Vipassana I learned that I burn and
burn with anger without causing any harm to the persons I am angry with. This was a perceptible
realization. This changed the course of my life. Now I don’t burn with anger. I do not let anger
overpower me but I become able to check it. I have learned to root it out. I can now very well
understand what Thera Vasabha\textsuperscript{10} means when he says that’ I harm myself before I harm
others’ - pubbe hanati attānaṃ pacchā hanati so pare. I have learned it – so why harm myself?
I have also learned not to let other defilements like greed overpower me. When they arise I observe
them equanimously and they become feeble. I feel I have grown up in Dhamma. I see clearly how
the Buddha’s philosophy of suffering is based on the experiences he had by practicing Vipassana.

\textsuperscript{10} Verse no.139 of the Theragāthā.
Mind, Death and Supervenience: Towards a Comparative Dialogue

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Introductory Remarks

The old cliché has it that there are two things of which one can be certain in life, but whilst there is relatively little to say about taxes, the topic - and concept - of death raises a host of philosophical issues. This paper seeks to examine death from the perspectives of both Western Analytic1 philosophy and the Vajrayāna tradition. Rather than attempting to give a complete account of what death is, and how it is undergone - for such would be a monumental undertaking - the aims of the present paper are much more modest. Our goal is simply to find a way to bring Vajrayāna and Western Analytical perspectives into a genuine dialogue concerning mind and cognition, and we do this by examining what each has to say on the specific topic of death. Simply staking out the conceptual space within which that dialogue can take place is enough for the present paper; conducting the debate is a much greater task that we postpone for a later date.

We start by outlining the prevailing physicalism—in both metaphysical and epistemic senses—in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, and showing how this is closely connected to the Western Analytic perspective on death in the practical settings of law and medicine. The concept of ‘supervenience’ is one way of articulating a kind of minimal physicalism; we argue that it is therefore shared by otherwise conflicting physicalist viewpoints within the Western Analytic tradition, and can also serve as the focal point for generating dialogue between Western Analytic and Vajrayāna perspectives. Accordingly, we briefly outline the Vajrayāna perspective on death, before returning to the question of supervenience, in a later section, in order to spell out what Vajrayāna would or should say about the concept. We conclude with some speculative comments about how the dialogue thus engendered will pan out.

I. Western-Analytic Perspectives

Physicalism:

It would be fair to say that within Western Analytic philosophy, the dominant conception of mind and cognition is a physicalist one. Physicalism comes in several different forms, but at root lies the conviction that everything in the universe - i.e., everything that exists - is ultimately physical. (For this reason, ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ have sometimes been used as synonyms, though we avoid this usage; as contemporary science makes quite clear, there are plenty of physical

1 We use the term “Western Analytic” to refer—broadly but probably inaccurately—to refer to the approach to philosophical problems and methods largely employed in the bulk of anglophone philosophy departments in (e.g.,) the US and the UK. As with the application of any label, there are inevitably problem or puzzle cases, and neither should it be assumed that we buy into such sweeping distinctions, but insofar as it “western analytic” philosophy is often contrasted with “continental” or “eastern” philosophy, we hope the reference is clear.
phenomena - forces, fields and the like - to which it would be a strain to apply the cognate terms ‘matter’ and ‘material’). In philosophy of mind, this physicalism amounts to a rejection of theses that account for mentality in terms of non-physical substances or properties; thus, the Cartesian view (arguably also shared by the Abrahamic religious traditions) that mind is a non-spatial mental substance (or immaterial soul) is set aside for a host of reasons that need not concern us here. Physicalism about the mind is largely seen as the ‘only game in town’ (Tim Crane, for example, quite reasonably points out: “there is in general a consensus that some form of physicalism is the solution to the [mind-body] problem.” (1994, p.479)), and even though there are many variants of the view, our contention is that they all share a common base (to which we will return later).

Perhaps the most contested issue within physicalism concerns the extent to which it entails a form of reductionism. Reductionism is usually taken as a doctrine about explanation; if A is reducible to B, then A-related phenomena (properties, events, processes) can be fully explained in terms of B-related phenomena (properties, events, processes). In this sense, ontological reduction is literal; the fact that everything about A can be explained in terms of B means that A is no longer required in our ontology - it is, as common parlance has it, ‘explained away’ and our ontology is reduced in size. The classic example is the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics; given that facts about temperature can be completely explained in terms of facts about the motions of particles, ‘temperature’ no longer features in our ontology. At best thermodynamic talk is retained as a linguistic shortcut for what we know is really something else. The parallel question in philosophy of mind, therefore, is whether mental states and processes are reducible in this sense to physical (i.e., some combination of neural, bodily and environmental) states and processes. Reductive physicalists of various stripes (e.g., Place, 1956; Kim, 1998) hold that they are, whereas non-reductive physicalists (e.g., Broad, 1925; Davidson, 1980) hold that they are not.

During the latter half of the twentieth century, Western Analytic philosophers of mind seemed to converge on what has been described as the ‘anti-reductionist consensus.’ Arguments from multiple-realisability (Putnam, 1975) and the absence of psychophysical ‘bridge laws’ (Davidson, 1980) led many to conclude that whilst mental states are indeed physical, the reduction of the mental to the physical (in the explanatory sense outlined above) is not possible. Clearly, formulating such an account is a subtle matter of navigating between the Scylla of reductionism and the Charybdis of substance dualism; indeed, whether non-reductive physicalism is actually a coherent position is a matter of some controversy. But we need not address that matter here - all we need note for now is that there are (at least) two significantly different ways of adopting a physicalist metaphysics. In the next section, we’ll show that these different physicalisms must share a common thesis of supervenience, and it’s that concept that will be most useful in generating the dialogue with the Vajrayāna tradition that we seek.

For now, let us note one potentially tricky issue - the issue of mental causation. A moment’s reflection reveals many cases where, as we might ordinarily put it, the mental can exert a causal influence on the physical; a decision leads to an action, the sensation of itching leads to the behaviour of scratching. Less anecdotal examples include the fact that certain types of cognitive activity (such as solving a mathematical puzzle) can delay the onset of a neurophysiologically-based epileptic seizure (see Thompson and Varela, 2001), and that certain meditative practices found in gTuumo yoga can result in physical changes in body temperature and metabolic rates (Benson et al., 1982; Cromie, 2002). These examples seem to be prima facie cases where the mental, qua mental, exercises causal powers ‘downwards’ onto the physical. We might legitimately ask, therefore, how physicalist viewpoints can account for them.
The reductionist answer is largely deflationary; reductive physicalists effectively deny that there is such a thing as genuine downward causation. On this view, since mental phenomena can be explained in physical terms, any apparent instance of mental causation is really just a case of (unproblematic) physical causation. By contrast, the non-reductive view embraces mental causation at the risk of abandoning physicalism; after all, if the mind is physical but cannot be explained as such, the only way to say why itching leads to scratching seems to accord mentality with unique causal powers that are absent from the physical, and this is precisely what the substance dualist contends. It is this tension that has led philosophers such as Jaegwon Kim to describe non-reductive physicalism as an ‘unstable halfway house’ - you can have physicalism if you’re willing to have reductionism, but you can’t have the former without the latter, so the claim goes.

The nuances of this debate need not concern us for now. What’s important is that both reductive and non-reductive physicalist positions face problems in accounting for genuine mental-physical causation (the former counterintuitively denies it, the latter embraces it at the risk of abandoning physicalism). The importance of this fact will become apparent in another section of this paper, where we consider Vajrayana’s requirement of genuine mental causation. For now, we turn to the Western treatment of death.

**Death**

In contemporary western societies, death is one of the most paradoxical of phenomena: it is inevitable, but probably the most feared event; it happens to all of us, but is generally a taboo topic of discussion. We have physicalized, sanitized and isolated death from common view. We have pathologized it and expended great medical effort to stave off its inevitability. Medicine has had great success in creating procedures and machinery to override the body’s essential but failing functions. Thus, in the last sixty years, the question has arisen as to how to define death. This task has been ceded to medicine, as death is now considered mainly a pathological and secular matter.

Prior to the wide-spread dissemination of defibrillators and mechanical respirators in the 1960’s the standard criterion of death was the cessation of cardiopulmonary function: an organismic criterion. The three organs considered critical were heart, lungs and brain. The function of lungs could be tested by use of a mirror held under the nose, the heart could be assessed by palpating the pulse and termination of brainstem function could be determined by lack of consciousness, lack of awareness and lack of responsive behaviour. With the advent of mechanical intervention, however, lung and heart function could be artificially assisted with the consequence that the definition of death became less clear. Was one dead or alive when one’s essential functions were artificially maintained? According to the old (American) cardiopulmonary standard one was alive so long as cardiopulmonary functions remained, either assisted or unassisted. The current (American) legal criterion of death is the whole brain standard, which judges one as dead even if cardiovascular function is artificially maintained so long as the whole brain is irreversibly non-functional (molecular function of the brain alone is ignored). According to this criterion, death ensues when the whole brain - lower brain and higher brain - irreversibly ceases to function; this includes the brainstem (which governs autonomic functions), the cerebrum (which, in part, governs conscious awareness) and

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the cerebellum (which governs voluntary muscle movement). This standard is generally associated, in the disjunctive, with the cardiopulmonary standard according to which death ensues when lung and heart functions terminate. That is, death is constituted when either standard is met. These criteria were legally codified in the Uniform Determination of Death Act, adopted by most of the states of the United States, the text of which states:

Determination of Death. An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory or respiratory functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem, is dead...3

According to the view embodied in the Act, death is not seen as a process but rather as an event (i.e., the instantiation of a property at a time - see Kim, 1976) or a state (i.e., the end result of the instantiation of that property). It occurs at a moment in time, although a medical determination must be made as to whether this state is irreversible. So a period of time may lapse between cessation of neurophysiological function and medical determination of irreversibility.

It is worth noting that according to the Act the cessation of brain/mental function may either be assumed or that criterion may be dispensed with altogether when heart or lung functions stop. Thus, the Act explicitly codifies the physicalist understanding that mental function is dependent upon and determined by physical function. This relationship of dependency and determination, as we shall discuss in detail later, is usually referred to as ‘supervenience’ in the Western Analytic tradition.

**Supervenience**

Physicalism is often characterized using the notion of ‘supervenience,’ a philosophical term of art designed to provide a positive account of the relationship between mental and physical events. In one oft-cited passage, arguing for non-reductive physicalism, Donald Davidson writes:

“Although the position I describe denies that there are psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics.” (Davidson, 1980, p.214)

Kim (1998) suggests that, following Davidson, talk of “supervenience” quickly caught on in philosophy of mind precisely because it appeared to offer a positive account of the relationship between mental and physical phenomena. Subsequent literature came to be dominated by talk of supervenience as an apparently viable statement of physicalism-without-reductionism. Davidson elaborates on what it means for the mental to be dependent on, or determined by, the physical thus:

“Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect.” (Davidson, 1980, p. 214)4

Davidson’s elucidation of the supervenience relationship, then, consists of two logically

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4 It is worth noting, that, of Davidson’s two explications of the concept of supervenience here, the first is for events, whilst the second is for objects. It is unclear from Davidson’s somewhat elliptical comment, whether he intends this distinction to do any philosophical work—in what follows, we shall ignore it.
equivalent (but differently emphasised) claims, to wit:

(D1) Things that are identical in all physical respects will be identical in all mental respects; and,

(D2) Things cannot change in their mental respects without also changing in physical respects.

Proposition D1 describes a relationship such that the mental is determined by the physical, whilst D2 describes a relationship such that the mental depends on the physical; taken together, their conjunction is usually understood as constitutive of the supervenience claim.\(^5\) Further, we can refine D1 and D2 so as to capture the varieties of supervenience that appear in the literature. If we add the specification that they hold within a possible world, and we replace ‘object’ with ‘individual,’ we have the notion of “weak supervenience”: no possible world contains two individuals who have all the same physical properties but different mental properties. According to weak supervenience it is possible, however, that two physically identical individuals in different possible worlds should have different mental properties.

Thus construed, weak supervenience runs into a potential problem, famously spelt out by Kim (e.g., 1982, 1990). According to weak supervenience, there is nothing necessary about the covariance between mental and physical properties; weak supervenience allows that there are other possible worlds where physical duplicates have different mental properties (or even no mental properties at all).\(^6\) This causes a problem for the ability of the weak supervenience claim to capture the notions of dependency and determination. If x’s mental properties really were dependent on and determined by x’s physical properties, then it should not be possible that a physical duplicate of x could fail to be a mental duplicate of x.

One way to sharpen this point is to think about how we could explain the fact that, despite being physically identical, x-in-w\(_1\) had different mental properties from x-in-w\(_2\). We could not explain the difference in terms of their physical properties alone, since, ex hypothesi, x-in-w\(_1\) and x-in-w\(_2\) are physically identical. The only way we could explain the difference in mental properties would be by reference to some factor other than their physical properties. In this case, however, the mental properties would count as at least partially dependent on and determined by that extra factor, in which case the supervenience relationship would have failed to capture the dependency of x’s mental properties on x’s physical properties.

One might think that a stronger formulation of supervenience (which denies the possibility that x-in-w\(_1\) and x-in-w\(_2\) could be physically identical but mentally different) might not fall prey to such difficulties. Adding the specification that D1 and D2 hold for individuals across possible worlds, generates this notion of “strong supervenience”: there can be no two individuals (even in different possible worlds) who have all the same physical properties but different mental properties. In these terms, the dependency of the mental on the physical is held to be necessary.

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\(^5\) Kim’s (1998, p.9) definition, for example is equivalent to the conjunction of D1 and D2, with appropriate modal qualifications. He writes “Mental properties supervene on physical properties, in that [D2] necessarily, for any mental property M, if anything has M at time t, there exists a physical base (or subvenient) property P such that it has P at t, and [D1] necessarily anything that has P at a time has M at that time.” We might call D1 the “no zombies” clause, and D2 the “no ghosts” clause.

\(^6\) This is to say that, according to weak supervenience, it is possible for an individual to have a physically identical zombie twin, as long as the two are in different possible worlds.
Kim argues that such a construal of supervenience falls prey to similar problems. Strong supervenience tells us that there is a relation such that if \( x \text{-in-} \omega_1 \) and \( x \text{-in-} \omega_2 \) have all the same physical properties, they necessarily have all the same mental properties. But Kim suggests that this construal of supervenience still fails to capture a dependency relationship since it only expresses the idea that the mental and physical properties of \( x \) covary. Covariance alone does not imply that one class of properties depends on another, since covariance is a symmetrical relationship, whereas dependence and determination are not. Accordingly, there are three possible explanations for the covariance between \( x \)'s mental properties and \( x \)'s physical properties; first, they could covary because the mental depends on the physical; second, they could covary because the physical depends on the mental; third, they could covary because both depend on some third factor. Only the first of these possibilities expresses the dependency relationship that supervenience-physicalism was supposed to capture. The trouble is that the concept of strong supervenience itself provides no way of adjudicating between the three possibilities, and so, once again, cannot do the job it was supposed to.

Kim concludes that since supervenience fails to capture the notion that the mental is dependent on or determined by the physical, it fails as a theory of the mind-body relationship. On the one hand, as we have seen above, the conjunction of D1 and D2 does not do enough to say that the mental depends on and is determined by the physical, let alone spelling out why that relation holds; Kim (1998, p. 13) writes: “...the mere claim of mind-body supervenience leaves unaddressed the question of what grounds or accounts for it.” On the other hand, reductionist and anti-reductionist physicalists alike can agree that physical duplicates are also mental duplicates, and that all mental changes correspond to physical changes. Thus, Kim argues, since the conjunction of D1 and D2 are tenets of both reductive and non-reductive physicalism, supervenience cannot be an independent position on the mind-body problem.

Because of these problems, Kim says, all supervenience can do is to establish a kind of “minimal physicalism” (D1 and D2 are, after all, denied by Cartesian substance dualists and Berkeleyan idealists). We are inclined to agree; one of the desiderata of a physicalist mind-body theory is that it should say something about how or why the mental depends on and is determined by the physical over and above asserting the mere existence of this dependency and determination. We might say, therefore, that D1 and D2 need to be supplemented with a further account of the mind-body relation; the difference between reductive and non-reductive physicalism is, therefore, between different ways of supplementing the supervenience claim.

For the present paper, however, this points to an important interim conclusion. Given that the dominant Western Analytic conception of mind and cognition is a physicalist one, and given that supervenience gives us a minimal physicalism, it follows that supervenience is a shared concept for pretty much all of Western Analytic metaphysics of mind. In order, then, to generate a dialogue between Western Analytic conceptions of mind and the Vajrayāna tradition, we need to see what the latter would or could say about the concept of supervenience. It is to this question that we turn in the remainder of the paper.
II. Vajrayāna Perspectives

Two Realities/Truths:

Buddhism approaches the understanding of the mind pragmatically and phenomenologically and secondarily, analytically. Perhaps this is because the main purpose is the elimination of suffering (duḥkha), and the path to accomplish it is experiential. The experiential nature is demonstrated clearly by the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Common to Theravāda, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna, the doctrine describes the twelve links that constitute the causal nexus by which ignorance of reality (avādāya) - the first link - leads to old age and death - the last link. Conversely, the same doctrine also describes how the same twelve links can lead to freedom from ignorance, old age and death. In each case the critical fulcrum is the mind. The doctrine of dependent origination, initially stated by Śākyamuni Buddha, propounds the process according to which one inexorably and inevitably either devolves to perceive mere appearances or evolves to perceive reality as it is.

Much like a physician who diagnoses an illness and its causes and then proceeds to treat it, the Buddha diagnosed: the illness, suffering, and its causes - the twelve links of dependent origination. The way to liberation, he said, was the Noble Eightfold Path (See footnote 8).

It is important to recognize that the doctrine is not a metaphysical theory in the sense normally employed by western analytic philosophy. Rather, it is a means of practically analyzing the chain of causation by which suffering arises and can therefore be eliminated. According to Vajrayāna, dependent origination has three levels of interpretation. At the first level, each of the twelve links, individually and jointly, is considered to be conventionally but not ultimately real. That is, the manner in which the links appear does not correspond with the way they actually are. And yet, it would be false to say that the links do not exist. They exist conventionally in the sense that the links explain the nexus of causation in which most of us are entrapped and they appear real to the conventional mind (a mind which misperceives appearances as reality). For example, death appears conventionally to be something inevitable and inherently existing. However, according to the teachings, when ignorance of ultimate reality is eliminated the chain of dependent origination is broken; birth, old age and death no longer occur. So, we might ask whether conventional reality supervenes on ultimate reality? This will be discussed below.

At a deeper level, dependent origination is understood to apply to all phenomena insofar as everything is composed of parts and the whole does not exist independent of its parts. So, for example, under analysis, a table is said to exist dependent upon its parts and the parts, in turn, can...

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7 This is not to say that analysis in Vajrayāna is unimportant but rather that analysis is subservient to experiential insight. But consider Jay Garfield according to whom rationality in Buddhism is to be most highly praised since it is necessary to subvert reason and to articulate non-conceptual insight. Mādhyamaka and Methodology: A Symposium on Buddhist Theory and Method. You Tube accessed 20 September 2011. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nWY0Tyhu9MM)

8 In the First Turning of the Wheel of Dharma, Śākyamuni Buddha proclaimed the Four Noble Truths as the means to extricate oneself from suffering. The Noble Eightfold Path, the Fourth Noble Truth, stated that the means to do this were Right Views, Right Aspirations, Right Speech, Right Conduct, Right Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness and Right Rapture. Coomaraswamy (1964) p. 38

9 “That being present, this becomes; from the arising of this, that arises. That being absent, this does not become: from the cessation of that, this ceases” Majjhima Nikāya, ii 32 quoted in Coomaraswamy (1964) p. 94

10 Dalai Lama (2000) p. 35-37

11 Each of the four Schools of Vajrayāna Buddhism has given a somewhat different interpretation of the two truths. For our purposes however, we need not concern ourselves with these differences. For a more detailed discussion see Newland (1999), Takechoe (2011)
be further and further broken down until the distinction between subject and object is dissolved. The analysis is captured by Dzogchen Penlop Rinpoche:

“It is important to remember that the purpose of analysis is to determine if a particular object truly exists on the absolute level. That is what we are looking at in this process. We do not question whether it is there, before our eyes, on the relative level. In the very beginning, before our analysis, we have both an object and a subject: an object of perception and a perceiving consciousness. During the analysis, when we arrive at a more subtle level of the object’s material existence, then the subject side - the perceiving consciousness - apprehends it. When we reach the final stage of finding “nothing at all,” then the perceiving consciousness is transformed. It is no longer a “perceiving” consciousness because the object of perception and the act of perception are discontinued. The true existence of the object is no longer there, what is there is a transparent appearance, and an equally transparent awareness. There is no solid existence anywhere. Without solid existence, there is no way to delineate or define identity. Therefore, the separation between self and other, subject and object, becomes illusory. What occurs in that moment is the direct apprehension of the ultimate nature of mind which is beyond the subject-object split.”

At a still deeper level of interpretation, phenomena are imputed to exist dependent upon their designations and concepts. The self, for example, is said to exist in such a manner, but when one searches for that which the term ‘self’ designates, no such entity can be found. Therefore, the self too is conventionally and not ultimately real. So the question arises: what is ultimately real and what is its relationship with conventional reality? It is to these matters we now turn.

Mind:

For Vajrayāna, the two levels of reality play a prominent role in the understanding of mind. Mind is said to have two aspects, the discursive, discerning, dualistic mind and a deeper aspect referred to as the ‘nature of mind’ (Tib. rigpa, Skt. sugatagarbha). The former, which appears to inherently exist but in fact depends upon the survival of a person, is considered to be conventionally real (hereafter referred to as conventional mind). It plays an essential role in our navigation of the conventional world but owes its existence to the nature of mind. The nature of mind, which continues to abide lifetime after lifetime through eternity, is considered to be ultimately real (though, from the perspective of ultimate reality, empty of inherent existence). What is the relationship between the nature of mind and conventional mind? There is a sense in which the question is meaningless as ‘relationship’ assumes the existence of two things. But the Vajrayāna position is that, from the perspective of ultimate reality, there is only one thing which, to the conventional mind, is misperceived as two. Restated from a western perspective the question might be rephrased, ‘in terms of conventional reality, what is the relationship between nature of mind and conventional mind’? Conventional mind certainly depends on the nature of mind since it is an emanation of it. But it is only partially determined by the nature of mind. It is determined by the nature of mind insofar as that is its essence. Therefore, conventional mind is inherently pure and so the obscuration of ignorance can always be cleansed. However there is another factor that determines the content and function

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13 Dalai Lama (2000), p.36
of the conventional mind: karma. It is karma that propels ignorance from the past to the present and obscures the nature of mind. Karma, a form of psychological momentum based upon past deeds, transmigrates from lifetime to lifetime with the mental continuum, and conditions cognition. But karma can be cleansed by meditation, contemplation and purification practices. This will be significant when we address the definition of supervenience directly in another section.

Non-physicalism

The Vajrayāna understanding of mind is properly categorized as non-physicalist. While the conventional mind may be dependent, in part, upon brain function this cannot be said of the nature of mind which is immaterial as a logical matter as well as experientially. Logically, if the nature of mind were material then it would be composed of parts and dependent on them. Furthermore, as discussed below, mind is said to continue to function after the body ceases function.

The relationship of nature of mind to the conventional mind is, depending on one’s philosophic perspective, either paradoxical or problematic. Conventional mind is said to be a natural emanation of mind as the rays of the sun are an emanation of the sun. But that analogy breaks down on closer examination because in the case of the sun and its rays both are physical whereas this is not the case with conventional and nature of mind. Furthermore, the sun and its rays are normally considered as separate whereas nature of mind and conventional mind are considered different aspects of one entity. One attribute of the nature of mind is pure, primordial awareness without object. The traditional analogy is to the vastness of the sky. It cannot be denied that conventional mind is heavily dependent upon and determined by neural correlates, the Vajrayanist might argue, but it is by no means clear that very subtle states of mind such as so called ‘clear light’ states will have neural correlates.  

Non-Reductionism:

While the nature of mind is the ultimate reality conventional mind cannot be metaphysically reduced to it in the same way the reductive physicalist would say that mind can be reduced to brain function as described in section two. Since conventional mind is said to be an indivisible aspect of the nature of mind it cannot be eliminated from our ontology. However, the question remains, could conventional mind be reduced to the nature of mind even though not eliminated? Recall that in section two we discussed two types of physicalism, reductive and nonreductive. Reductive physicalism would eliminate one entity, the mental, from ontology. Nonreductive physicalism would assert that mental function was in fact only physical but not explanatorily reducible to the physical. Can conventional mind be explainable in this way? We believe that the answer is no. Nature of mind can explain only the aspect of mind which is primordially aware. Karma, impelled by ignorance, explains the the aspect of mind which remains deluded.

Death in Vajrayāna Buddhism

The process of dying is referred to in Vajrayāna as “the painful bardo of dying”. Bardo is a Tibetan term which literally translates as “intermediate state”. Death takes place in two stages, outer dissolution and inner dissolution. Outer dissolution consists of the deterioration of the five physical senses and the elements that support them. First, the senses deteriorate. Then the elements that support them are re-absorbed - earth is absorbed into water, water into fire, fire into air and air into space. The dying person’s energy is concentrated at a point in the subtle body known as the heart centre. The breathing slows and finally stops. This is the point at which organismic function ceases. In the west, the person would be considered dead at this stage either by the cardiopulmonary or whole brain standards. However, this is when inner dissolution begins according to the Tibetan tradition. Now mind functions free of the body. Inner dissolution of gross and subtle levels of thought and emotion known as the three poisons—anger, desire/attachment and ignorance—occurs. The inner dissolution reverses the subtle process that occurred at birth. The teachings say that at birth, when father’s sperm and mother’s egg unite, consciousness enters the fertilized egg. During the development of the foetus the father’s essence migrates to the point of the foetus’ subtle energy body known as the crown chakra at the top of the head. The mother’s essence migrates to a point in the subtle energy body four finger widths below the navel. So during the inner dissolution the father’s essence descends to the heart, the three poisons dissolve and awareness becomes pristine. The mother’s essence ascends to the heart and all desire/attachment dissolves. When the two essences meet at the heart all the mental states constituting ignorance are dissolved. Duality vanishes and the ground luminosity—naked awareness—dawns. This is also called “the mind of the clear light of death”. This consciousness is the innermost subtle mind, the nature of mind, Buddha nature, the real source of all consciousness. This is the point at which Vajrayāna would consider one to have died. One who, during his lifetime, has stabilized the nature of mind can continue to abide in the mind of the clear light of death and it is traditional to remain in this state for a period of about three days. If one is successful it is said that during this time the heart remains warm and the body does not decay. So according to Vajrayāna, there is a period during which mind functions free of the physical body but nevertheless has a physical effect. This point is crucial to an understanding of supervenience from a Vajrayāna perspective.

For the dying Vajrayāna practitioner, a range of meditations may be engaged in to achieve liberation depending on one’s level of realization. The practitioner who, during his lifetime, has stabilized the nature of mind, continues to abide in it throughout the dissolution process and thereby obtains final liberation. For the practitioner who has not stabilized the nature of mind, during the dissolution process, he may practice Guru Yoga. This is the practice of visualizing and uniting with a deity or Buddha (yidam) which represents wisdom and compassion. So as the outer dissolution occurs, one might visualize this being in the various subtle energy centres and finally unite with it. The yidam is understood to be a representation of one’s enlightened mind. Through the practice of repeatedly visualizing the yidam and uniting with it while alive one comes to realize that the enlightened mind of the yidam and one’s own mind are not separate.

Yet another method to assist in the transition is the technique of p’howa. It is a technique in which the consciousness of the dying person unites with the yidam Amitabha Buddha, who represents compassion.
For a period of forty-nine days after death the practitioner may be guided through the bardo of dying, the luminous Bardo, and the bardo of rebirth by recitation of the Bardo Thodol more commonly known as the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*. The book recites the experiences one is likely to encounter in these bardos and provides guidance to liberation – it, being understood that all one’s bardo experiences are solely the manifestation of the contents, proclivities and conditioning of one’s conventional mind from all past lives. One gains liberation by realizing this.

**Downward Causation:**

It seems clear that, from the Vajrayāna perspective, ‘downward causation’ is accepted as an empirical fact. Most dramatically, as mentioned above, the teachings say that one who has stabilized the nature of mind during one’s lifetime, in death, maintains a surprising amount of bodily integrity for an extended period of time. This integrity is not maintained by physiological function but rather by the immaterial mind.

To summarize, in Vajrayāna, the nature of mind is conceived as the ultimate reality. Conventional mind may obscure it but because it is never permanently stained, the obscurations can always be removed. Buddhist practices, mostly mental, are designed to accomplish this. It is understood that training the mind properly clears these mental obscurations. The conventional mind is said to be an emanation of the nature of mind and as such, is not a separate entity. In the process of dying and after death one experiences one’s mind both with all its obscurations and in its pristine state. If one fails to recognize and abide in the nature of mind while in the bardo of death one experiences all the contents and proclivities of one’s deluded mind, both pleasant and unpleasant, and ultimately is reborn with those mental tendencies intact. Thus, the nature of mind is obscured in the next life.

**III. Towards a Dialogue**

Given the considerations of the foregoing sections, an important and interesting parallel emerges. We are faced with the situation where a central concern in both Western analytic and Vajrayāna perspectives can be characterised in terms of “levels” and the relation between them; in the Western analytic approach, we are concerned with the relation between the physical and the mental in the “layered picture of reality,” whilst in the Vajrayāna approach, we are concerned with the relationship between the nature of mind conceived as the ultimate reality, and the conventional mind conceived as an emanation of it. It is thus appropriate to ask whether these inter-level relationships might be characterised in a similar fashion, and for the purposes of the present paper we propose to consider whether the concept of supervenience is adequate to such a task.

More specifically, we might return to the two propositions (considered earlier) that constitute the Western analytic supervenience claim, in order to see whether they can be re-deployed in a way that adequately describes the relationship between the nature of mind and the conventional mind. We must ask whether, according to Vajrayāna, it would be correct to say that:

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15 Kim (2002)
(D1’) Change at the level of nature of mind will result in identical change at the level of the conventional mind; and,

(D2’) Change cannot occur at the level of the conventional mind without change also occurring at the level of nature of mind.

Before moving on to discuss this question, let us just pause to note that whatever the answer, our goal in this paper has been met. We stated that our aim was to bring Western analytic and Vajrayāṇa perspectives into a genuine dialogue where previously we felt they ran the risk of talking past each other. Here we are now considering whether a concept borrowed from Western analytic philosophy of mind can be usefully deployed in Vajrayāṇa metaphysics. Whether the answer is “yes” or “no,” it strikes us as fair to say we have found some common ground on which the discussion can take place. In fact, if the answer is “yes” then we can see that the contrast between Vajrayana and Western analytic perspectives concerning mind and cognition is a straightforward disagreement about which “level” is the most basic—no more problematic than any other metaphysical disagreement between viewpoints that nonetheless speak the same language. If, however, the answer is “no” (i.e., if D1’ and D2’ do not adequately capture the Vajrayāṇa view), then it remains to ask why and thus to pursue the dialogue further. Our hypothesis is that in fact the answer will be “no” for at least three reasons. Spelling them out and evaluating them is a matter for what we hope can be a fruitful ongoing dialogue (not to say another paper), but we will canvas them briefly here.

First, as we hinted earlier, supervenience in general (and its application to death in particular) has been developed within the Western Analytic tradition as an account of the relationship between states, properties and events considered synchronically (i.e., at-a-time). The Vajrayāṇa account of mind is quite clearly a process metaphysics (i.e., concerned with diachronic - over time relationships), and thus the concept of supervenience would need to be substantially re-worked (to apply to processes rather than states) in order to capture the Vajrayāṇa view. Even if such a re-working were possible, putting the matter in terms of the synchronic/diachronic distinction suggests that the Vajrayāṇa position may simply deny the dependency claim of D2’. Given that the present state of one’s conventional mind is critically dependent on the the karmic influence of one’s past, it is simply not the case that changes in one’s present conventional mind bear at all on the nature of mind; they could (counterfactually) come about in a way that depends solely on karma, with no change in the ‘subvenient’ nature of mind.

Following on from this, we can identify a second point of divergence that may lead us to doubt the veracity of D1’ and D2’. The Western analytic concept of supervenience permits - nay, requires - the possibility of change in the subvenient base. This is clearly indicated by the wording of D2 - what it is for the mental to depend on the physical is for changes in the former to come about because of changes in the latter. Furthermore, we should note that D2 also permits the possibility that there could be changes in the physical (the subvenient base) without any corresponding changes in the mental; different brains might nonetheless implement the same mental states, and it is this possibility that gives us the important feature of multiple realisability. It is far from clear that the Vajrayāṇa tradition allows for changeability in the underlying nature of mind (considered as the ultimate reality); indeed it probably does not. If so, it is directly at odds with both the articulation of and motivation for the Western Analytic concept of supervenience.
Finally, to return to another issue we repeatedly mentioned earlier, given Vajrayāna’s emphasis on *praxis* (e.g., meditative practice and what one must *do* during the process of death), it is quite clear that it requires a robust kind of mental process which exerts a causal influence on the physical (i.e., ‘downward’ causation). For example, as we mentioned, one who has stabilized the nature of mind during one’s lifetime is able to remain in this state for about three days after bodily death, during which time the heart remains warm and the body does not decay. As we pointed out, this kind of downward causation is ruled out (or at least denied) by the reductive and non-reductive variants of Western analytic physicalism that nonetheless share the supervenience claim. This is precisely because, if the ‘higher level’ is accorded with its own causal powers, it is possible that both D1 and D2 (and thus, D1’ and D2’) could be violated by an exercise of these powers. Accordingly, we have yet more reason to think that D1’ and D2’ do not capture the intra-level relationships in Vajrayāna in the way that D1 and D2 capture them in Western analytic metaphysics of mind.

Needless to say, these brief reflections are necessarily speculative and will thus require significant work to flesh them out. But the mere fact that this “fleshing out” is possible is, we think, evidence for the viability of dialogue between two traditions that might otherwise simply talk past each other: a dialogue that we hope to have initiated.
Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice

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Mindfulness Meditation and Praxis

Jeff Waistell

Introduction

Praxis is “where the theoretical is not separated from practice, but instead what is encouraged is the interplay of experience and reflection which becomes focused on concrete situations” (Carr, 2000, p.217). Whereas traditional theory formalizes thought, separating it from action, critical theory is concerned with praxis (Carr, 2000), which can be described as “a synthetic product of the dialectic between theory and practice” (Heilman, 2003, p.274). Similarly, Buddhism removes conceptual overlays and connects with direct experience, dispensing with the localization of the mind in one part of the body that makes it partial and frozen (Suzuki, 1959). Zen emphasizes the concrete, factual and existential (Suzuki, 1963) and material reality (Blyth, 1981). Non-dualism suggests that ideas must be tested by their practical application (Suzuki, 1949).

There is no independent self in Buddhism. The notion that all things are empty does not imply that they do not exist but it does mean that they are not self-existing (Batchelor and Brown, 1992). The inner and outer are both empty and so cannot be distinguished (Suzuki, 1953). Suffering results from constructing a self that is independent from others and objects, resulting in alienation from them, the resolution of which is fallaciously attempted through clinging to other people, objects or conditions, in order to bolster this sense of self. The self attaches to that which appears to secure it and averts itself from that which it perceives as threatening. Dualistic thought about self versus others/things leads to other distinctions, such as that between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In Buddhism, dualism is reversed in two related ways; by not clinging to the people and things that are perceived to be outside the self; and through meditation, which gradually erodes the distinction between self and not-self. Awakening to the nature of reality is realized through the self’s reunification with it, resulting in the demise of clinging; “since there is no self which does the possessing, there simply cannot be any possession” (Puligandla and Puhakka, 1970, p.346). Liberation consists of entering a non-egotistical state and experiencing the interdependent nature of all beings (Mishra, 2004). There is no independent self, in which the search for individual enlightenment ceases, and the focus moves to helping others (Shen-yen, in Brazier, 2002). The preoccupation is no longer private liberation from suffering but the “nirvana of society” (Dalai Lama, in Brazier, 2002, p.97). Collapsing dualism addresses the underlying causes of selfishness, merging the self with other people, and thereby informing relationships with them. Reunification with others leads to compassion and the focus of liberation becomes not the self but all beings. When we are freed from egocentricity, we experience unity and are at one with their suffering. So the notion of self-liberation becomes delusive because there is no longer a separate self from which to be liberated; liberation becomes freedom of all beings from suffering (Jones, 1989). Letting go of the illusion of a separate self extends self-interest to all beings (King, 2005). Buddhism’s notion of interdependence requires active engagement in social care and action.

Accordingly, mindfulness meditation involves becoming aware of the here-and-now through awareness of the breath and body. It is a visceral, not a cerebral exercise (King, 1993).
This connection with reality potentiates meditation for praxis; “once there is seeing, there must be acting”, argues Thich Nhat Hanh (1995, p.91), who reinterprets the Five Precepts as the ‘Five Mindfulness Trainings’, with changed emphases from prohibition to constructive action, and from individual to broader levels of analysis (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1987a; interbeing.org.uk).

Having introduced the principle of non-duality in Buddhism, the remainder of the paper will analyze Thich Nhat Hanh’s texts (in chronological order to see how his thinking developed), focusing on those that elaborate the relationship between meditation and praxis. The paper will close with conclusions and recommendations for meditation, praxis, and further research in this field.

**Discourse Analysis of Thich Nhat Hanh’s Texts**

The first text analyzed was ‘The Miracle of Mindfulness’. Here, Thich Nhat Hanh (1975), emphasizes breathing, with breath as a bridge connecting life and consciousness, uniting body and thoughts; mastering the breath is to control body and mind. Mindfulness is regarded as a miracle that restores us and calls back our dispersed mind; just as a magician who has cut up his body and placed the parts in different places and then works magic to reassemble all of the parts back into one whole.

Meditation and praxis are inextricably intertwined. No longer is religion separable from life; instead, every act in daily life can become a ceremony or rite that can enhance mindfulness. To strengthen this relationship, Thich Nhat Hanh advocates a day of mindfulness, which can then penetrate and affect the other days of the week, so that they all become mindful. He suggests contemplating on interdependency, impermanency and compassion. The contemplation on interdependency involves considering the five aggregates of physical forms, feelings, perceptions, mental functionings, and consciousness – to see that they are only aggregates, that everything is one and not many different things. Contemplating interdependence involves looking into the aggregates to see that there is one indivisible reality. Physical form is intimately connected with the world outside that form. For example, the existence of a table relies on a carpenter, screws, forest, and indeed the sun, soil and rain that allowed the forest to grow. Equally, meditating on the five aggregates in oneself enables insight that life in oneself and the universe are one. Meditating on interdependence should take place in the context of ordinary tasks (through mindfulness of the body’s positions, while making tea, washing dishes and clothes, cleaning the house, or bathing), events (which are inter-originated and interdependent) and social relationships (I am the other person; the other person is me). Contemplating on compassion can be practiced by meditating on the suffering of those who are suffering the most.

These themes are developed by Thich Nhat Hanh (1988), in ‘The Sun My Heart’, wherein he argues that meditating on interbeing and interpenetration of reality destroys concepts, in order to arrive at a direct experience of reality. One exercise to understand interbeing is to meditate on and become the person you most hate, becoming one with that person, their worries, and their suffering. No longer two people with separate selves but being that person leads to insight, compassion, tolerance, happiness, and letting go. It is possible to let go, as it is unnecessary to keep anything for oneself because one is no longer a fragile ‘self’ that must be preserved. The other’s happiness is also your happiness, so that there is no jealousy or selfishness, only tolerance and compassion. One suffers the other’s sufferings and so seeks to relieve these sufferings. These four virtues (known
as the Four Immeasurables) – loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and non-attachment – are metaphorized as the ‘fruits’ of the meditation on the interdependent co-arising of things.

A virtuous circle develops, in that awareness of others’ suffering means that meditation can no longer simply involve withdrawing to a forest or a room to sit in meditation. Peace is not a personal possession but an inner peace where we are one with those who suffer. Understanding and non-discrimination lead to peace and compassion. With compassion, we can look at all of living reality at once and see ourselves in every being. Understanding allows us to view reality from many viewpoints, to overcome all viewpoints, and act compassionately. Thus reconciliation is not ambitious and does not take sides in conflicts. Thich Nhat Hanh uses the metaphor of a mother hen who embraces all her chicks, with two fully spread wings, to explain that love and understanding should displace taking sides, embracing the whole of reality.

Meditating on interdependent co-arising enables this realization which, once attained, dispels discrimination and reality is no longer sliced by the “sword of conceptualization”; “we have to continue practicing until… the hunger and pain in the bodies of all living species are our own. Then we will have realized non-discrimination, real love” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1988, p.129). Koans can be used to shatter concepts and conceptualizing.

Thich Nhat Hanh conveys the image of a jug of settling apple juice to mediate the process of meditation as gaining clarity through sitting still. Such clarity refreshes us and our surroundings. Thus the experience of seeing differently in meditation is mediated by seeing differently through metaphor. Awareness is metaphorized as sunlight that dispels the boundary between the sacred and the profane, making each action sacred; for example, doing the dishes becomes a mindful activity. It is necessary to realize this, otherwise it will never be possible to live in the present moment, always being transported into the future. Mindfulness involves being in the here and now, so it is important to take care of the body in a nonviolent way, as it is not just a means to practice the Way, it is the Way. The body is not only the temple but is also the sage.

In ‘The Diamond that Cuts through Illusion’, Thich Nhat Hanh (1992) reinforces the notion of our interdependence with each other and with the environment, deploying various metaphors. He argues that we are not an island and therefore we need to help all living beings, without distinguishing between the helper and those helped. Interbeing and mutual interdependence is conveyed with the metaphor of the left and right hand, one helping the other in a formless way that does not distinguish between the hands; “our right hand puts a band aid on our left hand, without discrimination” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1992, p.38). Interbeing and mutual interdependence also applies to our relationship with the environment; polluting and destroying nature is to pollute and destroy ourselves. Discriminating between human and non-human leads to our destruction, as in climate change, so to protect ourselves, we must also protect the non-human. How is this to be achieved? Through meditation. Whereas we normally use our conceptual knowledge to grasp reality, meditation breaks through conceptual limitations so that we can move freely in what is metaphorized as “the boundless ocean of reality” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1992, p.61).

Commenting on Buddhism’s Five Precepts, in ‘For a Future to be Possible’, Thich Nhat Hanh (1993a, p.185) refers to “the lamp of mindfulness” and then explains the practice with a more extended metaphor of crossing the ocean on a boat and getting caught in a storm. In this situation, it is important to stay calm and not panic. This is to be achieved through focusing on the breath.
Being calm, we will know what actions to take and which to avoid. Otherwise, the boat may capsize. Mindfulness allows us to see things more clearly and know what to do to improve a situation. Mindfulness produces concentration, which brings about insight and wisdom. Thich Nhat Hanh (1993a, p.186) extends the metaphor to explain how mindfulness also reduces fear; “…the waves are impermanent and without a self. But if we look more deeply, we see that the waves are also water. The moment the wave realizes that it is water, all fear of death, impermanence, and non-self will disappear.” Thich Nhat Hanh (1987b) further develops the metaphor in ‘Being Peace’ by explaining that our world is a very small boat in the cosmos and our situation is as vulnerable as this boat in the sea, with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Humankind has become a dangerous species and the answer is for people to meditate and to be peace.

Commenting on the Sutra on the four establishments of mindfulness, in ‘Transformation and Healing’, Thich Nhat Hanh (1993b) explicates several methods of meditation practice. It is essential to mindfully observe the body and to engage in conscious breathing, following the breath, in order to return to ourselves, become calm, and regain contact with life, here and now. Through conscious breathing, we harmonize and unify body and mind. Awareness of body actions, positions, and parts leads to contact with the body, awareness of body and universe interdependence leads to interdependence of self and non-self, while awareness of body as impermanent (noticing the ageing or decomposition of the body) produces an understanding of transience. All of these exercises realize impermanence, selflessness and interdependent origination, leading to freedom from clinging and suffering. Mindfulness can heal thoughts and feelings in the following ways. Emotional wounds can be healed with awareness of joy. We should identify our feelings and go further to identify the ‘roots’ of feelings. Deep reflection makes it possible to see the relative nature of feelings, that (un)happiness can come from the same thing as happiness. Therefore, happiness is unconditional. Observing the desiring mind leads to the cessation of suffering, while observing anger provides the basis for love and compassion. Anger can be displaced by meditating on love. Finally, this text offers key principles for practicing meditation: recognizing that mind and mind objects are one, observing is being one with object of observation, following the way of no conflict (with others or indeed with ourselves), and remembering that observation is not indoctrination.

Thich Nhat Hanh’s (1995) ‘Peace is Every Step’ is subtitled ‘The Path of Mindfulness in Everyday Life’, clearly highlighting that meditation is confined neither to monastics nor to the meditation hall; instead, meditation is practiced within daily life, both in order that the benefits of meditation are maintained, and also so that meditation translates into action. Thus, Thich Nhat Hanh says that we can breathe anywhere, in an airport for example, “breathing mindfully in any position at any time can help you recover yourself” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1995, p.16). Meditation is not for avoiding problems; indeed, such an approach will mean that the problems will just return. Instead, meditation is to be practiced throughout daily life and including our everyday problems, and this will enable communion with life. Everyday experience in Europe includes the sound of church bells which, like temple bells, can be used as a reminder to be aware of the here and now. Indeed, any sound or any light (e.g. a sun ray) can serve as a reminder for mindfulness. Instead of seeing daily life as a distraction from meditation, all of our activities, such as eating, washing dishes, walking, phoning, and driving are all advocated as meditation exercises. No longer is life to be decompartmentalized with barriers between practice and non-practice; instead, meditation is to be brought out of the meditation hall and into the kitchen and office, so that it penetrates daily life and affects social concerns.
Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice

Just as there is to be no division between the meditation hall and daily life, mind and body are also connected in mindfulness meditation. Accordingly, a mindful person treats her body as a musician looks after her instrument, in a nonviolent way. The metaphor illustrates the importance of respecting the body and reflects how Zen privileges the here-and-now (instead of a disembodied and abstract spirituality). Accordingly, mindfulness involves “wishlessness” or “aimlessness” – “do not put something in front of you and run after it, because everything is already here, in yourself… we do not try to arrive anywhere” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1995, p.37).

Mindfulness meditation connects one with others. To think of ourselves as separate is a conceptualization and a false one at that. Thich Nhat Hanh argues that we must be careful not to imprison ourselves in such concepts; everything contains everything else, so that we cannot just be, we are interbeing and, as such, we hold responsibility for everything that happens.

Thich Nhat Hanh employs various metaphors to mediate this. He argues that we are all interconnected like leaves on a tree. Interbeing is metaphorized in terms of a sheet of paper that is interdependent with clouds, rain, trees, and loggers, which are all needed for paper to exist. The rose and garbage also depend on each other and are equal, such that the garbage is as precious as the rose. Everything and everyone has suchness, an essential true nature, and we must recognize the flower and the garbage aspects of a person if we are to live in peace and happiness with them. If we do not do so, internal formations will arise – metaphorized as fetters or knots; a knot is tied when we do not effectively communicate with and understand one another. Suchness is also explained with metaphors of gas and electricity, which have suchness; both are dangerous but can be used for our benefit, providing that we use them mindfully – so we must be mindful in all situations.

Most of the metaphors used by Thich Nhat Hanh relate to organic growth in nature, reflecting his caring, nurturing and humanistic Buddhism. For example, he refers to planting good seeds of mindfulness, which act like antibodies on a virus, dispelling the negative seeds. Mindfulness nourishes our tree of understanding and love. Thich Nhat Hanh likens the process of mindfulness to when we boil potatoes in a pot of water; the fire is mindfulness, breathing and focusing on anger, the lid is concentration (the lid prevents heat/anger escaping), and with cooking, anger is transformed into understanding and compassion. He uses the metaphor of a lettuce to explain how mindfulness affects our relationships; if the lettuce does not grow, we do not blame it - but we do blame our friends or family when things go wrong. Instead, we need to take care of them, just like when we grow a lettuce (which we nurture by giving it access to water, sun, and fertilizer). Blame, reasoning and argument have no positive effect - only love and understanding changes the situation. We are one with others and the environment because we have interbeing; a notion metaphorized with the idea that the sun is our second heart, one that is shared by all living things. Equally, all earth is part of our body; we must be interdependent with it in order to survive. We must be the forest or the river, so that we do not pollute it. Clarity, determination and patience in social and environmental action are the fruits of meditation, while the roots of war are in our industries, societies and consumerism.

Similar metaphors of organic growth in nature can be found in the title and text of Thich Nhat Hanh’s (1996) ‘Cultivating the Mind of Love’. Meditation cultivates the garden, wherein seeds of love, understanding, enlightenment and happiness are already present. Just as a pregnant woman experiences transformation and peace, meditation is giving a baby Buddha inside us a chance to be nourished and born. We need to trust this meditation process, just as a woman trusts her body to nourish her baby.
Thich Nhat Hanh’s (1998a) book ‘Interbeing’ is subtitled ‘Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism’, which provide ‘Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings’, only a few of which are selected for discussion below. We should nurture a mindful approach to anger so that we transform the ‘seeds’ of anger by practicing mindful breathing or walking and acknowledge, embrace, and look deeply into our anger. Mixed metaphors extend this teaching; the seeds of anger and hatred can be tackled with the ‘preventative medicine’ of meditation; the light of awareness can be shone on our unpleasant feelings to identify their roots. Instead of feeling angry, we can learn to be compassionate to ourselves and others. Thich Nhat Hanh (1998a, p.34) explains with this metaphor; “when we grow a lemon tree, we want it to be vigorous and beautiful. But if it isn’t vigorous and beautiful, we don’t blame the tree. We observe it in order to understand why it isn’t growing well.” Similarly, we should not blame human beings when they are not growing well. The message of this metaphor is that people, like lemon trees, will grow properly if we take good care of them. Blaming is unhelpful whereas love and understanding helps people change. Caring for people is rewarded by their pleasantness, just as caring for a lemon tree rewards us. Meditation’s purpose is to see, hear and understand others. Thich Nhat Hanh explains his teaching with the metaphor of a pirate; if he had been born and raised in a pirate’s social conditions, then he would have become a pirate. Various interdependent causes have created the pirate’s existence, so it is not the pirate’s responsibility but also that of society; we all share the responsibility for piracy; “meditating on dependent origination and looking with compassionate eyes helps us see our duty and responsibility to suffering beings” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1998a, p.35).

Life is only available in the here and now, so it is imperative to live deeply each moment of daily life, instead of losing ourselves in dispersion or getting carried away by regrets, worries, craving, anger, or jealousy. Mindful breathing allows the meditator to come back to what is happening in the present moment. This mindfulness training is emphasized when it is metaphorically compared to the ‘kernel of a peach’, at the ‘heart’ of our lives.

Thich Nhat Hanh (1998b), in ‘Fragrant Palm Leaves’, argues that sitting is just one part of Zen –we dwell in the present moment while performing daily tasks, which Zen can infuse with mindfulness. Otherwise, reality is only seen through the ‘dark curtains’ of our selfish desires and narrow views.

In ‘The Blooming of a Lotus’, Thich Nhat Hanh (2009) provides a ‘Guided Meditation for Achieving the Miracle of Mindfulness’. Here it is argued that meditation’s function is that of healing and transforming, through being mindful of what is within and without, producing insight and wisdom that liberates us from suffering and causing suffering to others. It helps us to bring about change and to help others to be free.

Meditation can be practiced anywhere, in any daily activity. Conscious breathing leads to realizations of “impermanence, emptiness, interdependent origination, selflessness, and non-duality of all that is” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 2009, p.4). It puts us in touch with the body and loving our own body enables us to love others. Mindfulness instructs us what kinds of sense contact to foster or avoid, so that we can exercise wise discretion when choosing films, music, books, conversations, and what thoughts to nurture. Many people are always in a restless hurry and do not know how to care for their bodies and minds, bartering their health away to obtain material comforts, but in doing so they destroy body and mind; pointing to the need for awareness of body and mind.
Meditating on impermanence can help dispel the despair of environmentalists and develop an acceptance of impermanency, which brings peace and wisdom in how to reverse global warming. Meditating on the impermanence of someone, who caused us to suffer and hate them, can dissolve anger and foster love and compassion for that person and for ourselves. Looking deeply at there being no birth and no death, we realize that nothing comes and is born, and nothing dies and goes. There is no existence and no non-existence. We realize interdependence, interpenetration, and interbeing, that there is no separate self, and that “all is one and one is all” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 2009, p.94). Birth and death are both illusory, and reality is birthless and deathless; realising this can liberate us from our fears and sorrows. How can this be achieved? Through seeing, smiling, and breathing, comments (Thich Nhat Hanh, 2009, p.96);

“Seeing the deathless nature of my consciousness, I breathe in.
Smiling to the deathless nature of my consciousness, I breathe out.”

Looking deeply at self as a collection of aggregates, rooted in everything (e.g. water), it can be seen that the view of self as a separate entity is erroneous. Thich Nhat Hanh comments on the Diamond Sutra, whose purpose he says is to overturn habitual patterns of thought that the self, our species, and other species are separately existing entities, or that a life span begins with birth and ends with death. Instead, all species are interconnected and interdependent – and a human life is present before birth and after death in many different forms, such as in elements, descendants, and culture. Birth and death are only apparently so, when in fact they do not exist. Such a realization enhances our love and respect for other species.

Conclusion:

This article examined mindfulness meditation, as presented in the literature of Zen, focusing on the writings of Thich Nhat Hanh, whilst also making reference to other Engaged Buddhist authors. It explored the relationship between Buddhist philosophy (especially non-dualism) and praxis, enquiring how meditation effects transformation. The key finding is that Thich Nhat Hanh emphasizes non-duality in mindfulness meditation and thereby is able to relate it to praxis. He does this in two ways; firstly, through emphasizing the non-duality of mind/body, self/other, and self/environment, and secondly, through explaining his teaching through metaphors that mediate these non-dualities. Most of the metaphors used by Thich Nhat Hanh relate to organic growth in nature, reflecting his caring, nurturing and humanistic Buddhism. Engaged Buddhism requires this kind of meditation as well as this approach to communicating it. Zen has traditionally privileged meditation over and above other aspects of Buddhist tradition and practice. Thich Nhat Hanh is in line with this tradition but by explaining how mindfulness is to be understood and practiced within daily life and in relation to others and our environment, meditation is no longer seen as a narrow focus but as universally applicable. Accordingly, Thich Nhat Hanh (1987a; interbeing.org.uk) reinterprets and renames the Five Precepts of Buddhism as the ‘Five Mindfulness Trainings’, with changed emphases from prohibition to constructive action, and from individual to broader levels of analysis. It is concluded that Thich Nhat Hanh’s particular privileging of non-dual meditation enables the relationship between meditation and praxis – and that metaphorical discourse is crucial for our understanding of this relationship, and to ensure that meditation leads to social and environmental action.
References:


Perceiving in terms of signs, beings take a stand on signs.
Not fully comprehending signs, they come into the bonds of death.
But fully comprehending signs, one doesn’t construe a signifier.
Yet nothing exists for him by which one would say,
‘To him no thought occurs.’

The Question

I would like to begin by framing a question that goes to the heart of Buddhist meditation, then I will develop an explanation that answers the question.

The first principle of Buddhism is that human beings are chronically plagued by suffering (dukkha), though we normally ignore it. The second principle is that this suffering is not intrinsic to human nature, but that it a function of adventitious causes extrinsic to human nature. The Buddha taught that the root cause of dukkha is a multifarious complex of misunderstandings of the nature of things, which is collectively called avijja, commonly translated into English as ‘ignorance.’ Since this ignorance is extrinsic, it is possible to bring this chronic suffering to an end by eradicating the ignorance that causes it. Therefore, since the cessation of dukkha would be of great benefit to human beings, the Buddha taught people how to eradicate ignorance. He taught the correct worldview, which consists of several interrelated principles of natural law such as tilakkhana and paṭiccasamuppāda. And he taught a system of practice, itself a function of natural law, a path that leads to the alleviation of dukkha. The culmination of this path of liberation is a type of meditation, vipassana (‘clear seeing’ or ‘seeing deeply’) which enables one to see the true nature of things, the truth, and thereby eradicate ignorance, and thus bring about liberation from dukkha.

There are many different principles and practices in the Buddhist worldview and the Buddhist path of liberation, and they are all interrelated, but for purpose of this discussion I would like to focus on vipassana meditation. I believe that anyone who has studied and practiced vipassana becomes aware of and has struggled with a fundamental question, a puzzle, a paradox, in the logic of vipassana. And, whereas such a paradox would be intolerable in the logic of a conventional endeavor, I suggest that this paradox is not only tolerable in vipassana, but is integral to its functionality in that its purpose is to see beyond conventional logic, to see the ultimate truth (paramattha sacca) that is beyond all logic, beyond grammar, beyond words and all other signs. It is an endeavor to see the signless, and from that point of view the paradox is seen as merely an apparent paradox.

Perhaps the simplest way to see the paradox is to consider the central image of Buddhism: a representation of the Buddha sitting in the position prescribed for mediation. The implication

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1 From Samiddhi Sutta, translated by Thanissaro 2010
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is that if we want to follow the path of liberation from suffering prescribed by the Buddha, this is what we should do. And what is he doing? He is doing something very abnormal: Nothing. He is not reading, not studying, not talking, not building, not going, not even moving. Here is the puzzle: How can one progress along the path of liberation by doing nothing? How can one do something by doing nothing?

Of course, while this image conveys important implications, it does not say anything about what is going on in the mind, and that is of the utmost importance in Buddhism, for Buddhism holds that mind is preeminent. The Buddha gave detailed instructions on vipassana meditation in the Satipatthāna Sutta and the closely related Ānāpānasati Sutta. One can also benefit from the teachings of contemporary Buddhists of great accomplishment. For example, the Venerable Achaan Chaa described it in simple terms thus:

You must examine yourself. Know who you are. Know your body and mind by simply watching...The practice is not to try to achieve anything. Just be mindful of what is. Our whole meditation is looking directly at the mind.²

Try to keep your mind in the present. Whatever there is that arises in the mind, just watch it. Let go of it. Don’t even wish to be rid of thoughts. Then the mind will reach its natural state.³

What he says here is that we should not do active analysis, or think, or even wish. There is a role in Buddhism for reading, studying, logical and critical analysis (yonisomanasikāra), but not in vipassana meditation. We should just watch, and the mind will reach its natural state, the state of liberation. My focus here is on the point that it is not that I do something to cause liberation, but that if I watch, silently, passively, liberation happens to me. Here is the puzzle: How can mere watching result in the eradication of ignorance and liberation from suffering? On this question, Achaan Chaa gives us a clue: because that is the natural state of mind. Liberation is the natural state of the mind, and ignorance is not the natural state of the mind. So in sum the effect of meditation is not a function of what I do, but a function of natural forces.

It is also made clear in the above mentioned suttas that vipassana is essentially a passive silent watching of what goes on in the body and mind without goal, without intent, without interference, even without judgment, in a totally disinvested state of mind as regards one’s likes or dislikes. As Venerable Anālayo puts it, ‘like a spectator at a play’:

A close examination of the instructions in the Satipatthāna Sutta reveals that the meditator is never instructed to interfere actively with what happens in the mind. If a mental hindrance arises, for example, the task of satipatthāna contemplation is to know that the hindrance is present, to know what has led to its arising, and to know what will lead to its disappearance.⁴

Uninvolved and detached receptivity [is] one of the crucial characteristics of sati...the purpose of sati is solely to make things conscious...Sati silently observes, like a spectator at a play, without in any way interfering. Some refer to this non-reactive feature of sati as “choiceless” awareness. “Choiceless” in the sense that with such awareness one remains impartially aware, without reacting with likes or dislikes.⁵

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² Kornfield p. 48
³ Kornfield p. 40.
⁴ Anālayo p. 57
⁵ Anālayo p. 58
Sati as such is mere awareness of phenomena, without letting the mind stray into thoughts and associations… By letting go of all dependencies and cravings during this advanced level of practice, a deepening realization of the empty nature of all phenomena dawns on the meditator.  

Again we see the apparent paradox that in vipassana meditation the meditator does not seek the goal of realization, and yet by engaging in the passive activity of vipassana meditation the realization of truth ‘dawns on the meditator,’ and thus his goal is attained. The meditator does not do anything that is causally efficacious, and yet ignorance goes away and truth emerges.

Finally, the same implication follows from the Buddha’s description of his own enlightenment by the use of passive grammar:

Vision arose, insight arose, discernment arose, knowledge arose, illumination arose within me with regard to things never heard before: ‘This is the noble truth of stress.’

So here is the question. How does passive, silent, detached watching of the mind lead to the eradication of ignorance and the emergence of truth? Above we saw the suggestion that it is a function of the nature of mind. If so, what exactly causes the emergence of realization? What dynamic is at work here?

Buddhism is Science

In order to answer this question, we must begin by correcting an error that European scholars imposed upon the Buddhist universe of discourse many years ago by calling it ‘religion.’ When Europeans first came into contact with Buddhism, they tried to make sense of it in their universe of discourse, which had been fundamentally split by the struggle between religion and science. To these foreign scholars Buddhism did not appear to be a science, but it did have many of the features of religion, so they categorized it as a religion. As the European discourse gained power and prestige, mainly through the success of its science in the material dimension, European societies became powerful and its discourse spread throughout the world. Consequently, Buddhism came to be thought of as a religion by all authorities: governments, academia, Google.

What is most unfortunate, even though the conflict between religion and science did not exist in the Buddhist universe of discourse, Buddhism came to regard itself as a religion. Thereby Buddhism accepted the awkward strategic positioning imposed upon it by a foreign universe of discourse as being unscientific, when in fact, upon objective consideration, it is obvious that Buddhism is scientific. However, many Buddhists do realize, perhaps unconsciously, this framing of Buddhism as religion is inappropriate with incorrect implications, and so they try to avoid this problem by speaking of Buddhism as a philosophy, or a spiritual journey, or inner science, or mind science. My impression is that in recent years more and more Buddhists are realizing that Buddhism is science, and are taking the position that Buddhism should be framed as science, not religion.

Let me cite three examples of prominent Buddhists who have done so. First, the Dalai Lama has been deeply interested in the relation between science and Buddhism since his childhood.

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6 Anālayo p. 115-16
7 Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. 2010
He has stated innumerable times along the lines of the following quote that Buddhism is fundamentally grounded in empiricism, and thus a scientific endeavor.

From either of the two perspectives, the [Theravada] or the Mahayana, we find that analysis and examination through reasoning, the basic Buddhist attitude is very important. Once you find a fact through investigation, then you accept it. Even if that fact appears contradictory to Buddha’s own words, it doesn’t matter. Because of this, I feel the basic Buddhist attitude is quite similar to the scientists’ attitude...either way there is a strong emphasis upon your own analysis and investigation and not simply a dogmatic adherence out of faith in the Buddha.8

A second example is Venerable Buddhadāsa. In explaining ānāpānasati meditation he asserted that:

…we have studied and explained the sixteen step method in full, because it will reveal the secrets of nature thorough its scientific approach. This is a science that leads to a natural understanding of kāya, vedanā, citta, and Dhamma, in the best and most complete way possible, through the perspective and approach of natural science. This method is a scientific approach…9

And in another place he stated that ‘To come to know the true nature of things is the true objective of every Buddhist.’10 And, succinctly, ‘Dhamma is nature.’11

A third example is Phra Prayudh Payutto, who amassed a mountain of evidence that Buddhism is science in his monumental work, Buddhadhamma: Natural Laws and Values for Life. He does not explicitly assert Buddhism is science, but he makes the all arguments that would be needed to establish that as a fact. First, he asserts that ‘Buddhism only accepts empirical knowledge’ and he cites the Buddha’s teachings throughout the book that support this assertion.12 Second, he asserts that the basic Buddhist principles tilakkhaṇa and paṭiccasamuppāda are natural law.13 And in regard to many other aspects of Buddhism throughout the book he argues that every aspect of Buddhism is based on natural law and the principle of cause and effect.

According to the principles of Buddhadhamma, there is nothing higher than nature, or nothing besides nature…Furthermore, the whole of the natural process continues along according to causal factors: it does not proceed in an aimless manner and it is not subject to supernatural influences apart from causal factors.14

To establish that Phra Prayudh Payutto has in effect argued that Buddhism is science, consider how the U. S. National Academy of Science defines science as distinct from religion:

Scientists seek to relate one natural phenomenon to another and to recognize the causes and effects of phenomena….In science, explanations are limited to those based

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8 Hayward. 32-3
9 Buddhadāsa 1997. 123-4
10 Kornfield, p. 125
11 Buddhadāsa 1997 p 36
12 Payutto 284
13 Payutto 61 and 94
14 Payutto 95-6
15 Steering Committee on Science and Creationism viii
on observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other scientists. Explanations that cannot be based on empirical evidence are not a part of science.16

Here are the key points. First, the U.S. National Academy of Science says that science deals with natural phenomena, whereas, by implication, religion deals with un-natural phenomena, supernatural, mystical, etc. Second, science seeks to make sense of natural phenomena by recognizing causes and effects, as distinct from religion which allows phenomena that are not subject to the natural laws of cause and effect, such as miracles, which, by definition, are interruptions of the laws of nature. Third, all principles of science, including theories, hypotheses, laws, axioms, etc., are subject to empirical verification, as distinct from religion which rests on fundamental principles and practices that are explicitly held not to be capable of empirical verification and must instead be taken as true by faith, such as the existence of God, the laws and commandments of God, etc. So as you can see, Phra Prayudh Payutto has provided extensive arguments in support of each of the three characteristics that distinguish Buddhism as science rather than religion.

As a fourth and final example of a Buddhist that regards Buddhism as science, I would like to cite the fact that the Buddha, Gautama, described the fundamentals of Buddhism, the four noble truths and the noble eightfold path, not as a path that he created, but as a path that he discovered, in fact, an ancient path that he re-discovered.

It is just as if a man, traveling along a wilderness track, were to see an ancient path, an ancient road, traveled by people of former times... In the same way I saw an ancient path, an ancient road, traveled by the Rightly Self-awakened Ones of former times. And what is that ancient path, that ancient road, traveled by the Rightly Self-awakened Ones of former times? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right aspiration, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. That is the ancient path, the ancient road, traveled by the Rightly Self-awakened Ones of former times. I followed that path.17

The implication is that the Buddhist path of liberation, and the other fundamentals of Buddhism, have always been there, prior to and independent of their discovery by this Buddha, Gautama, just as gravity has always been there, prior to and independent of its discovery by Newton. From this it follows that the Buddha was describing natural phenomena, just as much as Newton was. And it follows that Buddhism is just as legitimately science as physics is.

Though one could continue this argument at great length, I believe I have cited sufficient evidence to justify in the current context the premise that Buddhism is science, and thus rectify this historical error that has been foisted upon the Buddhist universe of discourse.18 However, since the positioning of Buddhism as science, or rather the re-positioning of Buddhism as science, has radical and far reaching implications, I feel it is important to solidify this position by briefly exploring some of its potentially confusing fundamental features before we move beyond.

The first feature of Buddhism as science I would like to consider is that a moral code (sīla) is a fundamental element of Buddhism. For this reason, one might object to the characterization of Buddhism as science, based on the notion that science does not prescribe morals. To begin with,

16 Steering Committee on Science and Creationism 25
17 SN 12.65, translated by Thanissaro 2011
18 I have developed a similar argument in Pyle 2009, and Wallace 2003 is excellent.
while it is true that in some abstract, philosophical sense scientists may consider their work to be beyond the realm of morals, in fact science does prescribe morals. It is very common for governments and individuals, including hardcore scientists, to develop positions on moral issues based on what they believe to be scientific grounds. On the other hand, the moral code of Buddhism is not simply an ethics, but is an integral component of its scientific methodology. Just as the sterility of a biological laboratory is a necessary condition for the scientific study of microorganisms, so too is the Buddhist moral code a necessary condition for the study of mind. As Phra Prayudh Payutto put it:

This code is not a divine command demanding that followers do this or that in accordance with a divine purpose, a purpose based on ungrounded faith and loyalty that does not require an understanding of interconnected causes and effects. The Buddhist moral code has been determined based on reasons and natural law…as its foundation in order for true wisdom to occur.19

The second feature of Buddhism as science I would like to consider can be approached in terms of the role of hermeneutics in Buddhism as a science, as distinct from its role in Christianity as a religion. In religious systems of thought, such as Christianity, because those systems are based on texts of supernatural origin that reveal truths that are hidden behind a limit of knowledge that human beings are not capable of going beyond, the practitioners can only try to understand those truths through the texts that reveal them. And, since those texts are exposed to various types of corruptions, and because language is inherently liable to multiple, and often conflicting, meanings, religious texts are always subject to multiple conflicting interpretations. And yet it is crucial that these inconsistent interpretations be resolved in order to determine how one should act in conformity with those highly important revealed truths. It is in this Christian context that hermeneutics developed as a branch of scholarship that attempts to develop objective, mechanical, one might say, scientific, principles by which one can extract the intended meaning from texts. Hermeneutics is of the utmost importance in religion.

However, in science hermeneutics, while not entirely pointless, is of relatively little importance. Of course one must learn to understand the discourse of one’s discipline, and that is done largely through the study of texts. But even in the beginning stages, the study of texts is always accompanied by a corresponding practice of experimentation and direct observation of the phenomena being studied. In science one studies the texts, but direct observation of the phenomena is preeminent. It has always been the fundamental principle of Buddhism that realization of the true nature of things is the point, whereas the original teacher and his teaching, now present only in texts, merely point to the truth.

I believe that the famous simile of the blind men and the elephant (Ud 6.4) can be instructive here. Although it is not the stated point of the story, it does imply that direct knowledge not only obviates the interpretation of second-hand representations, i.e., texts, but direct knowledge is a necessary precondition for the correct interpretation of texts. In the story a number of blind men were each allowed to examine a different part of an elephant. One examined the ear, one the leg, and so on. Then, when they were asked to explain what an elephant is like, they each gave correspondingly different answers, such as ‘It is like a winnowing basket,” and “It is like a post,” and so on. The reports of the blind men, who are presupposed not to know what an elephant is, can be taken as signs, which by their nature also only convey a partial and distorted representation of

19 Payutto 245
that which they represent. Further it is also presupposed in the story that the teller of the story and the addressees of the story do know what an elephant is. Therefore, it is implicit in the story that you have to know what an elephant is in order to be able to sort out and interpret the signs, the texts, that represent the elephant.

Thus Buddhist practitioners are, like all other scientists, obliged to pursue the study of texts, to engage in critical examination (vonisomanasikāra) of both the texts and actual phenomena, and, preeminently, to seek direct understanding of the nature of things by direct observation. Physicists might use a telescope, Buddhists use meditation. The third feature of Buddhism as science I would like to consider is that Buddhism includes mind, where the conventional sciences do not. In Buddhism mind is considered to be a sixth sense, in addition to the five commonly recognized - sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch. Correspondingly, whereas conventional sciences make the assumption that everything is a function of material causality, Buddhism holds that, on the contrary, mind is predominant. It is not that Buddhism excludes or discounts material phenomena apriori. It is not that Buddhism is lacking in knowledge of material phenomena. This is not an oversight or an incidental issue. It a central point of difference between Buddhism and conventional science. It is an empirical finding that is boldly asserted in the first line of the Dhammapada:

Mind precedes its objects. They are mind-governed and mind-made. To speak or act with a defiled mind is to draw pain after oneself, like a wheel behind the feet of the animal drawing it.20

It is important to note that in the conventional scientific discourse it is very common to presuppose that mind is merely an epiphenomenal artifact of material causality by using ‘mind’ and ‘brain’ interchangeably, or even as a conjoint term ‘mind/brain’. But it is also important to note that the exclusion of mind from the scientific discourse, and the presupposition that everything is a function of material causality, is simply a premise inherited from the European scientific and cultural tradition. It is not asserted to be an empirically substantiated premise. The question of whether the Buddhist position on mind makes sense or not should, by the standards of scientific inquiry, be decided on empirical grounds.

There is much that should be said about this issue. I cannot go into it in depth here, but I would like to cite a very practical and relatively obvious reason the Buddha gave for focusing on mind:

Bhikkhus, there are two kinds of diseases: Physical diseases and psychological disorders. Some people in this world can claim that they have been without physical disease for a whole year. And you can find some people who can claim that they have been without physical disease for two years...three years...four years...five years...ten years...twenty years...thirty years...forty years...fifty years...a hundred years. But it is hard to find anyone who can claim that he has been free of mental disturbances, even for a single moment, except for those who have destroyed all mental intoxicants (āsava).21

The fourth feature of Buddhism as science I would like to consider is faith. While, as I argued above, Buddhism is grounded in empiricism, faith (saddhā) does still play an essential role in Buddhism, just as it does in the conventional sciences. It is by the power of faith, and maybe also hope, that one is motivated to invest the time and effort necessary to test a hypothesis.

20  http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/dhammapada.htm
21  A II.142-143, Payutto p. 269
In Buddhism, as in other sciences, after you have verified or falsified the hypothesis, the need for faith falls away. Phra Prayudh Payutto has a detailed and heavily referenced discussion of faith.22

Once a person has insight—that is, clear knowledge and vision—there is no need for confidence, it is not necessary to have faith in other people... an arahant has the highest insight and, therefore, has a quality called “asaddhā,” meaning a person without saddhā.23

The fifth feature of Buddhism as science I would like to consider is epistemology. Buddhism holds that it is possible to gain some degree of understanding of things by means of logical inference, but the ultimate goal is to attain direct personal knowledge of the nature of things, of the natural characteristics of things as mentioned above, such as the law of dependent origination, the three characteristics, the causes of suffering, the cessation of the causes of suffering, etc.

The epistemological position of conventional science is very different, and somewhat confusing. On the level of the philosophy of conventional science it is commonly held that there is no truth, or if there is, it is unknowable. Indeed, it is held that is not possible to know anything with certainty. The idea is that science approaches truth by developing theories and from those theories they derive implications that are falsifiable, and then they develop test situations in which one can prove the implications false or fail to prove them false. In this view, the closest way one can relate with reality is by asymptotically approaching it, though never getting there. And any system of ideas that is not falsifiable is not science.24

While this view of science has wide acceptance, it is a philosophical view of science, and as with all philosophical views, it is fraught with conditions, exceptions, and other complexities, which we will not venture into here. Suffice it to say that in the real world real people invest their lives and fortunes in the exploration and development of scientific ideas in the hope that they are correct, and thus they will work, not because they are falsifiable.

In any case, Buddhism holds a radically different view of knowledge and of truth and falsity. And the epistemological issue from the Buddhist point of view is not so much a matter of gaining new knowledge, but of becoming free of false knowledge, delusions, that prevent us from seeing and knowing what is perfectly obvious. Conventional scientists talk about ripping the veils from mother nature, so that we can discover nature’s secrets. Buddhism is concerned with us getting rid our own veils, so that we can see the nature of all things clearly.

In concluding this discussion of Buddhism as science, I think it is possible to succinctly state the basic principle of Buddhism thus: We normally live in conflict with the laws of nature, and this causes suffering. We can learn to understand and conform to the laws of nature, which results in the disappearance of suffering, and brings happiness.

22 Payutto p. 211-222
23 Payutto p. 221-222
24 Popper, 1959.
Buddhism is related to the Sciences of Semiotics and Linguistics

Given that Buddhism is science, and given the radical differences from conventional science, the next question is this: is it possible, and if so, how can Buddhism and conventional science find common ground on which to begin to develop an integrated and mutually beneficial discourse? There have been many conferences and publications attempting to develop a meaningful interaction, such as the Dalai Lama’s series of Mind and Life Institute conferences, Wallace’s *Buddhism & Science: Breaking New Ground*, etc. In so far as I am aware of such efforts, there has been very little progress, if any. The reasons for this as I see it are basically twofold. First, all of the scientists in these joint efforts, whether psychologists, neurobiologists, or physicists, presuppose that Buddhism is not really science and they presuppose that speaking of ‘mind’ is just an informal way of talking about brain phenomena. Or, in other words, they presuppose the validity of their position on what should be the fundamental question, namely, whether material causality is able to explain all phenomena. To put it the other way around, the scientists assume the falsity of the fundamental premise of Buddhism, that mind is one of the sense modes, and that it is the preeminent sense mode, and therefore such discussions do not really take place on a common ground.

I want to suggest that perhaps the only branch of science, as it is currently conceived, that does share common ground with Buddhism is the science of semiotics, which is the study of signs, and particularly the sub-branch of semiotics that studies the systems of signs that comprise human language, linguistics. These are both very complex areas of study, and consist of multiple theoretical divisions, so let me be more specific. I am suggesting that Buddhism is compatible with the system of semiotics that evolved out of C. S. Peirce’s theories of logic and his theory of signs, and the school of linguistics that grew out of Peirce’s groundwork through the work of linguistic pioneers such as Nikolai Trubetzkoy, Roman Jakobson, Edward Sapir, and Jacques Lacan, particularly in regard to the theory of markedness and language universals. The common ground is the phenomena of the sign, and the essential feature of the sign shared by Buddhism and Semiotics was stated in a characteristically succinct way by the Zen patriarch Huang Po:

Anything possessing any signs is illusory. It is by perceiving that all signs are no signs that you perceive the Tathāgata.25

Obviously it would not be possible to even provide a general introduction to semiotics and linguistics here, so what I propose to do here is to offer a very brief explanation and a couple of examples of some important points on which Buddhism and semiotics clearly share common ground. Then I will return to elaborate the point made by Huang Po. In conclusion, I will offer a brief explanation of how the question posed in the first section can be answered from this point of view.

Let me begin with a sketch of C. S. Peirce’s systems of logic and semiotics. He begins with the assertion that there are three universal categories of phenomena, which he calls Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. He describes the categories in various ways, none of which are exactly like the descriptions of the three characteristics of Buddhism (*tilakkhana*), but nevertheless, once you understand his categories and their implications, it becomes clear that they align with and seem to be exactly the same. That is an important point of similarity, which I will state, but cannot justify here.

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25 Blofeld p.71
It is important to begin with this foundation because Peirce’s logic and his theory of signs grow out of the three categories. The most important tripartite categorization of signs that follows from his categories, and certainly the most well known is the distinction between iconic signs, indexical signs, and symbolic signs. A sign is something that refers to something else. An iconic sign refers to its referent by virtue of a relation of firstness, or similarity. An indexical sign refers to its referent by virtue of a relation of secondness, or concrete force. And a symbolic sign, which is the type of sign characteristic of human language, refers to its referent by virtue of a stipulation or habit.

An example of an iconic sign is the reflection of the moon in the water, represented in Figure 1, one of the most commonly used examples of a sign in the Buddhist discourse. Note that Figure 1 is not a representation of how the reflection of the moon in the water would actually look physically, like a photograph, because the moon would be above its reflection. It is a representation in terms of Peirce’s diagrammatic logic of the sign relationship between the moon and the iconic image of the moon reflected in the water. The point of this mode of representing the sign relationship is that there are two levels of phenomena. The first level is the image of the moon as you might see it if you look at the moon directly, and the second level is the image of the moon as you might see it reflected in the water. The first level is conceptually prior to the second. Or in other words, the second, the iconic sign of the moon, is derived from and is dependent upon the first. Thus if the first were to go away, the second would go away. If the first appears, then the second can appear. So note first that Peirce’s diagrammatic logic of the sign is represents the logic of dependent origination (*paññiccasamuppāda*).

Secondly, there is a relation of relative truth and falsity between the first and the second, and this is so in multiple ways. In this particular case, for example, if you were situated in such a way that you could not see the moon itself, and if the water were perfectly calm, you might take the reflection of the moon in the water as the moon itself. In other words, the reflection of the moon in the water says, in effect, the moon is here, when it is not so. Or in another scenario if the water...
were disturbed, as in this image, so that it doesn’t look much like the moon, and if you didn’t see
the moon itself, you might think someone was on a boat on the water flashing a light. The logic of
both of these scenarios can be represented if you suppose the second layer in this diagram were to
be expanded to cover the first layer. That would represent what would be seen by someone who
naively took the reflection of the moon in the water at face value as something in itself. So this
diagram represents the fundamentally deceptive logic of signs. Technically, this is a representation
of the logic of duplicity, the essential logic of falsity, and it is the logic of all signs. This is why one
of the three doors to liberation is the signless.

Further, even when we see the image of the moon directly, as represented in the first level
of this diagram, what we see is not actually the moon itself, but is also an iconic image of the moon.
It is a reflection of the light of the sun from the surface of the moon. It is conceptually prior to
the image we see reflected in the water, but it too is derivative, and that fact is also represented here,
though in a somewhat surreptitious way. The page on which this diagram is represented can be taken
as the implicitly presupposed first level of representation, the level of unrepresented truth, or in this
case as the level of the moon as it is in reality, which is not represented but can be supposed to be
being covered up by the first represented level. Thus the page itself represents what Peirce called
the first sheet of assertions, which is absolute truth, and the two represented levels represent levels
of relative truth, each of which is an iconic representation of the moon. Thus the two levels that are
represented arise in layers of lesser degrees of truth, relatively speaking, from the prior unrepresented
level of absolute truth. In this we have a representation of the distinction between relative truth
(or conventional truth) and absolute truth, *sammuti-sacca* and *paramattha-sacca*.

The second type of signs is indexical signs. These are signs that refer to their referent by
means of some relation of material force, contact, or related implication. For example, the footprint
of a deer in the mud represents a deer. The footprint is similar to the shape of the deer’s foot because
the deer’s foot forced the mud to take that shape by pressing into the mud. Such a footprint says,
‘some animal was here, and it was a deer,’ and in some cases, where there were unique
characteristics in the footprint, it might even say, ‘that particular deer was here.’ Another indexical
sign is the movement of a flag that can be taken as an indication of the direction of the wind, because
the wind forces it to move in just that way. On the human level a basic type of index is pointing,
which references its object by protruding a finger in the direction of the object. Of course, this type
of sign is subject to misunderstanding too, as anyone knows who has tried to direct a dog to the food
you have laid out for him by pointing. Invariably the dog will come to your extended finger, and not
go to the food. This exemplifies the classic Buddhist aphorism, ‘Do not take the finger for the moon.’

The third type of sign is symbolic signs. These are signs that refer to their referent by means
of a stipulation or habit or convention. These types of signs are mainly, though not exclusively,
found in human language and culture. For example, the word ‘moon’ doesn’t have any relation of
similarity or physical contiguity to the moon. It refers to the moon merely by the conventions of
the English language. So outside of the realm of English it does not mean ‘moon’. This bring us to
the realm of language.
Language

Language consists of signs that are a mixture of all three of the sign types distinguished above. For example, “I went to work and went to school” describes two acts using symbolic signs, but it also implicitly conveys the order of the two events iconically by means of the order of the words. That is, by default one assumes this means that the first event is first and the second event is second. The pronoun “I” is an index, and thus cannot be interpreted in the abstract. It can only be interpreted in a physical context, normally as referring to the person who speaks the sentence. This simple example demonstrates that the analysis of language in terms of sign functions is extremely complex, so I will just consider a couple of relatively obvious features of language.

First, it is very important to realize that human language is essentially unnatural. One way to see this is by considering that every language is a foreign language, and that it is foreign in two ways. First, each language is foreign in relation to every other language, as for example Thai is foreign to English. And second language is also foreign in relation to each child born in that language community. A child will naturally develop physical characteristics that are similar to those of its parents, but if a child is removed from its parents at a young age, it will grow up speaking the language of its caretakers whatever that might be. Children must go through a rather lengthy and sometimes painful process of learning the language of their community. Thus no language is a truly native language. Or to put it the other way around, every language is unnatural. Thus as a child learns a language, he is investing himself into an unnatural world view, he is developing an unnatural sense of self, one that is not a function of the laws of nature, and thus a self and a world that is characterized by dukkha.

That language is unnatural can also be seen by considering the three types of signs. Iconic and indexical signs function by means of a natural relation between the sign and referent. In order for a sign to be symbolic it must not be related to its referent by a natural relation, for if it were, it would not be a symbolic sign, but an icon or index. Thus by definition every symbolic sign must be an unnatural sign.

This characteristic of language has been commonly ignored by most linguists and philosophers, but the British philosopher H. P. Grice noticed this is a characteristic of human language, referring to it as nonnatural meaning.

This question about the distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning is, I think, what people are getting at when they display an interest in a distinction between “natural” and “conventional” signs.26

Furthermore, if you observe the way children learn to communicate, you can see that there are two distinct phases. Roman Jakobson noted in his most influential work on the development of child language that children speak a different type of language until about the age of two, at which point they begin to actually learn the language of the adults surrounding them.27 Before this point children do not use the negative word, in English, ‘no.’ They are able to express negativity, as for example by spitting out food, but that is different from saying ‘no.’ And they also do not use the first person pronoun, or generally any pronouns. They refer to themselves the same way as their parents.

26 Grice p. 379
27 Jakobson 1968
do. For example, at this early stage of development, if the parents call the child “Bobby,” the child would say, “Bobby hungry” instead of “I hungry.” And during this first phase children are capable of pronouncing any sound or combination of sounds that is physically possible.

But all of a sudden around the age of two, children are struck by a more or less comprehensive inability to pronounce the wild variety of sounds they could before. Some children are struck totally dumb for weeks or even, rarely, a year. At this point they also begin to use the negative word to an excessive degree, responding almost compulsively negatively. And at this point they begin to use the first person pronoun to refer to themselves.

In Buddhist terms I think it is reasonable to suppose that at this point the child undergoes a comprehensive eradication of his prior sense of himself, being struck by a kind of total ignorance, by which he becomes a clean slate, the foundation upon which he can progressively rebuild himself in the unnatural logic and conceptuality of his language. Thus he will find himself, as we all do, suffering under a very thick and complexly woven fabric of ignorance and false conceptuality. I believe this is exactly what Phra Prayudh Payutto is discussing here:

Their pattern of behavior has been received, handed down to them through their education and training, their culture, religious beliefs, and the preferences of their society.28 He says, ‘the above points are called āsava. I think it makes sense to extend this slightly and say that āsava are a function of language. These are the deep and persistent unconscious influences that induce us to misperceive and misunderstand reality. If this is true, then we can say that the fabric of language is the fabric of ignorance, and that the dynamic of language is the dynamic of ignorance.

By way of elaborating this relationship, I would like to point out that ignorance (avijja) is commonly misunderstood to be a simple gap in knowledge. However, the type of ignorance Buddhism is concerned with is an activity of semiotic displacement, an instantaneous event that uses a sign to cover up what was there before. Ignorance is the unconscious substitution of what you expect to hear, or what you want to hear, for what you actually hear. Ignorance produces a kind of hallucinatory state of mind in which you perceive things that are not there, or don’t perceive things that are there, or incorrectly evaluate things, etc. Let me illustrate that this is an ordinary and integral function of language with a couple of examples. Please also bear in mind, that, while I have chosen very simple and superficial examples to illustrate this point, the exact same dynamic is at work in every element of language.

28 Payutto p. 128
Consider the diagram in Figure 2. I don’t know how widespread this belief is, but in America those who are superstitious in believing believe that if a black cat walks across your path, that is bad luck, and more generally that black cats are evil. I have seen a person throwing stones at a black cat to chase it away so he wouldn’t be contaminated by evil. Such a person sees what is simply a black cat, but they instantly displace that simple perception with the idea of it as the embodiment of evil. They are only aware of the second level of representation in this figure, displacing and covering over the prior naïve perception.

A similar type of hallucination, but on a completely different level of language, consider Figure 3. I am trying to represent the type of hallucinatory mishearing that normally takes place as a function of language on the boundary of foreignness between languages, in this case Thai and English. The first level represents the sounds of a pair of words in Thai that differ only in the first sound element, or phoneme. The word for ‘duck’ begins with an unaspirated [p] and the word for ‘spicy’ begins with an aspirated [ph]. These two words can be distinguished by a Thai speaker by the difference in their initial sound. However, English prohibits an unaspirated [p] from occurring at the beginning of a word, so when an English speaker, who is not familiar with Thai, hears a Thai pronounce the word for ‘duck’, he unconsciously substitutes an aspirated [ph], and cannot hear any difference between the two words. He ‘hears’ [ph] instead of [p].

Furthermore, this hallucination in hearing is matched by a corresponding incapacity in pronunciation. An English speaker will not be able to pronounce the word for ‘duck’ correctly either. He will compulsively pronounce it incorrectly, as he hears it, with an aspirated initial.

Similarly, the other way around, consider Figure 4. If an English speaker says the words represented here on the first level, a naïve Thai speaker will mishear the final sounds as represented on the second level, and will be entirely unaware of having done so. This is so because [sh] and [l] sounds are prohibited in the Thai language from occurring at the end of a word. And also here the automatic mishearing of what is prohibited, is matched by the automatic, compulsive mispronunciation of the words in the same way they are misheard.
Figure 3 An English Speaker’s Hallucination

If we take these as examples of the general phenomena of ignorance, which I believe is correct, one of the most interesting implications that becomes obvious is that ignorance is not just the active distortion of perception, but it is also at the same time and in exactly the same way, and imposition of a compulsion on performance. There is no biological reason for these inhibitions of pronunciation; they are entirely a function of the systemic ignorance imposed upon us by our language.

Figure 4 A Thai Speaker’s Hallucination

In concluding this attempt to convey a sense of how deeply semiotics and linguistics is related to Buddhism, I would like to point out that the entities that are at work in these last two examples are not actual sounds, but are abstract categories of sound, defined within a matrix of
intersecting oppositions, such as consonant vs. vowel, dental vs. labial, aspirated vs. unaspirated, etc. The Buddha said that the world is supported by the opposition between existence and non-existence. And the implication here is that the world arises by adding layers of oppositions upon that foundational opposition. So the elements that are the function of ignorance in the above examples are of the same ontological order as all the other elements of ignorance. That is to say, in sum, that the self is exactly the same type of object as a phoneme. So it is not only on the level of signless liberation that linguistics is relevant, but also on the level of not-self, because obviously the self is also a function of language.

**How Does Meditation Work**

Now that we can picture the logic of duplicity and the dynamic of ignorance in terms of Peirce’s diagrammatic logic, we can see that ignorance is not just a matter of conceptual or logical phenomena, but it is a matter of force, inhibition, compulsion. Second, we can see that, while the general realm on which Buddhism is focused is the realm of mind, it is more particularly the play of truth and falsity in the realm of mind that is at issue. The atomic element, so to speak, is the duality, or the duplicity, which is the atomic structure of falsity. Because duplicity is intrinsically asymmetric, the elaboration of this realm is also intrinsically asymmetric. It is built up layer upon layer, and woven into complex networks of falsity. And globally speaking this realm is governed by a kind of gravitational force, such that falsity arises conditionally, layer by layer, from truth, and is constantly compelled by its nature to collapse downward toward truth. This is the nature of ignorance, and it is also the nature of language.

For example, one basic principle that follows from this is that truth is one and falsity is many. There can be only one center, but there are many radii, and many points on a circle. This principle also is presupposed in language. Hence, any concept that implies singleness, implies truth, and any concept that implies manyness implies falsity. Thus in English we say ‘he is straight’, meaning he is honest, but ‘he is crooked’ means he is a liar. ‘He is two-faced’ means he is a liar.

Consider speed and slowness. There is a scale of faster and slower. There is no limit to how fast you can go, and people have all sorts of contests to see who can go the fastest. But no one has a contest to see who can go the slowest. Indeed, there is a limit to slowness. When you stop and sit on the ground, the dimension of speed collapses. Hence ‘fast talker’ means someone who lies. It is common practice for salesmen to try to keep your mind moving and get you to make a decision without giving you time to stop and think. Because when you slow down, or stop, falsity tends to come apart, and truth tends to emerge.

It is similar with sound, that is, sound of language. You can talk louder or softer, faster or slower, but if you are silent, all the polarities that apply to sound collapse. There is an inherent association between silence and truth. That is why the Buddha was called Shakyamuni meaning “the silent Shakya.”
Consider the relation between up and down. It is clear that down is first and things grow or are built up. Of course, whatever goes up, must come down. The force of gravity, together with the inherent impermanent nature of constructed things, means that whatever is built up will eventually come down. Not only that, but there is an asymmetry in up and down. There is no limit to how far up you can go, but if you go clear down to the ground you can’t go any further down. Hence, in English ‘he has his feet on the ground’ implies that he is aware of truth, whereas ‘he has his head in the clouds’ implies he is caught up in a world of falsity.

Finally, the Buddhist distinction between relative truth and ultimate truth (samma-sacca and paramattha-sacca) is similar. There are multiple levels of relative truth, but at the limit of absolute truth all of the dimensions of relative truth collapse and become inapplicable.

Thus, just as physical things tend to fall, falsity also tends to fall, disintegrate, collapse, revealing the underlying truth. That is how the motionlessness, the silence, the aloneness, the equanimous awareness of Buddhist meditation can enable one to see truth. The force that is in play here is the force of truth. The truth speaks in silence. Contrarily, the more talk and social intercourse, the thicker the falsity, the more obscured is truth.
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Communicating the Innate: Observations on Teacher-Student Interaction in the Tibetan Mahāmudrā Instructions

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Debates about the manifold doctrines connected to the bKa’ brgyud pa Great Seal (mahāmudrā), especially its paths outside the mantra system, have considerably occupied both academic researchers and Tibetan scholars.1 When examining the Tibetan Great Seal traditions, we certainly must analyse its terminology, doctrinal development, and systematisation. Indeed, doctrinal classification and apologetics were carried out extensively in the writings of, among others, Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554), bKra shis rnam rgyal (1512–1587), and 'Brug chen Padma dkar po (1527–1592).2 But as meditation and realisation are often considered the heart of the matter, it may be difficult to pin the Great Seal down to any single doctrinal system. And, beyond doctrinal debates and systematisations, it is the teacher who often is mentioned as the necessary condition for any approach to the Great Seal—be it sūtra, tantra, or essence; dGe lugs or bKa’ brgyud. Research into Great Seal traditions may thus benefit from a closer contextual analysis of the role of the guru in both instruction and practice.

It is surprising that—although the general importance of the guru has been duly noted—the soteriological significance of the teacher in the Great Seal traditions has been given comparatively little explicit attention in academic circles.3 This presentation suggests that the focus on teacher-student interaction and guru-devotion is a perspective of research that allows for better explaining doctrinal variegations. Focusing on shorter Great Seal instructions (khrid) of the Eighth Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje, this paper consist of some observations that had emerged in my

1  I would like to thank Roger Jackson for bringing up the often missing logical argument behind the guru’s importance in a keynote speech at the Mahāmudrā Panel of the Eleventh Conference of the IATS, Bonn, August 2006. An earlier version of this paper was published 2009 in Russian (with English translation as ‘Preliminary Reflections on Guru Devotion in Medieval Tibetan bKa’ brgyud pa Great Seal’).


3  An exception is Jan U. Sobisch’s ‘Guru Devotion in the bKa’ brgyud pa Tradition’ (2011). For the general importance of the guru, see for example Jackson, R. (2004: 3–53), and notes below.
previous research, especially when encountering contradictory interpretations discovered in different instruction related texts. The paper first briefly discusses the varying Great Seal interpretations in general and those of Mī bskyod rdo rje in particular. Concluding that a definitive Great Seal categorisation of the Eighth Karmapa is difficult to locate in the examined material, it turns to the guru as crucial religious origin, means, and unifying spiritual element of the Great Seal and investigates the function of confidence (dad pa) and devotion (mos gus). It argues that an essential instruction is, according to circumstance, taught by a guru via either tantric or non-tantric means, and proposes to better approach the Great Seal instructions as a pragmatic heuristic rather than a fixed doctrine.

**bKa’ brgyud pa Great Seal: a path outside tantra?**

Among Buddhist traditions, those of Tibet perhaps stand out most for their blend of meditative systems, centred on various instructions (gdams ngag) and their lineages. The Great Seal practised in the various bKa’ brgyud lineages is one such meditative technique. In essence, it contains immediate instructions for achieving Buddhahood by transcending conceptual thinking (Skt. prapañca, vikalpa) and directly perceiving the nature of mind. The bKa’ brgyud traditions in medieval Tibet believed that it was Nāro pa who was the main transmitter of the Great Seal within tantric practice and yogic exercise (later called tantra or mantra Great Seal), whereas they held that Maitrī pa and Saraha also taught the Great Seal outside tantric contexts. Such an approach was ascribed to sGam po pa (1079–1153).

sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen, or, more specifically, the writings attributed to him, are crucial for understanding any of Tibetan bKa’ brgyud pa Great Seal. The research conducted so far allows for the (albeit preliminary) conclusion that sGam po pa distinguished three paths: sūtra, mantra, and Great Seal, also known as the path of inference (pāramitāyāna), the path of blessing (mantrayāna), and the path of direct perceptions; the last one being termed ‘Great Seal’ and considered a direct path for those of superior faculties. This said, it remains difficult at present to ascertain sGam po pa’s definitive position regarding this Great Seal as tantric or not. The ‘Bri gung pa exegete

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4 The late nineteenth century masters of the non-sectarian movement, such as Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ nas (1813–1899), have distinguished eight instruction lineages (see Kapstein 1996, 2007: 116). Most of the lineages originating from the new translation period are based on instructional texts which have a mystic origin as oral ‘vajra verses’ (rdo rje’i tshig rkang) that were later put into writing. Davidson (2004: 149–151) has termed some of them ‘gray texts’. He has argued that they emerged from the collaboration of Indian scholars and Tibetan translators and present the unfolding of the esoteric traditions in a new environment.

5 Mathes (2007: 1). A word definition by Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ nas (1813–1899) reads: ‘Because when experientially cultivating that to which one has been introduced through the esoteric directions of the guru, neither knowledge nor knowables surpass its radiance, it is a “seal” and because, besides that, there is no other gnosis of the Buddha to be sought out, it is “great”’ (trans. Kapstein 2006a: 54, n. 20).

6 Beyer (1975: 148) has distinguished three kinds of Mahāyāna Buddhist meditation technique: standard (insight and calm abiding), visionary and ecstatic (the stages of tantric meditation) and spontaneous techniques. Among these, the Great Seal of the bKa’ bryud pa—or at least some facets of it—can be described as a ‘spontaneous’ technique of enlightenment. The most essential works in the Tibetan language are contained in the Phyag chen mdzod and gdams ngag mdzod, vols. 5-7. The history of the Great Seal is recounted the famed Deb ther sngon po (Blue Annals) translated by Roerich (1996: 839-867).


8 For the three paths system of sGam po pa, see Sherpa (2004: 130) and Jackson, D. (1994: 25–28). The three paths are, for example, depicted in sGam po pa bSod nam rin chen, Tshogs chos yon tan phun tshogs, pp. 527f. While the last path of the Great Seal is described as the one of direct perceptions (mngon sum), Sherpa (2004: 130), based on research
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‘Jig rten mgon po, for example, offers a system ‘where, in short, mahāmudrā is achieved outside of the “path of means” (thabs lam), but clearly within the tantric “path of liberation” (grol lam).’

Great Seal interpretations and categorisations thus differ even among the bKa’ brgyud pa schools and its categorisation became a point of continued debate. The later bKa’ brgyud master Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas (1813–1899) for example, distinguished a generally accepted mantra Great Seal, a sūtra Great Seal, and an essence Great Seal. Essence Great Seal then constitutes the sudden realisation of one’s ‘ordinary mind’ (tha mal gyi shes pa, sometimes translated as ‘natural mind’), which is the perfection inherent (Skt. sahaja, Tib. lhan cig skye pa) in any experience: after being pointed out (ngo sprod) by a qualified teacher, a practitioner of high capacity experiences the essence of mind directly. These teachings are often linked to the dohā literature of Saraha and the teaching-cycles attributed to Maitrī pa. Karma bKra shis chos ‘phel, a nineteenth-century-born student of Kong sprul, conducted a similar analysis: he considers the Great Seal as such (synonymous here with essence Great Seal) a direct and quick path for those of highest capacity, dependent on neither the sūtras nor the tantras. However, it can be combined with the sūtra or tantra methods in order to be suitable for many. These were the two approaches Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas designated ‘sūtra Great Seal’ and ‘mantra Great Seal’.

The thirteenth century saw a crucial development in that the non-tantric aspects of bKa’ brgyud pa Great Seal became highly contested; especially Sa skya Paṇḍita’s (1182-1251) critique had a lasting impact. The interpretations of the bKa’ brgyud pa Great Seal teachings following the thirteenth century can be regarded as a story of reception, commentary, apologetic and systematisation of the practices and writings of early Tibetan masters like sGam po pa, and Indian proponents such as Saraha and Maitrī pa. In the sixteenth-century, Great Seal masters such as ‘Brug chen Padma dkar po (1527–1592) and bKra shis rnam rgyal (1512-1587) not only fervently defended their traditions but also contributed to more systematic manuals of progressive meditative practices. The Seventh Karmapa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454–1506) deserves mention for his role in compiling the Indian Great Seal works, whereas the First Karma ‘phrin las pa (1456–1539) composed the most significant direct commentaries on Saraha’s three dohā of sixteenth-century Tibet (Do hā skor gsum gyi ŋiːka). Among the Karma bKa’ brgyud pa, the Eighth Karmapa on a range of texts, labels it ‘path of blessing’. Also the Eight Karmapa’s Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII Kam tshang phyag chen nyams len gyi khrid, fol. 6b (p. 968), does so. Concerning the Indian sources for such assertions, Mathes (forthcoming b: 19) has concluded that the practices from the Indian Great Seal works do not need to be tantric; with regard to Tibetan interpretations he considers it reasonable to assume, that sGam po pa taught a ‘mahāmudrā beyond sūtra and tantra and something that was later called sūtra-based mahāmudrā’ (Mathes 2008: 44; see also ibid. 34–45). Sobisch (2011) argues that we cannot determine this matter with any certainty. Firstly, the ‘Great Seal’ that takes direct perception as the path can also be understood as mantra, since sGam po pa elsewhere precisely defines mantra as such. Furthermore the later bKa’ brgyud pa traditions developed a variety of classifications (see the following note below).

9 Sobisch (2011: 9).
10 Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas, Shes bya mdzod, vol. 3, p. 357; see also Mathes (2007: 1).
11 Mathes (forthcoming b: 10).
12 Ibid. used Karma bKra shis chos ‘phel’s gNas lugs phyag rgya chen po’i rgya gzhung. The collection of Indian works on the Great Seal, rGya gzhung, was assembled by the Seventh Karmapa and later edited by the Zhwa dmar Mi pham Chos kiy blo gros (Phyag Chen mdzod), who added works by later proponents of the Great Seal.
13 Jackson, D. (1994: 72); see also Kragh (1998: 52) and van der Kuijp (1986). The critique was mainly expressed in Sa skya Paṇḍita’s sDom gsum rab dbye and the Thub pa’i dongs gsal; for his strategy and the textual occurrences and further texts, see Jackson, D. (1994: 85–90, 161–189).
14 See especially Mathes (2008), for ‘Gos lo tsā ba’s interpretations.
15 The Seventh Karmapa compiled the Indian Great Seal texts (rGya gzhung) (bKra shis chos ‘phel, gNas lugs phyag rgya chen po’i rgya gzhung, fol. 17a). His own commentaries on the Great Seal remain largely unexplored (see Phyag
Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554), whose works are the focus of this paper, was undoubtedly one of the most learned masters.16 Mi bskyod rdo rje was a prolific writer: his oeuvre filled more than thirty volumes.17 Previous academic research on his doctrines has concentrated mainly on his well-known Madhyamakāvatāra commentary and his rang stong Madhyamaya philosophical position. His gzhed stong works, such as his Abhisamayālaṁkāra commentary and the Gzhed stong legs par smra ba’i sgron me, have also been taken into account. But his Great Seal instructions have been relatively neglected. A selection of few textual sources of this corpus forms the basis of the following reflection.18

Basic distinctions of the Eighth Karmapa’s Great Seal

In general, the Eighth Karmapa maintains that Great Seal instructions originate from Saraha. Saraha himself expounded on the Great Seal from the perspective of affirmation, whereas his student Nāgārjuna taught from that of negation.19 In his Madhyamaka commentary, Dwags pa’i sgrub pa’i shing rta, the Eighth Karmapa stresses Maitrīpa’s approaches as crucial for the Great Seal.20

16  See Rheingans (2008: 95–164), for a more extensive summary and analysis of the Eighth Karmapa’s life. For the problems with the two Karmapa candidates, see Rheingans (2010). From 1498 to 1518 the Rin spungs pa lords, who were supporters of the Seventh Karmapa and the Fourth Zhwa dmar pa, had ruled with an iron fist over Dbus and Gtsang (D. Jackson 1989a: 29ff.).

17  mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, p. 1313: bka’ bum ni rje pakṣi la’ang da lta po ti bcu drug la mi bzhugs la rje ‘di’i bka’ ‘bum po ti sum bcu lhag bzhugs. According to Kaṅ shang, p. 355 (completed 1715), about twenty volumes (pusti) made up the Eighth Karma-pa’s works. Such a difference in volume numbers does not necessarily indicate a different number of texts. The 1984 catalogue of the Beijing Nationalities Library claims (Mi-rigs-dpe-mdzod-khang (ed.), Bod gangs can gyi grub mtha’, p. 17.): “it is clear in the spiritual biography that there are twenty-eight volumes, however ...” (pod nyi shu rtsa brgyad tsam yod tshul rnam thar du gsal yang). However, this claim is not verified in any of the spiritual biographies. See Rheingans (2008: 57–71), for a more detailed analysis. In sheer number, the Karmapa’s writings may be compared to the likes of Shākyam chog-lbden (twenty-four volumes) and, most importantly, ’Brug-chen Padma dkar-po (twenty-four volumes).

18  Mullin (1978) and Richardson (1980) translated very short works. In 1980 a translation of the Bka’ brgyud mgur mtsho edited by Mi bskyod rdo rje was published by the Nālandā Translation Committee, which also published very brief prayers in 1989. From 1498 to 1518 the Rin spungs pa lords, who were supporters of the Seventh Karmapa and the Fourth Zhwa dmar pa, had ruled with an iron fist over Dbus and Gtsang (D. Jackson 1989a: 29ff.).

19  Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, gLo bur gyi dri ma, fol. 1b (p. 1074).

20  See Rheingans (2008: 143–145), for some conditions surrounding the composition of this important work. That he wrote it late in life (1544/45), and the high esteem it received in his traditions, points to it being the culmination of his scholastic enterprise.
Matrī pa’s *Tattvādāśaka* and Sahajavajra’s commentary *Tattvādāśakaṭīka*, along with Jñānakīrti’s *Tattvāvatāra* and the songs of Saraha are employed to that end.\(^{21}\) According to the Karmapa, Maitrī pa’s understanding of Madhyamaka included the teaching of Saraha the elder and younger along with Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.\(^{22}\) Quoting the *Tattvādāśaka*, the Karmapa comments on the verse outlining the pāramitāyāna pith instructions, which are to be practised adorned with the words of the guru.\(^{23}\) The Karmapa calls Maitrī pa’s understanding *amanasikāra-madhyamaka* ‘non mentation Madhyamaka’, distinguishing three types:

i. Practices focusing on Mantra-Madhyamaka  
ii. Practices focusing on Sūtra-Madhyamaka  
iii. And those focusing on the Alikākāra-Cittamātra-Madhyamaka.\(^{24}\)

The first two (i and ii) were taught by Mar pa and Mi la ras pa, the second (ii) was emphasised by sGam po pa and the third (iii) is the one of the vajra songs (*dohās*) as propagated by Vajrapāṇi of India, A su of Nepal and Kor Ni ru pa.\(^{25}\)

### Common strands and divergent interpretations

When examining texts of varied genres written by Mi bskyod rdo rje, comprehending conceptualisation as in essence *dharmakūya* could be identified as a central theme, although it may be explained in a more or less scholarly manner. This certainly bears similarity to sGam po pa’s material.\(^{26}\) In the following, the Eighth Karmapa’s varied definitions of the Great Seal into tantric and non-tantric are briefly considered. In his Madhyamaka commentary, the Eighth Karmapa reasons that this meditational theory and practice (*lta sgom*) of the Great Seal is so significant because it is *the* effective antidote to subtle clinging and conceptualisation in meditation. It would be indeed important for removing latent tendencies of fabrication (*prapañcānaśaya*) and badness (*daśūtya*), when the experience of the gnosis of bliss and emptiness in tantric meditation appears. As such, it is taught because it removes all veils like the ‘single white sufficient remedy’ (*dkar po gcig thub*).\(^{27}\)

When practising the mantra system, there would be the danger that the symbolic and actual (*dpe don*) ultimate awareness (*jñāna*) of the third and fourth empowerments, would not be able to

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\(^{22}\) *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta*, fol. 6a (p. 11).

\(^{23}\) *Tattvādāśaka* 92: *na sākārānirākārā tathātām jñātum icchata/ madhyamā madhyamā caiva guruvāganalaniktaḥ*. Mathes (2006: 209) translates: ‘Somebody who wishes to know suchness for himself [finds it] neither in terms of sakara nor nirakara; Even the middle [path] (i.e., Madhyamaka) which is not adorned with the words of a guru, is only middling.’ According to Mathes (2006: 213–216), the Eighth Karmapa interprets ‘the words of the guru’ here as those of Nāgārjuna, whereas ‘Gos lo tsā ba comprehends it as the pith instructions of the guru, who embodies Prajñāpāramitā.’

\(^{24}\) *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta*, fol. 6a (p. 11). See also Ruegg (1988: 1248ff.); Brunnhölzl (2004: 52); Sherpa (2004: 172).

\(^{25}\) The Eighth Karmapa claimed to have emphasised the *dohās* as transmitted via Vajrapāṇi in his teaching of the Great Seal (see Rheingans 2008: 160–164, and *Mi bskyod rdo rje'i spyad pa'i rabs*, fol. 9b/p.367). Though the Karmapa in the Madhyamaka commentary accepts this Madhyamaka type, he argues against the Alikākāra-Cittamātra (of Ratnākaraśānti) (Ruegg 1988: 1275).

\(^{26}\) See Rheingans (2008: 219–223), for a brief account of this strand in the instructions of the Eighth Karmapa; see also Rheingans (2011). For the similarity to sGam po pa, see the Sherpa (2004: 188–293).

\(^{27}\) *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta*, fol. 6b (p. 12).
remove all veils. This reminds one of the points made in the *g Ling drung pa la ‘dor ba’i dris lan* (*Answer to gLing drung pa*): There – in a ‘beyond-rhetoric’ that may be typical for the Great Seal and Great Perfection traditions – the Karmapa first asserts the *Kālacakratantras* superiority to common empowerments in order to then point out the Great Seal of sGam po pa as being beyond the *Kālacakra*. The story employed as apologetic technique in the Madhyamka commentary bears similarities to the *gLing drung pa la ‘dor ba’i dris lan* as well: the Karmapa uses the example of Phag mo gru pa, who, studying first with Sa skya Paṇḍita, made the energies enter the central channel and boasted of experiencing the innate joy (*sahajananda*), the path of seeing. This still incomplete experience of the fourth empowerments was, then, enhanced upon receiving pith instructions from sGam po pa.29

The Eighth Karmapa then notes with Sahajavajras *Tattvadaśaka* (as summarised by ‘Gos lo tsā ba) that this path is ‘essentially *pāramitā*, being in accordance with Mantra and being called Mahāmudrā’. The experiential instructions of this system are also given without tantric empowerment. This Great Seal system would implicitly teach the ordinary and extraordinary Buddha nature of both sūtra and tantra, wherefore the *Ratnagotravibhāga* was emphasised by sGam po pa, Phag mo gru pa, and ‘Bri gung ‘Jig rten gsum dgon.31

‘True nature Great Seal’ (*gnas lugs phyag rgya chen po*), and the Great Seal of bliss and emptiness, were differentiated but equal in value and it would not be right to distinguish sūtra and tantra and consider the sūtra-approach superior:

*Therefore, though according to the Mantra there does not exist a Great Seal instruction aside (zur du) from Nāro pa’s six doctrines, the lineage masters, having seen the empowerment of meaning (don gyi dbang gzigs nas), distinguished (so sor mdzad) instructions called ‘six doctrines’ and ‘Great Seal’.32*

This means he allows the possibility of teaching the Great Seal directly, without tantric empowerment, though he admits that the term stems from the tantras. The approach of sGam po pa as derived from Maitrīpa and (here subsumed under practices focusing on sūtra-Madhyamaka) is then distinguished from the sūtra-based Great Seal from Atiśa. In an instruction on the Great Seal of rGyal ba Yang dgon pa, the Eighth Karmapa explains that the common (*thun mong*) instruction from Atiśa’s *Bodhipathapradipā* would be known as the ‘innate union’ (*lhan cig skyes sbyor*), of dGe bshes sTon chen and sGe bshes dGon pa ba. He remarks, almost ironically, that sGam po pa and Phag mo

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28 For a more detailed study of this *dris lan*, see Rheingans (2011). For the *Kālacakra*, see also Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, *dPal ldan dwags po bka’ brgyud kyi gsung*, fol. 45aff. (p.55ff.).

29 Ibid. fol. 7a (p. 13). The story of Phag mo gru pa meeting sGam po pa is told also in Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, *Phyag rgya chen po sgros ‘bum*, fol. 181a (p. 361). Furthermore, the Karmapa uses the *Phag mo gru pa’i zhus lan* (which is found in the *Dwags po bka’ ‘bum*) on the meeting of sGam po pa and Phag mo gru pa (Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, *Phyag rgya chen po sgros ‘bum*, fol. 184b/p. 368).

30 This ‘quote’ does not express the actual text but is a condensation of it by ‘Gos lo tsā ba from his *Ratnagotravibhāga*-commentary as shown by Mathes (2006: 202, n. 4); see also ‘Gos lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal, *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma*. Nevertheless, the examination of the actual text by Mathes has proven that Sahajavajra indeed uses the term Great Seal for describing the pith instructions (ibid. and *Tattvadaśakātīka* 190a).

31 *Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta*, fol. 8a (p. 16).

32 Ibid.: des na brgyud pa ‘di pa dag snags sugs ltar na chos drug las gzhan phyag chen gyi khrid zur du med kyang don gyi dbang ‘di gzigs nas chos drug dang phyag chen zhes khrid so sor mdzad do. Ruegg (1984: 1261, n. 52) has noted two textual variants: whereas the 1969 edition reads ‘previous tradition’ (*sngar lugs*), both the 1975 (and the 2004 *Collected Works of the Eighth Karmapa* used here) have ‘mantra tradition’ (*sngags lugs*).
gru pa had merely given such teachings the name ‘Great Seal of innate union’ for those disciples of the dark age who find pleasure in ‘the highest’, or ‘high’ (*mtho mtho*) vehicle.\(^{33}\)

In the Madhyamaka commentary, the Karmapa also mentions the transmission of Atiśa, noting that it is the same in purport but rests more on wisdom based on conceptual analysis, whereas in Maitrī pa’s system one finds out that the analysing knowledge itself is without root and base (*gzhī med rtsa bral*). As such, Atiśa’s system contains the danger of deviating from emptiness (*shor sa*).\(^{34}\) The danger of deviating from emptiness recurs in more minor Great Seal commentaries; as does the connected argument that Great Seal is the effective antidote to clinging.\(^{35}\) Mi bskyod rdo rje quotes Mi la ras pa, commenting on his advice to avoid the ‘three delaying diversions’ (*gol sa gsun*), relating to experiences from *śamatha* and the ‘four occasions for straying’ (*shor sa bzhi*) into a wrong understanding of śūnyatā, where he mentions the mantra methods.\(^{36}\)

Yet, in the Eighth Karmapa’s answer to a question about Great Seal by a Bla ma sNe ring pa, the Karmapa defines the Great Seal as tantric, perfectly in line with Sa skyā Paṇḍita’s definitions: the way of progressing though the stages and paths (*sa lam bgroḍ tshul*) would consist of untying the blocks in the subtle energy system of the right and left channel, melting them into the central channel, and thereupon traversing the five paths and twelve bhūmi. The result would be actualised in being brought to maturity through the four empowerments, practising the two stages of tantric meditation, and applying the inner and outer Seals and three types of ‘innate conduct’ (*lhan cig spyod pa*).\(^{37}\)

\(^{33}\) Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, *rgyal ba yang dgon pa'i ngo spro dbyun ma'i khrid yig*, fol. I b (p. 560): snyigs ma'i gdul bya theg pa mtho mtho ma la dga' ba'i ngor. Sherpa (2004: 174–176) has suggested on the basis of sGam po pa’s writings to differentiate the Great Seal methods taught by sGam po pa: (i) ‘metonymic’ publicly taught ‘Great Seal’ *lhan cig skyes skyor* teachings which ‘designate a cause by naming its result’ (ibid. 170) and mainly derive from the bKa’ gdam gs pa. (ii) The actual Great Seal pith instructions transmitted by Maitrī pa (see ibid. 169–173). This seems to have parallels in the Indian material of Sahajavarja’s *Tattvaśāsakaśīka*, which clearly distinguishes the ‘practice of realising mahāmudra on the basis of pith-instructions from both Pāramitā- and Mantrayāna’ (Mathes 2006: 221).

\(^{34}\) *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta*, fol. 9a f. (p. 17f.); see also Brunnhölzl (2004: 58) and Ruegg (1984: 1263). Again, a story is told: sGam po pa, having previously studied with the bKa’ gdam gs pa masters, had risked still being fettered by this kind of meditation; only on meeting Mi la ras pa did he overcome these ‘golden chains’. In a later passage, the Karmapa distinguishes the luminosity (*’od gsal*) as taught in the sūtras from the one in the tantras, which are—though having a common purport—distinguished by its means (*Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta*, fol. 30a ff./p. 56ff). The commentary continues to argue that Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamakāvatāra* professes only the rang stong view. See Williams (1983a) and Brunnhölzl (2004: 553–597), for the Eighth Karmapa’s difference to Tson kha pa’ s Madhyamaka and the Eighth Karmapa’s concern for Madhyamaka being an effective antidote to mental fixation (*prapañca*) and a means to liberation. For a translation of part of the sixth chapter, see Mīkyō Dorje (2006).

\(^{35}\) Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, *gLo bur gyi dri ma*, is concerned with explaining the correct understanding and cultivation of the ordinary mind. This text contains more interesting definitions (in part using terminology from both the *pramāṇa* and *phar phyin* treatises) and debates which cannot fully be presented here. It was requested by the scribe Bod pa rgya bo and was written by the Karmapa in Kong stod ‘or shod. It is found in the *dKar chag* (fol. 9a/p. 17) of the Fifth Zhwa dmar pa but not in the title list of the Eighth Karmapa in *Mi bskyod rdo rje’i spyad pa’i rabs*. It could therefore have been composed after 1546.

\(^{36}\) Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, *gLo bur gyi dri ma*, fol. 3a (p. 1077). For the *gol sa* and *shor sa*, see also Namgyal (1986: 293–313) and Jackson, D. (1994: 181–85), who translates Sa skyā Paṇḍita’s criticism in the *Thubs pa’i dgon* gsal which maintains that precisely this teaching is not from the Buddha. As a strategy in the *gLo bur gyi dri ma*, Mi bskyod rdo rje refers Sa skyā Paṇḍita’s critique from the *sDom gsun rab dbyar* (blun po’i phyag rgya chen sgom pa phal cher dud ’gro’i gnas su skye) to the wrong understanding of *śamatha*, which pertains to the *gol sa*.

\(^{37}\) Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, *Ne ring ‘phags pa’i dris lan*, fol. 1b (p. 322).
In temporary summary—though at this stage of research a final statement would be premature—the strands presented here allow the deduction of some striking characteristics and contradictions. The Karmapa continues blending the sūtra and tantra, like Maitrī pa, by emphasising the term *amanasikāra-madhyamaka*. In that context, he stressed the primary importance of Saraha, Maitrī pa, sGam po pa and the Third Karmapa. The Eighth Karmapa’s Great Seal contains key elements found in the works of sGam po pa and the Indian siddhas: the removal of any clinging to experiences resulting from empowerments or to emptiness, and, connected to it, the teaching of conceptualisation as *dharma-kāya*. The Karmapa confirms Great Seal practice which focuses on sūtra-Madhyamaka as sGam po pa’s emphasis. But he differentiates this Great Seal of sGam po pa from Atiśa’s system which was called ‘Great Seal’ for pedagogical purpose. Though in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* commentary the Eighth Karmapa is at times opposed to considering sūtra Great Seal in any way superior to the tantric, in the reply to gLing drung pa the Karmapa taught the Great Seal as being neither sūtra nor tantra.  

It follows that there seems to be an essential instruction, an ‘essence Great Seal’, to be applied, which is not clearly categorised but is the key for overcoming clinging and conceptualisation. One may see here some similarity to the Eighth Karmapa’s contemporary, bKra shis shis mam rgyal. bKra shis shis mam rgyal, quoting the Indian siddha Saraha and sGam po pa, considers Great Seal an independent path which can nevertheless be linked to tantra. It would even be acceptable to connect it to the sūtras and tantras as benefit appears for many.  

As the reply to gLing drung pa (like most of the instructions) was taught in a specific context, the textual evidence is still too thin to read the Karmapa’s final view into it—if there is one. That its classification of the tantras into mundane and supramundane was found elsewhere lends some credibility to this source’s assertions. Its direction would also fit with the Karmapa’s purported emphasis of the *dohā*, which figure also among one of the three basic distinctions outlined above. But in other works the Great Seal was defined as clearly and only tantric.  

Given the interpretations outlined above, it seems useful to, at this point, remember that traditions view the teaching of the Great Seal as in one way or another depending on guru-disciple interaction. The teacher or guru, under whose close guidance the Great Seal is to be taught, may in fact permeate most of the Great Seal approaches regardless of their doctrine. In the following, the guru’s role as source of instruction and example along with the function as method (through guru-devotion) and goal of realisation will be investigated. It constitutes a research-focus next to the ‘doctrinal route’ that may shed some light on the praxis dimension of the bKa’ brgyud pa traditions.

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38 See Mi bskyod rdo rje’s *gLing drung pa la ’dor ba’i dris lan*, fol. 2f. and Rheingans (2011).
39 Namgyal (1986: 110–112). This is found in the subsection on identifying the essence as path in the section which describes how the Great Seal embodies the deep meaning of both the sūtras and the tantras. The passage in the *Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta* is on fol. 8b (p. 16). (See also Ruegg 1988: 1261). Jackson, R. (1994: 25, n. 59, n. 60) reads it that Karmapa objected to considering tantric Great Seal in any way inferior. Yet, one may also read it that he meant it to be not inferior to the sūtra Great Seal but to the essence Great Seal.
40 See section two above.
41 His spiritual memoirs and biographies maintain that he had, when teaching the Great Seal, particularly emphasised the meditation instructions on the bKa’ brgyud traditions, such as the one of Jo bo Mitra Yogin and the Great Seal of the dohās which was transmitted in India by Vajrapāṇi (Rheingans 2008: 155–163).
The guru as origin and example in the Vajrayāna and Great Seal traditions

The guru is a common element in mystic traditions ranging from Christianity to Sūfism and the Indian religions. According to the Buddhist Tantras, the divine became immanent with the Vajrayāna, where the guru was seen as the actual embodiment of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas. The chosen personal teacher is the source of empowerment and instruction and cannot be compromised. Importance of the teacher can thus be considered a unifying element of the Tibetan Vajrayāna-traditions.

The guru further takes the prominent role of introducing the student into the innate in the siddha’s songs, or the saha jayāna, which are cited as origins of non-tantric Great Seal.

The bKa’ brgyud pa Great Seal preliminaries usually contain a meditation on the teacher, which is, at times, considered the actual practice. sGam po pa has stated:

It (Buddhahood) is acquired through the blessing of the guru, from one’s own reverence and devotion, and by the power of meditatively cultivating through diligent effort, whereas otherwise it will not be acquired.

The Eighth Karmapa is no exception in suggesting the teacher’s significance. He, for example, explains that there is no more supreme ‘reincarnate [lama]’ (sprul skiu) than the vajra-master who transmits the liberating and ripening (smin grol) empowerments and instructions. The meditation

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42 For mysticism, see Moore (1978: 41); for the yogi in Indian traditions, see also the essays collected in Werner (1989); for mysticism in the discourses of the Buddha, see Harvey (1989). This section does not wish to discuss the intricacies of comparative mysticism but rather point to some striking themes in the Great Seal traditions. For understanding such aspects of religious experience, see, for example, Sharf (1996).


44 For the bKa’ brgyud traditions, see, for example, the famed short invocation of Vajradhara: ‘Devotion is said to be the head of meditation. A meditator constantly calls upon his lama as he is the one who opens the door to the treasury of profound instructions. Grant me your blessing so that non-artificial devotion may be born [within me]!’ (dBang phyug rdo rje Karmapa IX (et. al.), sGrub bryug rin po che’i phrel pa, p. 117: mos gus sgom gyi mgo bor gsungs pa bzhin/ /man ngag gter sgo ‘byed pa’i bla ma la/rgyud du gsal ba ‘debs pa’i sgom chen la/bcos min mos gus skye bar byin gyis rlob/).

45 Abhayadattaśrī, Grub chen brgyad cu, 172 (song of Tantipa), translated by Kapstein (2006a: 55). See also Tillipa’s Dohākūsa 6 (Jackson, R. 2004; see also ed. and trans. Bhayani 1998: 14). Saraha’s songs portray the guru as someone who ‘has done with karma’ (las zin pa yi skyes bu) and at whose feet one should gain certainty about the nature of one’s own mind: Dohākūsa 43a (Jackson, R. 2004): kye lags dbang po tros shig dang / ‘di las ngsi mi ma gtos (Advayavajra reads: mi rtogs) so /las zin pa yi skyes bu yi / drung du sens thag gcad par byos (see also Scherer 2007). See also Jackson, R. (2004: 3–53).

46 The Ninth Karmapa argues: ‘[The meditation on the teacher] is referred to as a “preliminary”, however, it determines whether meditation takes place or not, since it is actually the main practice’ (dBang phyug rdo rje, Phyag chen nges don rgya misho, fol. 48b: de ni snog ,gro ming btags kyang dngos gzi rang yin pas sgom skye mi skye ,di la rag las so/). For the various Great Seal preliminaries see dBang phyug rdo rje Karmapa IX (et. al.), sGrub bryug rin po che’i phrel pa; Namgyal (1986: 132–138); bKra shis mam rgyal, sNgon ,gro khrid yig thun bzhis’i rnal ,byor du bya ba. See also the seventh-century work Ngag dbang bsTan pa’i nyi ma, Phyag chen khrid yig. In the fivefold Great Seal of the ‘Bri gung pa the teacher is also one of the five elements of practice (Sobisch 2003). For the importance of the teacher in sGam po pa’s Great Seal, see Sherpa (2004: 93), Jackson, D. (1994: 150), and Kragh (1998: 12–26); see also Namgyal (1986: 112).

of those who do not truly discern the practice (gdar sha gcod) with the help of a supreme teacher, but instead practise not liberating their mind but pretending (ltar ‘chos) greatness in the Great Seal, is likened to ‘ascetic practice of pigs and dogs’. The bad teacher is as dangerous to spiritual development as the authentic one is beneficial; pretense of spiritual development is regarded as a main transgression. Nevertheless, the Karmapa notes that false teachers abound and complains about lamas these days, ‘who give up a bit of drinking and start talking about accomplishment’.

Why is the guru so important? The Great Seal would be a transmission of the meaning (don brgyud), and the one communicating its understanding should be called ‘main lama’ (rtsa ba’i bla ma). The Eighth Kamapa’s study and practice of the Great Seal mainly consisted of the transmission of blessing from his single most important teacher, Sargas rgyas mnyan pa. The stories quoted so often, be it about Phag mo gru pa and sGam po pa, Khams pa sbad mchod and Phag mo gru pa, or Mi la ras pa and sGam po pa, in essence revolve around the students and their relationship to a teacher.

The instructions analysed in previous research were either written by the Karmapa or (supposedly) a recorded word. In the dialogues, the great devotion the Karmapa inspired helped the students get closer to highest insight. Thus, tradition views as origin of Great Seal instructions in both oral and written form the guru, who is legitimised by his transmission. The Karmapa writes in a spiritual memoir that the teacher does not place the liberation in one’s hand, but that one should see his qualities and practice like him. In other words, the teacher is origin as well as example.
Philosophical argument for the teacher is rare in the examined material, so natural does appear the guru’s primary role. The implicit argument is rather one of transmission and experience; by invoking the authenticity of the lineage (brygyud pa), its power or blessing (Skt. adhisthāna), and the realisation of the guru.

Guru-devotion as method and goal in the The Eighth Karmapa’s Great Seal instructions

This section turns to the teacher’s role not only as origin or example but as means and goal of realisation in the Eighth Karmapa’s Great Seal instructions that do not explicitly entail the tantric path of means.

*Kaṅ tshang phyag chen nyams len gyi khrid* (Meditation Instruction for the Kaṅ tshang Great Seal Practice) explains the different paths for the different capacities, remarking that if a student endowed with ‘fortunate residues’ (skal ldan) meets a guru of the Dwags po tradition, not much elaboration is needed. On the basis of the deep wish to let go of attachment to cyclical existence (nges ‘byung) and harmful actions, ‘opening up’ or ‘invoking’ (gsol ‘debs) is considered essential, since the realisation of all paths only emerges from the three jewels and the lama. Through fierce invocation (gsol ba phur tshugs su btab pa), one could not avoid accomplishing śamatha, vipaśyanā, and the timeless awareness (ye shes) of the Great Seal.

In other words, the idea of invocation, or opening up, is both vital entrance to practice and a form of training. The Karmapa then defines gsol ‘debs: apart from eating, drinking, and sleeping, the practitioner’s body (through attending the lama), speech (through pronouncing the qualities of the lama), and mind (contemplating only the manifold qualities), should be constantly focused on

58 Roger Jackson has brought up this issue in a keynote speech on Great Seal studies at the Mahāmudrā Panel of the Eleventh Conference of the IATS, Bonn, August 2006.

59 Kragh (forthcoming) has pointed out with the example of the six doctrines of Nāro pa, how specific texts were only transmitted due to their authority but not necessarily due to their being used in practice. Davidson has argued that, in Tibet, the translator and his (sometimes self-styled) instructions (gdams ngag) constitute an important point of Tibetan tantric lineages, as do the clans for its transmission (Davidson 2004: 149–151).

60 An important stanza for guru-devotion among the bKa’ brgyud pa traditions is Hevajratantra I.viii.36 (especially the third line): ‘That which is not expressed by others, the inborn; which cannot be found anywhere; is to be known through ...[a special kind of]... guru attendance; and through one’s own merit’ (translation by Sobisch 2011, who treats in detail the variant problematic readings and ‘Jig rten dgon po’s interpretation of dus mtha’ (Skr. parva) as the final moment of attending the guru as dharmakāya). See also David Jackson’s translation of the same verse and its context in sGam po pa’s rJe Phag mo gru pa’s zhu lan (Jackson, D. 1994: 150–152).

61 Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII Kaṅ tshang phyag chen nyams len gyi khrid, fol. 3b (p. 962). It is difficult to accurately translate the meaning of gsol ‘debs. When it is used with an object following in the later part of the sentence, it can convey something like ‘please’ or ‘I ask of you’ (‘please grant me innate gnosis/timeless awareness of the innate’: gsol ba ‘debs so lhan skyes ye shes stsol). Where it is used without an object following, ‘to invoke’ or ‘open up’ can convey the state to be achieved in phrases such as ‘all beings open up to the precious lama’: sems can thams cad bla ma rin po che la gsol ba ‘debs (both examples from the guru-yoga in dBang phyug rdo rje Karmapa IX (et. al.), sGrub brygyud rin po che ‘i phreng ba, p. 117). ‘To pray’ would be an alternative, but ‘prayer’ often carries implicit assumptions regarding the nature of religion (Gomez 2000: 1037). For the so-called ‘Christian phase’ in translating Buddhism, see Doboom (2001: 2f.).
the teacher as opposed to invoking the teacher at set times and occasions only.\textsuperscript{62} In an interlinear remark (\textit{mchan}) a formal \textit{guru-yoga} is outlined.\textsuperscript{63}

The text continues with a description of the main body of practice (\textit{dngos bzhi}), which consists of the practices of \textit{samatha} and \textit{vipaśyanā} meditation.\textsuperscript{64} Again, the particular method of calm abiding and insight meditation of the Dwags po tradition is connected to contemplating one’s teacher; after an outline of calm abiding practice, the Karmapa continues: ‘in the tradition of the system of the bKa’ brgyud doctor from Dwags po, which expounds all words [of the Buddha] (\textit{bka’}) as an instructional precept (\textit{gdams ngag})\textsuperscript{65}, one would sit in the seven-fold meditational posture, evoke the teacher as the Buddha Vajradhara, and fervently open up to him (\textit{gsol ‘debs}). \textit{gsol ‘debs} incites the state of devotion or openness (\textit{mos gus}), which in turn acts as a means to let the mind rest one-pointedly on the wholesome (\textit{dge ba}): a facilitator to calm the mind and experience the three qualities connected with it: clarity (\textit{gsal ba}), joy (\textit{bde ba}), and non-conceptuality (\textit{rnam rtog med pa}).\textsuperscript{66}

The teacher re-surfaces in the ensuing discussion on different objections to the bKa’ brgyud method, where the Karmapa emphasises that in this tradition one should not over-analyse conventionally.\textsuperscript{67} Instead, one should rest the mind in a way that is suitable for the Great Seal ultimate awareness to arise. How? By invoking (\textit{gsol ‘debs}) an authentic teacher, who is the essence of all Buddhas, and having his blessing affecting or entering (\textit{bzhugs}) one’s mind.\textsuperscript{68} He then relates it to sGam po pa’s three paths: (i) the one of analysis (\textit{dpoyod pa}), (ii) the one of direct cognition (\textit{dngon sum}), and (iii) the one of blessing (\textit{byin rlabs}). Here the path of blessing is not equated with the Vajrayāna (as is at times done in sGam po pa’s writings), but with ‘the tradition of this transmission’ (\textit{brgyud pa ‘di’i lugs}).\textsuperscript{69}

The work continues to explain both calm \textit{samatha} and \textit{vipaśyanā} meditation across ten folios; the details of which cannot be expounded here.\textsuperscript{70} Again, the lama is employed as a means, while cultivating \textit{samadhī} or profound absorption and the three ensuing qualities of joy (\textit{bde ba}),
clarity (gsal ba), and non-conceptualitiy (mi rtog pa); making the face (zhal) of the lama an object of mind is considered a skillfull means for one-pointedness (rtse gcig) in this bKa’ brgyud lineage.  

Vipaśyanā is at first introduced with the depictions of essencelessness (Tib. bdag med, Skt. anātman). After some discussions, the Karmapa argues for a particular way of insight meditation, which is summarised as ‘... [one] needs to settle the immediate mind (de ma thag yid) on all aspects of the mental formation (Skt. saṃskāra, Tib. ’du byed) of the eight groups of consciousness.’  

In other words, ‘immediate’ means also ‘moment’ and ‘settle’ is defined as ‘apprehending’ (’dzin pa), an approach attributed to sGam po pa and the Third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje.  

The function of devotion (mos gus) in this work is thus an intense state of mind which is both a prerequisite of, and also a part of, the actual practice. Connected or enhanced by the practice of gsol ’debs, it can be used to both concentrate the mind as well as to bring it to a state where conceptual states fade and the power (byin rlabs) enters the mind stream of the trainee. That does not exclude investigating the mind, which the instruction also professes to a great degree, but points to devotion’s crucial function next to understanding or insight (prajñā).  

Other instructions indicate a similar usage for ‘confidence’ (Tib. dad pa, Skt. śraddhā). The first of seven sessions in the Phag rgya chen po bsgom pa la nye bar mkho ba ’i zin bris (Note of the Prerequisites for Cultivating the Great Seal) advises:  

Above one’s head, on a lotus and moon[-disc], [one visualises] the Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje, having a black crown in a garuda wing [form] and with golden radiance, endowed with the three dharma robes. Then one does one-pointed prayer through the [praise entitled] sKu bstod zla med ma.  

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71 Ibid. fol. 8b (p. 972). Making ‘blind faith’ (rmongs dad) its cause, however, is not considered correct (chog).  
72 Ibid. fol. 17a (p. 988).  
73 Ibid. The interlinear comment specifies this as the intention of the Third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje, as the defining characteristic (rang gi mthun nyid) of whatever consciousness (shes pa) is apprehended. The text asserts the indispensability for understanding this subtle point because, on the basis of it, the ignorance about the ultimate awareness of the Great Seal is removed. After more descriptions of how the levels (bhūmi) of the Bodhisattvas are realised, this approach is once more ascribed to sGam po pa and the Third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje (ibid. fol. 20a/p. 995). The wording may likely refer to Rang byung rdo rje’s rNam shes ye shes ’byed pa’i bstan bcos (see also the paraphrase by Sheehey 2005). The work concludes with an invocation of the transmission lineage of the Great Seal lamas from Vajradhara via Saraha to Sangs rgyas mnyan pa and the Eighth Karmapa. Thereby, it places the instructions in the continuity of the precepts passed from teacher to student (ibid. fol. 20b/p. 996).  
74 Other instructions directly make mos gus the central theme: Apart from the Kam tshang phyag chen nyams len gyi khrid, there are titles clearly indicating mos gus as the a main factor. For example the Mos gus phyag chen gyi khrid zab mo rgyal ba rgod tshang pa’i lugs, the Mos gus bdun ma’i khrid yig gzhung ’grel ba dang bcas pa (esp. fol. 31 a/p. 795), and the Mos gus chen mo’i khrid (Kam tshang, p. 364) which remains unidentified (all authored by the Eighth Karmapa).  
75 Analysis of the absence of self is carried out in for example Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, Kam tshang phyag chen nyams len gyi khrid, fol. 11a–13a/pp. 977–981.  
76 This text again consists of a note (zin bris) of the Eighth Karmapa’s teaching made by his student Bya bral Ratnakātha, who then later showed it to the Karmapa for confirmation (Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, Phag rgya chen po bsgom pa la nye bar mkho ba’i zin bris, fol. 3b/p. 275).  
77 Ibid. fol. 1b (p. 272): /de’ang phyag rgya chen po bsgom pa la nye bar mkho ba’i dmigs thun dang po ni/ rang gi spyi bor pad zla’i steng du rgyal ba karma pa mi bskyod rdo rje zhwa nag khryung gshog gser mdangs can chos gos rnam pa gsum ldan du gsal btab nas sku bstod zla med ma’i sgo nas gsal ’debs rtse gcig tu byed pa’o/.
Session two defines the ‘three kinds of confidence’ (*dad pa gsum*) as centring on the teacher, deviating from the more standard description in sGam po pa’s *Thar rgyan*:78

2. Then, increasing the longing towards that very [lama] (*de nyid*), one mainly strives to accomplish the very trust of wishing; [and] while [doing so], the trust of conviction, [namely] to consider whatever [the lama] says true and valid,79 comes about. And then, as the trust, where the two obscurations of one’s mind become removed, arises, one settles on that (*de*) one-pointedly.80

Here, confidence culminates in a state free from obscurations. This suggests that *dad pa* is not only prerequisite but also actual meditation, though the object in Great Seal practice is the guru rather than the teachings or the Buddha in more general terms.81

Additionally, it is vital to mention the practices or instructions, which are either explicitly designed as a meditation on the teacher (*guruyoga*) or come very close to such practices, indicated by their content. One of the Eighth Karmapa’s instructions exemplifies a guidebook for meditation that passes on essential instructions for advancing one’s contemplation.82 It contains condensed, and at times cryptic, advice for seven meditation sessions; ranging from *guruyoga* and control of inner energies, to contemplations of loving-kindness and compassion.83 But this ‘heart-essence of instructions’ clearly puts all practices into the framework of ‘becoming’ the teacher (presumably in its ultimate and metaphorical sense). It starts with the words: ‘further, those wishing to accom-

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78 For a slightly diverging definition popular in the bKa’ brgyud lineage, see sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen, *Dam chos yid bzhiin nor bu thar pa rin po che i rgyan*, pp. 214–219. D. Jackson has observed that also graded teaching works of sGam po pa and Phag mo gru pa start out with the notion of confidence or trust (*dad pa*) as prerequisite, as do the ‘three [levels] of appearance’ (*snang ba gsum*) meditation manuals of the Sa skya pa (Jackson, D. 1995: 233; 242, n. 24).

79 One may add a second ‘*dzin pa* for *tshad ma* here, or interpret the passage in a different way: from the bden ‘*dzin* comes the understanding of *tshad ma*, ‘considering whatever [the lama] says as true, [he is] authentic/valid.’

80 Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, Phyag rgya chen po bsgom pa la nye bar mkho ba’i zin bris, fol. 1b (p. 272): 2 /de nas de nyid la ‘*dam pa* cher btang ste ‘*dod pa*’i *dad pa* nyid gtsor sgrub pa la yid ches pa’i *dad pa* ci gsungs la bden ‘*dzin tshad ma* skyes shing/ de nas rang rgyud kyi sgrub gnyis dwangs [fol. 2a/p. 273] pa’i *dad pa* ‘byung bas de la rtse geig tu ‘*jog pa*’o/’.

81 In different Buddhist traditions, confidence (Skt. śraddhā, Pāli: saddhā) sometimes translated ‘faith’, has a range of meanings and is not to be confused with the theological concept of belief. The idea of confidence as practice is not confined to the Great Seal traditions, though the main focus is not usually the guru in other contexts. Brassard (2000: 98–99) has argued that in Mahāyāna context of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, beyond mere preliminary value, śraddhā can be considered a practice itself. It is sometimes glossed as ‘trust or reliance on someone else’ (*parapratyaya*), further connotations are often subsumed under *prasāda* or the *prasanccita*, which evokes the meaning of calm and serenity as well as conviction and trust (Gomez 2004: 278). In the sūtras, it is found among the ‘five faculties’ (*indriya eller hala*) conducive to good practice or, in more scholastic works, among the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (ibid.; Gimello 2004: 51). These are positive states of mind (*kuśala*), which often have the connotation of active engagement in practice, overcoming sluggishness and doubt (also expressed with the word *adhimukti* or *adhimokṣa*), and gaining the ability to trust or rely upon something (*Abhidharma-kosa* VI.29).

82 Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, *mNyams med daggs* [sic!] *po bka’ brgyud kyi gdam* [sic!] *pa’i srogi* [abbrv. for srog gi] *yang snying*, NGMPP, Reel no. E 12794/6, 9 fols, manuscript, *dbu med*, partly written in ‘*kyung yig* (Heart Essence of the Life Force of the Instructions of the Uncomparable Dwags po bKa’ brgyud). It found entry into the Eighth Karmapa’s title list from 1346 (*Mi bskyod rdo rje*’i spyan pa’i rabs, fol. 8a/p. 365), and the colophon clearly indicates the Eighth Karmapa’s authorship.

83 Informants from the Karma bKa’ brgyud tradition have maintained that this work was designed for advanced practitioners who had received guidance previously. They would know what certain cryptic lines would mean when doing their meditative practice (oral communication, Maṇi ba Shes rab rgyal mtshan Rin po che, July 2007; oral communication mKhan po Nges don, December 2006).
plish me myself”, and closes with: ‘Those who wish to realise the state of me, Mi bskyod rdo rje, in one life and one body, should strive to accomplish what was taught [here] in this way.”

Emulating the teacher is thus the fundamental goal of the path; and in that, the work is similar to the Eighth Karmapa’s famed Thun bzhii bla ma’i rnal ’byor, which starts with: ‘Now, those, who think only of me, Mi bskyod rdo rje…” This typical blend of oral and written transmission extends to the point where the text comes to life in meditation and could be termed ‘the teacher as text’. Another guru-yoga instruction concludes with the remark that unless mos gus is stable, methods to increase trust (dad pa) towards the teacher should be applied. This suggests mos gus also functions as goal.

On the whole, the concept of dad pa, or confidence towards the teacher, and the ensuing practices of mos gus and gsol ‘debs, are a central pillar of the Great Seal as prerequisite, practice, and goal. One may even go so far as to say that devotion to the teacher is the means for realising the Great Seal next to insight. With this emphasis, these particular instances of bKa’ brgyud pa Great Seal texts could be termed Vajrayāna, insofar as Vajrayāna has the guru and his transmission as a defining characteristic and insofar the guru is used as means: whether the yogic exercises of the path of means are employed or not.

Concluding Reflections

Although the Karmapa’s interpretations of various Buddhist doctrines will engage researchers for years to come, these preliminary remarks allow for some temporary conclusions. This paper has portrayed a threefold basic differentiation of the Eighth Karmapa’s Great Seal. Further investigating Great Seal categorisations in the instructions of the Eighth Karmapa, it has highlighted some distinct features: how the Karmapa differentiates between sGam po pa’s innate union instructions and those passed on from Atiśa and how he uses stories and the rhetoric of removal of clinging for justification. Some question and answer texts define Great Seal as only tantric, some as beyond sūtra and tantra, whereas the Madhyamaka commentary maintains they should not be distinguished in purport.

Apart from the common strands, these contradictions suggest that at this stage of research it is hard to pin down the ‘final’ interpretation or hierarchy of the Eighth Karmapa’s Great Seal. As it seems intrinsic to the study of Great Seal texts that it often evades classification, one must ask oneself, whether such a research avenue—albeit a necessary and important undertaking—does full justice to the material. But the doctrinal variegations support the Great Seal’s pedagogical

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84 Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, mNyams med dags po bka’ brgyud, fol. 1b: de yang khoo (= kho bo) rang sgrub par ‘dod pa rnam s/. 85 Ibid. fol. 9a: zhes bya ba ’di ni kho bo mi bskyod rdo rje’i go ’phang tshe cig lus cig gi grub par ‘dod pa rnam s ky (emend to kyis?) ’di bzhin sgrub par mzdod cig/. 86 Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, Thun bzhii bla ma’i rnal ’byor, p. 269: da ni kho bo mi bskyod rdo rje kho na min pa bsam rgyu med pa kun. 87 Mi bskyod rdo rje, Karmapa VIII, Bla ma phyi nang gsang gsum kyi sgrub thabs mos gus gsol ‘debs, fol. 18b (p. 810). 88 Sobisch (2011) has reached similar conclusions by investigating sGam po pa’s and ‘Jig rten dgon po’s works. He has argued that the guru devotion is the single means for the arising of realisation, especially in the final phase, where the guru is understood to be the dharmakāya. In the guru-yoga the realisation would—though not depending on the path of means—still be understood as tantra. 89 Jackson, D. (1990: 59–63) has suggested that researchers trace each doctrine in the context of the Great Seal debates around Sa skya Paṇḍita and the bKa’ brgyud pa. As was shown, doctrinal classification and apologetics were carried out extensively in the writings of the Eighth Karmapa, bKra shis shim rgyal, and ’Brug chen Padma dkar po.
significance, in which genre, teacher, and addressee play more than a secondary role. Viewing these
different approaches as pedagogical helps make sense of these apparent contradictions. As does
an investigation of the guru’s significance.

To sum up, three facets have become evident in the Eighth Karmapa’s Great Seal
interpretations at this stage of research. Firstly, there is a much needed instruction for understanding
conceptualisation’s true nature as Buddhahood and overcoming subtle clinging. Secondly, this
instruction is taught differently: as directly letting go of artifice, on the basis of sūtra-related practices,
or with the aid of the tantric path of means; different approaches are praised as superior in different
texts. Finally, the common origin of these instructions is the guru. The guru is used in meditation
practices as an aid, devotion to the guru in combination with understanding conceptualisation
is a soteriological sufficient factor, and realisation of the guru’s ultimate state represents the goal—
whether employing the yogic exercises of the path of means or not.

In conjunction with the doctrinal flexibility outlined, this supports the suggestion that
the Great Seal is not a set of readymade doctrines and practices but rather consists of, and lives in,
the dynamic interaction between teacher and student. The teacher is—true to the Buddhist ideal of
the ‘best preacher’—depicted as the one who selects the appropriate method from the ‘ocean of
instructions’. The main goal is then to actualise the innate, to find conceptualisation as in essence
dharmakāya and come to an experience. Experience and realisation are the ultimate goals against
which any means is ‘tested’. This pragmatic approach bears similarities to traits of early Buddhism,
as pointed out in the famous Alagaddīpamāsutta. Thus, the Great Seal of the Eighth Karmapa may
be better understood as an adaptable and flexible pragmatic device, where experience is conceived of
as superior to claims of ultimate truth. It is to be hoped that such an approach will constitute a useful
avenue for future research into the rich textual material of the Indo-Tibetan Great Seal traditions.

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90 For the Buddha as the best preacher, see Deegalle (2006: 21–35).
91 Realisation is achieved through training in meditative experiences (mnyam) and finally resting in the natural
state (Martin 1992: 242). Sharf (1995) has—mainly on the basis of Japanese Buddhism—argued that the rhetoric of
experience is not based on exact terms and experiences. Gyatso warns not to take this to the extreme (1999: 115f.)
and shows that, unlike Japanese Buddhism, Tibetan traditions clearly have written about experience (nyams myong).
She refers to the Great Seal, Direct Vision branch of the Great Perfection and the four empowerments of the niruttara-tantras.
92 It compares the Buddha’s teaching to a raft: ‘You, O monks, who understand the Teaching’s similitude to a raft, you
should let go even (good) teachings, how much more false ones!’ Alagaddīpamāsutta 14 (Majjhima Nikāya 22), trans.
93 The contemporary Zhwa dmar pa, Mi pham Chos kyi blo gros (b. 1952), for example, reported that he is using
the ultimate teaching from the Ninth Karmapa’s guidebook for both pointing out the nature of mind directly, and as
instruction on the completion stage (oral communication, July 2006).
Bibliography

General Abbreviations

HR  History of Religion
IATS  International Association of Tibetan Studies
JAOS  Journal of the American Oriental Society
JIABS  Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIATS  Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies
JIP  Journal of Indian Philosophy
JTS  Journal of the Tibet Society
LTWA  Library of Tibetan Works and Archives
NGMPP  Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project
PIATS  Proceedings of the Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies

Sources and Literature in Tibetan Language (Abbreviations)

A khu A khra


’Bras-spungs dkar chag


Collected Works of the Eighth Karmapa


dKar chag


Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta

\textit{Mi bskyod rdo rje'i spyad pa'i rabs}


\textit{mKhas pa’i dga’ ston}


\textit{Phyag chen mdzod}

Zhva dmar pa Mi pham chos kyi blo gros (ed.). \textit{Ngges don phyag rgya chen po’i khrid mdzod}. New Delhi, 1998 (Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, W 23447).

\textit{Kam tshang}

Si tu Pan' chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas (1699/1700-1774) and 'Be lo Tshe dbang kun khyab. \textit{bKa’ brgyud gser phreng rnam thar zla ba chu sel gyi phreng ba smad cha (The Golden Garland of Kagyu Biographies, vol. 2)}. Sarnath: Vajra Vidya Institute Library, 2004. (Reprint of: \textit{sGrub brgyud karma ka’m tshang brgyud pa rnam thar rin po che’i rnam par thar pa rab 'byams nor bu zla ba chu shel gyi phreng ba}.)

Zhang Yisun


\textbf{Sources and Literature in Tibetan Language}

bKra shis chos ‘phel, Karma (b. nineteenth century). g\textit{Nas lugs phyag rgya chen po’i rgya gzhung glegs bam gsum yi ge’i 'byung gnas su ji ltar bkod pa’i dkar chags bzhugs byang mdoor bsdsu pa sgrub brgyud grub pa’i rna rgyan ces bya ba bzhugs so}. In \textit{Phyag chen mdzod (rGya gzhung)}, vol. hûm.


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sGrub brgyud rin po che ’i phreng ba karma kam tshang rtogs pa ’i don brgyud las byung ba ’i gsung dri ma med pa rnams bkod nas ngag ’don rgyun khryi gyi rimpa ’phags lam bgrod pa ’i shing rta. In gDams ngag mdzod, vol. 7, pp. 106–121.


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Mathes, Klaus-Dieter (ed.). Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma ’i bstan bcos kyi ’grel bshad de kho na nyid rab tu gsal ba ’i me long. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003. (Nepal Research Centre Publications 24.)

Karma ’phrin las pa I, Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1456–1539). Dri lan gyi phreng ba rnams. In The Songs of Esoteric Practice (Mgur) and Replies to Doctrinal Questions (Dris-lan) of Karma ’phrin-las-pa. New Delhi: Ngawang Topgay, 1975, pp. 87–223. (Reproduced from Prints of the 1539 Rin-chen-ri-bo Blocks.)

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mGur kyi ’phreng ba rnams. In The Songs of Esoteric Practice (Mgur) and Replies to Doctrinal Questions (Dris-lan) of Karma ’phrin-las-pa. New Delhi: Ngawang Topgay, 1975, pp. 1–86. (Reproduced from Prints of the 1539 Rin-chen-ri-bo Blocks.)


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gZhan stong legs par smra ba ’i sgron me. NGMPP, Reel no. 2496/3, 20 fols.

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——. mNyams med dags po ka’ brgyud kyi gdam pa’i srogi (abbrv. for srog gi) yang snying, NGMPP, Reel no. E 12794/6, 9 fols. (Unpublished manuscript, dbu med, partly written in ‘khyug yig).


——. Po to ba’i chig lab ring mo la mi bs kyod rdo rje ‘grel pa mdzad pa’i bstan bcos. In Collected Works of the Eighth Karmapa, vol. 19, pp. 43–123, 43 fols.


——. Thun bzhi bla ma’i rnal shyor. In gDams ngag mdzod, pp. 271–278. (With commentary by Karma chags med.)


Literature in Western Languages


Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice


Searching for a Possibility of Buddhist Hermeneutics: Two Exegetic Strategies in Buddhist Tradition

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One of the main concerns in religious studies lies in hermeneutics: While interpreters of religion, as those in all other fields, are doomed to perform their work through the process of conceptualization of their subjects, religious reality has been typically considered as transcending conceptual categorization. Such a dilemma imposed on the interpreters of religion explains the dualistic feature of the Western hermeneutic history of religion—the consistent attempts to describe and explain religious reality on the one hand and the successive reflective thinking on the limitation of human knowledge in understanding ultimate reality on the other hand. Especially in the modern period, along with the emergence of the methodological reflection on religious studies, the presupposition that the “universally accepted” religious reality or “objectively reasoned” religious principle is always “over there” and may be eventually disclosed through refined scientific methods has become broadly questioned and criticized.

The apparent tension between the interpreter/interpretation and the object of interpretation in religious studies, however, does not seem to have undermined the traditional Buddhist exegetes’ eagerness for their work of expounding the Buddhist teachings: The Buddhist exegetes and commentators not only devised various types of systematic and elaborate literal frameworks such as logics, theories, styles and rhetoric but also left the vast corpus of canonical literatures in order to transmit their religious teaching. The Buddhist interpreters’ enthusiastic attitude in the composition of the literal works needs more attention because they were neither unaware of the difficulty of framing the religious reality into the mold of language nor forced to be complacent to the limited use of language about the reality. In this article, I attempt to search for a possibility and/or adequacy of intellectual activity of interpretation of religious-supra-intellectual sphere of Buddhism by investigating two exegetic strategies employed both in the Theravāda and the Mahāyāna tradition for this purpose.

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1 In this article, I use the term “hermeneutics” in the broad and general sense of “principles of interpretation” in the act of understanding texts, even if there is an apparent connotation of historicity in the current use of the term, hermeneutics. Historically the meaning of the term has evolved: Until the nineteenth century when F. D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) established the independent discipline of hermeneutics as “the art of understanding” that operated in all modes of human communication, not just in the activity of interpretation of written texts, the hermeneutics had just referred to the principle or method of interpretation of the religious texts, especially the Bible. In the modern hermeneutics since Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), this term has become intertwined with the notion of historicity: Heidegger, conceiving the act of understanding as the way of existence itself, claimed that our understanding is always determined within specific historical contexts, and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) also indicated the historical distance that placed between ancient texts and modern readers or interpreters. For the issue of hermeneutics and historicity in the study of Buddhism, see John C. Maraldo, “Hermeneutics and Historicity in the Study of Buddhism,” The Eastern Buddhist 19, no. 1 (1986).

Negative Induction: “Four Antinomies” and “Three Characteristics of Phenomena”

The first interpretive strategy that one may think of to explain the object beyond conceptualization should be to approach the object in a negative way: Since the object is not something conceptualizable, the only way to describe it is to describe it through what the object is not. This negative approach, which I would call “negative induction,” was employed by the early Buddhist interpreters: Since religious reality was not able to be directly presented by conceptual theorization, the early Buddhist exegetes, following the precedent of the Buddha, adopted the indirect method negating all possible conceptual formulations of the existential status of reality. For instance, in the dialectic form of the “four antinomies” (Skt. *catuṣkoṭi*), the status of Tathāgata after death is just described by negating all possible modes of the existence of Tathāgata: “It has not been declared by the Blessed One: ‘the Tathāgata exists after death’; ‘the Tathāgata does not exist after death’; ‘the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death’; ‘the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.’ “We should note here that what the early Buddhists implied by negating the existential modes of the reality was not simply the ineffability of religious reality, but the negation of the notion of existence itself - the notion that would have the risk of being reduced to an ontologically consistent entity. In other words, they warned the conceptualization itself of reality since the process of conceptualization tends to entail the false reading of ultimate reality as an ontological entity.

When we see that religious reality is something that cannot be caught in any form of ontological proposition, the interpretive dilemma in religious study appears not just confined to a methodological problem, but rather concerned with a more fundamental question--the question of how to approach reality or whether the interpretive method is an appropriate frame to represent the given object, and so on. As is well known, the broad reflection on the validity of methodology in academic fields, that is, “meta-methodological” discussion, has emerged as one of the main issues in the postmodern period; especially the modern positivistic scholars’ scientific methodology has been criticized along with their postulation of originally complete and wholesome objects of interpretation, which is believed by them to be finally discovered. For the modern positivistic scholars, the indubitable certitude of their objects did justice to their positivistic methodology, and the scientific rationality of their methodology in turn confirmed their eventual achievement of complete understanding of their objects. In this light, the methodological reflection again does not serve simply as the matter of a particular interpretive method but directly leads to the theoretical problem of how we understand or define the interpretive object. The early Buddhists’ exhaustive negation of the conceptualized modes of reality then may be seen as reflecting their denial of ontological characterization of ultimate reality as existentially identifiable entity.

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3 One of the representative instances of the early Buddhist negative approach to reality is well presented in the list of “fourteen unanswered (Skt. *avyākta*) questions” to which the Buddha refused to reply. The questions are all concerned about metaphysical understanding of reality confining the object into one of the alternative existential modes. These questions are as follows: Whether the world is permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent; whether the world is finite, infinite, both finite and infinite, or neither finite nor infinite; whether the Tathāgata exists after death, he does not, both exits and does not exist, or neither exists nor does nor does not exist; whether one has the same body and spirit after death, or different.
We can find another instance of the early Buddhists’ negative approach to ontological theorizing of reality among one of the main Buddhist doctrines—the doctrine of “three characteristics of phenomena” (Skt. *tridṛṣṭīnāmātmamudrā*), i.e. “impermanence” (Skt. *anitya*), “suffering” (Skt. *duḥkhā*), and “no-self” (Skt. *anātman*). The first and the third characteristics, “impermanence” and “no-self,” implies that there is no such thing as inherent selfhood that keeps its persistent identity through time. What needs to be noted here is that not only religious ultimate reality such as Tathāgata, but even our daily experienced phenomena are not able to be conceptualized on its ultimate level of reality: When conceptualized, each of the phenomena would be perceived as an individual static object with unchanging identity, and this illusory conceptualized image of the phenomenon is in turn identified with the phenomenon itself. Since there is no such existence that has independent “self,” that is, a fixed and unchanging identity, ultimate level of reality, whether Buddha or daily experiences, cannot be grasped in the conceptualized frame of language. But this does not mean that the conventional level of phenomena are not to be conceptually describable; Even with no determinate and permanent identity, phenomena still may be expressed in concepts. This will be more discussed later.

Just as the negative connotation of “impermanence” and “no-self” implies that there is nothing like permanent “self,” the negation of ontological interpretation of the “four antinomies” may be also viewed as being intended to prevent our arbitrary reduction of reality to such a permanent existence as unchanging metaphysical entity: Since the concept of “Tathāgata” of the “four antinomies” tends to be characterized as perfect and indubitable in its own right, “Tathāgata,” when taken on the ontological basis through such notions as “exist” or “non-exist,” is obliged to be rendered ontologically immutable entity. Thus, it may be seen that the negative response to any ontological approach in the “four antinomies” was aimed to obstruct the illusory formation of ontological “self.” The essential message of both doctrines of “four antinomies” and “three characteristics of phenomena” then may be viewed as “selflessness” of all phenomena. This notion of “selflessness” became fully developed later in the Madhyamaka philosophy into another negative notion of “emptiness.”

**Negative Induction of the Madhyamaka School**

The early Buddhist interpretive strategy of “negative induction” may be said to have been developed into the Mahāyāna, especially Madhyamaka, doctrine of “emptiness” in terms of both its signification and style. Both doctrines of “no-self” and “emptiness,” through their negative form of dialectic, have the implication that all phenomena are devoid of any sort of determinate identity. In his eminent *Madhyamakakārikā*, Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school, seeks to reveal “emptiness” of various categories of conceptual propositions, such as “dependent origination” (Skt. *pratītyasamutpāna*), “self-nature” (Skt. *svabhāva*), “time” (Skt. *kāla*), or “Tathāgata,” attempting to prove the logical falsity of ontological conceptualization of reality; Broadly negating ontologically antithetical categories such as “existence” and “non-existence,” “identical” and “different,” or “eternal” and “nihilistic,” Nāgārjuna indicates the fallacy of ontological understanding that is inherent in the process of conceptualization of reality. When considered that the process of conceptualizing an object tends to substantialize the object and that the substantialized object in turn solidifies back the conceptualizing process, all conceptual categories, including even Buddhist doctrinal concepts, Nāgārjuna argues, should be regarded as “empty.” The doctrine of “emptiness” may be seen as the Mahāyāna version of “negative induction” strategy.
In the method of “negative induction,” however, the hermeneutical problem suggested before, still seem to remain intact and unsolved: If the indirect negative approach is the only way of interpretation of reality, the attempt to express religious reality should just end up with ceaseless negations of what reality is not, while never reaching the direct meaning of it. Furthermore, what the interpreters of religious reality can do would be description of the mere “traces” of reality, not reality itself. The verification of reality then might seem to only belong to the individual or personal sphere of experiences, which would be never accurately comprehensible to others. Can we then ever proceed forward out of the endless negative description of reality?

“Middle way” (Skt. madhyamapratipad), the important dimension of the doctrine of “emptiness,” needs to be noted since it suggests the way to escape the circle of endless negation: Since the notion of “emptiness” does not refer to mere “nothing” or “non-existence” as the opposite meaning of concepts, “being” or “existence,” but represents the status beyond such ontological alternatives, even the “emptiness” should eventually be given up. Apparently the negation of “emptiness,” as one may imagine, does not mean making up again a “selfhood” and clinging back to the illusory “self,” for the same reason that “emptiness” does not simply mean “nothingness” of reality. The negation of “emptiness,” or, in other words, the double negation of “self,” rather leads to dynamic causal relationship between phenomena, providing us with the ground on which we can establish a new kind of understanding of existence, which is existence without “self.” On the basis of the realization that what “emptiness” really means, not adhering to the concept itself, we may probably start to discuss the hermeneutic possibility of Buddhism. I will discuss this at the next section by inspecting another main doctrine of the early Buddhism--”four noble truths” (Skt. catuḥsatya).

Independent signification: “Four Noble Truths”

The approach of “negative induction” was not the only interpretive strategy for the Buddhist exegetes to present ultimate reality. In fact, “suffering,” the second notion of “three characteristics of phenomena,” is noteworthy at this point, because the term “suffering” is clearly an affirmative, not negative, concept unlike the other two concepts, “impermanence” and “no-self”: Given that the persistent selfhood inherent in every phenomenon is negated, how is “suffering” (not “non-pleasure, for example) again to be established? In fact, this affirmative concept of “suffering” is, as is commonly known, one of the key notions of the Buddhist teachings; we see the concept in not only the doctrine of “three characteristics of phenomena” but also the crucial doctrine of “four noble truths,” i.e. “the truth of suffering” (Skt. duḥkhasatya); “the cause of suffering” (Skt. samudayasatya); “the cessation of suffering” (Skt. nirodhasatya); “the path to the cessation of suffering” (Skt. mārgasatya). It is apparent that, in this doctrine of “four noble truths,” the notion of “suffering,” as one of the “noble truths,” constitutes ultimate truth in Buddhist tradition along with the other affirmative concepts of “the cause,” “the cessation” and “the path.” Then again, the questions in this respect would be: How should we understand the use of the direct affirmative concept of “suffering” when there is no persistent entity that is objectifiable?; can we find any logical explanation for the conceptualization of ultimately in-conceptualizable object? Insofar as what “suffering” of the “four noble truths” refers

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4 In the chapter of Analysis of the Noble Truths, Nāgārjuna himself clearly presents “emptiness” as the ground of all existence by stating “Since there is the principle of emptiness, all phenomena are defined. If there were not the principle of emptiness, no phenomenon is possible.” (T 30. 33a22ff)
to is not considered a provisional or conventional truth, but ultimate reality, it appears that we need to find a hermeneutic legitimacy to explain this appropriation of the concept “suffering” in Buddhism.

A possible explanation to this problem seems to be found by reflecting on the way in which “suffering” means in the structure of “four noble truths”: The concept of “suffering” in the “four noble truths” has its meaningful sense only within the interdependent relationship with the other three truths. Likewise, it is only within the relationship with the other truths that each concept of the other three truths has its own validity. The point is that the reason that the term “suffering” is conceived as what “suffering” commonly means is not because an object corresponding to the term “suffering” exists, but because the interdependent relationship exists. The relationship between each of the four truths is not a byproduct of the preexisting four truths: Rather the existence of the four truths builds only upon their interdependent relationship. If the meaning of one of the four truths disappears, the meanings of the others would also disappear, since there is no such thing as individually existing referent of each of the truths. It is only through the relationship that the four truths have their existential meanings. Viewed in this way, this affirmative way to describe reality appears to lead us to another interpretive strategy, which I would call “interdependent signification,” besides the approach of “negative induction” mentioned before.

One thing that attracts our attention in relation with the interpretive model of “interdependent signification” is that, in different versions of the doctrine of “three characteristics of phenomena,” we read “nirvāṇa” at the place of the notion of “suffering.” The fact that the notion of “nirvāṇa” are found instead of “suffering” apparently suggests the close relationship between the two notions; moreover, when considered that each of the notions is commonly defined depending on the state of the other notion, the causal relationship between the two notions may be viewed as interdependent. Turning back to the problem that the notion of “suffering” in the doctrine of “three characteristics of phenomena,” unlike the other two, is affirmatively put, the difficulty of describing reality in affirmative way would then be explained this way: Even though concepts do not have their substantial referents, the affirmative use of concepts in describing ultimate reality is still to be legitimized because the concepts are able to maintain their valid meanings within the interdependent relationship between them. Since there is no such thing as substantial existence, the concepts, though seen as referring to it, do not indicate ontologically particular objects; since the relationship exists between the provisionally established concepts, the concepts do not have to be dismissed as nothing even without their referents. If the former negation of substantial existence is to be conceived as “not-being,” while the latter affirmation of the relationship as “not-non-being,” we may associate these negations of two ontological extremes, “being” and “non-being,” with the Madhyamaka doctrine of “middle way”; it appears that we may find doctrinal consistency between the early Buddhist interpretive strategy of “interdependent signification” and the Mahayana approach of “negative induction.” When we are able to admit the validity of the affirmative description of reality in the interpretive activity of religion, we also might be able to expect a hermeneutical possibility of religious reality.

5 In the Samyuktāgama, the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, the Mulasarvāstivādavinayavibhaṅga, etc., the concept of “suffering” is found instead of “nirvāṇa,” while the Anguttara nikāya and the Dhammapada present the doctrine as “permanence,” “suffering,” and “no-self.” There is also the doctrine of “four characteristics of phenomena” in such literatures as the Samyuttanikāya and the Pusa diqi jing (Skt. Bodhisattvabhūmiśūtra), listing all four in the order of “permanence,” “suffering,” “no-self,” and “nirvāṇa.”

6 Based on the common explanations in the scriptures on nirvāṇa and “suffering,” it may be generally said that nirvāṇa comes true only when one realizes the nature of “suffering” of life and overcomes it; if “suffering” remains in one’s way of cultivation, nirvāṇa, the goal of cultivation, is never to be reached.
“Nature of Dependent Arising” of the Yogācāra School

The interpretive strategy of “interdependent signification” of the early Buddhism was inherited to the Yogācāra school, one of the two main schools of Mahāyāna tradition along with Madhyamaka school. For instance, both doctrines of the “four noble truths” of the early Buddhism and the “three aspects of nature [of existence]” (Skt. tri-svabhāva) of the Yogācāra school, i.e. “nature of pervasive attachment [of illusory characterization of existence]” (Skt. parikalpita-svabhāva), “nature of dependent arising [of existence]” (Skt. paratantra-svabhāva), and “nature of perfect truthfulness [of existence]” (Skt. parinispamya-svabhāva), engage direct affirmative concepts in representing reality without assigning any ontological connotation to the concepts. The doctrine of “three aspects of nature,” even if designated as “nature” of reality, does not indicate something that exists independently with its own self-nature, but just provisional/conventional concept to signify the selflessness of reality. This does not mean, however, that the inherent meaning of the concept makes no sense just because of the provisionality of the concept; the point is that the inherent meaning of “three aspects of nature,” which is, “selflessness” of reality, should be grasped without postulating any substantial existences corresponding to the concepts. This is exactly what is noted before in regards with the Madhyamaka notion of “emptiness,” which is a merely borrowed concept to represent “selflessness” of reality. Moreover, such provisionality of the designation of “nature” is also demonstrated by the fact that the doctrine of “three aspects of nature” is commonly presented in parallel with the doctrine of “three non-natures” (Skt. tri-vidhāniḥsvabhāva), i.e. “non-nature of characteristics” (Skt. laksāna-niḥsvabhāvatā), “non-nature of arising” (Skt. utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā), and “non-nature of supreme truth” (Skt. paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā); the fact that one single purpose is explicable through two seemingly contrasting doctrines of “three aspects of nature” and “three non-natures,” or, in other words, through a paradoxical structure of “nature of non-nature,” induces us to notice that it is the inner purpose, not the literal meaning, that we should pay attention in these two intertwined doctrines. The double conceptualization of one single purpose appears to function as a kind of another interpretive strategy to inhibit the one-sided, not middle-way, understanding of reality.

It is in the “nature of dependent arising [of existence],” the second of “three aspects of nature,” that the establishment of relationship between phenomena is plainly accepted along with its meaningful validity in a positive tone: The “nature of dependent arising” means that causal relationship between phenomena can be established even though each of the phenomena has no independent substantial identity--the implication that is also displayed, as previously discussed, in the structure of the “interdependent signification” of the “four noble truths.” But, again, it is only on the basis of the principle of “emptiness,” viz. the principle of no-principle, that this causal

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7 The meaning of the doctrine of “three non-natures” is intrinsically identical with that of the doctrine of “three aspects of nature.” The signification of each “non-nature” in the light of the “three aspects of nature” is as follows: The “non-nature of characteristics” means that there is no such thing as nature in the illusorily characterized existence; the “non-nature of arising” signifies that there is no such thing as nature in the dependently arising existence; the “non-nature of supreme truth” indicates that there is no such thing as nature in the supreme truth. While the “three aspects of nature” expresses “selflessness” using a positive term such as “nature,” the “three non-natures” displays the same purpose in a negative way.

8 That what the “four noble truths” implies is no other than the “nature of dependent arising [of existence]” may be verified through the Yogācāra theory of “four levels of twofold truths (C. sīzhong erdi 四重二詮),” or “four levels of the absolute truth (Skt. paramārthasatya) and the conventional truth (Skt. samyuktasatya).” According to the theory, the doctrine of “four noble truths” is assigned to the second level of the “absolute truth” and the third level of the “conventional truth,” both of which conforms to the “nature of dependent arising.”
relationship has its valid meaning. “Emptiness” connotes the negation of itself as well as the others, and thus it does not allow residing at the one side of ontological alternatives. The clue to resolve the hermeneutical problem of conceptualizing the object beyond conceptualization then appears to be found by reflecting on the “dependent arising” aspect of phenomena.

At this point, however, arises a new and practical problem - the problem of how to establish the relationship, in other words, the problem of interpretation itself: When it comes to the interpretation of a particular text, we should consider the fact that any interpretation is necessarily conditioned by a complex mix of factors such as socio-historical environmental elements, the subjective mindset of the interpreter or the type of possible readers, and so on. We could reach different conclusions depending on what kind of conditions, to what extent and in what way we consider. But how different? This issue of fluidity of interpretation appears to be not only a problem of interpretation within Buddhist studies, but also one of the major issues in the current postmodern scholarship. It is at this moment that such notions as “spiritual capacity” (Skt. indriya), “skillful means” (Skt. upāya), and “doctrinal classification” (C. jiaopan 敎判) draw our attention as traditional devices that explain the existence of diverse or sometimes seemingly contradictory interpretations within the scriptures or the doctrines of Buddhist schools: According to the Buddhist traditional explanation, the different levels of teaching are necessary as “skillful means” for the different spiritual levels of living beings. The early distinction of scriptural texts into two groups, the “scriptures with definitive meaning” (Skt. nītārtha) and “those with a meaning to be determined” (Skt. neyārtha), also serves as one of the hermeneutic schemes legitimizing the activity of interpretation of the “scriptures with a meaning to be determined.”

The problem, however, is that such concepts of “spiritual capacity,” “skillful means,” and “doctrinal classification” may be used in considerably arbitrary ways. In fact it has been indicated that Buddhist schools selectively used and interpreted the scriptures in the way that they defended their own doctrinal positions as well as subsumed those of the rival schools.9 This hermeneutical contingency are sometimes taken as an evidence that supports the New Historicists’ claim that all phenomena, including religions, should be understood within the socio-cultural context that the phenomena are placed in, or the phenomenological way of approach that our understanding of phenomena should be regarded as the reflection of our subjective consciousness on phenomena. Strictly speaking, we do not have any consensual criterion or definite standard to determine whether the diversity of Buddhist interpretation should be considered from the view of contingency (if going further, the anti-reductionist/relativistic view), or be regarded as one facet of the causal relationship between phenomena. One might even argue that the positions of “middle way” and “relativism” have no difference not only in their style also in their basic tenet, because both views do not permit any universally applicable self-sufficient principle.

The difference between the “Buddhist/religious “ understanding of the diversity of phenomena from the perspective of “middle way” and the “secularist” approach to it from the “relativistic” viewpoint, I would suggest, lies in the way in which they comprehend the relationship of phenomena: While the “relativistic” approach explains the causal relationship of phenomena through the notion of contingent uncertainty, the “middle way” position perceives it through

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9 For the double use of the notion of “skillful means” as an explanation for the difference of Buddhist teachings that are all ultimately appropriate on the one hand and as an authoritative reason to advocate a particular school’s doctrinal position on the other hand, see Donald S. Lopez, “On the Interpretation of the Mahāyāna Sūtras,” in Buddhist Hermeneutics, ed. Donald S. Lopez (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988).
the principle of no-principle, that is, “emptiness.” Therefore, while the former position inevitably ends up with “endless narratives” regarding the causal relationship of phenomena, the latter pursues to advance toward the principle itself (or, if exactly speaking, the principle that there is no such thing as principle) which is beyond this relationship.

According to the traditional account, it is just on the level of the “nature of dependent arising” among the “three aspects of nature [of existence]” that such issues as the causal relationship of phenomena and the diversity of interpretation of phenomena make its sense. Even if the causal relationship between phenomena provides the answer to the hermeneutical dilemma, however, this relationship, according to Buddhist philosophical scheme, is no more than provisional establishment. Even the Buddhist doctrines that explain the interdependent relationship, such as the “four noble truths,” belongs to the provisional interpretation on the level of the “dependent arising,” not the direct description of “emptiness.” In other words, this relationship merely refers to the phenomena built upon the principle of “emptiness,” not straightforwardly revealing the principle of “emptiness” itself. Then, a similar, if not the same, question with the one that I raised in searching for the hermeneutic possibility of Buddhist interpretation will be put again now toward the last level of “three aspects of nature [of existence],” i.e. “nature of perfect truthfulness”: How can we understand the inconceptualizable principle of “emptiness”? To put it in another way, how are we able to see the moon, not the finger that points at the moon? It is in this context that the Buddhism attempts to take the hermeneutical leap, or “non-logical hermeneutics,” to reach the “nature of perfect truthfulness,” which is beyond the conceptual interpretation.

Non-logical Hermeneutics

The so-called “non-logical hermeneutics,” the hermeneutic method that was devised to immediately grasp the elusive notion of “middle way,” is well exemplified in the seemingly illogical or paradoxical Chan “public cases” (C. gong’an 公案). Strictly speaking, such “non-logical hermeneutic” strategies may not be categorized into the given issue of hermeneutics since the scope of the current hermeneutics is confined to the interpretive method by logical signification of conceptual system. To mention a little for the sake of integrity, this “non-logical hermeneutic” strategy refers to the distinctive Chan rhetoric that involves non-logical concepts in order to induce the student to an instant realization of the meaning of “middle way” that cannot be caught in the conceptual system.

In Chan gong’an, the concepts are used in the way that the student cannot settle in a particular ontological stance, while being forced to be led to the condition of ontological suspension. For instance, “no” (C. wu 無), Zhaozhou’s (778–897 趙州) response to his student’s question of whether dogs have Buddha-nature or not, may be considered as non-logical, or beyond logic, since Zhaozhou answered “no” even though he knew the doctrinally and logically correct answer, “yes”; the ontological tension that has been brought up due to the logical contradiction between Zhaozhou’s answer and the conventional answer inhibits the student from staying complacent about either of the two ontological alternatives.10 Zhaozhou’s dilemmatic situation of choosing between the two

Criticizing the popular tendency to regard gong’an merely as “illogical paradoxes or riddles,” Robert Sharf argues that in some cases the original meaning or doctrinal purport may be recovered. He claims that the “dog” gong’an works as a trap for those who seek to reify the notion of Buddha-nature and that Zhaozhou’s “no” is not a denial of Buddha-nature to dogs, but a rhetorical strategy to escape the conceptual trap on him. See Robert H. Sharf, “How to Think with Chan Gong’an,” in Thinking with Cases: Specialist Knowledge in Chinese Cultural History, ed. Charlotte Furth, Judith T. Zeitlin, and Ping-chen Hsiung (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007).
concepts with the opposite significations was able to be released by using this logical unconformity. In this regard, in Chan tradition, any types of theoretical explanation through conceptual meaning system is considered as “dead-word” (C. siju 死句), while the non-logical concepts to lead the student towards the raw meaning of “emptiness” is conceived as “live-word” (C. huoju 活句).11 The initial realization instigated by this non-logical hermeneutic strategy, Chan teachers say, may culminate in meditative cultivation.

Conclusion

The hermeneutic difficulty in Buddhism, as in the other fields of religious studies, comes from the supposition that the object of interpretation is beyond the methodological frame of interpretation, that is, conceptualization. The solution of the dilemma throughout the early and later Mahāyāna Buddhism was obtained not by the transformation or replacement of the particular methods but by the fundamental understanding of the object of interpretation. Based on the understanding of the ontological “selflessness” of reality, the hermeneutic tradition in Buddhism may be divided into two groups: The emphasis on the lack of substantial existence entails the negative (apophatic) hermeneutics, i.e. “negative induction,” that excludes the affirmative conceptualization; this hermeneutic approach is traditionally displayed in the early Buddhists’ “no-self” theory through the Mahāyāna notion of “emptiness.” On the other hand, the exhaustive contemplation on this “selflessness” in turn legitimizes the positive (cataphatic) hermeneutics, i.e. “independent signification,” in which the causal relationship of reality may be interpreted; the “four noble truths” theory of the early Buddhism and the Yogācāra doctrine of “three aspects of phenomena” represents this approach of hermeneutics. What remains to us appears the task of elucidation of the relationship, unraveling the entanglement of causes and effects of phenomena. This task is nothing new, however, at least in terms of its methodology. Whether one deals with the relationship from a comprehensive perspective of reality or approaches it in a regional or parochial category, or whether one seeks for the universal explanation of the causes and effects of phenomena or investigates concrete aspects of the relationships in specific temporal and local conditions, the commonly applied purpose is to explain the causal relationship(s). Or, in the light of the current subject of the hermeneutic possibility of Buddhism, as discussed in this article, whether the effort to explain reality is directed toward the “ceaseless narratives” or considered as a part of the process of religious cultivation, the elucidation of the relationship has been Buddhist interpreters’ responsibility, and will be in the future too.

11 Robert E. Buswell presents the notions of “live-word” and “dead-word” as one of Chan hermeneutical tools along with the notions of “three mysterious gates” (C. sanxuamen 三玄門) and the circular graphic symbols. He indicates that, once interpreted in a theoretical description, even any “live-word” becomes a “dead-word” on the one hand and presents the case of Chinul (1128-1210) on the other hand, who, even as a Sŏn (C. Chan) monk, regarded scholastic descriptions of Buddhist teaching as also vital for the process of cultivation. Chinul’s case that he obtained an enlightenment experience during reading the Platform Sūtra (C. Tanjing 廣經) demonstrates, Buswell claims, that “even the dead-words of the scriptures can come alive.” For more information, see Robert E. Buswell, “Ch’an Hermeneutics: A Korean View,” Buddhist Hermeneutics (1988).
References:


Introduction

This essay provides a condensed introductory ‘snapshot’ of just a few of the many and profound correlations existing between early (pre-Abhidhamma) Pāli Buddhism and Transcendental Phenomenology, by focusing on what is arguably the most central and essential ‘philosophical problem’ in both traditions: the true nature and significance of the ‘I’ of subjective intentional consciousness. It argues that the Buddhist axiom of ‘not-self’ (anattā) is by no means incompatible with the fundamental phenomenological irreducibility, and necessity, of transcendental subjectivity – or, as Husserl also puts it, of the ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental ‘I’’ – a structure evidently essential to intentional consciousness as ‘consciousness-of’. On the one hand, Husserl recognises (and struggles with) the peculiar ‘emptiness’ of the ‘pure ‘I’’. On the other hand, a fundamental distinction must clearly be drawn between genuine intentional subjectivity – which even Buddhas and Arahants must of necessity possess – and the erroneous bases upon which the concept of ‘self’ (atā) that Buddhism rejects is constituted: the feeling of ‘I am’ (asmi’ti), the sense of ‘I am this’ (ayam-aham-asmi’ti), and the concept/concept of ‘I am’ (asmi-māna) – all of which Buddhas and Arahants by definition do not possess. Hence, it is argued that, while the ‘pure I’ does not refer to some permanent ‘entity’ called ‘self’, nor is it merely an empty, non-referring, conventional linguistic marker: it has not merely a ‘use’, but a genuine meaning, which derives from the intrinsic, irreducible, and ‘pre-linguistic’ experiential structure of ‘consciousness-of’ itself. What is more, this meaning is not only recognised and admitted, but actively utilised, within the doctrine and methodology of early Buddhism, without any sense of contradicting the axiom of anattā.

1. Preliminary (1): The axiom of anattā

This essay aims to provide a very condensed and merely introductory ‘snapshot’ of just a few of the many and very deep correlations that exist between transcendental phenomenology (TP) and early Pāli Buddhadhamma (EB); but the elements of this ‘snapshot’ are organized around what is arguably the most essential theme – one might even say, ‘philosophical problem’ – at the heart of both TP and EB. It is the intention of this essay not to contradict the fundamental EB axiom of anattā, ‘not-self’. In other words, the arguments presented here will not posit any essentially permanent subjective or objective entity or identity called atā, or ‘self’. Nor will they assert asmi’ti, ‘I am’;

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1 I would gratefully like to thank Peter Harvey for his helpful and encouraging comments on and questions about the previous version of this paper. I hope that through my addressing his comments and questions, the clarity of this paper has been improved for the benefit of others. I would also like to register my respect for and appreciation of the great work accomplished by Bhikkhus Bodhi and Thānissaro: without their beautiful efforts, it would have required at least two more lifetimes for me to gain the understanding of early Pāli Buddhadhamma which they have helped me to gain within a fraction of this lifetime. I also deeply and gratefully thank the International Association of Buddhist Universities for accepting this paper as part of its 2011/2012 conference program.
or ‘ayam aham asmī`i, ‘I am this’; or asmi-māna, the ‘I am’ concept/conceit; or again, ahaṅkāra, ‘I-making’, or mamaṅkāra, ‘mine-making’.

However, these arguments will propose the conclusion that ‘pure subjectivity’ is an inherent and irreducible property of intentional consciousness (i.e., ‘consciousness-of’), an essential aspect of the actual process of lived conscious experience; and that there is a definite phenomenological sense in which, when everything else has been ‘excluded’ and ‘reduced’, ‘pure consciousness-of’ remains as an absolutely irreducible principle. But neither pure consciousness-of nor its intrinsic subjectivity can constitute (or be constituted as) a ‘self’ of any kind: they are ‘transcendental’ facts, equivalent to ‘pure emptiness’. Moreover, if there were no phenomenon whatsoever for consciousness-of to be conscious-of, then, given that consciousness-of already apodictically demonstrates the irreducible nature of ‘being conscious-of’, it could be conscious-of nothing but its own consciousness-of. In other words, this would be a form of absolute cessation (nirodha).4

For the sake of clarity and reference, the axiom of anattā will be summarized here in five items: a general premise and four arguments.5 1. Whatever might be regarded as a personal ‘self’ (atta) or ‘I am’ (‘asmī`i) will inevitably be just the five aggregates of clinging (pañcupādānakkhandhā) or some one of them.6 2. The five aggregates are not ‘self’ because one cannot control them to prevent affliction.7 3. The five aggregates are impermanent (anicca), painful (dukkha), and have the nature of change (vipaṇīma); therefore, it is not befitting or proper (kallām) to think of them as a ‘self’.8 4. It is not acceptable (na khamati) to posit a ‘self’ that is entirely separate from experience and the phenomena of experience.9 5. Dependent co-arising is a sufficient and valid explanation of the continuity of temporal experience; therefore, there is no need to posit a ‘self’ in order to account for that continuity.10

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2 In Husserl’s TP terminology, this is Erlebnis, ‘lived experience’, ‘mental process’ (cf. also fn. 86 below). In EB terminology, this is viññā as a conditioned, constituted, and temporal experiential life-process: i.e., as one of the five aggregates (khandhas); as a ‘tying down’ (nidāna) or ‘link’ in the continuum of dependent co-arising (paṭicca-samuppāda); and thus also as the medium of ‘becoming-again’ (punabbhava). (Cf. also fn. 59 below for further aspects of viññā.)
3 Cf. Section §2.3 below for a clarification of the terms ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’.
4 Here, ‘cessation’ (nirodha) should not be taken to imply a nihilistic sense of ‘annihilation’. Rather, it is intended more literally, in the sense of ‘stopping’. For a very similar understanding, cf. Harvey 1995, §11.8, pp. 184-185; §12.3, p. 199; §§12.7-8, pp. 201-202.
5 Items 2 to 5 have been adapted from the taxonomy of arguments in support of anattā in Collins 1990, §§3.2.2-5, pp. 97-110.
6 SN 22.47 (S III 46): ye hi keci . . . sāmañña vā brāhmanā vā anekavihiṭaṁ attaṁ samanupassaṁmaṁ samanupassaṁti, sabbete pañcupādānakkhandhe samanupassaṁti, etesam vā aṇātaram. The abbreviations DN, MN, SN, and AN will be used to refer to sutta numbers, while D, M, S, and A will refer to Pali Text Society volume and page numbers.
7 SN 22.59 (at S III 66): rūpaṁ, bhikkhave, anattā. rūpaṁo hidaṁ, bhikkhave, attaṁ abhavissat, nayidaṁ rūpaṁ abhādhiya samvatteyya, labbhetha ca rūpe `evaṁ me rūpaṁ hotu, evaṁ me rūpaṁ mā ahosī`i. (So also for vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, viññā.)
8 SN 22.59(atSIII67-68): yampanāniccam dukkhāṁ viparītāṁ mahāṁ, kallammutaṁ samanupassitum: `etam mama, eso ahosī`i?
9 Cf. the refutations in DN 15 (at D II 67-69), which will be discussed below (cf. §4). (Cf. also Bodhi 2010, pp. 42-48, for a detailed discussion of those arguments.) The arguments 3 and 4 above, taken together, constitute a nice dilemmatic argument in support of anattā.
10 The locus classicus is MN 38 (M I 256). I do not think that this argument can be treated as an independent one, as it only has decisive force in combination with the arguments of 3 and 4.
2.  Preliminary (2): Pahāna and epokhē

2.1. Pahāna

In EB, the *assutavā puthujjana* is the ordinary, common person (*puthujjana*) who has either not heard or not understood (*assutavā*) the ‘transcendental’\(^1\) instruction of the Dhamma. Such a person is contrasted to the *ariya sāvaka*, the ‘noble hearer’ or disciple of the Dhamma. The *Mūlapariyāya Sutta* provides an apt ‘phenomenological’ definition of the *assutavā puthujjana*:

He perceives ‘earth’ from ‘earth’; having perceived ‘earth’ from ‘earth’, he conceives ‘earth’, he conceives ‘in earth’, he conceives ‘from earth’, he conceives ‘earth is mine’, he delights in ‘earth’.\(^2\)

This same formula is then applied to ‘absolutely everything’; even, indeed, to *Nibbāna*; as though to say: if a person gets this one thing wrong, they get absolutely *everything* wrong, even the ‘ultimate truth’.

The first essential ‘antidote’ to this problem is *pahāna*, ‘abandoning’. The *Sabba Sutta* and *Pahāna Sutta* teach, respectively, ‘the All’ (*sabba*) and the ‘Dhamma for abandoning All’ (*sabba-pahānaya dhamma*).\(^3\) The *Natūmahākāy Suttas* of the *Khandhaśaśyutta* and the *Saśyatanasāśyutta* also teach exactly this same Dhamma in terms of the five clung-to aggregates (*pañc-upādāna-kkhandhā*) and the six sense spheres (*saśyatana*), respectively; but, as the title of these *sutta*s, ‘Not Yours’ (*na tumhākāma*), indicates, they teach it with an especially interesting twist. The former *sutta* says:

Monks, what is not yours, abandon that. When you have abandoned that, it will be for your benefit and happiness. And what, monks, is not yours? Form . . . feeling . . . perception . . . constitutions . . . consciousness is not yours, abandon that. When you have abandoned that, it will be for your benefit and happiness."\(^4\)

\(^1\) In this context, the term ‘transcendental’ could legitimately be understood as a translation of the term *lokuttara* (lit., ‘higher than, above, beyond [uttara] the world [loka]’), as this sometimes occurs in the EB *sutta*s (as distinct from the ‘technical’ sense that this term is later given within the Abhidhamma system). The term is also often translated as ‘supramundane’. Thus, e.g., MN 96 (at M II 181): evameva kho ahaṃ . . . ariyāṃ lokuttaram dhamman purisassa sandhahan pahiṇapemi, “I . . . declare the noble supramundane Dhamma as a person’s own wealth” (Ñānamoli and Bodhi 2009, p. 789, §12); MN 117 (at M III 72): aṭṭhi . . . sammādiṭṭhi ariyā anāsavā lokuttarā maggagā, “[T]here is right view that is noble, taintless, supramundane, a factor of the path” (Ñānamoli and Bodhi 2009, p. 934, §5). It is quite possible and plausible to argue that, in connection with the Dhamma, the term *lokuttara* can be understood to have certain fundamental implications that it shares in common with the TP sense of the term ‘transcendental’; indeed, this point can already be discerned through the correlation between EB *pahāna* and TP *epokhē* that is outlined in this present section; but cf. also §2.3 below.

\(^2\) Unless otherwise cited, translations from the Pāli are by the present author. MN 1 (M I 1): pathaviṃ pathavito saññānāti, pathaviṃ pathavito saññāvā pathaviṃ maññati, pathaviṃ maññati, pathaviṃ meti maññati, pathaviṃ abhinandati. Bodhi (2006, p. 27) and Nānamoli and Bodhi (2009, p. 83, §3) translate this formula, in accordance with the interpretations of the commentary and sub-commentary, with interpolations, thus: ‘he conceives [himself as] earth, he conceives [himself] in earth, he conceives [himself apart] from earth’, etc. While this reading is certainly valid, I nevertheless prefer a quite literal translation of the text, as I believe that this makes good (phenomenological) sense, just as it is.

\(^3\) SN 35.23-24 (S IV 15-16).

\(^4\) SN 22.33 (S III 33) and SN 35.101 (S IV 81), respectively.

The latter *sutta* says:

Monks, what is not yours, abandon that. When you have abandoned that, it will be for your benefit and happiness. And what, monks, is not yours? Eye . . . visual forms . . . eye-consciousness . . . eye-contact . . . whatever feeling arises with eye-contact as condition, pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant: that, too, is not yours. Abandon that. When you have abandoned that, it will be for your benefit and happiness.\(^{16}\)

And so also for ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty. The commentary explains that the imperative ‘Abandon . . . ’ should be understood to mean: ‘Abandon by means of the abandoning of desire and lust’.\(^{17}\) The *Dutiya Chanda-ppahāna Sutta* supports this, but it is also more exhaustive:

With respect to form . . . feeling . . . perception . . . constitutions . . . consciousness: whatever desire, lust, delight, craving, taking up and clinging, standpoints, adherences and underlying tendencies of the mind there are: abandon these. Thus that form . . . feeling . . . perception . . . constitutions . . . consciousness will be abandoned, cut off at the root, made like an uprooted palm tree, made without (further) becoming, not subject to arising in the future.\(^{18}\)

### 2.2. Epokhē.

In general, it seems true to say that not only human individuals, but human societies, cultures, civilizations – indeed, the human species, as such – are born into, live, and die within a certain ‘pregiven’ and unquestioned attitude towards and assumption about ‘the world’ and their relationship to ‘the world’. This is true not only in ordinary, ‘pre-theoretical’ life, but also in the case of the positive natural sciences; and even, for most people, in religion and religious life. Ordinary, everyday life; the life of science; the life of religion; all of them share and are grounded upon one and the same ‘natural attitude’ (*natürliche Einstellung*).

In this natural attitude, ‘the world’ is given as a self-evident objective and real fact: it exists in front of us, around us, and we live in it: we perceive it, experience it, and act in it. It is ‘simply there, ‘on hand’’.\(^{19}\) The ‘world’ *was* before each of us and *will be* after each of us; it is independent of us; it is just as it is, from its own side, not from ours; and we see it and know it just as it is – including its ‘illusions’ and ‘hallucinations’ – as though these were simply reflected in our minds as in a blank and passive mirror. The world is made up of objects; and we, too, are objects in the world. Yet the world exists outside of us: we each have our own separate, inner, private, subjective life, our mental life; but the real world is external, public, objective, and physical.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{16}\) SN 35.101 (S IV 81-82): *yaṃ bhikkhave, na tumhākaṃ, tām pajahatha. tām vo pahiṇaṃ hitāya sukhāya bhavissati. kiṇca, bhikkhave, na tumhākaṃ? cakkhu . . . rūpā . . . cakkhuviññānaṃ . . . cakkhusamphasso . . . yampidām cakkhusamphassa-paccayā uppajjati vedayitaṃ sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhomasukhaṃ vā tampi na tumhākaṃ. tām pajahatha. tām vo pahiṇaṃ hitāya sukhāya bhavissati.*

\(^{17}\) Spk II 265: *pajahathā ti chandarūga-paṭahāna pajahatha.*

\(^{18}\) SN 22.112 (S III 161): *rūpe . . . vedanāya . . . saññāya . . . saṅkhāresu . . . viññāṇe . . . yo chando yo rūgo yā nandī yā tanha ye upaṭṭadānaṃ cetassā adhiṭṭhānābhinivesanasyā, te pajahatha. evam tāṃ rūpanaṃ . . . tā vedanā . . . tā saññā . . . te saṅkhārā . . . tāṃ viññāṇanāṃ pahiṇaṃ bhavissati uchchinnamūlam tāḷavaṭhukatāṃ anabhāvamkataṃ āyatām anupādadharmam.*

\(^{19}\) Husserl 1982, §27, p. 51; Husserl 1976a, §27, p. ‘*einfach da . . ., ‘vorhanden’ . . .’. This section begins with a nice ‘first personal’ description of the natural attitude.

\(^{20}\) Cf., e.g., Husserl 1982, §30, pp. 56-57; Husserl 1976a, §30, pp. 60-61.
When the scientific attitude says that ‘reality’ is what is really ‘there’ when our own merely subjective consciousness is not ‘there’, and then tries to posit and study that ‘mind-independent’ reality, it is simply intensifying the natural attitude. When the religious attitude says that one must be good and do good ‘in this world’, so that one can be granted access to a ‘better world’, perhaps a ‘heavenly world’, it, too, is simply practising the natural attitude. Something remains fundamentally unquestioned, fundamentally hidden from view, in this natural attitude. Husserl writes of the ‘natural attitude’:

Daily practical living is naïve. It is immersion in the already-given world, whether it be experiencing, or thinking, or valuing, or acting. Meanwhile all those productive intentional functions of experiencing, because of which physical things are simply there, go on anonymously. The experiencer knows nothing about them, and likewise nothing about his productive thinking... Nor is it otherwise in the positive sciences. They are naïvetés of a higher level.\(^2\)

For Husserl, the first essential ‘antidote’ to the ‘natural attitude’ is what he calls the *epoikhe* – an ancient Greek word meaning ‘check, cessation’; and in late Hellenistic philosophy, having the applied sense, ‘suspension of judgment’.\(^2\) For Husserl, the *epoikhe* is the radical suspension or exclusion of the ‘natural attitude’ and all that it implies. He argues that the way in which we give ‘validity’ to our sense of the ‘world’ – with ‘ourselves’ as ‘objects’ within it – cannot be examined, let alone overcome, from within the natural attitude, because the natural attitude is always-already the effect of that bestowal of ‘validity’.\(^2\) We need to step back from, to step out of, that attitude, in order to see how it is constituted in the first instance, and what it obscures from view; in other words, to see what is really and truly ‘here’. He describes this as a shift from a ‘two-dimensional’ to a ‘three-dimensional’ perspective, speaking of the ‘antagonism . . . between the ‘patent’ life of the plane and the ‘latent’ life of depth’.\(^2\) ‘This is not a “view”, an “interpretation” bestowed upon the world,’ he says.\(^2\) All such ‘views’ have their ground in the pregiven world: but the *epoikhe* frees us from this ground itself: we stand ‘above’ the world, which becomes for us a pure ‘phenomenon’.\(^2\)

Husserl first describes the *epoikhe* as a ““parenthesizing” or “excluding””, as a ‘refraining from judgment’,\(^2\) or ‘better, refraining from belief’;\(^2\) but all of this, he says, is perfectly compatible with an ‘unshakable conviction of evident truth’.\(^2\) More explicitly, he says: ‘We put out of action the general posit ing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude.’ Thus,


\(^{25}\) Husserl 1970b, §41, p. 152; Husserl 1954, §41, p. 155: ‘Das ist aber nicht eine „Auffassung“, eine „Interpretation“, die der Welt zuerlebt wird.’


the phenomenological *epokhē* ‘completely shuts me off from any judgment about spatiotemporal factual being’.\(^{30}\) Husserl describes the *epokhē*, and the phenomenological or transcendental attitude that it awakens, as ‘a *total change* of the natural attitude, such that we no longer live, as heretofore, as human beings within natural existence, constantly effecting the validity of the pre-given world’.\(^{31}\) It is ‘by no means a temporary act’, but taken up ‘once and for all’.\(^{32}\) Thus, the *epokhē* is ‘a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion’; but beyond this, he says, it ‘bears within itself the significance of the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to humankind as such’.\(^{33}\)

### 2.3. A clarification of TP terms: ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’

Never can the limit of the world be reached by travelling;

But nor is there release from the painful without having reached the world’s limit.\(^{34}\)

This cryptic passage from the *Rohitassa Sutta* elegantly captures the sense of the two mutually-related yet mutually-exclusive TP terms, ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’. This correspondence is neither merely coincidental nor merely metaphorical: rather, it is not only philosophically, but phenomenologically, quite precise.\(^{35}\) Thus: in the quest to find an escape from ‘the painful’ (*dukkha*), even if one could travel forever, one would never reach the limit or end (*anta*) of the ‘world’ (*loka*). By its very nature, the ‘spatiotemporal world’ and all that it comprises is *transcendent* with respect to any ‘moment’ of experience, or even any indefinite ‘continuum’ of experience: it ‘exceeds’ the grasp of experience, and does so in an ‘objective’ and ‘necessary’ manner. This is the sense of ‘the limit of the world’ (*lokassa-anta*) in the first verse of the *riddle*. In the second verse, however,

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33  Husserl 1970b, §35, p. 137 (translation modified); Husserl 1954, §35, p. 140: ‘. . . eine völlige personale Wandlung zu erwirken berufen ist, die zu vergleichen wäre zunächst mit einer religiösen Umkehr, die aber darüber hinaus die Bedeutung der größten existenziellen Wandlung in sich birgt, die der Menschheit als Menschheit aufgegeben ist.’
34  SN 2.26 (at S I 62) = AN 4.45 (at A II 49): *gamanena na pattabbo, lokassanto kudācanaṃ. | na ca appatvā lokantaṃ, dikkhā athi pamocanam. ||*
35  The *Rohitassa Sutta* provides us with the Buddha’s profoundly phenomenological (and well-known) definition of ‘world’ (*loka*): ‘Just in this very fathom-long cadaver, percipient and endowed with mind, I make known the world, and the arising of the world, and the cessation of the world, and the path leading to the cessation of the world’. (*imasmiṃeva byōmamatte kalevare sasānṇhimhi samanake lokaṁca paññapemi lokasamudayaṁca lokanirodhaṁca lokanirodhagāminīṁca paṭipadan ti, S I 62.*) The *sutta* is closely related to the *Lokantagamana Sutta* (SN 35.116, S IV 93), which further enhances the preceding definition: ‘(That) by which, . . . in the world, one is percipient of the world, and the arising of the world, and the cessation of the world, and the path leading to the cessation of the world’. (*yena kho . . . lokasmiṁ lokasaṁñhi hoti lokamāṇi ayam vuccati ariyassa vinaya loko. kena ca . . . lokasmiṁ lokasaṁñhi hoti lokamāṇi? cakkhumā kho . . . sotena kho . . . ghnena kho . . . jīvāya kho . . . kāyena kho . . . manena kho . . . lokasmiṁ lokasaṁñhi hoti lokamāṇi. S IV 95.*) Cf. also SN 35.23-29 (S IV 15-21) on ‘the All’ (*sabbaṃ*).
‘the world’s limit’ (loka-anta)\textsuperscript{36} takes on a very different meaning. It refers to the attainment of that which is ‘absolutely beyond’ the ‘spatiotemporal world’ as such: that which the ‘world’, and all that it comprises, cannot ‘reach’ or ‘touch’; namely, of course, \textit{Nibbāna}.\textsuperscript{37} In just this sense, \textit{Nibbāna} is \textit{transcendental} with respect to all phenomena: its nature is such that it is absolutely non-phenomenal.\textsuperscript{38} The means to attain the ‘world’s limit’, and thus to transcend the world’s inherent and inevitable painfulness, can only be realized through the fully purified and fully liberated consciousness; for consciousness, too, by its very nature, necessarily partakes of the ‘transcendental’, as well as of the ‘transcendent’.

In his later writings, Husserl refers to what he calls ‘the transcendental problem’ (\textit{das transzendentale Problem}): a ‘universal’ problem which ‘arises from a general turning around of the natural attitude’.\textsuperscript{39} As we have just seen in §2.2, the natural attitude assumes that ‘the real world is pre-given to us as self-evidently existing, ever at hand’.\textsuperscript{40} To ‘reverse’ the natural attitude is, in one sense, ‘to put it out of play’.\textsuperscript{41} an allusion to the literal sense of the \textit{epokhē} as a ‘suspending’ of that attitude. But it is also, thereby, ‘to compel a new attitude’, which Husserl calls ‘the transcendental’.\textsuperscript{42} This emerges because the philosophical attention is now free to be directed towards ‘the life of consciousness’ (\textit{Bewußtseinsleben}), which the \textit{epokhē} naturally and spontaneously reveals. One becomes aware that ‘the world’, previously taken for granted as simply ‘pre-given’, is in fact something that in every respect ‘appears’ in, has meaning in, and is validated by, that same consciousness.\textsuperscript{43} Previously, ‘the real world’ had our complete and one-sided attention and concern, and ‘consciousness’ was barely – if at all – noticed, let alone investigated. Now, through the \textit{epokhē}, we are intimately aware of our own consciousness-of ‘the world’, and ‘the world’ is thus radically disclosed as a ‘pure phenomenon’ in our consciousness. But precisely herein resides the interesting ‘transcendental problem’. In his last major but unfinished text, Husserl writes:

The empty generality of the \textit{epokhē} does not of itself clarify anything; it is only the gate of entry through which one must pass in order to be able to discover the new world of pure subjectivity. The actual discovery is a matter of concrete, extremely subtle and differentiated work.\textsuperscript{44}

The ‘work’ to which Husserl refers, here, is the ‘transcendental reduction’, which is made possible through the attainment of the ‘transcendental attitude’ of the \textit{epokhē}: ‘a reduction of “the” world to the transcendental phenomenon “world”, a reduction thus also to its correlate,
transcendental subjectivity, in and through whose “conscious life” the world... attains and always has attained its whole content and ontic validity." The transcendental reduction clarifies and brings into sharp relief what Husserl had much earlier described as “the essential relationship between transcendental and transcendent being”: “this most radical of all ontological distinctions – being as consciousness and being as something which becomes “manifested” in consciousness, “transcendent” being”. This correlation engenders profound insights, but also profound questions. Even so, many of these profound questions are, in an important sense, merely secondary or derivative: they are rooted in, and can be traced back to, the truly fundamental ground of the ‘transcendental problem’, which reveals many layers of ‘ascent’ or ‘descent’.

[W]e have become aware of a peculiar split or cleavage, so we may call it, which runs through all our life-process; namely, that between the anonymously functioning subjectivity, which is continuously constructing objectivity for us, and the always, by virtue of the functioning of anonymous subjectivity, pre-given objectivity, the world. The world also includes within it human beings with their minds, with their human conscious life. When we consider the pervasive and unsuspendable relatedness of the pre-given and self-evidently existing world to our functioning subjectivity, humankind and we ourselves appear as intentionally produced formations whose sense of being objectively real and whose verification of being are both self-constituting in subjectivity. Also, the being of the objective... has now appeared as a meaning that constitutes itself within consciousness itself.

But even the task of further clarifying and comprehending ‘this correlation between constituting subjectivity and constituted objectivity’ is not yet the deepest expression of the ‘transcendental problem’. Rather, the fundamental matter is that this ‘constituting subjectivity’ in no sense whatsoever actually ‘appears’ within the ‘constituted objective world’. For, even our own bodies, our sensations, our emotions, and our thoughts are ultimately ‘constituted phenomena’ that ‘appear’ within, and as elements of, ‘the world’: that is to say, they, too, ‘appear’ to our ‘transcendental subjective consciousness’. However, ‘transcendental subjectivity’ does not itself ‘appear’; and, through reflection and analysis, it becomes quite evident that, in principle, it would be a sheer countersense to expect or to suppose that it could or should in any sense whatsoever such...
appear’, as a phenomenon amongst phenomena. We see, hear, smell, taste, touch, and think ‘the world’ and what we identify as our psychophysical ‘selves’ within ‘the world’; but that subjective consciousness-of in dependence upon which we see, hear, smell, taste, touch, and think can never itself appear as an ‘object’ or ‘phenomenon’. It is not itself anything ‘in the world’; yet, there would be no ‘appearing’ of ‘the world’ without it. For this reason, above all others, Husserl refers to it as ‘transcendental’: it is ‘beyond’ or ‘above’ all that ‘appears’ — i.e., the ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ ‘world’-phenomena — and yet it is also the ‘limit’ of ‘the world’: for, ‘the world’ cannot ‘appear’ without it, and is inseparably correlated with it. For these same reasons, however, ‘transcendental subjectivity’, or what Husserl also calls the ‘transcendental ‘I’’, is essentially empty, in itself, of all ‘phenomenal content’.

3. Intentionality and subjectivity: irreducible properties of ‘consciousness-of’

What the epokhē and the transcendental reduction reveal, first of all, is the apodictic (i.e., self-evident and self-proving) fact of consciousness itself; more specifically, they reveal that consciousness is inherently and fundamentally a consciousness-of… This quality of being conscious-of… is called ‘intentionality’. The common sense of the word, ‘intend’, i.e., ‘to have a purpose in mind,’ is included within the wider and deeper phenomenological sense of ‘intentionality’, but only as one possible kind of ‘intentional’ mode or act. The essential sense of phenomenological ‘intending’, of intentionality as such, refers to the way in which consciousness is ‘turned’ or ‘directed’ towards what it is conscious-of; and, moreover, the way in which consciousness thereby gives ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ (Sinn) to all that it is conscious-of, even purely through the act of being conscious-of it.

It is not accidental that Buddhaghosa, in explicating the compound nāmarūpa, defines the term nāma, which literally means ‘name’, as though it were derived from the verb namati, ‘to bend, to direct’: ‘[A]ll that should be defined as “mentality” (nāma) in the sense of bending (namana) because of its bending on to the object.’ This is not sound etymology; but I think it is fairly obvious that Buddhaghosa was trying to express and justify a sound phenomenological intuition through this word play. Voicing the same intuition, the commentary to this passage says: ‘Bending in the direction of the object means that there is no occurrence without an object; it is in the sense of that sort of bending…’. Here, ‘bending in the direction of the object’ is, in the Pāli, literally: ‘bending or inclining with the face towards the object’ (āramma-abhimukha-naminām).

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50 The words ‘transcendent’, ‘transcendental’, and the verb ‘transcend’ (doing service for both of the former senses) derive from the Latin trānsscendere: trāns, ‘across, through, beyond’ + scandere, ‘to climb’. A precise Pāli correlate would be atikkamati: ati, ‘over, above’ + kamati, ‘step, walk, go, walk, progress’ (cf. Cone 2001, p. 60.1-2); but the more usual form found in the EB suttas, with the technical sense of ‘transcending’ (in the context of the four higher meditative states, or arūpa jhānās) is samatikkamati (as a gerund, samatikkiyamma) where the prefix sa- functions as an intensifier, with the sense ‘thoroughly, fully, perfectly’ (cf. Rhys Davids and Stede 1998, p. 655.2; Monier-Williams 1993, p. 1152.1).

51 From the Latin intendere, ‘to stretch forth, give one’s attention to’, from tendere, ‘to stretch’.

52 This is very close in meaning to ceteti, ‘forms an idea in the mind; thinks about, is intent upon; has in mind (to); forms an intention (to); strives mentally for’ (Cone 2010, p. 167.2); and hence to cetanā, which could be translated as ‘volitional intent’ (cf. also Cone 2010, p. 164.2, 1.(ii)).

53 Nāṇamoli 1991, XVIII.3; Vism 587: . . . sabbampetam ārammanābhimukham namanato namanatthena nāma nti vavatthapettabbām. I shall leave aside, here, the question of whether ‘mentality’ (or again, ‘mind’) is an appropriate translation of the meaning of the term nāma in the compound nāmarūpa.

Of course, what is intended here is the sense in which consciousness is directed towards its ‘object’. This same essential sense can, I believe, be seen in a *sutta* passage such as: ‘See his concentration well developed and his mind well liberated – not bent forward [*abhinatam*] and not bent back [*apanatam*].’ Here, *abhinata*, ‘bent towards, inclined towards’ is a past participle formed as though from *abhinamati* (*abhi + namati*); and *apanata*, ‘bent away, disinclined, averse’, is the past participle of *apanamati* (*apa + namati*).56

In revealing consciousness and its intentionality (consciousness-of), the *epokhē* and reduction also reveal, concomitantly, the sense in which consciousness-of is fundamentally characterized by ‘subjectivity’. The fact that ‘consciousness-of’ is consciousness directing – metaphorically ‘stretching’ or ‘extending’ – itself towards its object means that it is *not* its ‘object’; that it is, in a certain sense, *relating itself* to its ‘object’ from ‘within itself’; i.e., from within its own self-evident nature, which is precisely to be *conscious-of*.57 This inherent inflection of consciousness-of towards phenomena is precisely that property of consciousness-of to which the term ‘subjectivity’ implicitly refers. In fact, I believe that careful reflection and meditation will reveal that a ‘non-subjective’ consciousness would be no more than a pure ‘potentiality’ of consciousness.

A very important point that I would like to make clear is that ‘mental acts’ or ‘experiences’ such as ‘feeling’ (*vedanā*), ‘perception’ (*saññā*), or ‘thinking’ (*vitakka-vicāra; maññati*), and even advanced meditative states of being purely percipient or aware (*saññī*),58 are inevitably and irreducibly modes of consciousness-of, and are therefore *intrinsically* characterized by *subjectivity*. The term ‘I’ (*aham*) is problematic because it is very ambiguous and has several different senses and uses, the most important of which I shall discuss below (cf. §4). However, I argue that, ultimately, all of its various senses must derive from one fundamental and purely experiential fact, which is pre-linguistic: namely, the inherent subjectivity of consciousness-of. Therefore, it is very important to distinguish, on the one hand, between the *purely phenomenological* sense of the term ‘I’ as referring back to ‘pure subjectivity’, which is not a ‘concept’ but a (transcendental) property of conscious experience; and, on the other hand, the manner in which this phenomenological sense – a sense not noticed, let alone comprehended, within the natural attitude – can be turned into, or constituted as (*abhisaṅkhata*), concepts/conceits (*māna*) and underlying tendencies (*anusaya*) such as ‘I am’ (*‘asmīti’*) or ‘I am this’ (*‘ayam-aham-asmīti’*). These are *ontological* concepts, which can only have ‘sense’ if they are taken to refer to something that ‘exists’, ‘manifestly’ or ‘objectively’. For this reason, such concepts/conceits can refer to nothing other than the ‘five clung-to aggregates’ (*pañc-upādāna-kkhandhā*), or to some ideal abstraction that is ultimately derived from these; this

55 Bodhi 2000, p. 117. SN 1.38 (S I 39): *passa samādhiṃ subhāvītāṃ cittaṅcena suvimuttaṃ, na cābhinatam na cāpanatam...*

56 Cf Cone 2001, pp. 199.1, 164.1.

57 Husserl does use the term ‘subject’ (*Subjekt*) in its relation to the ‘object’ (*Objekt; Gegenstand*); and sometimes speaks of intentionality in terms of the ‘I-pole’ (*Ichpol*) in its relation to the ‘object-pole’ (*Gegenstandspol*) or ‘counter-pole (*Gegenpol*). (Cf., e.g., Husserl 1970b, §50, pp. 170-171; Husserl 1954, §50, pp. 173-174; Husserl 1989, §25, pp. 111-114; Husserl 1952, §25, pp. 105-107). The image of a ‘pole’ or ‘ray’ is significant, because it presupposes that the two ends of the ‘pole’ are inseparable from the ‘pole’ itself; and this is an important aspect of the concept of intentionality of which Husserl was well aware. In any event, I shall consistently avoid the term ‘subject’, for reasons that will become clear in the course of this paper; and will focus, instead, upon the property of ‘subjectivity’.

58 Cf., e.g., AN 11.7 (A V 318f.), apparently describing *animitta cetosamādhi* (Harvey 1986, p. 42, reaches the same conclusion). Of the meditator in this *samādhi*, it is said: *saññī ca pana assā ti*, ‘and yet he is percipient (aware)’. (For a translation, cf. Nizamis 2011, AN 11.7 (cf. also AN 11.8), forthcoming).
being the basis of the concept of a permanent attā (‘self’, ‘soul’), as an individual and ontologically independent entity. The phenomenological understanding of the term ‘I’ has nothing to do with such ontological abstractions and positions.

4. The problem

In Khemaka Sutta, the Venerable Khemaka says:

Venerable friends, I [ahaṃ] do not say “I am” [‘asmīti] of material form, and I do not say “I am” apart from material form. I do not say “I am” of feeling, and I do not say “I am” apart from feeling; I do not say “I am” of perception, and I do not say “I am” apart from perception; I do not say “I am” of constitutions, and I do not say “I am” apart from constitutions; I do not say “I am” of sense-consciousness, and I do not say “I am” apart from sense-consciousness. Nevertheless, with respect to these five clung-to aggregates, “I am” is found in me, but I do not regard (them as) “I am this”.

He explains that, even though the five lower fetters may have been abandoned by a noble disciple (ariya-sāvaka), ‘with respect to the aggregates subject to clinging, he has a residual “I am” concept/conceit, an “I am” desire, an “I am” underlying tendency not yet removed’. Khemaka likens this lingering sense of ‘I am’ to the scent of a lotus: one can’t say that the scent belongs to any particular part of the flower; rather, it belongs to the flower as a whole. However, when the disciple dwells constantly contemplating the growth and decay of the five aggregates, this residual sense of ‘I am’ is eventually uprooted. Indeed, at the end of the sutta we are told that Khemaka’s mind was freed from the saśavas through non-clinging (ampūdāya). Thus, Khemaka’s problem was resolved. But ours now commences.

59 When the term viññāna is used specifically in the sense of viññāna-khandha, I sometimes translate ‘sense-consciousness’: this is in fact the specific definition of viññāna-khandha. Cf. SN 22.56 (at S III 61): katamaṇa, bhikkhave, viññāna? chayime, bhikkhave, viññānakāyā: cakkhuviññāna, sotaviññāna, ghānaviññāna, jīvāviññāna, kāyaviññāna, manoviññāna. The same definition is given in SN 12.2 (at S II 4) of viññāna as the third link in the 12-nidāna formula of paṭiccasamuppāda. In other contexts of the paṭiccasamuppāda formula, however, viññāna is described in terms of the rebirth-process, in which case it cannot be active sense-consciousness, since nāmarūpa has not yet developed: cf. DN 15 (at D II 63). On this topic, cf. Wijesekera 1994, §17, pp. 198-200. The term viññāna also has at least two other senses and usages in the suttas: the viññāna of the ‘immaterial meditative states’ (arūpa jhānas), which need not be the viññāna of an Arahant, but which transcends the material (and hence bodily) sense-spheres; and the sense of viññāna anidassana ananta sabbatopabha (DN 11 (at D I 223); MN 49 (at M II 329)), which may be correlated with viññāna in the sense of appatīṭhiṭham viññāna avirūṇa anabhisaṅkhacca vimutta (e.g., SN 22.53 (at S III 53)) and: appatīṭhītena ca . . . parinibbuto (SN 4.23 (at S I 122), SN 22.87 (at S III 124)). (On this topic, cf. Thanissaro 2011, DN 11, fn. 1; MN 49, fn. 9; MN 109, fn. 1. Cf. also fn. 80 below, for references to Harvey 1995.) These various inter-related senses of viññāna may be understood as differing conditioned and unconditioned affections of ‘intentional consciousness’.

60 SN 22.89 (at S III 130): na khvāha, āvuso, rūpaṇ ‘asmīti vadāmi; napi aṭṭhata rūpā ‘asmīti vadāmi, na vedanaṇa... na saññā... na sañkhāre... na viññānaṃ āvuso; napi aṭṭhata viññāna ‘asmīti vadāmi. api ca me, āvuso, pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu ‘asmīti adhiścana ayamahamasmi ni ca samamuppasāmi.

61 SN 22.89 (at S III 130): yo ca pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato asmi māno, asmi chando, asmi amasayo asamihato.

62 SN 22.89 (at S III 130): ‘pupphassa gandho ti.

63 SN 22.89 (at S III 131): . . . sopi samugghatam gacchati.

64 Along with the minds of sixty other elder monks: SN 22.89 (at S III 132): . . . satthimattānaṃ therānaṃ bhikkhunām ampuḍāya āśavehi cittāni vimuccisu, āyasmato khemakassa cāti.
Let me imagine that I had the remarkable good fortune to meet Ven. Khemaka once his residual sense of ‘I am’ was finally removed. I would have liked to inquire, very respectfully, about the nature of his consciousness at that time. From the ample and unambiguous evidence of the suttas, I know that there should be no particular technical difficulty in speaking with an Arahant (if we speak the same language): he would be able to see me and hear me; he would understand my questions; and, out of compassion, he might even make an effort to answer them.

I would have liked to say to him: ‘Bhante, you have finally eliminated the residual conceit of ‘I am’ from your mind. But now, I am deeply intrigued by the fact that your senses and intellect continue to function perfectly. I also understand that your body is ailing, and that you are experiencing severe physical pain. These and many other facts demonstrate very clearly to me that you are subjectively and intentionally conscious. I really do believe that you have uprooted the residual concept and conceit of ‘I am’. But it is evident, from the way in which your consciousness is functioning, that when you use the word ‘I’, you are not using it merely as a meaningless token for the sake of not disrupting convention. Even though you know that this word ‘I’ cannot refer to the khandhas or to anything apart from the khandhas, and so cannot refer to any existing entity at all, nevertheless, it seems to me that the word ‘I’ still does have a genuine meaning for you: it refers to the pure subjectivity of your consciousness, your consciousness-of... You are clearly conscious-of me, of the meanings of my words, of the fact that I am asking you about the nature of your own present consciousness; just as much as you are conscious-of your bodily pain, and you are conscious-of the fact that your mind is fully and finally liberated.

To be conscious-of truth, to be conscious-of bodily pain: in all cases, to be conscious-of necessarily implies to be subjectively and intentionally conscious-of... This strongly suggests to me that there must be a fundamental difference between the sense of ‘I am’, and hence also the sense of ‘self’ (atti), which you no longer possess, and the meaning of ‘I’ as neither more nor less than the pure subjectivity of intentional consciousness; without which, there could be no consciousness-of... whatsoever; not even for an Arahant.’

The common objection that an Arahant or Tathāgata uses the term ‘I’ merely in accordance with the linguistic conventions of the unenlightened is poorly formulated. But consider the following verses from the Arahant Sutta (which are not poorly formulated):

No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned [pahīna-mānassa];
For him all knots of conceit [māna-ganthassa] are consumed.
Though the wise one has transcended the conceived [vīvatta[67] maññatāṁ],
He still might say, ‘I speak’ [‘ahaṁ vadāmi’ti],

65 Cf. SN 22.89 (at S III 127). The suttas contain examples of Arahants experiencing severe bodily pain (e.g., if read literally, SN 22.87 (S III 120), SN 35.87 (S IV 55) = MN 144 (M III 263). The Buddha himself, of course, experienced severe bodily pain (cf. SN 1.38 (S 1 27), DN 16 (at D II 100); Mil IV.1.8 (Mil 134) cites four cases of injury and illness).
66 Cf., e.g., MN 4 (at M 1 23): tassa me evam jānato evam passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccittha, bhavāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccittha, avijjāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccittha, avijjāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccittha. vimuttasmiṁ vimuttamiti nāhaṁ ahosi. ‘khiṁ jāti, vusitaṁ brahma carbāṇaṁ, katām karoṇyam, nāpam āttattāyati abbaññāsiṁ. ‘Then, knowing thus, seeing thus, my mind was liberated from the unconscious influence [āsavā] of sensual desire, from the unconscious influence of being, and from the unconscious influence of ignorance. When it was liberated, there was the knowledge, “It is liberated”. I knew by direct experience [abbaññāsiṁ]. “Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, no more for being-here.”’
67 vi + ati (emphatic form of ati, ‘beyond, over; through’); cf. Cone 2001, p. 59.1) + vatta (past participle of vattati in the compound ativattati, ‘goes beyond, escapes from’ (cf. Cone 2001, p. 69.1). Thus, Bodhi’s rendering, ‘has transcended the conceived’ for vīvatta maññatāṁ, is, from the TP perspective, an apt translation.
He might say too, ‘They speak to me’ ['mamānap vadanti ti'].

Skilful, knowing the world’s parlance [loke samañña],

He uses such terms as mere expressions [vohāra-mattena].

These verses are spoken in reply to the question whether the Arahant, who is by definition khīnasavo, ‘one with unconscious influences (āsava) destroyed’, would still be able to speak and to understand the speech of others; and if so, whether this might be because ‘he has come upon conceit [mānas nu kho so upagamma]’, which is to say, because he has fallen back upon the conceit/concept ‘I am’ (asmi-māna).69 For, to be sure, in the suttas, Arahants are found to say such things as ‘I eat, I sit; my bowl, my robe’, and other such common, conventional talk.70 All that these verses entail is that the Arahant still uses words such as aham and mama as the ordinary world uses them, although he has ‘transcended’ their worldly sense. But the commentary’s explanation of the answer to this question takes a somewhat different slant:

Having abandoned talk that presupposes acquisition (of a ‘self’), he does not breach convention, but would speak (in terms of) ‘I and mine’. If he said, ‘The aggregates eat, the aggregates sit, the aggregates’ bowl, the aggregates’ robe’, it is a breach of convention; no one would understand.71

This interpretation falls back upon the Abhidhamma-based theory of ‘two truths’, which posits two kinds of discourse, the ‘conventionally true’ (sammuti-sacca) and the ‘ultimately true’ (paramattha-sacca). On that view, the conventionally valid locution is ‘I eat’, etc., whereas the ‘ultimately true’ locution is the technical one, ‘The five aggregates eat’, etc.72 Unfortunately, this interpretation completely misses the truly essential point of the problem in question here: for it makes no difference whatsoever whether the Arahant says ‘I eat’ or ‘These five aggregates perform the function of eating’. The truly crucial point is that the Arahant (or, if one prefers, the five aggregates) can indeed still speak. Even in this one act itself the entire phenomenonological import of subjective intentionality is immediately demonstrated. And since I am prepared to grant that the concept of ‘Arahanship’ is a phenomenologically valid and possible concept, this would entail that even an Arahant devoid of the conceit/concept ‘I am’ is nevertheless subjectively and intentionally

68 Bodhi 2000, p. 102. SN 1.25 (at S I 14-15): pahīnamānassa na santi gantā | vidhūpitā mānaganthassa sabbe. | sa viṭṭatto maññatāt su medhā | aham vadāntītā pi sa vadeyya. | mamān vadāntītā pi so vadeyya. | loka samañña kusalo vidītvā | vohāramattena so vohareyyā ti. ||

69 SN 1.25 (at S I 14).


71 Spk I 51: The passage continues: ‘Therefore, having spoken thus, he expresses (himself) by means of worldly ways of speech.’ [atta-jupaladdhinissatākathām hitā vohārabhedān akaronto aham, mamā tī vadeyya. khandhā bhuhjānti, khandhā nisīdānti, khandhānām patto, khandhānām cīvaran’ti hi vutte vohārabheda hoti, na koci jānāti. tasmā evaṃ avatāva lokavohāreṇa voharatāti. Cf. Bodhi 2000, p. 360, n. 49. Cf. also MN 74 (at M I 500): evam vimutaccitto kho . . . bhikkhu na kaciti samvadati, na kaciti vivadati, yaḥca loke vuttam tena voharati, aparāmasan’ti ‘A bhikkhu with mind thus liberated does not agree with anyone, does not dispute with anyone; what is spoken in the world, that he expresses, without holding on (to it).’

72 Cf. Nārada 1975, p. 7, for a classical modern representation of this Abhidhamma view. There may be a certain basis in the suttas for an absolute distinction between a singular and absolute truth, transcending speech and thought, on the one hand, and, on the other, all forms of ‘speech and thought’, even the ‘technical speech and thought’ of the Dhamma itself. (Cf. the simile of the raft: MN 22 at M I 13-135; MN 38 at M I 260-261; cf. also, e.g., Sn 4.12 (Sn 172): ekāhī saccāna dutiyamatthi, ‘The truth is one; there is no second.’) But there is arguably no basis in the suttas for a relative distinction between an ‘absolute technical conceptual truth’ (the ‘real truth’ of the reductionist categories and concepts of the Abhidhamma) and ‘worldly, conventional truth’ (which by comparison becomes no ‘truth’ at all).
conscious. Therefore, there must be a fundamental distinction to be elucidated between asmi-māna and the phenomenological import of the term ahaṃ.

Another possible objection might be that this purely subjective sense of ‘I’ – as distinct from the ‘I am’ conceit – is somehow merely a natural by-product of the activity of mano, the ‘mental faculty’, sixth of the six sense faculties (indriyas). This might seem plausible, since mano is defined as the ‘refuge’ (paṭisaraṇa) of the five bodily senses: ‘Mano is (their) refuge, mano experiences their field and range.’ 73 In addition, mano experiences its own field and range of purely ‘mental’ or ‘ideal’ objects (dhammas). Mano thus functions as the unifying synthesis of the six sense-consciousnesses constituting viññāna-khandha. Might not the sense of the ‘I’ be a mere by-product of this synthetic function of mano?

There are perhaps several reasons why this hypothesis cannot be sustained, but I need mention only one of these reasons here because, even by itself, it is as fundamentally decisive as it is simple and self-evident: namely, that the synthetic functions of mano would not even be possible unless intentional subjectivity is already presupposed. The functions of mano include, on the one hand, ‘simple’ acts of feeling, perception and conception; and, on the other, more ‘complex’ acts of cognitive synthesis (e.g., judgments such as ‘The proposition ‘All phenomena are impermanent’ is demonstrably true’). 74 Both of these types of activities presuppose a mental structure of intentional subjectivity as their unifying principle: that structure cannot be derived from the acts themselves; rather, the acts are only possible if that structure is already in place. Every kind of mental act (or noesis) has a definite structure of intentional subjectivity directed towards its ‘objects’; and, in that sense, a noetic act also constitutes its ‘objects’ through specific kinds of ‘object-meanings’ (noemas). There is a strong correlation, here, with the function of manasikāra,75 which may be

73 SN 48.42 (at S V 218): mano paṭisaraṇaṁ, mano eva nesan gocaravasayaṁ paccamubhoti. (So also MN 43 (at M I 295).)
74 Such rational judgments must surely belong to the functions of mano. Although they clearly presuppose an intuitive sense of ‘truth’, they are conceived and expressed linguistically and logically, and can thus be distinguished from purely immediate and immediate recognitions of ‘truth’, which in EB are ascribed to ‘wisdom’ (paññā). Thus in MN 43 (at M I 293), it is asked, ‘What can be known by purified manoviññāna, released from the five sense faculties?’ (nissatthena… pañcāhi indriyehi parisuddhena manoviññāṇena kiṁ neyyan ti?). The answer is the first three of the four higher meditative states (which the commentators call ariyāni jhānāni, ‘immaterial meditative states’). Mano is implicitly contrasted to the wisdom-eye: ‘A dhamma that can be understood, friend, is (clearly) known by the wisdom-eye… Wisdom, friend, is for the purpose of direct knowledge, for the purpose of full knowledge, for the purpose of abandoning.’ (nevayaṁ kho, āvuso, dharmam paññācakkaṁ pañjāmī…pañā kho, āvuso, abhiññathā pariññathā pañhānatthā ti.) I would argue that any ‘intuition of truth’ whatsoever – whether via mano or via paññācakka – is necessarily a mental act presupposing intentional subjectivity, and that no ‘intuition of truth’ (no ‘intuition of any kind at all) can occur independently of such a structure of subjectivity. This, then, might also serve as a second argument against the hypothesis that the ‘I’ might be a by-product of manindriya; for, according to EB, ‘intuitions of truth’ can occur at a level of consciousness (e.g., the level of paññācakka) that is supposed to be beyond the scope of mano.

75 Literally, manasikaroti means ‘doing or making (karoti < kṛ) in the mental faculty (manasi),’ and manasikāra is an abstract neuter noun of action formed from the same root (manasi + kāra < kṛ). It is often translated as ‘attention’, but I think that it (also) more strongly implies a sense of ‘intending towards’, and even, in some contexts, of ‘intentionally constituting’. Thus, e.g., in the formulaic clause, sabbamittanān amanasikāra animittaṃ cetosamādhīṇa upasampajja viharati (SN 41.7. at S IV 297). I think anamasikāra is not mere ‘non-attention’, but implies a conscious meditative inhibition, withdrawal, or suspension of intentional functions (i.e., of intending towards ‘objects’, and of intentionally constituting ‘object-meanings’). I do not believe that mere ‘non-attention’ would be sufficient for attaining an ‘objectless (‘non-noematic’) concentration of mind’, which the suttas identify as subsequent to the ‘sphere of neither perception nor non-perception’ (cf. MN 121, at M III 107-108), and thus second only to the ‘cessation of perception and feeling’. Indeed, this would explain why it is said (in the same passage) of a bhikkhu experiencing animitta cetosamādhī: so evaṃ pajāmī: ‘ayampi kho animitto cetosamādhī abhisankhato abhisācetayito’. He (clearly) knows thus: ‘This objectless concentration of mind is [sc. intentionally] constituted and volitionally intended.” These matters are discussed in detail in other texts that I am currently in the process of writing.
directed towards (or away from), and also constitute (or not constitute), its ‘objects’ and ‘object-meanings’ or nimittas.\(^{76}\)

At this point, it may be helpful to clarify further the ‘problems’ underlying the sense and usage of the term ‘I’. An example from Wittgenstein may serve as a starting point. Wittgenstein noticed what he called ‘two different cases in the use of the word ‘I’ (or ‘my’), which he called ‘the use as object’ and ‘the use as subject’:\(^{77}\)

Examples of the first kind of use are these: ‘My arm is broken’, ‘I have grown six inches’, ‘I have a bump on my forehead’, ‘The wind blows my hair about’. Examples of the second kind are: ‘I see so-and-so’, ‘I hear so-and-so’, ‘I try to lift my arm’, ‘I think it will rain’, ‘I have a toothache’.\(^{78}\)

Wittgenstein takes the ‘object sense’ of the word ‘I’ to refer to the body: that particular body that each of us calls ‘my body’, and which other people can also see, hear, and touch, for example. He goes on to say that this ‘object sense’ of ‘I’ is fallible: it is quite conceivable, for example, that I could, under some peculiar circumstance, visually mistake someone else’s arm for my own. In this way, he illustrates a distinction between the ‘object’ and the ‘subject’ sense of ‘I’. For, it seems nonsensical to suppose that I could mistake a feeling of pain in my arm to be someone else’s pain; or for someone to ask me, ‘Are you sure it’s you who feels the pain, and not someone else?’\(^{79}\)

But what does this distinction really imply?

Even though Wittgenstein says (correctly) that it is conceivable that I could mistake an objectively appearing part of someone else’s body as my own, one must point out that it would be just as nonsensical to doubt that it is I who see that body – whossoever it might be, or even if it happens to be a hallucination – as it would be to doubt that it is I who feel a pain. Wittgenstein’s distinction is useful, but misleading, because it crosses unwittingly between three phenomenologically distinct categories: subjective consciousness-of; subjective or immanent phenomena (e.g., what I actually see, what I actually feel); and intersubjective ‘transcendent’ objects (e.g., my body and the bodies of others, as ‘objects’ in the ‘objective’ world). But at least Wittgenstein was alert to a certain interesting distinction within the ordinary sense and function of

\(^{76}\) In the context of EB, the term nimitta is usually translated as ‘sign’, and in some contexts as ‘ground’, ‘reason’ or ‘cause’. Cf., e.g., Nānāmoli and Bodhi 2009; Bodhi 2000; Nānāmoli 1991. Thanissaro translates as ‘impression’ or ‘theme’, depending on context; cf., e.g., Thanissaro 2011, SN 8.4 (S I 188), SN 22.3 (at S III 10) For a useful survey of its range of meaning, cf. Harvey 1986, §V, pp. 31-33. Harvey (p. 33) concludes: ‘[Nimitta] is a delimited object of attention, that may, or should be taken as indicating something beyond itself or the general features of that to which it belongs.’ In my own work, the term nimitta has been correlated with the TP concept of noema (a correlation that requires a fairly detailed explanation and, no doubt, justification, which are provided elsewhere); that is why, for example, I sometimes refer to animitta cetosamādhī as an ‘objectless’ or ‘non-noematic’ concentration of mind.

\(^{77}\) Bischof-Kühler points out (1991, p. 253, referring to W. James [1892] 1961, Psychology: The Briefer Course, Harper and Row, New York) that James had already written of this distinction in 1892, contrasting the sense of the ‘Me’, in which one experiences oneself as an ‘object’ (of experience), and the sense of the ‘I’, in which one experiences oneself as the ‘subject’ (of experience).

\(^{78}\) Wittgenstein 1958, pp. 66-67. This distinction is phenomenologically valid and useful. As we shall see, Husserl effectively makes just the same distinction, but from the perspective of TP, which differs in very important ways from Wittgenstein’s perspective upon and analysis of this distinction.

\(^{79}\) Cf. Wittgenstein 1958, p. 67. Wittgenstein thinks of this distinction in terms of the rules of a ‘language-game’. From a TP perspective, however, we must examine the ‘pre-linguistic’ aspects of subjectivity and intentionality, for which Wittgenstein’s ‘language-game’ theory cannot really account. Furthermore, an interesting and phenomenologically important question is raised by the possibility of ‘knowing another’s mind’ (cf., e.g., SN 16.9, at S II 213).
the word ‘I’: sometimes, we use it to refer to a particular body, namely, the one we think of as ‘our own’; and sometimes we use it to refer to our subjective consciousness-of whatever we are conscious-of.

Unlike the physical body, however, we cannot point to our subjective consciousness-of, or make it appear or manifest itself in any other way. In this sense, by definition, it is properly ‘transcendental’: i.e., it is not anything phenomenal, something that could ‘appear’, whether to ourselves or to others. What ‘appears’ is just what ‘manifests’ itself, what we are conscious-of as a ‘phenomenon’ in any of the modes of the ‘six sense spheres’ (saḷāyatana) of consciousness (viññāṇa). On the other hand, we also cannot doubt that we are subjectively conscious-of; so, this ‘transcendental’ consciousness-of is something that we just know, immediately and apodictically, because, in any final analysis, when it comes to our own consciousness-of, what we know is just the fact that we know. This is the one thing about which, in principle, no conscious being could possibly be mistaken. This, in effect, is the result of the epokhē and of what Husserl calls the ‘transcendental reduction’.

Husserl says that the epokhē and reduction lead us back to ‘absolute intentional consciousness’, and to the function of the ‘I’ as the pure subjectivity of that consciousness. He recognizes that this pure subjectivity is phenomenologically distinct from all that it is conscious-of: that includes, of course, the body, but also all sensations, thoughts, and emotions that appear as phenomena or experiences of that consciousness-of. For this reason, he distinguishes between what he calls the ‘empirical I’ and this pure, transcendental subjectivity. The ‘empirical I’ is that ‘objective’ or phenomenal ‘self’ constituted out of the appearances of ‘my own body’, ‘my thoughts’, ‘my feelings’, and so on, which, as a complex psychophysical ‘entity’, belongs within, and is an inextricable part of, the ‘objective’ and intersubjective ‘world’. We can see, then, that Husserl’s concept of the ‘empirical I’ is similar to Wittgenstein’s ‘object sense’ of the ‘I’, but it is much more inclusive: it includes all those phenomena, ‘physical’ or ‘mental’, which are taken to constitute the psychophysical person who lives and acts within, and as part of, the ‘world’. Of course, what Husserl has distinguished in this way is, in fact, the five clung-to aggregates (pañc-upādāna-khāṇḍhā), which the ‘ordinary worldling’ (assutavā puthujjana), the person in the ‘natural attitude’, assumes to be their ‘self’ (atā).

Correlatively, Husserl also recognizes that the pure subjectivity of consciousness-of is utterly non-phenomenal: there is nothing about it that could possibly ‘appear’. Therefore, it is not a ‘thing’, nor even remotely like any ‘thing’. It is more like a ‘no-thing’, a ‘nothing’. Indeed, it

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80 As is perhaps well known, in its Greek philosophical origins, the phainomenon is that which is caused to appear or which reveals itself (phainesthai) in the light (phao); and this means, fundamentally, that which appears ‘in the light of the mind’. (Cf., e.g., Heidegger 2001, ¶7, pp. 49-63 (1993, ¶7, pp. 27-39) for a thoughtful account.) The common Indo-European root of these Greek terms is √bhā (cf., e.g., Hofmann 1994, pp. 464, 465, 467), a root which appears also in Sanskrit and Pāli (as both √bhā and √bhās), with the same meaning: ‘to shine, be bright; shine forth, appear’, etc. (cf. Monier-Williams 1993, pp. 750.3-751.1, 755.3-756.1). This root is evident in EB descriptions of citta, ‘mind’, as pabhassara, ‘brightly shining’ (e.g., pabhassaraṁ idam . . . cittam, AN i.49-52, at A I 10); and, still more importantly, in the descriptions of viññāṇa anidassana, ‘non-manifestive consciousness’, as sabbato pabhām, ‘shining or luminous all round (in all directions)’ (D1223; MII329). (For more details on pabhassaracitta, cf. Harvey 1995, §§10.20-25, pp. 166-170, §§10.31-35, pp. 173-176; on viññāṇa anidassana, cf. ibid., §§12.3ff., pp. 198ff.)

81 The significance of this result should be understood in the sense of Husserl’s TP, rather than in the incomplete and flawed sense of Descartes’ cogito. For Husserl’s lucid and important exposition of why Descartes’ came so close, yet failed to recognize the true (properly phenomenological) meaning and implications of the cogito, cf. Husserl 1970b, §§17-18, pp. 75-81; Husserl 1954, §§17-18, pp. 76-83.
really is like a kind of ‘emptiness’\textsuperscript{82} – except that it is evidently a consciousness-of, and therefore also a source of mental acts. It is for this reason that Husserl calls it the transcendental or ‘pure I’ (\textit{das reine Ich}). In German orthography, the ordinary first-person pronoun \textit{ich} is clearly distinguishable from the noun-form \textit{Ich}; and Husserl virtually makes a technical term of the noun, \textit{das (reine) Ich}, to name the fact of the pure subjectivity of consciousness-of. But Husserl is aware of a difficulty here, when he writes:

The ‘I’ [\textit{das Ich}] that I [\textit{ich}] attain in the \textit{epokhē} . . . is actually called ‘I’ [,\textit{Ich}’] only by equivocation – though it is an essential equivocation since, when I [\textit{ich}] name it in reflection, I can say nothing other than: it is I [\textit{ich}] who practice the \textit{epokhē}, I who interrogate, as phenomenon, the world. . . .\textsuperscript{83}

This ‘essential equivocation’ is in fact an essential \textit{indication} pointing towards what is truly at the basis of the problem of the ‘I’.

On the one hand, pure subjectivity – which Husserl calls, by way of a certain inevitable equivocation, the ‘pure I’, also ‘the experiencing I’\textsuperscript{84} – apart from its nature as consciousness-of, and as a source of acts, ‘is completely empty of essence-components, has no explicable content, is undescribable in and for itself; it is pure ‘I’ and nothing more’.\textsuperscript{85} As pure, subjective consciousness-of, it is phenomenologically quite distinct from all phenomena of which it is conscious, including those constituting the ‘phenomenal person’ through which it ‘lives and experiences’ (\textit{erlebt}).\textsuperscript{86} On the other hand, if it were somehow possible to sever the apparently inseparable unity of this subjective consciousness-of and the phenomena of which it is conscious, that consciousness-of would

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Cf., e.g., Husserl 1982, §80, p. 191; \textit{ibid.}, §57, pp. 132-133 (where he likens the phenomenological ‘I’ to ‘a transcendental nothing \cite{ibid}.'); Husserl 1980, §24, p. 110; \textit{ibid.}, §24, p. 111; Husserl 1970b, §43, p. 155; \textit{ibid.}, §55, p. 187.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Husserl 1976a, §80, p. 179: ‘das erlebende Ich’.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Husserl 1982, §80, p. 191 (translation modified); Husserl 1976a, §80, p. 179: ‘. . . ist es völlig leer an Wesenskomponenten, es hat gar keinen explikabeln Inhalt, es ist an und für sich unbeschreiblich: reines Ich und nichts weiter.’
  \item \textsuperscript{86} The transitive verb \textit{erleben} means ‘to experience’, and is formed by the prefix \textit{er}- (which has no meaning in itself) added to the intransitive verb \textit{leben}, ‘to live’. The connection between \textit{leben} and \textit{erleben} can be expressed in English: as when someone might say, ‘I know exactly what it was like: I lived it!’ Here, ‘lived’, of course, means ‘to experience directly, personally’. The noun \textit{das Erlebnis}, ‘experience’, formed by adding the suffix –\textit{nis} (designating the result of an action) to the verb stem of \textit{erleben}, becomes a technical term for Husserl. He specifically thematises the relationship between ‘pure consciousness’ (\textit{reines Bewußtsein}) and its ‘pure correlates’ (\textit{reinen Bewußtseinskorrelaten}) as a temporal process. Thus, Kersten (Husserl 1982) has translated \textit{Erlebnis} as ‘mental process’, while Cairns (Husserl 1970a) translates it as ‘subjective process’. Husserl writes: ‘In itself, every mental process is a flux of becoming . . .; it is a continuous flow of retentions and protentions mediated by a flowing phase of originarity itself in which there is consciousness of the living now of the mental process in contradistinction to its ‘before’ and ‘after’.’ Husserl 1982, §78, p. 179. (‘Jedes Erlebnis ist in sich selbst ein Fluß des Werdens . . .; ein beständiger Fluß von Retentionen und Protentionen vermittelt durch eine selbst fließende Phase der Originarität, in der das lebendige Jetzt des Erlebnisses gegenüber seinem „Vorhin“ und „Nachher“ bewußt wird.’ Husserl 1976a, §78, p. 167.)
\end{itemize}
lose all possible definition; so, too, correlativelly, would the phenomena, because a phenomenon is, by definition, what appears to consciousness-of, in the way that it appears. Thus, we would apparently end up with two virtual ‘nothingnesses’.

Even so, there would still be one fundamental difference here. The phenomenon ultimately depends on consciousness-of for its appearance, although this does not mean that consciousness-of creates the phenomenon. A phenomenon is, in effect, an essential aspect of an act of cognition; and that cognition may be of something that ‘transcends’ (‘extends beyond’) any momentary subjective act of consciousness-of: e.g., a ‘physical object’ in the intersubjective ‘physical region’, or a ‘mathematical object’ in the ‘ideal region’. Consciousness-of constitutes the phenomenon precisely because the phenomenon is inseparable from the intentional act cognizing the ‘object’.87 But the phenomenon is not merely an image ‘representing’ an ‘object’ hidden behind it: rather, it is the direct but intentionally constituted cognition of the ‘object itself’. In fact, it follows from this that the ‘object’ can have no ultimate, hidden, non-phenomenal ‘essence’ of its own: what the ‘object’ is is only ever expressed through the modes of its appearances to consciousness-of.

By contrast, consciousness-of does not depend upon the phenomenon for its own intrinsic property of ‘being conscious’ or ‘being aware’. It ought to be apodictically evident, in reflection, that the phenomena that appear to consciousness-of cannot be the cause of the consciousness-of that cognizes them. On the other hand, one may certainly ask whether a consciousness-of deprived absolutely of all phenomenality would still be any kind of ‘consciousness-of’.

In the Mahānidāna Sutta, the Buddha provides a neat refutation of the notion of ‘self’ (attā) as relative to the experience of ‘feeling’ (vedanā). Three ways of regarding ‘self’ (atta-samanupassanā) are defined; but, for our purposes, we can legitimately reduce these down to two mutually exclusive ideas: (1) feeling is the self (the self is identical with feeling); (2) feeling is not the self (the self is separate from and independent of feeling). The first notion is denied on the basis that all feeling is ‘impermanent, constituted, dependently co-arisen, subject to destruction, decay, fading away, and cessation’.88 The conclusion is: ‘Therefore, here, because of this, it is not acceptable to consider: ‘Feeling is my self’.”89 The second notion is denied by means of two expressions of the same argument, framed as rhetorical questions: ‘Where feeling altogether is not, could there be, there, (the thought) ‘I am’?’ Of course, the answer is: ‘Certainly not, Venerable Sir.’90 And again: ‘If all feeling were to cease completely in every way, without remainder, then with the complete non-being of feeling, because of the cessation of feeling, could there be, there, (the thought) ‘I am this’?’ Again, of course, the answer must be: ‘Certainly not, Venerable Sir.’91 These refutations of both (1) and (2) constitute an exhaustive dilemmatic refutation of a permanent, independently existing ‘self’ (attā), given that ‘self’ cannot be identified with feeling, but nor can it be identified with anything other than feeling. The Buddha concludes with the following deeply significant statement:

87 I have argued elsewhere that the expression ‘to constitute intentionally’, can be very closely correlated with concepts such as saṁkharoti and abhisamkharoti in EB, especially when these are comprehended from a TP perspective.
89 DN 15 (at D II 67): tasmātātha . . . etena petam nakkhamaṭi ‘vedanā me atta’ti samanupassitum.

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When a bhikkhu does not consider feeling as self, and does not consider self as without experience of feeling, and does not consider ‘My self feels; for my self is subject to feeling’ – then, being without such considerations he does not cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Not being agitated, he personally attains Nibbāna.92

5. The ‘I’ (ahaṁ) in meditation: a prolegomenon

The removal of the concept/conceit ‘I am’: that, verily, is the ultimate bliss!93

In the Vivekaja Sutta, Sāriputta says to Ānanda: ‘I [ahaṁ] entered and dwelt in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by thought and examination, with rapture and happiness born of seclusion. Yet, friend, it did not occur to me, “I am attaining the first jhāna”, or “I have attained the first jhāna”, or “I have emerged from the first jhāna”’. Ānanda thinks: ‘It must be because I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit have been thoroughly uprooted in the Venerable Sāriputta for a long time that such thoughts did not occur to him.’94

Once we recognize that the phenomenological sense of the term ‘I’ can, and must, be radically distinguished from constituted ontological senses such as ‘asmī’ti, ‘ayam-aham-asmī’ti, and attā; and once we thereby also recognize that the phenomenological meaning of the term ‘I’ is grounded in the pre-linguistic intentionality of consciousness, and therefore cannot be dismissed as a mere linguistic convention; then, it becomes decidedly unproblematic to focus upon an inquiry into the question of the sense of the ‘I’ (ahaṁ) in meditation. For, what we are now focusing upon is the question of the intrinsic subjectivity of consciousness-of, an apodictic fact that is entirely unrelated to asmi-māna-anusaya, ahaṅkāra and mamakāra, and thus does not in any sense conflict with the EB axiom of anattā. These are recognitions that are most effectively accomplished in the transcendental attitude of the epokhē or pahāna; and, in particular, by means of the methods of reflection and meditation. It is from within this perspective, and with the aid of these methods, that an inquiry into the ‘I’ of meditation really must proceed.

92 Bodhi 2010, p. 70. DN 15 (at D II 68): yato kho . . . bhikkhu neva vedanaṁ attānaṁ samanupassati, nopi appaṭṭisāmaṇaṁ attānaṁ samanupassati, nopi ‘atta me vediyati, vedanāḥhammo hi me attā tī samanupassati. so evaṁ na samanupassanto na ca kiñci loke upādiyati, amupādyam na paritassati, aparitassam paccattaṅgeva parinibbāyati. . .

93 Ud 2.1 (Ud 10): asminānassa yo vinayo, etam ve paramāni sukhanti. This statement is uttered by the Buddha after his emergence from what seems to have been nirodha samāpatti. Cf. also AN 9.34 (A IV 414): ‘This Nibbāna is blissful, friends. This Nibbāna is blissful, friends. . . . Just that, here, friends, is blissful: where the felt is not (where nothing is felt)!’ sukhamidam, āvuso, nibbānaṁ. sukhamidam, āvuso, nibbānaṁ . . . etadeva khvettha, āvuso, sukkhaṁ yadettha naththi vedayitam. Note that such ‘bliss’ is supposed to be ‘known’ or ‘experienced’ as a result of the erasure of the ‘I am’ conceit/concept and of the cessation of ‘the felt’ (vedayita). Again, I must reiterate the irreducible principle that, where there is any ‘knowing’ or ‘experiencing’ of any kind at all, there is also (necessarily) ‘subjective consciousness-of’ (these being two aspects of one and the same fact). On the other hand, however, the terms ‘subjectivity’ and ‘subject’ definitely do not have the same meaning and implications. (This point is further clarified in the concluding Section §6 of the present paper.)

The *epokhē* or *pahāna*, combined with reflective or meditative reduction, reveal (1) the apodicticity of awareness, (2) of intentionality, (3) of subjectivity, and (4) the intuitional nature of ‘truth’; they disclose (5) the true origin and meaning of the sense of ‘being’; (6) they awaken the phenomenological recognition that the ‘pure ‘I’’ and the pure ‘Now’ are really but two aspects of, or two ways of focusing upon, one and the same structure, thus opening up the problem of the relation between the ‘I’ and temporality in a radically potent and profound way; and they also disclose (7) the basis of the possibility of ‘volition’ and ‘agency’.

Within the limited space of this present paper, only the first three of these themes have been touched upon, all too briefly; the fourth has been referred to in passing; the fifth, sixth, and seventh themes are to be discussed in other writings. However, a brief word, here, concerning the seventh theme might be useful for the present discussion.

Although I have not, so far, explicitly mentioned the question of agency, it is in a sense already implicit within the basic concept of the ‘mental act’; and in fact explicit in the capacity of intentional subjectivity to turn its intentional attention toward or away from its ‘objects’, and even to suspend its intentional attention from such ‘objects’.95 ‘Agency’, too, is a *phenomenological* property of intentional consciousness; and just as subjectivity does not entail ‘a subject’, so, too, agency does not entail ‘an agent’. Rather, agency is effective, just as subjectivity is effective, precisely because the intentionality of consciousness-of imubes the *khandha* with *experienced meaning*, and thus makes their dependent co-arising possible. If the *khandha* lacked the unifying phenomenological ‘I’-sense, they could not intend and act; hence there could be no *kamma*; and therefore no *patīccasamuppāda* and no *punabbhava*. To put it in quite another way, the *khandhas* are *not* merely a mindless, robotic, deterministic componentry; if they were, enlightenment and liberation would be logically impossible, not to mention literally ‘meaningless’. Rather, it is the constitutive experience of ‘meaning’ – which is another way of describing intentional consciousness – that makes craving (*taṇhā*) and clinging (*upādāna*) possible, as it also makes possible dispassion (*virāga*) and abandoning (*pahāna*). It also makes the fundamental contrast between binding ignorance (*avijjā*) and liberating knowledge (*ñāṇa*) meaningful and consequential.

We should keep in mind that the doctrine of agency or action (*kiriya, kriyā*) is fundamental to EB.96 One of five themes set down for frequent reflection by men and women, lay and ordained, is the following:

I am the owner of my actions, heir to my actions, born of my actions, related to my actions, taking refuge in my actions. Whatever action I perform, good or evil, of that I shall be the inheritor.97

95 Cf., e.g., MN 121 (at M III 108): ‘And beyond that, again, Ānanda, a bhikkhu, by not intending in *manas* to the perception of the sphere of no-thing-ness, by not intending in *manas* to the perception of the sphere of neither perception nor non perception, intends in *manas* to the oneness (or essence) [ekattāṃ] dependent on the ‘objectless’ (or ‘non-noematic’) concentration of mind.’ *puna caparaṃ, ānanda, bhikkhu amanasikaritvā ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ, amanasikaritvā nevasāññāsāññāsāññāyatanaṃ, anānissīṣṭāṃ cetosānādhāniṃ pañcamaṃ karoti ekattām.*

96 Cf., e.g., AN 2.35 (A I 62), where the Buddha says: ‘I am one who teaches action (what ought to be done), brahmin, and non-action (what ought not to be done).’ *’kiriyaṃ ca, brāhmaṇa, akiriyaṃ ca, ākiriyaṃ ca tāti.* (Cf. also Vin III 2, D I 15, D I 132, M I 483, M II 167.)

97 AN 5.57 (at A III 72): ‘kammasakomihī, kammapādāko kammayoni kammapaṭissarāno. yam kammaṃ karissāmi, kalyāṇam vā pāpakam vā, tassa dāyādo bhavissāmi ti.’ Cf. also AN 10.216 (A V 288); MN 135 (at M III 203).
The agency of the ‘I’ is fundamental to Dhamma practice and to the path to liberation. It begins with self-reflection upon and self-disciplining of one’s own mind: ‘A monk himself should reflect upon himself thus . . .’,98 ‘Constantly one’s own mind should be reflected upon . . .’.99 For an especially unruly mind in meditation, the following example is given: ‘He beats down, constrains and crushes mind with mind.’100 In brief: ‘A bhikkhu wields mastery over his mind, he does not let the mind wield mastery over him.’101

These descriptions are all in the third person, but one need only transpose them into one’s own subjective practice in order to confirm their first-personal phenomenological sense. That sense is quite explicit in other examples, which are expressed first-personally: e.g., it is said that one who, through the arising of vision (cakkhupāda), abandons desire and lust for the pañc-upādānakkhandhā, might think: ‘For a long time, alas, I [ahaṁ] have been deceived, cheated and seduced by this mind [citta].’102 It should hopefully be clear by now why such a use of the term ‘I’ (ahaṁ) is phenomenologically meaningful and important, why it cannot be ‘reduced’ to a meaningless linguistic marker or to a mere congregation of atomic components, and why it is doctrinally quite unproblematic because it does not contradict the anattā axiom. To the contrary, the sense of ‘I’ is inseparable from the acts of insight and volition without which the path to liberation could not be practised. As we have seen,103 ‘abandoning’ (pahāna) is itself a foundational act of the path; and this very act of abandoning is itself an act of decision and will motivated by understanding. When the Buddha admonishes the abandoning of the five aggregates because these are ‘not yours’, the question ‘Who abandons the five aggregates?’ would be ill-formed and ultimately meaningless;104 but the question ‘How can the aggregates be abandoned?’ would be quite meaningful, and may be understood, and practised, precisely through the recognition that neither the subjectivity nor the agency of intentional consciousness, nor intentional consciousness itself, constitute a ‘self’. Thus, ‘abandoning the All’ is no paradox at all.

The Buddha himself, of course, uses the term aham to refer to his subjective ‘consciousness-of’. That he is indeed subjectively conscious and that his experience is intentionally constituted is necessarily demonstrated every time he hears and understands others who address him and every time he addresses others. It is necessarily evident every time he picks up his outer robe and his alms-bowl and goes to the village on his alms-round;105 or when he surveys the saṅgha

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98 E.g., MN 15 (at M l 98): bhikkhunā attānaṁ atānaṁ evam paccavekkhitabbam. . . The syntax of the Pāli could be rendered more literally: ‘by a monk himself the self should be reflected upon thus . . .’, which of course does not imply that the monk has a ‘self’ (attā), but that he reflects upon ‘his own mind and body’.
99 SN 22.100 (at S III 151): abhikkhaṅgam sakāṁ cittāṁ paccavekkhitabbam. . .
100 Nāṇamoli and Bodhi 2009, §7, p. 213. M 20 (at M i.121): . . . cetasā cittāṁ abhiniggaṁhato abhinippāyato abhissatāgamya. . .
102 MN 75 (at M I 511): dīgharattaṁ vata . . . ahamiminā cittenā nikato vañcito pañcito paluddho. . .
103 Cf. section 2.1 above.
105 E.g., MN 18 (at M I 109): attha bhagavā pubbaṅhasamāyam nivāsetvā pattaṁvaramādāya kapilavatthuṁ pindāya pāvīsi.
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silently meditating and is pleased with the progress of the monks. But perhaps the most striking example is the Buddha’s first-person description of his attainment of the three knowledges (tissso vijjā) on the night of his enlightenment and liberation. Attaining the first knowledge, he says: ‘I remembered my various previous abodes [i.e., lives]. . .’ This knowledge raises the question, from the first-personal perspective, of the relation between the ‘I’ and the temporal continuity of subjective experience, both within and between different lifetimes. Attaining the second knowledge, he says: ‘With the divine eye, which is pure and transcends the human, I saw beings passing away and reappearing . . . and I understood that beings proceed [sc. after death] according to their actions.’ This knowledge again raises the previous question, but from a third-personal perspective, and imbued with the recognition of the constitutive power and ethical value of subjective volitional intent and action. Finally, by attaining the third and ultimate knowledge, he automatically attained liberation: ‘I recognised directly, just as it actually is: ‘These are the unconscious influences [āsavā]’ . . . ‘This is the arising of the unconscious influences’ . . . ‘This is the cessation of the unconscious influences’ . . . ‘This is the path leading to the cessation of the unconscious influences’. Then, knowing thus, seeing thus, my mind was liberated [sc. from the ‘unconscious influences’]. . .’

From this moment on, Gotama was enlightened and liberated; with the extinction of the āsavas, the sense of ‘asmi’ti also forever vanished. It is important to recognise that ‘liberation’, here, is not merely an external ‘result’ of the ‘third knowledge’, but is ultimately identical with it: the direct recognition and understanding of the ‘unconscious influences’ is itself the liberation from them. This liberation itself is also an act of knowledge: ‘When liberated, there was the knowledge: ‘Liberated.’ Here, then, in the Buddha’s description of the crucial act of ‘knowing’ that is the essential final goal of EB, we cannot but recognise the evident irreducibility of intentional subjectivity. Where there is ‘knowledge’ there is certainly an ‘act of knowing’: there is certainly a subjective consciousness-of, even though there is no ‘self’, no ‘subject’, no sense of ‘I am’ or ‘I am this’.

106 E.g., MN 118 (at M II 79): atha kho bhagavā turnībhūtaṁ tumībhūtaṁ bhikkhusaṅghāṁ amuloketvā bhikkhū āmantesi: ‘āraddhosmi, bhikkhave, imāya paṭipadāya; āraddhacittosmi, bhikkhave, imāya paṭipadāya. . .’

107 MN 4 (at M I 22-23):

108 MN 4 (at M I 21-22): so kho ahaṁ . . . paṭhamam jhānām upasampajja vihāsim . . . catuttatham jhānām upasampajja vihāsim . . . so evam samāhite citte parisudhhe pariyodāte . . . pubbenivāsānussatiñāya cittaṁ abhinimmānesim. so anekavihītam pubbenivāsam anussārāmi. (I have begun this elliptical quotation of the Pāli text with the first words of the Buddha’s extended report, where the pronoun ahaṁ occurs.)

109 MN 4 (at M I 22): so dibbena cakkhuṁ visuddhena atikkamantamussakena satte passāmi cavamāne upapajjamāne hīne pañcāṁ suvaṁne dubbante suvatte yathākammippage satte pājānāmi . . .


111 The formula expressing the direct recognition of the āsavas is of course identical with the formula expressing the direct recognition of the ‘Four Noble Truths’ (but cf. Harvey 2009); thus MN 4 (at M I 23): so ‘idaṁ dukkhan’ti yathābhūtaṁ abbaṁñāsīṁ, ‘ayaṁ dukkhasamudayo ti yathābhūtaṁ abbaṁñāsīṁ, ‘ayaṁ dukkhanirodho ti yathābhūtaṁ abbaṁñāsīṁ, ‘ayaṁ dukkhanirodhaṁ patipadāti yathābhūtaṁ abbaṁñāsīṁ. . .

112 MN 4 (at M I 23): vimuttaṁ vinumuttamen hiṁsam ahosi. ( Cf. also fn. 66 above.)
6. Conclusion: Not ‘thing’, but ‘quality’; not ‘the pure ‘I’’, but just pure ‘‘I’’-ness’

My point of conclusion, then, will be to propose a decisive terminological shift. Throughout this discussion, I have never made philosophical use of the term ‘subject’, but only of the term ‘subjectivity’. The distinction between these two terms is perhaps self-explanatory, precisely because their two senses (especially in the present context) are so radically different. Although they are both nouns, they belong to fundamentally different categories: the former readily suggests the notion of an ‘independently-existing individual being’, a kind of ‘thing’ or ‘entity’, and so can readily tend towards the concept of attā. The latter, however, can only really mean a property or quality of consciousness, and so can be readily dissociated, conceptually, from any notion of a ‘subject’ as an ‘independently-existing individual being’. ‘Subjectivity’ can belong to ‘consciousness-of’ without having to belong to ‘a subject’, as such; in fact, ‘subjectivity’ is virtually synonymous with the very sense of ‘consciousness-of’. What has already been discussed so far should hopefully make this point evident.

Perhaps it is also already clear that Husserl’s use of the noun-term ‘I’ (Ich), i.e., ‘the pure ‘I’’ (das reine Ich), ‘the transcendental ‘I’’ (das transzendente Ich), is problematic. If one understands what Husserl is referring to as the ‘residuum’ of the epokhē and of the transcendental reduction, then one also understands the reason why Husserl says, quite rightly, that this use of the term ‘I’ is really ‘an essential equivocation’. But the equivocation can easily be avoided. Just as the word ‘subjectivity’ arguably indicates the actual nature of ‘consciousness-of’, whereas the word ‘subject’ obscures and even deforms it, so too, a term such as ‘‘I’’-ness’, which would name a quality or property of consciousness, would be preferable to the term ‘the ‘I’’, which can easily be misunderstood and reified, once again, into the notion of an ‘independent entity’. In effect, I am suggesting that ‘‘I’’-ness’ is ultimately a synonym for ‘subjectivity’; and that this is, after all, the necessary TP meaning of Husserl’s term, ‘the pure ‘I’’. Looking at the matter in this way perhaps helps to clarify why that which Husserl called ‘the pure ‘I’’ was necessarily a kind of ‘emptiness’. After all, he himself recognised that what he called ‘the ‘I’’ was no kind of ‘positive entity’.

The first-personal pronoun, ‘I’, ‘ahām’, is thus not an empty, non-referring linguistic marker used merely according to worldly convention; but nor does it refer to some permanent, independently-existing entity. This term has not only a ‘use’, but a genuine ‘meaning’: the intrinsic

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113 Cf. fn. 83, and its main text, above.
114 However, the term ‘‘I’’-ness’ expresses something that the term ‘subjectivity’ may not express so clearly or vividly; for, the latter term is somewhat conceptual and theoretical, whereas the former term evokes the same property of consciousness in a more directly experiential (‘first-personal’) sense; a more robustly phenomenological sense.
115 Cf., e.g., Husserl 1980, §24, p. 111: ‘Everything which ‘appears’, everything which, in whatever way, presents and manifests itself can also not be; I can be deceived by these things. The ‘I’, however, does not appear, does not present itself merely from a side, does not manifest itself merely according to discrete determinations, aspects, and moments. . . As pure ‘I’ it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear.’ (‘Alles „Erscheinende“, alles irgendwie sich Darstellende, Bekundende kann auch nicht sein, und ich kann mich darüber täuschen. Das Ich aber erscheint nicht, stellt sich nicht bloß einseitig dar, bekundet sich nicht bloß nach einzelnen Bestimmtheiten, Seiten, Momenten. . . Als reines Ich birgt es keine verborgenen inneren Reichtümere, es ist absolut einfach, liegt absolut zutage. . . ’) (Husserl 1952a, §24, pp. 104-105.) Cf. also fn. 82 above for further references.
and irreducible pure subjectivity – the “I’-ness’ – of intentional consciousness. If there were no intentional consciousness, with its inherent property of pure subjectivity, not only would the pronoun ‘I’, ‘aham’, have no meaning: it could not exist. Yet, it does exist, and the Buddha had no qualms about using it in the same breath with which he preached the principle of anattā, because he understood, much more deeply than we, its true meaning and nature. Indeed, without that meaning, there would be no ‘path’ (magga) and no ‘escape’ (nissarana). If we confuse and conflate the root error of ‘aham-asmīti with the true but hidden meaning of ‘aham’ – namely, the intrinsic “I’-ness’ of consciousness-of – then I believe that we lose sight of the genuine possibility of the path and the gateway of escape.

By you the effort must be made. The Tathāgatas are (but) teachers.117

116 MN 7 (at M I 39): ‘there is an escape beyond this whole realm of perception.’ atthi imassa saññagatassa uttarim nissaranam.
117 Dhp 20, §276a (at Dhp 40): tumhehi kiccamātappam akkhātāro tathāgatā.
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Is It True That Buddhism is Mind-Based Science?

Apisin Sivayathorn¹ & Apichai Puntasen²

Introduction:

The article is intended to illustrate that Buddhadhamma or the teaching of the Lord Buddha is not a religion as understood in the Western context which is based on faith, but a science which is different from physical science which focuses on the study of the relationship and the change of matter and energy. The Dhamma of the Buddha deals with the study of the human mind which includes both matter and energy but its characteristics are completely different from matter and energy. Buddhism has the development of the human mind as its goal so that man can transcend suffering and pain. The scientific nature of Buddhism is based on the methodology of development of the mind which is very clear that man can ultimately be and liberated from suffering completely. The method employed is practical for everyone, and like science which generally depends on the knowledge and ability of individuals to understand down to its final goal, having well set method of achievement to assure the outcome in the same way that scientific methodology serves its purpose. The science of this type should be categorized as the science of the mind.

Its main context is the illustration of the Supramundane Truth discovered by The Lord Buddha which is the science of the mind accessing to the Ultimate Truth which belongs to another dimension that transcends the science of matter and energy which is struggling to explore the Universal Truth but has great challenge to overcome continuously. The liberated ones and the acquirer of the Knowledge of the Buddha are endowed with the Knowledge and Virtuous Conducts (Vījñācaranasampanno), enlightened no less than the level of Arahat. Having the Consciousness of the Awoked One, having the vision and knowledge of the termination of suffering (dukkha), they can indeed attain the Ultimate Truth (sacca-antima). Through their practices, they offer to the interested ones who belong to the disciple level to have the methodology of the Supramundane level and to lead them closest to the state of Buddhahood which is the Ultimate Truth. They also have no intention to have any argument regarding the level of methods offered by various contemporary schools of meditation, as there are numerous techniques of meditation, and this is similar to the situation before the time of the Lord Buddha. This nature has mixed and troubled the basics in the search of the Truth of the teaching of the Lord Buddha or even in the original issue of “One who is endowed with the Knowledge and Virtuous Conducts (Vījñācaranasampanno)”; the truth of this still remains the topic of extensive debates and analyses.

The author believes that Right Mental Concentration (Sammāsamādhi) is the appropriate guidelines for the quest of the Noble Truth of Suffering (dukkha-ariya-sacca) and can lead to the Right Noble Mental Concentration (Sammāriyosamādhi) paving the way to the Awakening Consciousness discovered by the Lord Buddha through his great experience gained from extensive spiritual training and his wisdom has been elevated up, having structure, pattern and model that are tangible that it spirals and penetrative into the meaning of the Dharma (Dhamma-vinaya) passing

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from the gross level to the refined one, holistically, causing the holistically dynamic and unified flow having all the details of the information in the body of knowledge which is called the 15 Caranas and 8 Vijjas which qualified him to be one who is truly endowed with the Knowledge and Virtuous Conducts (Vijjācaranasampanno). The primary contexts of this article include 6 topics, namely:

1. Outlines of learning and training in spiritual practices leading to liberation from suffering (dukkha)
2. Clarification of the understanding about meditation practices that it is different from the Right Mental Concentration (Sammāsamādhi) of the Lord Buddha
3. The practice of the Right Mental Concentration (Sammāsamādhi) which is the 3 levels of Supra-mundane (lokutara) related to the principles of the Triple Training (Trai-sikkhā)³
4. The Noble Right Concentration (Sammāriyosamādhi) which is conducted along the Nobel Eightfold Path (Sammāriyo-atthangika-magga) bases on the foundation of the Four Enlightened Noble People.
5. The appraisal of the twofold Direct Knowledge of the Noble Fruit of following of the 15 Caranas and 8 Vijjas which are Supra-mundane (lokutara).
   - Appraisal of the Noble Direct Knowledge with the structure of the 16 Direct Knowledges (Soḷasaṅgaṇa) consecutively from the beginning to the fruition of the path to Nirvana which leads to the completeness of the twofold of the fruit in the Right Direct Knowledge (sammānāma).
   - Appraisal of the mind which the Noble Fruit with the structure of the sixteen Cetopariyaṅganas consecutively from the beginning to the liberation to lead to the completeness of the twofold noble fruit as a part of the Right Direct Knowledge and Vision (Sammāvimuttiṅgadassana).
6. Following along the path of the Enlightenment of the Lord Buddha consecutively.

### 1. Outline for learning of the training of spiritual practice leading to the liberation from suffering (dukkha) to Nibbāna

1.1 At present, people know the law of nature through the framework of physical science but during the Buddha’s time most people knew the Natural Law of Dhammathiti, i.e., the maintenance of all phenomena and appears in the Definition of the Dharma (Dhamma-niyāma) in the famous writing of Venerable Phra Dhammapitaka under the quotation of “Dependent Co-origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) illustrating that all things are interrelated to one another by the flux of causality which can be shortly expressed as the process of the dharma (dhammapavatti). All things that have form and abstract in the physical world and life are composed of name and form, expressing themselves as various Laws of the Nature, so-called the Dhammaniyāma…”⁴

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³ In Pāli: Te-sikkhā
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The body of knowledge of Dhammaniyāma, which is composed of five categories, is immensely huge as the universe itself (and the quest for the Truth of the universe as the Universal Truth has never reached its conclusion), namely:

- **Utuniyāma**: the laws of nature covering the non-living objects (have no life) merely matters and energies;
- **Bijaniyāma**: the laws of nature covering the living objects including genetic materials and plants;
- **Cittaniyāma**: the laws covering the activities of the minds of the animals including human beings;
- **Kammaniyāma**: the Law of Karma; in the level of animals, they are influenced by their natural instinct; in the level of the humans, however, it is specially related to the happiness and suffering \((dukkha)\) in life conditioning the endless cyclical sequences of defilement-action-the ripe of the fruit of action \((kilesa-kamma-vipāka)\).

**Dhammaniyāma**: the laws on relationship between causal agents of various dimensions which are illustrated in the classification of the Dharma, involving deep and complicated phenomena. They are categorized into 2 levels: *lokīyadhamma* which is the rising, sustaining and passing away according to the Law of the Three Universal Characteristics as they are originated by *Avijjā*, ignorance of the path of liberation from suffering \((dukkha)\), i.e., the Four Noble Truths; and *lokuttaradhamma* which is the following of the process of Dependent Co-origination \((paticcasamuppāda)\) originated by *Vijjā*, i.e., the Four Noble Truths leading to the attainment of the Ultimate Truth as the end of suffering \((dukkha)\) is possible by the Lord Buddha’s Enlightenment over two thousand and five hundred years ago.

1.2 The Lord Buddha was enlightened by discovering the way to completely eliminate suffering \((dukkha)\) through his own effort. The Truth is of the Dharma is timeless \((akalika)\). Hence, he called himself a man who is endowed with the Knowledge and Virtuous Conducts \((Vijjācāraṇasampanno)\), i.e. the one who is endowed with *Vijjā*, the knowledge leading to liberation from suffering \((dukkha)\) and *cāraṇa*, the path leading one out of suffering \((dukkha)\) as he taught in the Sekhapatiipadasutta that the knowledge is the 15 *Caraṇas* and 8 *Vijjās* with all the 8 *Vijjās* explained. The mainstream Buddhism (in Thailand) interprets it as special psychic ability related to miracles and ability to know the mind of other is called the *Ādesanāpāṭīhārīya* counted to seven items. The Venerable Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, however, explains the last three *Vijjās* of the list of the Eight *Vijjās* are in agreement with the Anusāsanāpāṭīhārīya, the miracle of instruction that the listeners emancipate all the mental defilement enabling annihilation of suffering\(^5\) as follows:

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The First Vijjā: Pubbenivāsāmusatiñña, the Direct Knowledge of Recollection of the Past Lives, the true meaning of which focuses on the knowledge of the rising of the “me-and-mine” delusion of the past, i.e., the formation of the grasping of the Five Aggregates that the Five Aggregates are “me” or “mine”, tracing back to the original, hundreds or even thousands times.

The Second Vijjā: Cutūpapātañña, seeing the rising and cessation of movement to rebirth of all animals under the dictate of their own karma.

The Third Vijjā: Āsavakkhayāñña, the Direct Knowledge that brings extinction to āsava or intoxicant of the deepest part of the mind i.e., eradicating the āsava with this power of Vijjā

The tool for creating vijjā is called carana which means the facilitator; carana is therefore the facilitator of the mind to arrive at vijjā which are of 15 types, classified into 3 groups of Buddhist principles:

Group #1: silasampadā, indriyasaṃvara, bhojanemattānūtā, jāgriyāmyyoga. These are series of principles beginning with fostering the moral precepts (sīla) then restraining the senses such as the eye, ear, nose, tongue, bodily sensation, and the mind, being aware of the amount of food intake, cultivating diligence with happy well alertness.

Group #2: saddhā, faith; hiri, moral shame; ottappa, moral dread; bāhusacca, learnedness; viriya, energy; sati, mindfulness; and paññā, wisdom.

Group #3: there are four of the jhāna (mental absorption), i.e., the four rūpajhānas

Caraṇa has to be respectively cultivated according to the above principles. This is the heart of the meaning of “caranasampanno”; sampanno means complete acquisition. This also has another hidden meaning, i.e., they have to be interrelated to each other. If they are not interrelated to each other the acquisition can never be completed. Then, one can ask: Why vijjā and carana are to be interrelated? The answer is vijjācaranasampanno is the state in which one is completely endowed with both vijjā and carana, for perfection of the Brotherhood, on the one hand, and on the other hand to fulfill the duty of the Awakened One.

1.3 According to the author’s research in the PhD dissertation “Vijjācaranasampanno for Liberation: 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās”, it was found that there are not so much explanation provided by the mainstream Buddhists [in Thailand] and they are not quite systematically related. However, there are a lot of teaching about the 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās and detailed exegesis as the main principle of community development of the Santi Asok People for almost four decades under the instruction of Samana Bodhiraksa especially during the interview about the Triple Training (Trai-sikkhā). According to his teaching, it is emphasized that the meditation practice of the Trai-sikkhā are related to the 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās as the Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) is different from “meditation” that is generally understood with the details as follows:
2. Clarity of understanding of the meditation practices before the age of the Lord Buddha that they are different from the Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) of the Lord Buddha

Clarity of the understanding in putting the mind at peace is meditation practice that is in agreement with the behavior of the mind of the Mundane Dharma (lokiya-dhamma) which is the knowledge of the human race of every age even before the rising of the Lord Buddha. They are different from the mind training for peace after kilesa has been expelled, i.e., the Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) that corresponds with the Behavior of the Spiritually Awakened in concordance with the Supra-mundane Dharma (lokuttara-dhamma) which is a body of knowledge in the enlightenment of the Lord Buddha.

2.1 The meditation that calms the mind belongs to the practice of samādhi which is qualified at the four rūpajhānas and culminates at the level of arūpajhānas until the mastery of the meditation skills in the entering and exiting of the nirodhasamāpatti; the method of which includes the training of function of the five aggregates to slow down the process of cooking up of the mind (saṅkhāra) and refining the sensation (vedana), freezing the memory (saññā) which leads to the freezing of the cognitive element (viññāna-dhātu). This is the success of the ability of an arahat of Buddhism who is able to enter and exit the state of trance known as “Saṅñāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti” which is the total collective Cessation (nirodha) of all suffering as the five aggregates is the mass of suffering, reaching the termination of suffering is nirodha so the functions of the five aggregates ceases. Its exact term is Nirodhasamāpatti which can be considered as the attainment of the Noble Truth of Cessation (Nirodha), as the person is still alive, he has to exit the Nirodhasamāpatti to restart the functions of the five aggregates in order to resume the daily life. Because of this reason, the Noble Truth of Cessation (Nirodha) of the Awakened is understood as the state of annihilation, i.e., everything perceived becomes totally void this is the state of a liberated mind (vimutticitta); this is Nirodha. This reveals the wisdom (paññā) of the Enlightenment of Nirodha of the Lord Buddha (otherwise) even the Lord Buddha entered and exited nirodhasamapatti many times as stated in the Tipiṭaka (the truth of this is subject to doubt) and the practices of the four rūpajhānas and four arūpajhānas which are collectively called the eight jhānas which still belong to the mundane knowledge. It is not clear when they have contaminated the core of training that leads to samādhi in the Trai-sikkhā. Then, whether or not the success in this flatter form of meditation should be called the Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) and whether they are different from sammāsamādhi as practiced by those who are Vijjācaranasampanno who the Lord Buddha has described in the Sekhapaṭipadāsutta6 which provides details of the 15 Caranās and 8 Vijjās. These are important issues which to be clarified.

Because the practice of Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) of the Lord Buddha is the systematic training for the purification of the mind through the Trai-sikkhā of the “Adhi” level that arises after kilesa has been consecutively diminished as clearly shown in #3. The practice of meditation (samādhi) is generally useful in de-stressing or deceasing the degree of problem one facing which may include creativity of new ideas or enhancing the para-normal psychic power but it never clearly produces the success in the cultivation of adhipaññā that is able to eradicate kilesa of the gross level (i.e., taṃhā or craving), of the medium level (i.e., nivaraṇa or the impediments of the mind; upādāna or clinging), of the refined level (i.e., anusaya or the defilement in the inborn trait;
The practice of meditation does not involve systematic and continuous engagement, therefore the liberation of all suffering is not actualized.

3. The Practice of Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) of the Three Supra-mundane Levels related to the Trai-sikkhā

3.1 The level of practice of Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) according to the system of the Trai-sikkhā related to the 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās.

Out of the great compassion, the Lord Buddha revealed the Path of Liberation from all suffering which is the Supra-mundane spiritual development of man that purifies the mind from causes of suffering i.e., defilement, (kilesa) craving (tanḥā), clinging (upādāna) and ignorance (avijjā) of the Four Noble Truths through the Trai-sikkhā, i.e., sīla, samādhi, and paññā which need to be further developed to the Trai-sikkhā of the Adhi-level which belongs to more advanced levels. Having consecutively diminished the defilement (kilesa), craving (tanḥā), and clinging (upādāna) to the final state of the Trai-sikkhā, the level of Asekha, (further training is no longer required) as it is the result of success in practice. Being freed from the refined kilesa, the anusaya-āsava, especially when avijjāsava is completely uprooted, the cankers of ignorance (avijjāsamyojana) is crossed over, the fruit of Arahat enlightenment is clearly step-by-step harvested with the body of knowledge of 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās. The result of the Supramundane is gradually increasing along the way until the Supramundane Output is fully reached.

See the diagram illustrating the relation between 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās related to the Trai-sikkhā’s accumulated output of the Supra-mundane, resulting in the four types of the Noble People consecutively.
**Diagram illustrating relations between 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās related to the Trai-sikkhā**’s accumulated output of the Supra-mundane resulting the four types of the Noble People consecutively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st set of Caraṇas related to “primary” Trai-sikkhā</th>
<th>2nd - 6th sets of Caraṇas related to Adhi-level of Trai-sikkhā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INPUT</strong></td>
<td><strong>OUTPUT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd set of Caraṇas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd set of Caraṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th set of Caraṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th set of Caraṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6th set of Caraṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>OUTCOME</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crossing over World of Sensual Pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crossing over World of Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crossing over World of Formless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>IMPACT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crossing over World of Sensual Pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crossing over World of Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crossing over World of Formless</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Moral Restraint**
- Sense restraint
- Controlled consciousness

**Risks to doom existing**
- Transcending vices
- Passing cross road: Supra-mundane-Mundane

**Trai-sikkhā of Asekha level & Enlightened Persons**
- 5-precept base
- 8-precept base
- 10-precept base
- 227 precepts – Īvādapāṭimokkha-sīla
- Sotapanna
- Sakadāgāmi
- Anāgāmi
- Arahat

**FEEDBACK LOOP**
- of the truthful information (paṭīnasagga)

**Note:**
- G. body = gotrabhūkāya
- G. mind = gotrabhūcitta
- G. knowledge = gotrabhūnā
3.1.1 Trai-sikkhā of “Primary level”

It begins with 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjā of the 1st set related to the Trai-sikkhā framework of “tasks in the Four Noble Truths” i.e., “know–relinquish-clarify-cultivate”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trai-sikkhā</th>
<th>1st set of Caraṇas (no. 1 – 4)</th>
<th>Tasks in the Four Noble Truths : “know–relinquish-clarify-cultivate”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sīla</td>
<td>sīlasamvara (setting appropriate precept-base for entrapment of kilesa)</td>
<td>targeting behavior that needs to be treated of kilesa “knowing” its addictive power, causing more suffering in life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>indriyasamvara (guarding the 6 sense doors, eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, mind, on their current sensual contact, e.g., watching the rising and falling away of the senses)</td>
<td>“relinquish” kilesa that causes suffering sensation (dukkhavedanā); mitigating it, to grow feeling of happiness (sukhavedanā) until it develops into sensation that is neither happiness nor suffering (adukkhamasukkhavedanā) or equanimity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samādhi</td>
<td>bhajanemattaññutā (knowing sufficient amount of consumption, i.e., having contentment appropriate to the precept bases)</td>
<td>“clarifying” kilesa: as it ceases to exist, the mind is delightful, contented. Then inspiration (chanda) in cultivating morality increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paññā</td>
<td>(diligently cultivating awakening consciousness)</td>
<td>The progress of wisdom to the Awakening: now seeing the spiritual path of liberation really exists.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The training at this level help elevate ordinary people to have inspiration (chanda) in the Dharma, so-called Kalyāṇa-jana (literally, beautiful people) who thread upon the bifurcation whether they are going to progress along the Supramundane to be liberated step-by-step from suffering by diligently cultivating awakening consciousness (jāgriyānuyoga) through spiritual renunciation (nekkhamma) of the three realms, i.e., the realm of the sensual pleasure (kāmabhava), the realm of form (rūpabhava), and the realm of the formless (arūpabhava). If they are still trapped in any of the realms, they are still sleeping (saiya) in that mundane realm. The Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi), however, causes the enlightened to be Wise, Awakened, and Blissful as they have crossed over the transcending condition (gotrabhū) of the three realms that belong to the mundane level of the ordinary to the Supramundane level of the Noble Enlightened People according to the knowledge to the next level.
3.1.2 Trai-sikkhā of “Adhi-” level

It is the elevation of the mind to the “Adhi-level” by following the 15 Caranas and 8 Vijjas of the 2nd to 6th set which results in the radical change of lineage of the triple conditions of body, mind and consciousness of the followers of the Dharma at this level so-called the gotrabhū people:

At the gross level, the transcending body (gotrabhūkāya) follows the 1st, 2nd and 3rd sets of the 15 Caranas and 8 Vijjas resulting in the crossing over of the “realm of sensual pleasure” (kāmabhava).

At the intermediate level, the transcending mind (gotrabhūcitta) follows the 1st to 4th sets of the 15 Caranas and 8 Vijjas resulting in the crossing over of the “realm of form” (rūpabhava).

At the refined level, the transcending direct knowledge (gotrabhūnā) follows the 1st to 6th sets of the 15 Caranas and 8 Vijjas resulting in the crossing over of the “realm of the formless” (arūpabhava).

Together with this, when the follower of the Dharma tries to upgrade the level of morality (sīla) again and again until the precept bases are accordingly complete.

3.1.3 Trai-sikkhā of “Asekha level”

The perfection of the training of the 6 sets of the 15 Caranas and 8 Vijjas results in the complete crossing over of the lineage of the old world (ayam loko) of the 3 realms, namely: the realm of sensual pleasure (kāmabhava), the realm of form (rūpabhava), the realm of the formless (arūpabhava). A new lineage of the new world (paraloka) is born, i.e., the 4 levels of the Noble Realm (ariyabhūmi) which are related to the four precept bases of the Asekha as follows:

- Morality level of Asekha: 5-precept base attains the Noble realm of sotāpanna closing off the realm of woe.
- Morality level of Asekha: 8-precept base attains the Noble realm of sakadāgāmi released from the realm of the woe of sensual world.
- Morality level of Asekha: 10-precept base attains the Noble realm of anāgāmi released from the realm of the woe, the sensual world, and the world of phenomena.
- Morality level of Asekha: 227-precept base Ovādapātimokkha-sīla (i.e., culasīla, majjhimasīla, mahāsīla, etc.) attains the Noble realm of arahat released from the Three Worlds and the realm of the Self (attā).

3.2 Level of practice in the cultivation of the Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) of the Supra-mundane with 5 abandonments (pahānas) and the task in the Four Noble Truths related to the 15 Caranas and 8 Vijjas
3.2.1 As for meditation, it is generally focused on the result which is the peace of mind known as \textit{jhāna}. From the development of \textit{samādhi} that scales the level of peace with the span of time, short and long. The development of which are called 1st – 4th \textit{jhāna}, shown as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{khanikasamādhi}: momentary concentration
  \item \textit{upacārasamādhi}: access concentration
  \item \textit{appanāsamādhi}: fixed concentration
  \item \textit{Fourth jhāna}
\end{itemize}

It can be called the process of calming the mind as well as gradually energizing it. The peak is called the 4th \textit{jhāna}, known as Fixed Concentration (\textit{appanāsamādhi}). However, there is no clear definition as to when the defilement (\textit{kilesa}) is abandoned. Therefore, it is called the \textit{samādhi} for calmness “ceto-samatha” (ceto = mind; samatha = calm). This is the meditation practiced before the time of the Lord Buddha. It has the mind-body relationship that is conventional according the Law of \textit{Dhammaniyāma}. Historically, it has exited with the human race at all time, regardless of race, religion and civilization.

The exceedingly important message is that meditation for calming the mind that results in \textit{jhāna} is different to the Right Concentration (\textit{sammāsamādhi}) of the Lord Buddha who cultivated \textit{jhāna} for \textit{sammāsamādhi} which has the clarity of the Superwisdom (\textit{adhipaññā}) that the \textit{jhāna} is to be cultivated to eradicate \textit{kilesa} of intermediate level which are the five impediments (\textit{nivaranas}) in the body-base level that is progressing from renunciation (\textit{nekkhamma}) of the Realm of Sensual Pleasure (\textit{kāmabhava}), and dissolve \textit{upādāna} in the mind-base level of that is progressing from renunciation (\textit{nekkhamma}) of the Realm of Form (\textit{rupabhava}).

3.2.2 Cultivation of the Right Concentration (\textit{sammāsamādhi}) to reach the Supra-mundane, resulting \textit{Samma-adhi-citta-bhavana} has to be done in the system of the \textit{Trai-sikkhā} of the Adhi-level that includes the practice of the 15 \textit{Caranas} and 8 \textit{Vijjās}. The heart of the practice is the following of the 6 sets of the 15 \textit{Caranas} and 8 \textit{Vijjās} completely as each set contains the tool for abandoning the defilement (\textit{kilesa}). Each type of the 5 \textit{pahanas} is specifically for the eradication of \textit{kilesa}, \textit{tanţhā}, \textit{upādāna}, \textit{anusaya}, and \textit{āsava} so that the mind will be progressively clear. (See the Table below)

The progress of the Cessation of the unwholesome is indeed the success of the task that should be achieved in entering the Four Noble Truths. This verifies that the practice of the Right Concentration (\textit{sammāsamādhi}) is Supramundane in the same accord with the framework of the task of the Four Noble Truths.
Diagram illustrating the relations of the Trai-sikkha of the Adhi-level related to 15 Candas and 8 Vijjas with the 5 Abandonments (pahāna) and the Task in the Four Noble Truths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Set</th>
<th>Task in the Four Noble Truths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trai-sikkha of the Adhi-level</td>
<td>15 Candas &amp; 8 Vijjas</td>
<td>Task in the Four Noble Truths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sīlasamvarā</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Mental Defilement (kilesa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apamālapatipada</td>
<td>2nd &amp; 3rd</td>
<td>Mental Defilement (kilesa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddhamma</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Mental Defilement (kilesa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhāna</td>
<td>5th &amp; 6th</td>
<td>Mental Defilement (kilesa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emprowerment of pāññā with the 7 limbs of Enlightenment (bojjha)</td>
<td>Nissara</td>
<td>Total uprooting all levels of kilesa through holistic and dynamic power of the mind</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. The Noble Right Concentration

4.1 The Right Concentration (sammāsāmādhi) is the cultivation of the old mind of ordinary people who are inspired to be Kalyāṇa-majā (beautiful people) to enter the Supra-mundane higher and higher (See Table in no. 3.1). It is the progressive development of the mind of the beautiful people (gotrabha) ascending the three steps, namely: Gotrabhukāya (Transcending body), Gotrabhucitta (Transcending mind), and Gotrabhiññāna (Transcending Knowledge), in order to follow the stream of the gotrabha to the Mundane, i.e., from gotrabha to the Supramundane to join the new spiritual world of the Noble People which results in the elevation of the level of their ability to the Noble Right Concentration of the Noble Enlightened People who are Vījjanarājasampanno, endowed with the 15 caraṇas and 8 Vījjas, who have managed to partly eradicate the āsava and not yet completed the training (Sekkha) down to the level of those who managed to complete the training (Asekha) by total eradication of the āsava.

4.2 The Noble Right Concentration (Ariya-sammāsāmādhi) is the cultivation of the spiritual behavior of the enlightened, initiated by Vījja as the four classes of the Noble Enlightened People own successfully cultivated Vījja. Some have managed to eradicate certain part of āsava. Therefore, the 15 Caranas and 8 Vījjas in the level of the Noble Right Concentration is certainly regarded as Supra-mundane thorough out the course. They and can be understood through the framework of System Analysis that corresponds to Dependent Co-origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda) i.e., the current of causality of the spiritual process according to the Mahāniddānasutta7 as illustrated from the period of the Buddha according to the Table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Analysis</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Caranas &amp; 8 Vījjas</td>
<td>Silasamvara</td>
<td>Apannakapatipada</td>
<td>Saddhamma</td>
<td>Jhāna</td>
<td>Vījja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causality of spiritual process (Dhammapavatti)</td>
<td>Primary Cause</td>
<td>Origin (nidāna)</td>
<td>Cause (samudaya)</td>
<td>Facilitating agent (paccaya)</td>
<td>Result (phala)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the first of the four classes of the Noble Enlightened People, the Stream-enterer (sotāpanna), the 5-precept base is the cause for abandoning the six vices, following the five precepts. It is also the cause for the “Input” that is the body of the Dharma which is the primary cause of the process to eradicate the defilement (kilesa) which the Lord Buddha has assured that it is not the wrong practice. The practice includes of the 3 Apannakapatipada: namely, guarding of the six sense doors (indriyasamvara), considerate in food consumption (bhujanemattanṇutā) which is done in concord with following the precepts, diligently cultivate the awakening consciousness (jāgrīyāmyyoga), these three practices are done based on the framework of the five precepts to step out of the world of vices. It is the training through the practice of the precepts as the base to

eradicate personal kilesa for the synthesis process in the mind, and to achieve the Samudaya, i.e., craving (tanha), until it is the finally extinguished; this is the task in the Noble Truth. The Output is the 7 Core Dharma (Saddhammas): the mind that is progressive in faith (saddha), moral shame (hiri), moral dread (ottappa) that allows one to see the defilement (kilesa), once being aware of, can be progressively quenched, and the learnedness (bhusacca) facilitates more and more energy (viriya) for cultivated mindfulness (sati) and orientation awareness (sampajañha). Seeing that craving (tanha) is retreating to dwindle away gives rise to wisdom (panna) that has crossed over doubt (vicikiccha) in renunciation (nekkhamma) from mental defilement of mind (the impediment) for the cultivation of the Core Dharma (Saddhamma). The most outstanding of which is the 5 Authorities (Indriyas): faith (saddha), energy (viriya), mindfulness (sati), mental concentration (samadhi), wisdom (panna), as the five powers of authority that has samadhi as the Outcome from the Core Dharma of the Adhicitta, jhana.

Therefore, the Core Dharma is the collective agent of the Causality Process that jhana of the Adhicitta evolves higher and higher, in association with wisdom (panna) to Vijja, the Direct Knowledge, and the cultivation of Wisdom as authority (pannindriya) or (pannabala). The impact of which gives rise to the six items of dharma of the Right View (sammadiitti) of Anasava level, i.e., panna which is authoritative (pannindriya and pannabala), for example. And with the continuous quest for the Supra-mundane Dharma (Dhammacayyasambojjha) the Right View (sammadiitti) is conducted with its other components of the Path (magganga) that evolve together as a Feedback Loop (patissaggaga), which is the constituent of the path that upgrades the Morality level of the Asekha of sotapanna from 5-precept base to 8 precepts which needed to be upgraded to the level of the trained morality (sekhasila) of Sakadagami. The constituent of the path is the Adhi-sila, the unfolding of the new path which spirals into the Apannakapaṭipada, i.e., the unfailing path that flows from the primary cause (nidana) elevating to the other constituents of the seven other Noble Path, culminating with the Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) that is present in every moment in daily life. Right View (Sammadiitti) leads the Noble Eightfold Path (Ariya-atthangika-magga) to the perfection of Noble Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) that results in Vijja (sammānana) and liberation (Sammavimuttinanadassana) of the Four Noble Truths arising for those freed from 8 Avijjasavas to the last step, ignorance of the Dependent Co-origination facilitating the ignorance of the Causality of all things that include the spiritual practice that is free from avijja that impacts the enhancement of the balance of the nature with the environment and spiritual development of the human race which is Supra-mundane, having Nibbana as the final conclusion.

5. Appraisal of the Double Direct Knowledge of the Noble Fruit (Ariyaphalana) from the practice of the Supra-mundane

15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjas

5.1 Appraisal of the Noble Direct Knowledge (Ariyana) with the structure of the 16 Direct Knowledges (Solasaṇanas) starts from the beginning to the final fruit of the path to Nibbana to lead to perfection of twofold of the Right Direct Knowledge (Sammānana).

The 16 Direct Knowledges (Solasaṇanas) are the collective appraisal of the Direct Knowledge of the Result based on the practice of the Lord Buddha, i.e., the Three Universal Characteristics
(Tilakkhaṇa), Trai-sikkhā and the Four Noble Truths that are consequentially linked (See Diagram illustrating the Principles of Buddhism leading to the Noble Direct Knowledge, on page 13).

5.1.1 The Three Universal Characteristics (Tilakkhaṇa) is the origin of the 3 paññas in Vipassanābhāvanā, reflection on the Name and form. Three steps of which are related to 1st set of Čaraṇas (Table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Universal Characteristics (Tilakkhaṇa)</th>
<th>1st–3rd pañṇa of 16th pañṇa</th>
<th>Three steps of Vipassanā bhāvanā</th>
<th>1st set of Čaraṇa</th>
<th>Mindfulness- based Satipaṭṭhāna ānāpāna-sati</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anicca: Impermanence of kilesa</td>
<td>Characteristics (Tilakkhaṇa)</td>
<td>Process: Three Universal</td>
<td>Silasamvarā</td>
<td>Body-based morality; correction of kilesa &amp; suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nāmarūpaparichedānāṇa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indriyasamvara</td>
<td>Sensation-base, decreasing sensation of suffering to neutral: sensation of neither-happy-nor-suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Characteristics (Tilakkhaṇa)</td>
<td>Process: Three Universal</td>
<td>jāgriyāmu-yoga</td>
<td>Dharma-base, awakening and “contented” with inspiration (chanda) progress to the Supra-mundane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dukkha: decay of kilesa</td>
<td>Paccayaparīgahanaṇāṇa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. in taking hold of causality agent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anattā: Cessation of kilesa; new behavior of adhisīla</td>
<td>Characteristics (Tilakkhaṇa)</td>
<td>Process: Three Universal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sammasanaṇāṇa:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. on name-and-form reflection by Three Universal Characteristics (Tilakkhaṇa)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note : K = Direct Knowledge

This level of practice elevates the mind of the ordinary to beautiful people (Kalyāṇajana) who just turn into the Supra-mundane path to complete the spiritual development, after finishing the 1st to 3rd sets of Čaraṇas.

The practice of the 1st set of the 15 Čaranaś and 8 Vijjās is to be done in the current sense contact (phassa) so that it is undertaking of Vipassanā in 3 levels of name-and-form (continuously without any interruption). This clearly reveals the process of the three universal characteristics: impermanence, non-sustainability, cessation of defilement, from which rises the 1st –3rd paññas of
the set of the sixteen, especially after Sammsanañāṇa which is the Direct Knowledge that rises after completing the reflection on the Three Universal Characteristics. This gives rise to (bhāvanā) wisdom, i.e., diligently cultivation of the awakening consciousness (jāgiṛiyānyyoga) which evolves into faith, i.e., the confidence in the insight of the 4th Direct Knowledge i.e., Udayabbayamupassanāṇāṇa, the Direct Knowledge in clearly seeing the births (continuing) and cessation of the name-and-form of the defilement (kilesa). The primary outcome from the practice of the 1st set of the Caraṇas is called Vipassanābhāvanā in name-and-form. The result of which is the respective development of 2nd - 4th set of Caraṇas from which rises 4th - 12th paññās of the set of the sixteen, i.e., the 9 Vipassanāpaññās. The detail of which is as follows.

5.1.2 The Trai-sikkhā of the Adhi-level and the 9 Vipassanāpaññā (3rd - 12th paññās) in the list of the Solasaṃāṇa are related to the Core Dharma (Saddhama) and jhāna in the 2nd to 4th sets of 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās (See Diagram in no. 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15 caraṇas</th>
<th>2nd set of 15 Caraṇas and the 9 Vipassanāpaññās</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>saddhā (faith)</td>
<td>Core Dharma (Saddhama): state of mind that synthesizes faith &amp; wisdom (paññā). Through authority of wisdom gives rise to moral shame &amp; moral dread in being diluted in vicissitude due to delusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiri (moral shame)</td>
<td>Vipassanāpañnā: “Udābhyāmupassanāṇāṇa” seeing the rise-and-fall of all things in the mundane world that it has no meaning; “Bhāṅgānūpassanāṇāṇa” seeing destruction of all things; “Bhayatupiṭṭhaṇāṇa”, the Knowledge (paññā) in seeing the frightening danger of the sin and corruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ottappa (moral dread)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bāhusaccā (learnedness)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15 caraṇas</th>
<th>3rd set of 15 Caraṇas and 9 Vipassanāpaññās</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vīriya (Energy)</td>
<td>Ādiṇāvānupassanāṇāṇa: K. the false of corruption &amp; need for honesty in body, speech &amp; mind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sati (mindfulness)</td>
<td>Nibbidānāṇa: K. to relinquish delusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paññā (wisdom)</td>
<td>Muñcitukamayatāṇāṇa: K. in abandoning, free from doubt, and defilement of mind.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15 caraṇas</th>
<th>4th set of 15 Caraṇas and 9 Vipassanāpaññās</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st jhāna (analytical thoughts)</td>
<td>The 4 jhānas “Paṭisankhāmupassanāṇāṇa” K. in reviewing the quest to the Supra-mundane in order to destroy grasping in the five aggregates. Having ended it, Sankhārupekkhānāṇa rises, i.e., K. to be indifferent to all compounded things with Adhipaññā, giving rise to Saccāmulomikānāṇa: K. necessary for attainment of the Four Noble Truths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd jhāna (joy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd jhāna (happiness)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th jhāna (equanimity)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: K = Direct Knowledge

The practice turns Kalyāṇajāna into Supra-mundane people: 3 levels of gotrabhūjana: gotrabhūkāya and gotrabhūcitta that is evolving into gotrabhūnāṇa (See Diagram in no. 3.1). They are on the way to the Realm of the Clan of Noble People in the next level.
Diagram illustrates relation of Buddhist Principles leading to *Ariyaphalañña*, *Soḷasañña*as & *16 Cetopariyañña*as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Buddhist principles leading to <em>Ariyaphalañña</em></th>
<th>16 <em>nāgas</em> (Soḷasañña)</th>
<th>15 <em>Caraññas</em> &amp; 8 <em>Vijjās</em></th>
<th>Abandoned roots of unwholesome</th>
<th>16 <em>Cetopariyañña</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vipassanābhāvanā on name-and-form based on <em>The Three Universal Characteristics (Tilakkhana)</em> (content in no. 5.1)</td>
<td>nāma-rūpa-parichedañña (K. in discriminating name-and-form)</td>
<td>Silasamvara (cultivating true defilement eradication)</td>
<td>Eradicating 3 unwholesome roots of some actions:</td>
<td>- sarāga - sadośa - samohā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paccayapariggahāñña (K. in taking the causative agents of name-and-form)</td>
<td>Indriyasamvara (guarding the 6 sense-doors)</td>
<td>- rāga: greed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sammasañña (K. in thorough contemplation of name-and-form through Three Universal Characteristics (Tilakkhana))</td>
<td>bhogemattañña (considerate in food consumption)</td>
<td>- dosa: hatred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>jāgriyāmyyoga (awakening consciousness cultivation)</td>
<td>- mohā: delusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Vipassanāññas according to Adhisāla level of <em>Tra-sutta</em> (See content in no. 5.1)</td>
<td>saddhā (faith)</td>
<td>Eradicating 3 roots of <em>kilesa</em> to decrease taṇhā.</td>
<td>Empowering wisdom in relinquishing impediment:</td>
<td>Samkhitta Viṅkhatta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhisāla bhāvanā</td>
<td>hiri (moral shame)</td>
<td>Quenching corruption of body, speech &amp; mind.</td>
<td>- kāmāpādāna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ottappa (moral dread)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- ātitthu-pādāna</td>
<td>Samkhitta Viṅkhatta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bhusacca (learnedness)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- atavāhu-pādāna</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- samahācācchā &amp; viṣikiccha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>viriya (Energy)</td>
<td>Relinquishing 4 upādānas</td>
<td>Mahaggatā-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mind bhāvanā</td>
<td>sati (Mindfulness)</td>
<td>- Kāmapādāna</td>
<td>Amaḥaggata-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paññā (Wisdom)</td>
<td>- Āṭṭhāpādāna</td>
<td>citta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Silabbatupādāna</td>
<td>Sauttara-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Attavāhu-pādāna</td>
<td>Anuttara-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>citta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st jhāna – <em>vītaka-vicāra</em></td>
<td>1st jhāna – <em>vītaka-vicāra</em></td>
<td>Sammādaha-citta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd jhāna – <em>piti</em></td>
<td>2nd jhāna – <em>piti</em></td>
<td>Simagga-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd jhāna – <em>sukha</em></td>
<td>3rd jhāna – <em>sukha</em></td>
<td>Cittavāsako-citta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th jhāna – <em>upekkhā</em></td>
<td>4th jhāna – <em>upekkhā</em></td>
<td>Cittavāsako-citta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(equanimity)</td>
<td>(equanimity)</td>
<td>Cittavāsako-citta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 <em>Caraññas</em> and 8 <em>Vijjās of anasaṇa</em> level along the Noble Eightfold Path, led by 20 Right Views, gearing up from 5-precept base to 8-precept base, etc.</td>
<td>Vipassanāñña</td>
<td>Relinquishing 3 āsavas</td>
<td>Samādaha-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective factor to culminate as the twofold of <em>Sammāñña</em></td>
<td>Gotrabhāñña</td>
<td>- Kāmāsavā</td>
<td>Uṣṇakha-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maggañña</td>
<td>- Bhavāsavā</td>
<td>Mahamajja-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phalañña</td>
<td>- Avijjāsavā</td>
<td>Uṣṇakha-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paccavekkhāññañña</td>
<td></td>
<td>Samādaha-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective factor to culminate as the twofold of <em>Sammāvimuttihāññadassana</em>.</td>
<td>Vipassanāñña</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uṣṇakha-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manomayiddhi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mahamajja-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dhammihāñña</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uṣṇakha-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dibbasotañña</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mahamajja-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cetopariyañña</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uṣṇakha-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pubbhavasaamatasotāña</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mahamajja-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cutūpapāññañña</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uṣṇakha-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asakkhahayañña</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mahamajja-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note : K = Direct Knowledge
5.1.3 The Four Noble Truths and 13th -16th of the Solasaññas and 8 Vijjās proceeding to the Four Noble Truths whereas the last four นānas 4 of Solasaññas, i.e., Gotrabhūñāṇa, Maggañāṇa, Phalañāṇa, Paccavekkhañāṇāṇa which is the structure related to and supportive of the Four Noble Truths, respectively.

| 8 Vijjās born along the course of the Eightfold Path | Gotrabhūñāṇa transcendals ordinary people to the Noble People, from which rises. Maggañāṇa, K. in Noble Eightfold Path (Ariya-aththangika-magga) with sammāsamādhi or the Noble Right Concentration, from which rises Phalañāṇa, K. of the Noble Enlightened People of different levels, from which rises Paccavekkhañāṇāṇa, K. in reviewing & revolving up of Sammāñāṇa, and from which rises Sammāvimuttiñāṇadassana that transcendals sotāpanna to Sakadāgāmi, to Ānāgāmi until the task of arahat is complete. |

Note : K = Direct Knowledge

5.2 Appraisal of the mind of the Noble Fruit with the structure of 16 Cetopariyaññas respectively from liberated mind (Vimutticitta) down to perfection the twofold fruits of Sammāvimuttiñāṇadassana is resulted from the practice of the 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās. The practice is very profound and requires the practitioners to have sufficient spiritual buoyancy over defilement (kilesa) that have sprung out from craving (tanthā). It starts with trimming off some defilement (kilesa) before purging out craving (tanthā) the impediment (nivarana) that obstructs the mind and dissolving clinging (upādāna), eliminating the deeply rooted impurity (anusaya) of the mind and uprooting the intoxicant that have inlaid in the mind (āsava), respectively through the power of Vijjā. The mind is then consequentially culminating the Supra-mundane Path and Supra-mundane Fruit without any obstacle. The condition of the mind is at of the Adhi-level which is a form of sammāsamādhi known in Pali as “Ānantariyakasamādhi”. It is the most excellent samādhi, the Lord Buddha said that it is samādhi that is superior to any other samādhi (Khu.Khu.25/75). It is most advanced than any samādhi of the rūpajāna and arūpajāna as it quenches kilesa of all levels. Finishing this, the person is progressing to renounce (nekkhamma) from the three worlds, the realm of sensual please, the realms of form, and the realm of the formless, transcending to the Noble Realms through the authority of power to the final state of arahat.

6. Step-by-step Practice to Enlightenment according to Lord Buddha

Having completed the final interpretation of the Sammāvimuttiñāṇadassana, is possible when one is able to achieve the Ultimate Truth (Sacca-antima), uniting the dichotomy (Ubhatobhaga) of the Emptiness (through attainment of the Four Noble Truths that has liberation as its end) and the Tathatā (following Dependent Co-origination initiated by Vijjā).

The understanding of the Direct Knowledge of the Noble Fruit (Ariyaphalañṇa) the last outcome of the Noble Right Concentration which is conventionally taken as it is a liberated mind (vimuttacitta) is not yet final. Because solving the enigma of the Cetopariyañṇa is the last frontier for an un-liberated mind, before the rise of the liberated mind (vimuttacitta) (no. 15th).

In the mainstream Buddhism conventionally translates un-liberated mind as the mind which is not liberated. Since the 14 other minds before the rise of the 15th which is called liberated mind do not belong to the level of \textit{Vimuttī}, why the un-liberated mind is listed as the last (instead of having liberated mind the last in the series)? This is like an enigma in the \textit{ānā-paṁñā} of the Vision in the Dharma of the 20 levels of the anasavas that include 10 of the wholesome (\textit{sammā}), and 10 from the unwholesome (\textit{micchā}) as stated in the Mahācattārisakasutta.\textsuperscript{9} Why there is the Right View (\textit{Sammādiṭṭhi}) of the Anāsava level which is freed from \textit{āsava}, as there exist the Wrong View (\textit{Micchādiṭṭhi}) of the Anāsava level? Logically, when a person has not gone beyond the 10 Wrong View (\textit{Micchādiṭṭhi}) of the sāsava level, she should not rise to the Right View (\textit{Sammādiṭṭhi}) of the Anāsava level. This the question raised by the two schools of mind power cultivation (\textit{ceto}) and insight cultivation (\textit{paññā}) that belong to the conventional structure. The answer is not based solely on analysis of terminology because it is belongs to the domain outside of logical analysis (\textit{atakkāvacāra}) that is the appraisal of the state of \textit{arhat} in the \textit{sotāpanna} endowed with the eight attributes that has structure, pattern and model related the Dharma that transcend the 8 \textit{Avijjāsavas} of \textit{arhat} as shown in the Table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Body of knowledge in \textit{Anāsava}</th>
<th>8 Attributes of a \textit{Sotāpanna}</th>
<th>Liberation from Eight \textit{Avijjāsavas} of \textit{Arahat}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Static Part: Collecton of \textit{suññatā}</td>
<td>Closing off rebirth in hell (\textit{khīṇaniṛya}) Closing off rebirth as hungry ghost (\textit{khīṇapetavisaya}) Closing off rebirth as animal (\textit{khīṇaṭiracchānayoni}) Closing off rebirth in all states of woes (\textit{khīṇapayadugativinipāta})</td>
<td>Away from ignorance of the Four Noble Truths Away from ignorance of the Noble Truth of the Causes of Suffering Away from ignorance of the Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering Away from ignorance of the Noble Truth of the Path Leading to the Cessation of Suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic Part: Progress to \textit{Tathatā}</td>
<td>Entering stream of the Supra-mundane (\textit{Sotāpanna}) Having un-falling path (\textit{Avinipātadhamma}) Predestined to \textit{Nirvana} (\textit{Niyata}) Predestined to Enlightenment (\textit{Sāmbodhiparāyana})</td>
<td>Away from ignorance of the past Away from ignorance of the future Away from ignorance of the past related to the future Away from ignorance of Dependent Co-origination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Thai Tipiṭaka Book 9 “Verabhayasutta” no. 1574</td>
<td>Thai Tipiṭaka Book 34 “Asavagocchaka” no.712</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Closing off the realms of woes of \textit{sotāpanna} is the model that \textit{Vijjā} rises in the form of structure of the \textit{arhat} who is free from \textit{avijjāsavas} as in the first 4 levels, i.e., destruction (\textit{khīṇa}) closing off the four states of woes is being liberated from the ignorance of the Four Noble Truths that allows the liberated mind to rise in the level that has transcended the realms of six vices, i.e., consuming intoxicants, gross immoral sexual conducts\textsuperscript{10}: womanizing, promiscuity, or loitering during the night hour; gambling habits, influenced evil friends, frequenting entertainment, laziness in work\textsuperscript{11}; all of which a \textit{sotāpanna} has liberated from, renouncing (\textit{nekkhamma}) the nature of the six realms of woes.

\textsuperscript{9} “Mahācattārisakasutta” (1982). Thai Tipitaka Book 14, Department of Religious Affairs, Thailand.

\textsuperscript{10} When accomplished, it will form a strong foundation for not committing adultery of the Third Precept.

\textsuperscript{11} On the contrary, one should be more diligent in working to elevate to a higher Lokuttara level.
Conclusion

This article is intended to illustrate that meditation and the Right Concentration (sammāsambhādi) are different from each other as the Right Concentration (sammāsambhādi) of the Lord Buddha belongs to the Supra-mundane having no mundane component, both in the objective and methodology. Currently, the non-Supra-mundane meditation of various types has invaded Buddhism.

1. The practice of the Right Concentration (sammāsambhādi) of the Lord Buddha includes the cultivation of the 15 Caraṇas and the 8 Vijjās. This is the path which is entirely Supra-mundane that facilitates the elevation of the spiritual of an ordinary mundane human to be inspired by the Dharma which is called the High-minded People (Kalyāṇajana or literally Beautiful People) entering the Supra-mundane. Their progress continues to the transcending level wherein their level of consciousness (bhūmicitta) is elevated from the mundane consciousness to the transcending state (gotrabhū), and progressing to the new ground of the Supra-mundane, making them the Noble Enlightened Followers of the Noble Right Concentration of the Four levels of the Supra-mundane People. The path is therefore completely Supra-mundane all the way through to the end. (See no. 3 and 4).

2. Evaluation of the result of ariyañāṇa is supra-mundane vis-à-vis the sixteen ānās in the so-called the Solasañña (See no. 5.1). These ānās are collected from the ānās in the Tipiṭaka, Book 31, Suttantapiṭaka, Khuddakanikāya, Patisambhidamagga, of the official publication by the government of Thailand down to the later books, e.g., the Visuddhimagga with the objective that ānā that rises from the beginning to the path-and-fruit of Nibbāna which means that primarily when
the primary รกฏ arises. It comes from the cultivation of insight (Vipassanabhāvanā) that all the form-and-names (รูป-นาม) are under the rubric of the Three Universal Characteristics (Tilakkhana) and straightly proceeds to the path of the Supra-mundane. The intermediate รกฏs the Trai-sikkhā of the Adhi-level follow suit, i.e., the Nine Direct Knowledges of the Insight (Vipassanānā). As the Dharma practice continues, eradication of craving and mental defilement (kilesa-tanho) according to the teaching of the Lord Buddha, all the Direct Knowledges (รกฏs) that are Supra-mundane consecutively arise, and followed by the รกฏs of the advanced level (See no.5.1.3). They belong to the structure of entrance to the Four Noble Truths which belong to the Supra-mundane.

3. The step-by-step of enlightenment according to the Lord Buddha (no. 6) is possible only through the practice of the Noble Right Concentration because the Lord explicitly said that in the teaching that is void of the Noble Eightfold Path (Ariya-atţhanga-magga) there is no Noble Enlightened People of the four levels.

3.1 The explanation that the Lord Buddha has adopted meditation system of his two former meditation masters who he had studied all the eight jhānas and then topped with the Saññavedayitanirodha to complete the Supra-mundane; this is inaccurate and retards the system of complex rotations (Gambhirāvabhāsa) that give birth to the four levels of the Noble Enlightened Person or else never existed as explained by the words of the Lord.

3.2 The Venerable Buddhadasa Bhikkhu wrote that the Ultimate Tathatā is the Tathāgata. Even the disciples of the Lord who were enlightened as arahats because of the state of Tathatā that they had12 (from the Book of Applied Attamayatā). And he emphasized on the words of the Lord Buddha addressed to the Venerable Ānanda in the Mahāsāṅkhatasutta that the Tathāgata dwells in Sāṅkhatavihāra even when he is delivering his sermons that are Supramundane (Upari. M.14/236/346).13 This is indeed the state of Awakening that is clearly the Cessation (nirodha) that he has achieved (saţchikatvā). Even where the Lord was doing the Task of the Buddha which is said to be entirely different from the state of Sāññavedayitanirodhasamāppati in which all the faculties of mind come to cessation (nirodha). In the same way as the meditation system of his two former meditation masters, Ālara Kalama and Udaka Rāmaputta which were still in the domain of the Mundane. Having analyzed as above, it is clear that the state of Tathatā which appears in Sāṅkhatavihāra are in concord with the spiritual practice of the Awakened, Wise and Blissful One at all time.

The aforementioned discussion on the 3 topics is an attempt to affirm that the quest of the Knowledge through the Right Concentration (sammāsamādhi) of the Lord Buddha is based on the new procedure in structure, pattern and model that are clearly Supra-mundane path all the way through in the Direct Knowledge Vijjācaranasampanno consisting of components of the 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās rooted in the Noble Truths. All the constituents are mutually and holistically facilitating one another in the dynamic progress of Dependent Co-origination (paţiccassamuppāda). This will be the mental cultivation through the Noble Right Concentration that is Buddhist spiritual science that directly leads to Nibbāna.

Introduction

In the past decade or so, Western Theravāda Buddhists have become increasingly interested in the practice of the *jhāna*-s, but the curious practitioner is immediately confronted with conflicting descriptions of these states, methods for cultivating them and views as to their soteriological utility.1 Theravāda meditation teachers disagree as to:

1. Whether there is awareness of bodily sensations or sounds in some or any of the *jhāna*-s.
2. Whether the feelings produced in the *jhāna*-s are best characterized as mental or physical.
3. Whether there is any discursive thought in the first or other *jhāna*-s.
4. Whether there is any intentionality2 or only non-dual experience in *jhāna*.
5. Whether there is any volition in *jhāna*.
6. Methods of entry into and of refining *jhāna*.
7. Whether movement from one *jhāna* to another is intentional or simply the result of deepening concentration.
8. Whether it is recommended or even possible to practice *vipassanā* while inside a *jhāna*.
9. Whether the object of the *jhāna* is a single (and therefore, conceptual) object or changing phenomena (and therefore, might include *dhamma*-s).
10. Whether *jhāna* is required, recommended or even antithetical with respect to the goal of liberation.

Although there is no reason why all Theravāda Buddhists should agree on these issues, it is important that individual teachers or schools of practice decide where they stand. Having a clearly defined notion of the particular states to be cultivated, of the methods that will bring about these states and what to do with these states should they arise are of the utmost importance when it comes to the nuts and bolts of the teaching and practice of meditation.

This paper examines the presentation of the *dhyāna*-s in Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) in light of the aforementioned disagreements, paying particular attention to the views of

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1 For an overview and analysis of the different approaches of contemporary *jhāna* teachers in the West, see Leigh Brasington’s “Interpretations of the Jhanas” at http://www.leighb.com/jhanas.htm (retrieved October 9, 2011). Also see the interviews with contemporary teachers in Richard Shankman, *The Experience of Samādhi: An In-depth Exploration of Buddhist Meditation*. Boston: Shambhala, 2008.

2 “Intentional” in the phenomenological sense of awareness of an object/content.
Vasubandhu and his contemporaries on the cognitive and affective qualities of these states, their relationship to vipaśyanā and soteriological utility. The Abhidharma, and the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, in particular, is commonly seen as a purely scholastic enterprise trading in abstract theory or obscure points of doctrine that are of little consequence to the practical concerns of Buddhist meditators, but most of the disputes that define the modern jhāna debate find analogues in the AKṣh. Given that modern Theravāda meditation teachers and the Sarvāstivāda Abhidarmikas both attempt to make sense of canonical statements regarding the jhāna-s/dhyāna-s, this should not be too surprising, but it does offer a novel opportunity for us to reflect upon how moderns and pre-moderns talk about the jhāna-s/dhyāna-s and to frame the issues that define the modern debate in a broader historical context. Additionally, by looking at the AKṣh account of dhyāna in light of the modern debate, we might also gain some insight into the obscure dynamic between practice and theory in the AKṣh and other Sarvāstivāda accounts of the role of meditation upon the path. Needless to say, I will not be able to examine all of these issues in depth here, but aim to provide enough analysis as to recommend specific topics for further inquiry.

Methodological Note

As I will demonstrate below, Vasubandhu’s presentation of the path exhibits a pronounced degree of scholastic elaboration typical of late Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma path theory, but his interpretation of the nature and function of the dhyāna-s is largely based on the presentations of dhyāna found in sūtra. The result is a conception of dhyāna that has more in common with a combined samatha-vipāsana style of meditation suggested by several Pāli suttas and typical of the modern Thai forest tradition than with the more absorptive jhāna-s and discrete style of samatha and vipassanā practice presented in the Visuddhimagga and other Theravāda commentarial literature. While I think it is fair to say that the Visuddhimagga represents an evolution in meditation theory over what we find in the suttas, it is not my intention to argue whether or not the Visuddhimagga or AKṣh is consistent with a properly “canonical” style of practice. In fact, I think it rather problematic to assume univocality on the part of the Nikāyas or Āgamas with respect to meditation practices. I merely aim to illustrate that the AKṣh and Visuddhimagga represent two fairly distinct options amongst a broad range of views concerning the jhāna-s/dhyāna-s available in fifth century South Asian Buddhism and to examine how these views might relate to modern debates regarding the jhāna-s.

The fact that there are, and perhaps always have been, significant disagreements concerning the nature, practice and use of the jhāna-s might be taken to suggest that the terms, “first jhāna,” etc. do not refer to discrete experiences and so it is a mistake to suppose that modern Buddhists and pre-modern Buddhists could be taking about the same phenomena. This is what Robert Sharf argues in “Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience.” Sharf cites canonical discrepancies regarding the description of the first jhāna as well as the fact that contemporary practitioners disagree about the proper identification of this and other meditative states as well as about the proper designation of techniques like vipassanā and samatha as evidence against the view that the meaning of these terms derives from their putative phenomenal referents. He does not deny

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that persons who undergo rigorous meditation training might “experience something that they are wont to call sotāpatti, jhāna, or satori,” but says:

My point is that such private episodes do not constitute the reference points for the elaborate discourse on meditative states found in Buddhist sources. In other words, terms such as samatha, vipassanā, sotāpatti, and satori are not rendered sensible by virtue of the fact that they refer to clearly delimited “experiences” shared by Buddhist practitioners. Rather the meaning of such terminology must be sought in the polemical and ideological context in which Buddhist meditation is carried out.

I agree with Sharf’s general thesis that we ought to avoid the uncritical assumption that meditative experience necessarily plays a central role in the production of the various artifacts of Buddhist thought and culture, including discourse purportedly about meditation. I also endorse Sharf’s critique of the practice of using the category of experience to protect religion from objective or empirical scrutiny. But I do not agree that lack of consensus regarding descriptions of meditative states like the jhāna-s or the fact that Buddhist meditation terminology is used in a variety of polemical and ideological contexts entails that this terminology does not refer to specific kinds of experiences. I believe it is reasonable to suppose that the meaning of terms like jhāna is constituted both in reference to particular kinds of experiences available to those who endeavor to cultivate them and by the various discursive contexts in which these terms are deployed.

Unlike some of the purportedly ineffable experiences at the center of the protective strategy Sharf targets, the jhāna-s/dhyāna-s are subject to extensive description. The AKBh and other Sarvāstivādin texts aim to provide formal, objective descriptions of the psychological and physiological factors that define these states. The Theravādin Abhidhamma and Visuddhimagga also provide this kind of description (or prescription), but also draw on figurative descriptions of the sort found in the suttas, which appear intended to convey something of the “feel” of these experiences. By contrast, modern Western teachers tend toward more subjective descriptions based on their own experiences, which they often try to correlate with the formal and poetic descriptions found in classical Buddhist literature. The assumption that all parties involved might be talking about similar kinds of experiences carries some interpretive risk, but I don’t think Sharf has demonstrated that this cannot be the case with respect to the jhāna-s or other reasonably effable meditative states.

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5  Ibid.
6  Ibid.
8  I agree with Sharf that what appears as description often functions as prescription. This is a problem for those who want to claim that meditative experiences give some privileged access to the truth, but does not pose a problem for the more modest claim that some of the mediative states described in pre-modern Buddhist texts have a defined range of phenomenal referents. Moreover, it stands to reason that a prescription that functioned to produce a certain kind of experience in the past might, given commonalities in human psychology and physiology, produce a similar kind of experience today. Finally, we should also note that in comparison to the suttas or the Visuddhimagga, the AKBh and similar Sarvāstivāda compendia take a decidedly more theoretical and less prescriptive tone.
9  Sharf points out that we do not find these kinds of subjective descriptions in classical Buddhist sources and takes this as evidence that pre-modern Buddhists were not particularly interested in the experience of the states that figure in their formal theories of the path. (See Robert H. Sharf, “The Rhetoric of Experience and the Study of Religion,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7, No. 11–12, 2000, p. 272 and “Buddhist Modernism,” pp. 238-239.) I suggest that the fact we don’t find first person subjective descriptions in classical Buddhist texts might have more to do with literary and cultural convention than with whether or not the authors of these texts (or other members of their communities) cultivated the states these texts describe.
Like others who have investigated the various ways that modern meditation teachers describe the \textit{jhāna}-s as well as classical textual presentations, I think it is reasonable to attribute these differences to the fact that different attentional methods and duration or depth of concentration produce different kinds of phenomenal experiences. It should also be noted that there is something of a consensus forming amongst American meditation teachers that the principle \textit{jhāna}-s are discrete states\textsuperscript{10} of consciousness whose phenomenal attributes vary depending on these factors.\textsuperscript{11} I do not intend to argue that all differences in description in classical sources are the result of different phenomenal experiences. My point is merely that disagreement as to which psychological and physiological factors qualify a state as \textit{jhāna} or as the “right sort” of \textit{jhāna} does not imply that there are no phenomenal referents for “first \textit{jhāna},” etc., only that there are a variety of candidates for reference and different views as to which of these is most deserving of the name.

Although I believe it is reasonable to suppose that pre-modern Buddhist discourses purportedly about meditation might, on occasion, actually be about meditation or that when Ābhidharmikas discuss the various mental factors present in a particular meditative state they might, among other things, be referring to the salient phenomenal properties of a particular kind of experience, I also think it is important to keep in mind that discourse about meditation and mental states can be informed by a variety of interests and serve multiple functions. Thus, while I take seriously the possibility that Vasubandhu and his co-religionists might have been concerned about the same kinds of psychological and physiological phenomena that modern meditators encounter or seek to cultivate, I have endeavored to be attentive to the places where theoretical coherence or scriptural orthodoxy appear the primary concern.

\textbf{Sutta-Jhāna and Vipassanā-Jhāna}

One of the more fundamental disagreements among modern practitioners is whether one can (or should) practice insight (\textit{vipassanā}) while inside a \textit{jhāna} or whether one must emerge from the \textit{jhāna} in order to do so. It has been suggested that part of the reason for this disagreement is the result of differences between the way the \textit{jhāna}-s are presented in the suttas and the \textit{Visuddhimagga}.\textsuperscript{12} In the \textit{Visuddhimagga}, the \textit{jhāna}-s are presented as states of such deep absorption in the meditation object that one must emerge from these states even in order to ascertain their phenomenal qualities. Modern practitioners who cultivate this style of \textit{jhāna}\textsuperscript{13} describe these states as involving an extremely bright and pristine awareness so exclusively focused on the object that any sense of being a subject drops away.\textsuperscript{14} In other words, these \textit{jhāna}-s have a strongly non-dualor

\textsuperscript{10} In other words, the first \textit{jhāna} can be experienced in a number of ways, but these different experiences have enough in common with each other to be considered the same basic state.

\textsuperscript{11} See Shankman’s interviews with Kornfield, Thanissaro, Salzberg, Feldman and Brasington in \textit{Samādhi}. For an interesting account of various depths at which the \textit{jhāna}-s might be accessed and how this relates to their intentional qualities based on personal experimentation, see Leigh Brasington’s “Jhanas at the Forest Refuge.” Retrieved October 9, 2011 from http://www.leighhh.com/jhana_fr.htm.


\textsuperscript{13} It should be noted that not everyone who cultivates this style of \textit{jhāna} (sometimes called “hard” \textit{jhāna}) takes the \textit{Visuddhimagga} to be authoritative. A prime example is Ajahn Brahmavamso (Brahm) who trained in the Thai forest tradition with Ajahn Chah. See Ajahn Brahm, \textit{Mindfulness, Bliss and Beyond: A Meditator’s Handbook}, Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2006.

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There is no sensory awareness and virtually no discursive thought or volition. Vipassanā cannot be practiced in this kind of jhāna because the single-pointed focus does not allow for any awareness of transitory mental factors or physical sensations and the depth of the absorption does not allow for sufficient “intentional space” between awareness and its object.

By contrast, the suttas often describe a kind of vipassanā style practice occurring inside a jhāna. One of the clearest examples is in the Anupada sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya where Śāriputta is said to know individual mental factors as they arise and pass away in the four principal jhānas as well as the first three formless attainments. After examining the differences between these two styles of jhāna in his book on the subject, Richard Shankman concludes:

Jhāna in the suttas is a state of heightened mindfulness and awareness of an ever-changing stream of experiences, in which the mind is unmoving. Jhāna in the Visuddhimagga is a state of fixed concentration, where there is no experience of changing phenomena whatsoever, because the objects of the mind are unmoving.

Although I am wary of Shankman’s suggestion that the suttas consistently describe one kind of jhāna practice, I believe he correctly identifies an important difference between the styles of jhāna described in suttas like the Anupada and the Visuddhimagga: the fact that the former has changing phenomena for its object and the latter, a single, unchanging (and therefore, conceptual) object. In Visuddhimagga-style jhāna practice as taught by Pa Auk Sayadaw, for example, the practitioner does not pay attention to variation or change in the object with which he begins his meditation. For example, if the object is the breath at the nostrils, the practitioner uses sensation of the breath to stay focused on the breath, but does not emphasize or examine the different sensations in the area. As concentration deepens, an internal, “counterpart sign” (paṭibhāga nimitta), which typically manifests as a kind of inner light, arises in awareness. This is the object (now merged with or having replaced the breath) with which one enters jhāna. Although vipassanā, which necessarily involves awareness of changing phenomena, cannot be practiced inside this kind of absorption, the absorption is said to produce an extremely powerful and clear awareness that can be directed towards the task of insight with great effect “on the way out” of the jhāna (or the formless attainments).

15 I hesitate to call these states completely non-dual or non-intentional since there seems to be some disagreement over whether it is the phenomenal qualities of the awareness or the awareness itself that are the proper object of the absorption. Moreover, in the first jhāna there are vitakka and vicāra, which are defined intentionally. I will say more about vitakka and vicāra below.

16 It is a bit problematic to say that there is absolutely no discursiveness or volition in the first jhāna because of vitakka and vicāra.

17 By “intentional space” I mean a sufficient degree of intentionality or separation between subject and object for clear apprehension of an object. As suggested above, there may be a kind of low level intentional awareness of the phenomenal qualities of these states that is still not sufficient for insight.

18 According to the Visuddhimagga, vipassanā is possible in a supramundane (lokuttara) jhāna. Supramundane jhānas are the vipassanā states in which the four paths and four fruits are realized. They are said to have the phenomenal properties and intensity of the mundane jhānas, but take nibbāna instead of conditioned things as their object.

19 M 111, PTS ed. iii.25. The dhammas are continuously examined (amupa−ava−avattha), which causes him to know (paññātī), “So indeed these dhammas, not having been, come into being; having been, they vanish.”

20 He must emerge from the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (neva−saññā−saññāyata−na) and the cessation of perception and feeling (saññāvedayatana−dha) in order to observe (sammappassati) the dhamma−s that were present in these states.


22 It is understood to be an object of mental rather than visual consciousness.
In the second part of his book, Shankman interviews several contemporary teachers regarding their understanding and use of the jhāna-s. Most of those interviewed agree that there is a range of jhāna-like states available to the practitioner depending on depth of concentration or method of entry, but vary as to what qualities they attribute to the jhāna-s proper, particularly with respect to the degree to which the five sensory consciousnesses are engaged. With the exception of Ajaan Thanissaro and Bhante Gunaratana, the interviewees seem to agree that it is not really feasible to do vipassanā in jhāna or, at least, not in the second jhāna and above.23 Thanissaro, who trained in the Thai forest tradition,24 explains that while one can become absorbed in a jhāna to the point where vipassanā is impossible, one can pull back a bit from a jhāna that is not totally secluded from the five senses in order to contemplate the experience of the jhāna in terms of the four noble truths.25 In his interview with Shankman and in a separate essay, Bhante Gunaratana26 strongly advocates practicing vipassanā within jhāna: “If you want to come out of Jhāna to practice Vipassanā, then you should not waste your valuable time to attain it at all.”27 The reason, according to Gunaratana, is that the “purity, concentration, light, and mindfulness” of the jhāna fade as the hindrances rush back upon exiting the jhāna. He concedes that there may be a kind of state wherein the mind is utterly absorbed in the object to the point where vipassanā is impossible, but suggests that this is the (undesirable) result of cultivating jhāna without sufficient mindfulness (sati).29

Although Thanissaro and Gunaratana agree that it is possible to do vipassanā within jhāna and that there is bodily awareness in jhāna,30 they rely on different methods of entry. Thanissaro mentions that jhāna can be cultivated using the four foundations of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) and specifically describes directing attention towards the pleasant sensation that result from increased concentration to deepen jhāna.32 Focusing on these sensations (pīti and/or sukha)33 in order to enter and deepen (the first three) jhāna-s is a common modern practice,34 which takes its cue and/or derives authority from one of the standard canonical formulations of the jhāna-s found in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta:

...a monk enters and dwells in the first jhāna. He steeps, drenches, and suffuses his body with pīti and sukha born of seclusion, so that there is no part of his entire body that is not suffused with pīti and sukha. Just as a skillful bath-attendant or his apprentice might

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23 This has to do with the absence of vitakka and vicāra. I will say more about this below.
24 A tradition renowned for a mixed samatha-vipassanā style of practice and a suspicion of the commentarial tradition.
25 Shankman, p. 122.
26 Bhante Gunaratana is a Sri Lankan monk who has taught in the United States since the late 1960’s.
28 Sense desire, ill will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and remorse, and doubt. These are sources of distraction that are naturally suppressed as concentration (samādhi) increases.
29 Gunaratana, “Should We Come Out of Jhāna to Practice Vipassanā?” p. 3.
30 Note that without bodily awareness, it would be impossible to practice the first foundation of mindfulness as described in the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta.
31 Specifically, from the suppression of the hindrances:
32 Shankman, p. 119.
33 There is a considerable amount of disagreement over whether one or the other of these is physical or mental and whether both are feelings (vedanā) or whether one might be a member of the sankārā-khandha/samkārā-skandha. I will discuss these issues below.
34 This is the method taught by Ayya Khema and Leigh Brasington, for example.
The sutta provides similarly evocative metaphors with respect to the phenomenal qualities of the other three jhāna-s. As will be discussed below, classical commentators and modern practitioners alike to disagree as to whether this formula refers to a kind of bodily awareness that is simply more subtle than we usually experience, something that is felt by the mind or “mental body” (nāma-kāya) or something that is produced by the mind but felt with the body. Although Gunaratana says that there is bodily awareness in the kind of jhāna he recommends, he describes a method of entry similar to the Visuddhimagga light nimitta method described above. This suggests that while method of entry might determine the depth of absorption available, it does not determine whether a jhāna can be used for vipassanā. Based on the views of modern practitioners, it appears that the light nimitta can produce an absorption that is too deep for vipassanā or just deep enough. The same may be true for jhāna developed on the basis of a sensation nimitta. In sum, the central difference between what we might call a Visuddhimagga-style jhāna and sutta-style jhāna seems to be: 1) the degree to which the mind is absorbed in the object (whether there is enough “intentional space” to observe mental or physical phenomena), 2) whether the mind is fixed on one, unchanging object or aware of changing phenomena and, finally, 3) whether vipassanā is practiced subsequent to or within a jhāna.

Overview of Dhyāna in the AKBh

Vasubandhu and most of his Sarvāstivāda counterparts agree with the Visuddhimagga view that attaining dhyāna is not strictly necessary for liberation. They consider anāgāmya, the “not quite there” state before the first dhyāna, roughly equivalent to the Visuddhimagga notion “access” or “neighborhood” concentration (upacāra-samādhi), sufficient. Despite this, the dhyāna-s are recommended and play a central role in the conceptual structure of the path. The AKBh presents the dhyāna-s as both an effective means with which to attenuate and abandon defilements and ideal basis for gaining insight into the four noble truths.

According to Sarvāstivāda path theory, liberation is not simply a function of gaining insight into the true nature of things, but of abandoning the defilements, viz., unhealthy affective and cognitive orientations towards conditioned phenomena. Indeed, the complexity of their path theory derives in large part from their understanding of the multiple ways in which the defilements are abandoned on the mundane and supramundane paths, through the paths of seeing (darśana-mārga) as well as

35 Samaññaphala sutta, D i.74.
36 There seems to be something of a consensus that the light nimitta method allows for a depth of absorption not available through the sensation method.
37 There seems to be some disagreement about this. While the orthodox Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika position is that dhyāna is not necessary, Ghoṣaka (a representative of the western Vaibhāṣikas) defines the nirvedha-bhāgīya-s (the mundane phases of insight leading to the supramundane path) in such a way that suggests dhyāna is necessary. See points 11-15 in Ghoṣaka-s presentation of the first nirvedha-bhāgīya in Robert E. Buswell, Jr. “The ‘Aids to Penetration’ (Nirvedhabhāgīya) According to the Vaibhāṣika School,” p. 602.
cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga).\footnote{See Cox, “Attainment Through Abandonment” and Jew Chong Liew, “The Sarvāstivāda doctrine of the path of spiritual progress: a study based primarily on the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāstra, the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya and their Chinese and Sanskrit Commentaries,” PhD dissertation, The University of Hong Kong, 2010.} The Sarvāstivādins regarded the cultivation of the dhyāna-s (as well as the immaterial attainments) as an effective means of abandoning certain classes of defilements,\footnote{Namely, desire, hostility, pride and ignorance. These involve a mistaken apprehension of or unhealthy orientation towards an existent (vastu) object (like material form) in contrast to the defilements abandoned through the path of seeing (darsana-mārga, i.e., direct insight into the four noble truths), which involve a mistaken view with respect to a non-existent (avastu) object (i.e., the self). AKBh vi.58b; Śāstrī p. 780.} because attaining each state requires an affective detachment (vairāgya) from the phenomenal qualities of the lower states, starting with detachment from the gross sensual pleasure of the desire realm in order to enter the first dhyāna and culminating in detachment from third formless attainment in order to attain Bhavāgra (the “summit of [worldly] existence,” the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception).\footnote{AKBh vii.48-49. One can only detach from the fourth immaterial attainment or Bhavāgra on the supramundane path of cultivation. AKBh vi.45cd.} This does not require deep insight into the four characteristics of phenomena or the other four noble truths;\footnote{The four characteristics (anitya, dukkha, sūnya, anāman) comprise the four aspects of the first noble truth. On the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, see below.} it just requires that the lower state be apprehended as undesirable or gross in relation to the higher state.\footnote{It is also possible to develop the required detachment from the form and formless realms without first-hand experience of them via dhyāna. The “direct” or “higher comprehension” (abhismaya) of path of seeing involves both direct and indirect comprehension of the four noble truths with respect to all three spheres of existence.}

Although one does not need to cultivate dhyāna in order to gain direct comprehension (abhismaya) of the four noble truths or to abandon the defilements associated with the form and formless realms,\footnote{AKBh vi.49a-d; Śāstrī p. 766. The higher state is seen as as “peaceful, excellent, as a way out” (śāntita praṇītata, niḥsāraṇa). The lower is seen as coarse (audārīka), laden with suffering (duḥkila) and as thick wall (sthūlabhītika) [preventing a way out].} the AKBh defines dhyāna in terms of its ability to cause practitioners to know (prajñānti) things as they really are (yathābhūta).\footnote{AKBh viii.1d; Śāstrī p. 870.} The dhyāna-s are thus recommended as the ideal basis for cultivating the path as well as states that make for a pleasant abiding in the here and now (drṣṭadharma sukhamā Employees).\footnote{AKBh vii.66a; Śāstrī p. 794.} Vasubandhu explains that, “The path in the four dhyāna-s is a pleasant (sukha) route (pratipad), because it is effortless (ayatna) owing to the dhyāna factors and their balance of calm (śamatha) and insight (vipaśyanā).”\footnote{Caturdhyānasū mārgaḥ sukhaḥ pratipad anāgaparipraṇāgasyaśamathavipaśyanāsamatābhīthāyāmayatnāvāhītvā. AKBh vi.66a; Śāstrī p. 794.} By contrast,

The path in the other bhūmi-s, namely, anāgāmya, dhyāṇāntara and the ārūpya-s, is a difficult (duḥkha) route, because it requires effort owing to the lack of the accompanying dhyāna factors and deficiency in either śamatha or vipaśyanā. There is a deficit of śamatha in anāgāmya and dhyāṇāntara and a deficit of vipaśyanā in the ārūpya-s.\footnote{AKBh vii.66cd; Śāstrī p. 794.} It is rather mysterious why there should be a deficit of śamatha in dhyāṇāntara, but not in the first dhyāna. AKBh vii.22d-23a (Śāstrī p. 904) explains that dhyāṇāntara takes effort to pass through it, so cannot be associated with a pleasant mental sensation (saumanasya) and is a difficult path. (Cf. Gunaratana 1985, pp. 101-102.) I suspect that this view might simply be the result of unease about the fact that this fifth dhyāna (which has vicāra, but not vīrāga) is not explicitly mentioned in the sūtra-s. In “Jhāna and Buddhist Scholasticism,” JIABS 12.2, 1989, 79-110, Martin Stuart-Fox notes that some of the references to this kind of jhāna found in the Nikāya-s (which serve as the basis for the Abhidhama inclusion of a fifth jhāna) are missing from the Chinese Āgamas.
The dhyāna factors are the mental and physical qualities that predominate in and therefore define the dhyāna-s. We have already mentioned two of them, prīti and sukha, and will have more to say about these and the others below, but before discussing the factors in greater detail, there are a couple of things to note with respect to these passages.

First, in the rhetoric of modern “dry insight” movements, the path which does not involve the cultivation of jhāna is a faster, more efficient route to liberation, even if a bit rough or bumpy without the stability and comfort of the jhāna-s. By contrast, the AKBh does not correlate speed with method. Vasubandhu says that the relative speed with which the path is traversed depends on the strength of the faculties, in particular, wisdom (prajñā). The person with sharp faculties (tīkṣṇendriya) will traverse the path faster than the person with weak faculties (mrdvindriya), but for either the path will be pleasant or difficult based depending on whether or not he cultivates dhyāna.

Second, one might be tempted to think that the notion of a pleasant versus unpleasant or difficult path is predicated on the assumption of something like the so-called “dukkha-ñāṇa-s,” the sixth through tenth stages in the progress of insight in the Visuddhimagga system. During these stages, the practitioner may experience fear and other unpleasant psychological (and physiological) phenomena as he comes to grips with the existential impact of insight into the dissolution of phenomena (bhanga). Given the modern tendency to view the dhyāna-s as desirable but dispensable “shock absorbers” for this impact, it is natural to suppose that this is what Vasubandhu has in mind when he distinguishes the pleasant path in the dhyāna-s from the unpleasant path without them, but there does not appear to be anything like the dukkha-ñāṇa-s in Sarvāstivāda path theory and the AKBh says very little about the psychological (or physiological) difficulties that might ensue from insight. Vasubandhu simply refers to the dukkha of the “difficult” path(s) as the mental or physical discomfort associated with effort (yatna) and the absence of the dhyāna factors.

Finally, it should be noted that aside from any view regarding the intrinsic qualities of the dhyāna-s, part of the reason why the AKBh recommends the dhyāna-s is the understanding that the Buddha himself realized the four noble truths and saw the destruction of the taints (āsrava), viz., became liberated, in the fourth dhyāna. In fact, the entire conceptual structure of the Sarvāstivāda path, both the role the dhyāna-s play in abandoning the defilements and the way the mundane and

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48 Here I have in mind the modern Burmese vipassanā movements that grew and spread worldwide owing to the efforts of Mahasi Sayadaw and U Ba Khin.
49 The jhāna-s are seen as either as a desirable but dispensable “shock absorber” for the profound psychological impact of insight or an useless detour into a kind of non-Buddhist quiescence.
50 In contrast to some modern Theravāda movements- especially the Mahasi Sayadaw and U Ba Khin/Goenka movements, the Sarvāstivādins saw the path as taking a minimum of three lifetimes and in most cases, far, far longer.
51 AKBh vi.66d; Str. p. 795.
52 Here we might also note that Gunaratana cites the Cūḷaḥatthipadopama sutta recounting the Buddha’s enlightenment on the basis of the fourth jhāna as “conclusive evidence” that the Buddha practiced vipassana while in jhāna. Gunaratana, “Should We Come Out of Jhana to Practice Vipassana,” p. 15. The sutta (M 27, PTS ed. i.175) does not mention coming out of jhāna to realize the three knowledges or the four noble truths.
53 “[Buddhas and pratyekabuddhas] abide in the fourth dhyāna and without rising from that very spot, and due to their intense, immovable samādhi, undertake the aids to penetration until they are awakened.” AKBh vi.24ab; Str. pp. 722-723.
54 The fact that the Buddha was an ordinary being when he sat down and an arhat when he arose also sets the precedent for the Sarvāstivāda theory of skipping attainments via the mundane path. In brief, by abandoning defilements through the cultivation of the dhyāna-s and formless attainments on the mundane path, the ascetic may enter the path of seeing as a candidate for the fruition status of a sakridgamin or anāgamin.
supramundane paths are structured around the contemplation of the four noble truths, seems to be abstracted from this scriptural account of the Buddha’s awakening.55

Śamatha, Vipāśyanā and Dhyāna in the Progress of the Path

The Sarvāstivāda path is divided into five major stages and dhyāna plays an important role in all but the first of these stages.56 The first stage of the path (the “aids to merit” or puṇya-bhāgīya) involves ethical discipline, learning and purification and, like in the Visuddhimagga is regarded as an essential foundation for undertaking mental cultivation (bhāvanā). The second stage of the path (the “path of preparation” or prayoga-mārga) involves two phases: 1) the cultivation of śamatha and the practice of the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) and 2) four stages of increasingly subtle contemplation of sixteen aspects of the four noble truths.57 These stages, the nirvedha-bhāgīya-s (“aids to penetration”) are included under the rubric of the fourth foundation of mindfulness, mindfulness of dharma. The last of these four stages (laukikāradharma or “highest worldly dharma”) serves as the immediate condition for the supramundane path, which is also divided into two stages: the path of seeing (darśana-mārga), which involves a higher comprehension (abhisamaya) of the four noble truths over the course of fifteen moments58 and the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga), in which the three noble persons who are not yet arhats (stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner) abandon remaining defilements by means of continued contemplation of the four noble truths.

Some interpreters have been inclined to associate the path of seeing with vipāśyanā and the path of cultivation with samādhi or dhyāna,59 but the dhyāna-s (which are particular instances of samādhi)60 play an important role in nearly every phase of the path, not only in the abandoning of defilements on the mundane and supramundane paths of cultivation, but also in the insight work of the paths of preparation and seeing.61 According to the AKbh, the nirvedha-bhāgīya-s and the path of seeing require the attainment of anāgamyā, dhyānātara or the four principle dhyāna-s, but when the nirvedha-bhāgīya occur in the dhyāna-s, the practitioner is assured to reach the path of seeing in this very life, owing to an intense world-weariness (samvega).62 In other words, the affective detachment produced through the cultivation of the dhyāna-s is regarded a powerful means by which to sharpen the faculty of prajñā and thereby speed the progress of insight.

55 Buswell makes a provocative comparison between what he calls the Vaibhāṣika’s “retrospective approach to soteriology” working backwards from the point of the Buddha’s awakening and the Visuddhimagga’s “proleptic” approach starting from the point of defilement. See Buswell, p. 608.
56 See the chart below.
57 1) anitya, duhkha, śunya, anātman, 2) hetu samudaya, prabhava, pratyaya, 3) nirodha, śānta, pranīta, nihsaraṇa, 4) mārga, nyāya, pratipatti, nairvyānika.
58 The sixteenth moment is the fruition that marks entry into the supramundane path of cultivation. For each truth there are two phases of comprehension, one pertaining to the sensual realm and the other to the two higher realms. Within each phase there is a moment of receptiveness to knowledge during which defilements are cut off and the a moment of knowledge which prevents the defilements from re-arising.
60 See below.
61 I don’t mean to suggest that the process of abandoning defilements does not involve insight, merely that the method of abandonment described above does not emphasize insight to the same extent as the nirvedha-bhāgīya-s or darśana-mārga. As indicated above, there are classes of defilements abandoned by darśana, bhāvanā and both.
62 AKbh vi.22b; Śāstrī p. 721.
This thoroughly integrated conception of the relationship between the cognitive and affective dimensions of the path (and of human psychology more generally) defies the interpreter’s wish to find a clear distinction between darśana, vipaśyanā, prajñā and jñāna on the one hand and bhāvanā, samādhi and śamatha on the other.⁶³

Although the AKBh does not make a principled distinction between śamatha and vipaśyanā, and both are present to a greater or lesser extent in the meditative states (samāpatti) in which the path is traversed, it does present śamatha as the foundation for vipaśyanā.⁶⁴ Compared to the forty śamatha objects mentioned in the Visuddhimagga, the AKBh only discusses two: meditation on the loathsome (āsubha-bhāvanā)⁶⁵ and mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasamrtri).⁶⁶ As in the Visuddhimagga, these are recommended according to personality: meditation on the loathsome for those with excessive lust (adhīrāga) and mindfulness of breathing for those with excessive discursive thought (adhitarka).⁶⁷ These meditations can be used to cultivate dhyāna and anāgāmya, respectively⁶⁸ and the AKBh variously describes them as entrances (avatāra) to cultivation (bhāvanā),⁶⁹ the means by which there is the gaining of samādhi⁷⁰ and accomplished (nispanna) with the aim of attaining vipaśyanā. Vipaśyanā itself is defined as the four foundations of mindfulness.⁷¹ Yaśomitra explains that the defilements (kleśa) cannot be abandoned except by wisdom (prajñā) resulting from the perfection of samādhi.⁷²

Yaśomitra further explains that scripture testifies to the fact that there is one vehicle, namely, the four foundations of mindfulness.⁷³ Note that the practices of mindfulness of breathing and the meditation on the loathsome are included among the meditations concerning mindfulness of the body in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.⁷⁴ As mentioned above, the AKBh regards the contemplation of

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⁶³ Again, this does not mean that these terms do not have phenomenal referents, just that these referents do not fit the interpreter’s categorial scheme.

⁶⁴ AKBh. vi.13d; Śāstrī p. 708.

⁶⁵ According to the Mahāvibhāṣā (MVŚ), this is the the primary meditation for entering the noble path and so is discussed at some length there. See Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, 2009, 15.3.1.1.

⁶⁶ AKBh vi.9ab; Śāstrī p. 703. Other Sarvāstivāda texts include analysis of the four elements. See Bart Dessein, Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya: Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Addition, Vol. I (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999), pp. 312-314. Also see vol. II, p. 259, fn. 56. It should also be noted that although the AKBh discusses mindfulness of the breath as a method for perfecting śamatha in preparation for vipaśyanā, Bhikkhu Dhammajoti notes that the Sarvāstivādins had a whole range of views regarding whether each of the six elements of the practice (counting, following, etc.) was vipaśyanā or śamatha or both. The MVŚ concludes that all six elements can come under the rubric of either vipaśyanā or śamatha. See Dhammajoti 15.3.1.1.

⁶⁷ AKBh vi.9a-d; Śāstrī p. 703.

⁶⁸ The AKBh explains that mindfulness of breathing cannot be practiced in the dhyāna-s because it is accompanied by a neutral feeling, which conflicts with the feeling ascribed to the first three dhyāna-s, but there seems to be some debate over this issue and Vasubandhu does not take a clear side.

⁶⁹ ibid.

⁷⁰ AKBh. vi.13d; Śāstrī p. 708.

⁷¹ AKBh vi.14a; Śāstrī p. 708.

⁷² Śāstrī p. 709. According to the Mahāvibhāṣā, defilements can be abandoned through the applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), but only when based on concentration (not when practiced on the basis of hearing or reflection). See Collett Cox, “Attainment through Abandonment: The Sarvāstivādin Path of Removing Defilements,” in Buswell and Gimello, ed. Paths to Liberation: The Mārga and It’s Transformations in Buddhist Thought, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992, p. 84.


⁷⁴ This is also the case with the analysis of the four elements, which are included in the mokṣabhāgīya in the Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya.
the four noble truths in the nirvedha-bhāgīya-s and path of seeing as part of the fourth foundation of mindfulness. Thus, it appears that samādhi (ideally dhyāna, but barring that, anāgamo) is cultivated via mindfulness of the body and then serves as the basis for the other foundations, culminating in the mindfulness of dharmas in the nirvedha-bhāgīya-s and path of supramundane path.\(^{75}\)

Instead of constituting two separate paths or two discrete phases of practice, śamatha and vipaśyanā simply indicate a predominance of samādhi or prajñā or styles of practice suited to persons of different dispositions. Thus, the Mahāvibhāṣā describes two kinds of practitioner: the śamatha-carita who enjoys solitude and quiet and the vipaśyanā-carita who enjoys study, especially of the Abhidharma.\(^{76}\) There is much more to be said about vipaśyanā, śamatha and dhyāna in relation to the AKBh’s presentation of the paths of preparation and seeing, especially with regard to the nature of the objects on these paths,\(^{77}\) but this overview should suffice to illustrate the multiple ways in which dhyāna relates to vipaśyanā according to the AKBh.

**Overview of Dhyāna Factors**

The fact that the AKBh is clearly of the view that one can and should practice vipaśyanā while in dhyāna does not tell us very much about what Vasubandhu or his co-religionists thought these states were like. For that, we will need to examine their views regarding the dhyāna factors. As in the Theravāda Abhidhamma, the Vaibhāṣika call the mental and physical qualities that predominate in dhyāna and define a mental state (citta) as dhyāna, factors (āṅga).\(^{78}\) It stands to reason that the enumeration of these factors ought to have something to do with phenomenal description, but as mentioned above, we shouldn’t assume that this is the case in all Buddhist discourse. Modern meditators tend to treat the factors as descriptions of phenomenal properties that can help identify whether a particular experience is access concentration, first jhāna, second jhāna, etc., and also as descriptions of potential objects for absorption or investigation. While I don’t think there is any reason to rule out the possibility that this is also how Vasubandhu and his co-religionists understood the dhyāna factors, it is clear that there are a variety of other concerns also at work in their debates about these factors. While Vasubandhu and his Vaibhāṣika interlocutors generally agree about the structure and progression of the path and about the role dhyāna plays in this, they disagree about the ontological foundations of defilement and abandonment, and thus, about the very nature of the transformation effected by the path. With respect to the dhyāna factors, Vasubandhu’s own views are typically informed by an interest in ontological parsimony and/or a preference for a simpler scriptural explanation, but he shares with the Vaibhāṣika a commitment to analyzing the dhyāna-s in a manner that is consistent with the basic principles of Abhidharma psychological theory.

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\(^{75}\) Vasubandhu does not spell out too many of the details of this, but it is my hope that a more thorough study of the commentaries on the AKBh will reveal a fuller account of what these practices might have been understood to entail.

\(^{76}\) See Dhammajoti 15.3.1.1.

\(^{77}\) There is some ambivalence and debate about whether the objects of the paths of preparation and seeing are the intrinsic characteristics (svaṅkalpa or svabhāva) of phenomena or their common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and how insight into one relates to insight into the other. While both are objects of the four foundations of mindfulness (see AKBhVI.14cd), the Mahāvibhāṣā explains that in the path of seeing there is direct comprehension (abhisamaya) of the specific or intrinsic characteristics of phenomena through the direct realization of the common characteristics that are the 16 aspects of the four noble truths. See Dhammajoti 15.4.

\(^{78}\) AKBh vi.71c and following also discusses which of the 37 aids to enlightenment exist in each dhyāna.
Both Vasubandhu and the Vaibhāṣika take as authoritative the śūtra formula that outlines the four factors that predominate in the first dhyāna and fall away in the higher dhyāna-s (the elimination formula)\(^{79}\) as well as another formula that emphasizes the positive qualities that develop and predominate in each successive dhyāna (development formula):\(^{80}\)

Elimination formula:
1\(^{st}\) dhyāna: vitarka, vicāra, prīti, sukha
2\(^{nd}\) dhyāna: prīti, sukha
3\(^{rd}\) dhyāna: sukha
4\(^{th}\) dhyāna: [upekṣā]

Development formula:
1\(^{st}\) dhyāna: vitarka, vicāra, prīti, sukha, cittaikagrata.
2\(^{nd}\) dhyāna: adhyātmasamprasāda, prīti, sukha, cittaikagrata
3\(^{rd}\) dhyāna: [saṃskāra]-upekṣā, smṛti, samprajñāna, sukha, samādhi
4\(^{th}\) dhyāna: aduṣkha-sukhā-vedanā, upekṣā-pariṣuddhi, smṛti-pariṣuddhi, samādhi

In the following sections, I examine Vasubandhu and his co-religionist’s interpretations of these factors, focusing on issues that relate to the modern jhāna debate.

### Single-pointedness (Ekāgratā)

The Vaibhāṣika define the attainment (samāpatti) of dhyāna as the single-pointed focus (ekārya) of a pure (śubha) or wholesome (kuśala) mind.\(^{81}\) Vasubandhu agrees with this definition, but objects to Vaibhāṣika view that samādhi is a discrete mental factor responsible for making a mind single-pointed. According to Vasubandhu, samādhi is a just a concept referring to a series of minds that are single-pointed. This series constitutes dhyāna depending on the presence and strength of the wholesome mental factors, in particular, the dhyāna factors. Both parties agree, however, that the relevant sense of single-pointedness (ekāgratā) is having a single (ālambana).

Based on their definitions of samādhi, it would seem that the Vaibhāṣika and Vasubandhu assume that the single-pointedness of dhyāna, whatever its ontological underpinnings, is consistent with the notion that dhyāna involves a balance of śamatha and vipaśyana. In the modern jhāna debate, however, Shankman and Gunaratana distinguish the vipassanā-style jhāna found in the suttas from the Visuddhimagga-style of jhāna on the basis of different interpretations of the term ekaggatā.\(^{82}\) Shankman proposes different translations of ekaggatā to capture the relevant distinction:

\(^{79}\) AKBh viii.2ab.

\(^{80}\) AKBh viii.7-8; Sāstī p. 888. This formula is similar to that found in the Samaññaphala Sutta, but adds cittaikagrata to the first, samādhi to the third and smṛtipariṣuddhi and samādhi to the fourth.

\(^{81}\) AKBh vii.i.1d.

\(^{82}\) This factor is not mentioned in any of the standard formulas for the first jhāna, but is implied in the formula for the second jhāna by the phrase cetaso ekodibhāvam and is explicitly mentioned in some suttas (e.g., Mahāvedalla MN 1:294, Anupada) and is picked up in the Vibhaṅga.
“unification of mind” for sutta-jhāna versus “one-pointedness” for Visuddhimagga-jhāna. Gunaratana explains that the mind in jhāna is unified in the sense that all the wholesome factors work in harmony, but that there is not “one-pointedness of the meditation object.” Although jhāna is attained via focus on a single object, according to Gunaratana, namely, the light nimitta, the object of vipassanā within jhāna is the subtle changes that take place in the body and mind. Although Shankman and Gunaratana’s explanation of ekaggatī seems to make sense of one of the important distinctions between the kind of jhāna that is described in suttas like the Anupada and the Visuddhimagga style of jhāna, it is hard to reconcile with what we find in the AKBh. It seems that there are two possibilities here: either the AKBh only means “object” (ālambana) in a rather loose sense, something like a single frame of reference, such as the breath or body, in which one might observe change, or that Vasubandhu has something other than the direct observation of changing or momentary phenomena in mind when he refers to vipaśyanā. Unfortunately, deciding which might be the case is beyond the scope of the present paper.

Vitarka and Vicāra

One of the more vexing issues in the modern jhāna debate has to do with the phenomenal referents of the dhyāna factors of vitakka and vicāra. How these terms are interpreted concerns the discursive, intentional and volitional qualities of the first jhāna, but it also concerns what distinguishes the jhāna-s as a special class of conscious states from ordinary states. Early Āhidharmikas and later commentators like Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa also struggled with the interpretation of these factors. The problem is that in the Nikāyas and Āgamas vitakka and vicāra are explicitly defined in terms of speech, which might be taken to suggest that the first jhāna is not so very different from ordinary discursive consciousness. In the Cūladenalla Sutta, for example, the Bhikkhuni, Dhammadinnī identifies vitakka and vicāra as the conditions for speech (vacīsanākhāra). Vasubandhu gives the same definition in the AKBh, explaining that the difference between the two has to do with their degree of subtlety. The Nikāyas and Āgamas also commonly define vitarka and vicāra in terms of intention (saṃkalpa). This tracks with how Vasubandhu uses the term vitarka in some parts of the AKBh and his explanation of the two terms in the Pañcaskandha:

Vitarka is mental discourse (manojalpa) that searches about (paryēṣaka), a particular kind of volition (cetana) and discrimination (prajñā) that is the grossness of mind. Vicāra is mental discourse that examines (pratyavekṣaka), a particular kind of volition and discrimination that is the subtleness of mind.

83 Shankman, p. 4.
84 Gunaratana, “Should We Come Out of Jhana,” pp. 6-7; 15.
85 Gunaratana, p. 6-7.
86 See note 77 on the objects of the prayoga- and darśana-mārga.
87 For an excellent summary of the various early interpretations of these terms, in the Pāli literature, in particular, see Lance Cousins, “Vitakka/Vitarka and Vicāra: Stages of Samādhi in Buddhism and Yoga,” Indo-Iranian Journal 35 (1992): 137-157. Also see Bhikkhu Anālayo, Satipaṭṭhāna: The Direct Path to Realization, Kandy: BPS, 2010, pp. 75-78.
88 M 1.299 (MN 44).
89 AKBh, ii.33a. vitarkya vicārya vācaṃ bhāṣaṃ nāvītarkya-vicārya.
90 Tib.14b. Yāsomitra quotes the Pañcaskandha directly in the commentary on AKBh i.33 Śāstra p. 72: vitarka katamah/ pratyaveksako manojalpaścetanāprajñāvīśesah /yā cittasyavādārikatā / vicāra katamah/ manojalpaścetanāprajñāvīśesah/ yā cittasya sūkṣmatā. This is the same definition as found in the Abhidharmasamuccaya.
Here Vasubandhu defines *vitarka* and *vicāra* as kind of discursive activity that is both connative and cognitive⁹¹ and further specifies that while the discursive activity of *vitarka* involves zeroing in on an object, the discursive activity of *vicāra* involves subsequent examination of that object. Whereas the Theravāda Abhidhamma redefines *vitakka* and *vicāra* when they serve as *jhāna* factors so that they are longer directly connected to discursive activity, Vasubandhu makes no such adjustment in the AKBh (or *Pañcaskandha*). Shortly after defining *vitarka* and *vicāra* as the conditions for speech, he refers to their role as *dhyāna* factors and argues (contra the Vaibhāsika position) that because *vitarka* and *vicāra* merely refer to a relatively gross and subtle form of discursive or pre-verbal⁹² activity, they cannot be present in the same mind. The upshot of this is that, according to Vasubandhu, they are alternately rather than simultaneously present in *dhyāna*.⁹³ The notion that even as *dhyāna* factors, *vitarka* and *vicāra* refer to discursive or pre-verbal activity finds support in canonical references to the second *jhāna* as “noble silence” (*ariyo tunhībhāvo*)⁹⁴ or as involving the cessation of even wholesome intentions (*saṅkappa*).⁹⁵ However, the discursive activity that is contrasted with silence and intention need not be taken to imply full-blown conceptual activity in the form of an internal monologue. Following the *Pañcaskandha* definition, it might only refer to the conative impulse to seek out and observe an object as well as the ability to individuate an object (or its qualities), viz., to see an object (or its qualities) as distinct from other things. While this would seem to depend on some implicit form of conceptualization, it need not entail any explicit labeling. In other words, it might seem as if there is no conceptual mediation.

Amongst modern practitioners, there is some debate as to how *vitakka* and *vicāra* might relate to the task of *vipassanā*. Insofar as *vipassanā* is typically described as a process of directing attention to and examining the characteristics of individual phenomena, it stands to reason that *vipassanā* might require precisely the kind of volitional and discursive activity described above. This seems to be something like what Thanissaro has in mind when he describes pulling back from the *jhāna* to engage in “thought” and “evaluation” (his translations for *vitakka* and *vicāra*) or the first *jhāna* (which has these factors) “piggy-backing” on the other *jhāna*-s.⁹⁶ Thanissaro describes this kind of analysis “an almost preverbal level of surveillance.”⁹⁷ By contrast, Gunaratana maintains that there is no discursive activity in a *vipassanā* *jhāna* (presumably, including the first *jhāna*):

Mindfulness is mindful of not letting words, concepts, ideas, logic, philosophy and psychology disturb the smooth running of *samādhi*. It does not get swept away with their verbal specifications. Attention simply keeps paying attention to whatever is happening without verbalizing, conceptualizing and it makes sure that this is non-conceptual awareness. Mindfulness at the highest level does not use concepts.⁹⁸

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⁹¹ There is a tradition of reading the compound *manojalpaścetanāprajñāvīśesah* implying a disjunction, but I don’t think we can attribute this to Vasubandhu. See Karin Meyers, “Freedom and Self-Control: Free Will in South Asian Buddhism,” PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2010, pp. 209-215.

⁹² Here we must read “pre-verbal” in the sense of anticipating verbal activity. Perhaps “pro-verbal” is better.

⁹³ The notion that *vicāra* is just a subtler form of the discursive or pre-verbal activity of *vitarka* is part of the logic of the fifth *dhyāna* or *dhyānāntara* found in both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.

⁹⁴ S. ii.273.

⁹⁵ M. ii.28.

⁹⁶ Shankman, p. 122.

⁹⁷ ibid., p. 128. The emphasis is mine.

It’s hard to tell if these views are really so different from each other or just the result of different emphases. Whereas Thanissaro aims to explain the difference between a deeply absorptive jhāna and one with enough intentional space to engage in vipassanā, Gunaratana is trying to emphasize the difference between ordinary discursive activity or low level mindfulness and deeply concentrated vipassanā. Based on what little he says in the AKBh, it seems that Vasubandhu might agree with Thanissaro that vitarka and vicāra involve an almost preverbal level of surveillance, but he would not say that vipaśyanā requires this. After all, the ideal state in which to practice vipaśyanā is the fourth dhyāna, which is far removed from the activity of vitarka or vicāra. Looking at the development formula of the dhyāna factors, it is evident that it is the mindfulness (smṛti) and clear comprehension (samprajñā) of the third dhyāna and the purified mindfulness (smṛti-pariśuddhi) of the fourth dhyāna that support vipaśyanā. One might argue that even purified mindfulness might require some implicit form conceptualization, but it is not clear whether the Vasubandhu of the AKBh would agree.

In order to avoid attributing discursiveness to jhāna, vitakka and vicāra get redefined in the Theravāda Abhidhamma, as the application of the mind (cetaso abhinirōpana) to the object. The Visuddhimagga explains that while vitakka continually strikes at the object, vicāra is sustained engagement with the object. The relationship between the two is then illustrated by a series of metaphors that seem to suggest two slightly different conceptions of the relationship between vitakka and vicāra. They are explained, on the one hand, in terms of the striking and sustained ringing of a bell or a bee seeking and then buzzing around a flower, and on the other, as the one hand that holds a dish while the other wipes it. These metaphors are rather different in that the former suggest a temporal progression from one mental activity to another and the latter, simultaneous activities. The latter gives some notion of how vitakka and vicāra might be distinctive factors in the same moment of consciousness, but the former two seem more like what Vasubandhu has in mind in the Pañcaskandha.

In the modern jhāna debate, advocates of deeply absorbed jhāna-s tend to argue that all the jhāna-s including the first do not involve any discursiveness or volition whatsoever and so tend to favor something along the lines of the Visuddhimagga definition of vitakka and vicāra as mental application. Others claim that the jhāna-s, especially the first but even the higher jhāna-s might involve some low-level discursiveness “in the background,” but that this does not interfere with concentration. Naturally, they are inclined to interpret vitakka and vicāra as implying a subtle discursiveness, a kind of discursiveness that may play a useful role in initially taking up and engaging with the object, but is no longer necessary once the mind is firmly engaged. Opinions differ as to whether such a low level discursiveness is conducive to vipassanā. Some interpreters simply regard this kind of discursiveness as a potential distraction or minor imperfection in concentration, but Thanissaro seems to take it to be an asset to vipassanā. I have already suggested that Vasubandhu is not likely to agree with this. In fact, Vasubandhu clearly sees vitarka or vicāra as a potential problem. He defines the second dhyāna factor of inner tranquility (adhyātmasamprāśada), as “the calm flowing (prasāntavāhita) of the mental series (santati) that results from the absence of...

99 At AKBh ii.24 (Pradhan p. 54) mindfulness is simply defined as non-forgetting (sampramoṣa) of the object.
100 See Cousins 1992; Gunaratana 1985, pp. 49-59. Cousins 1992 (p. 139) offers an interesting explanation of the meaning of vitakka in relation to an eidetic rather than discursive paradigm for thought, which helps account for a closer relationship between the sutta emphasis on vitakka as thought or thinking and the Abhidhamma emphasis on vitakka as application.
101 PTS ed. p. 142.
the agitation (kṣobha) of vitarka and vicāra.”102 This calls to mind Ajahn Brahm’s understanding of vitakka-vicāra as the “wobble” of the first jhāna. As an advocate of a deeply absorbed style of jhāna, Brahm does not attribute the instability of the first jhāna to discursiveness, but rather to the conative qualities of vitakka and vicāra, to “involuntary control” in the form of an automatic movement towards (vitakka) and holding onto (vicāra) the bliss of pīti and sukha.103 Given that Vasubandhu defines vitarka and vicāra as volitional as well as discursive, he might agree that the first dhyāna is disturbed by these volitional aspects of vitarka and vicāra (as well as their discursiveness), but does not directly connect attachment to prīti or sukha to the activities vitarka and vicāra.104

Prīti and Sukha

Most of the debates between Vasubandhu and his Vaibhāṣika interlocutors over the dhyāna-s are about their ontology rather than their phenomenology. The one exception might be their debate over prīti and sukha. This debate concerns whether sukha is a bodily or mental sensation and indirectly, whether the five sensory consciousnesses are active in the dhyāna-s. This same debate (although typically with respect to pīti rather than sukha and auditory consciousness) is one of more decisive debates amongst modern practitioners. After all, a meditative state that is entirely cut off from the senses, such that there is no sound or awareness of the body (or taste or smell or sight),105 would seem to be a very distinctive state, easy to distinguish from a state in which the sensory consciousnesses were engaged. Moreover, because it is impossible to observe the body with no sensory awareness of it, this would seem to decide whether vipassanā in the form of first foundation of mindfulness is possible in jhāna. Thus, modern advocates of vipassanā styles of jhāna typically understand the jhāna-s to involve bodily awareness and tend to interpret pīti and/or sukha as referring to bodily sensations. By contrast, advocates of more absorptive styles of jhāna tend to take the absence of bodily awareness and sound as definitional of jhāna.

Given that it would seem impossible to practice the first foundation of mindfulness without any bodily awareness, it is somewhat surprising to find that Vasubandhu’s Vaibhāṣika interlocutor insists that the five sensory consciousnesses are cut off in the dhyāna-s. His commitment to this position results in a rather elaborate hermeneutic strategy where he interprets sukha in the first two dhyāna-s as tranquility (prasrabdhi) and prīti as mental happiness (saumanasya).106 But because there cannot be two feelings (vedanā) in the same moment of consciousness according to the Abhidharma, he claims that sukha is part of the saṃskāra-skandha in the first two dhyāna-s, but is vedanā in the third dhyāna, where it refers to the ease (sukha) of the mental body (manaskāya).107

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102 AKBh: viii.9c; Śāstrī p. 893. The Vaibhāṣika describe adhyātmasamprasāda as confidence (śraddhā) resulting from the conviction that the meditative state can be left behind.

103 Shankman, pp. 172-3.

104 He would also not attribute this only to vitarka an vicāra. According the AKBh, any dhyāna which takes its own existence (bhava) as an object of enjoyment (asvādāna) is defined (kliṣṭa) by thirst (ṛṣṇā). Any of the four dhyāna-s (and immaterial attainments) can be defined, pure (śubha, śraddhaka) or untainted (anāsrava). The one exception is that Bhavāgra cannot be anāsrava owing to the weakness of perception there.

105 No one seems to argue about these senses. It should also be noted that visual awareness wouldn’t be much of an issue since most modern Theravāda jhāna practice is with eyes closed.

106 AKBh viii.9b.

107 This is the explanation according to the Vibhāṣaśāstra, Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya and Dharmaśāstra. See Kuan, Tse-Fu, “Clarification on Feelings in Buddhist Dhyāna/Jhāna Meditation” Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33: 297.
Vasubandhu objects to this explanation, arguing that *sukha* is pleasant bodily feeling and *prīti* is happiness (*saumanasya*). He concedes to the principle that there cannot be two feelings in one and the same consciousness by explaining that like *vitarka* and *vicāra*, *prīti* and *sukha* are only present one at time.\(^{108}\)

It would be easy to read Vasubandhu’s objection as just an extension of his general preference for a more straightforward, less theoretically elaborate reading of scripture. It is, after all, a little awkward to insist that the meaning of *sukha* should change in the course of the standard formula. But in the discussion that follows, it seems that the debate might concern the phenomenal properties of *dhyāna*. When asked how there can be bodily conscious in a *dhyāna*, the Dārṣṭāntika (who seems to be representing Vasubandhu’s position here) maintains that there is a pleasant (*sukha*) sensation, owing to a wind that is produced by a particular *samādhi* and felt by the body.\(^{109}\) The Vaibhāṣika suggests that this would amount to a deterioration (*bhramśa*) in concentration due to distraction by an external object, but the Dārṣṭāntika argues that this is not the case because this pleasant sensation is internal to the body and thus favorable (*anukūla*) to *samādhi*.\(^{110}\) At first blush, this debate does not look unlike like the debate between modern practitioners who emphasize a totally absorptive style of *dhyāna* and those who emphasize focusing on pleasant bodily sensation\(^{111}\) as a means of entering or deepening absorption and/or as a potential object for investigation. Although it is reasonable to suppose that a difference in styles of practice might play a part in informing this debate, the conversation soon turns to a rather abstract discussion about how to classify the sensation in question according to the soteriology of defilement.

**Conclusions**

What is perhaps most striking about the AKBh presentation of *dhyāna* in light of the modern debate is the way that it seems to take up some of the central concerns of modern practitioners only to deal with these concerns in a way that defies expectations. Whereas the most vocal parties in the modern debate agree that *vipassanā*-*jhāna*-s have a changing object and involve sensory awareness, both Vasubandhu and the Vaibhāṣika agree that *samādhi* is single-pointed and the Vaibhāṣika insist that there is no bodily awareness in *dhyāna* despite the fact that they consider *dhyāna* the ideal state in which to practice the four foundations of mindfulness. This seems to suggest that:

1. Vasubandhu and his co-religionists had a very different understanding of what practices like the four foundations of mindfulness or *dhyāna* entail
2. that the ways in which their practices correlate with various styles of modern practice will be revealed upon further study, or
3. that they didn’t have any conception of what they entail and/or were not particularly interested in the actual cultivation of these states.

Whatever the case, I think that it is a fruitful hermeneutic strategy to continue to test expectations based on modern Buddhist practice against the internal logic of the AKBh. Given

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\(^{108}\) Śāstrī, p. 892.

\(^{109}\) Śāstrī, p. 891.

\(^{110}\) ibid.

\(^{111}\) Which they tend to call *pīti* instead of *sukha*. 
the systematic structure of the path, we may be able to discover a theoretical coherence of
the meditation system there.

A more difficult question, and one that I suspect we will not resolve, is whether Vasubandhu
has any real or imagined phenomenal referents in mind when he talks about the states in which
the path is traversed. He tells us a great deal about how the dhyānas fit in the structure of the path,
why they are recommended and how they function soteriologically, but tells us very little about
what these states are like. Where we might hope to get greater clarification about the phenomenal
properties of these states, the debate typically concerns points of ontology, theory or scripture that
have little bearing on the basic phenomenal constitution of these states. We might conclude from
this that Vasubandhu simply does not have any phenomenal referents in mind when he talks about
the dhyānas or the other meditative states. Another possibility is that Vasubandhu does have
distinct phenomenal referents in mind, but just a very different set of concerns about these states.
In either case, examining the ways in which apparently phenomenal description enters into and then
recedes from the debate should help us come to a better understanding of the intellectual project
of the AKBh. In the process, I suspect that we are likely to learn as much or more about our own
understanding of the relationship between practice and theory.
Buddhadāsa’s Poetry:  
the Object of Contemplation on Emptiness

Thanaphon Cheungsirakulvit

Poetry has been regarded as one of the most efficient methods used for communicating profound ideas since ancient times. For example, the classical Indian epics - Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana were composed in śloka, a type of poetry invented by a hermit named Viśvāmitra. As well as the classical well-known books of the Greek – the Iliad and the Odyssey, were also composed in verse. In Buddhism, the canonical text - the Tripitaka was composed in ‘verse’ format.

There are a few reasons why poetry is famous among the great thinkers and teachers of all time. The first reason is because it helps remember the poem since each type of poetry has its unique rhythm and rhyme; then specific words need to be put in specific position to create the rhythm; and the rhyme is a control factor that links each line of the poetry together. Similar to a song that specific music comes with its lyrics. Once the music is recorded into one’s mind, they will recall the lyric right away when they hear the music, or vice versa.

The second reason is poetry leaves some space for the reader, or the hearer, to interpret and create individual understanding of the poem. Most poetry are limited by the number of words, then the poets need to use limited words to communicate the ideas. This limitation challenges the reader to solve the puzzle of the poetry; Moreover, the interpretation of the poetry requires individual experience to create individual understanding of the poetry. Each person will have different experiences by reading the same poetry because we all have different experiences and different way to interpret the world. This makes poetry one of the most powerful tools to communicate the profound ideas since it can penetrate into personal entity of the reader.

There are some studies relating the using of poetry in the teaching of the Buddha. In ‘A study of Patterns and Methods of the Preaching by Thai Sangha in the Present Time’ by Phra Boonchok Chayadhammo (2005)1 and ‘an Analytical Study of the Buddha’s Strategy in the Propagation of Buddhism’ by Songvit Kawosri (Ph.D., 2008.)2; both studies maintain that poetry is an important method used in presenting and transmitting dharma in Buddhist context both in written literature and verbal communication. The studies also show that dharma poetry has long been used since the time of the Buddha, for example, the Tripitaka was composed in the form of versed ‘kāthā.’ In addition, the studies also prove that poetry enables the audience to remember the content and helps the monks to correct the mistake as the rhythm of the poetry is the control factor of the content.

For Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu, on whom this paper will focus, mentioned the importance of poetry that:

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“The word ‘kavi’ (poetry) does not only mean that the work is composed in verse, however, the work must express some profound thought, no matter it is versed or not. The difficulty [of composing the poetry] is how to express such profound thought for the audience to understand easily, and explicitly. The versing process is another separate process helping the audience remember the poetry fast, easily and eventually.”

From the quotation above, Apart from the ability to enable the audience to remember the content, Buddhadāsa’s meaning of poetry goes beyond such explicit functions of poetry. We can see that the main focus of poetry in Buddhadāsa’s point of view is the profound idea that is expressed, not the beauty of the word. Good poetry, in this case, does not have to be versed, or fully decorated with imageries. But it needs to communicate some profound meaning.

In the study of poetry in general, there will be two parts that need attention – the content and the technique of composing. In this paper both parts will be discussed but the main point of this paper will focus on the techniques used by Buddhadāsa to make his poetry the object of contemplation on emptiness.

Before going any further, the first thing that needs to be understood is the definition of the word emptiness in Buddhadāsa’s point of view. Buddhadāsa explained that ‘emptiness’ in his sense has the same meaning of the word suññatā. The word suññatā is “derived from Pāli language. ‘Suñña’ means ‘empty’, ‘tā’ means ‘ness’; ‘suññatā’ means emptiness.”

Moreover, Buddhadāsa defined the word emptiness in both worldly language and dharma language. He said,

Emptiness in worldly language - the language of the silly people who haven’t seen dharma or haven’t reached dharma - means “nothing” or “waste” or “receive nothing.” Listen carefully, suññatā in worldly language means that there is nothing; not only one, nor a few: it is all empty and all waste and cannot be used in any way. This is suññatā in worldly language, the world of silly people who haven’t seen dharma.

For suññatā or emptiness in dharma language, there is everything, there can be anything in any quantity except for the feeling that there is the self and what belongs to the self. You can own whatever you want to own, you can have everything - both tangible and abstract things, except for one, that is, you cannot have the feeling of yourself or yours. There must be no feeling relating to the self and what belongs to the self. This is suññatā in dharma language.”

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5 Ibid. p.82.
Emptiness is a means of perceiving the nature of reality in Buddhadāsa’s point of view. When Buddhadāsa said that everything is empty, he meant that nothing has any independently permanent essence; nothing can truly exist by itself. Rather, every element is made up of other elements; paradoxically, each thing is made of what it is not. If all these other elements are removed, the thing is empty. Therefore, emptiness, especially in Buddhadāsa’s point of view, emphasize on the way human being perceive the reality. This emptiness mainly related to the individual experience.

“This is the great art of possession:
To possess without holding the fire from hell,
To possess with emptiness,
And see emptiness in the possession.
This is a joyful way of possessing thing.
Let’s possess thing in this way.”

In this poetry, Buddhadāsa played with the word ‘possess’ and ‘empty.’ In general when we possess things, we think ‘we’ are the owner of the things. This is the normal way of possession. But Buddhadāsa suggested that the right way of possession is to do it without thinking that ‘we’ are the owner of the things. That is, we need to understand that there is no such thing called ‘we.’ The ‘we’ is an illusion that we grasp. The way that enables us to look at ourselves as an illusion is to concentrate our mind; then our awareness and wisdom will lead our mind to think in the right way.

This poem is also an example of how reading Buddhadāsa’s poetry could lead one’s mind into dharma practice. In Buddhadāsa’s teaching, emptiness is a characteristic that the mind should have in order to attain nirvana. Buddhadāsa called the mind that is equipped with the awareness of emptiness as the ‘empty mind.’ Buddhadāsa explained the ‘empty mind’ as the mind that is free from desire, free from the existing of the self. He said that:

“When the mind is free from anything that relates to the concept of the self - which is the great delusion – everything will disappear, there is nothing left, therefore, the mind is empty. But when the mind can feel the desire and generate what is called the self - including what belong to the self; gaining, losing, love, hate, anger, fear, or anything – this is called the mind is deluded by the self. This kind of mind is not empty because it is occupied by the self.”

At this point we can say that the main focus of Buddhadāsa’s teaching is, then, to practice the ‘empty mind’ in every minute of life. Concentrating on the empty mind is, thus, another way of meditations. In one of his poem, Buddhadāsa said:

"For Dharma poetry, it is not necessary-
That the words must be beautiful,
Or the verse is put so finely,

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As general poetry do.
Mainly, it needs to convey Dharma,
Clearly, explicitly; first and foremost.
It gives emotional taste of Dharma,
Which will ripen the elevated mind.
The previous habit will be changed;
From melancholy to happiness.
The mind will be strong; not lacking or excessive.
Please, taste the dharma, not the beauty.

The poem states clearly that the main purpose of Buddhāsā’s poetry is to convey dharma and ‘change’ the perception of the reader. He explained further in another occasion that:

“This kind of dharma is used for contemplation in order to see the truth that lies in words. And then contemplate more until you can feel it, until your mind is changed according to the Dharma...The knowledge and understanding generated by this kind of contemplation is more correct and more beneficial than only read through the poem. Also this kind of practice is another way of meditations. It is the access to concentration and wisdom. This is the way that is reachable by general people. And it is also a precept at the same time.”

From the quotation, it is important to note that Buddhāsā intended, for his poetry, to be an object of contemplation. He stated clearly that by reading poetry, the audience is practicing Dharma, both in terms of sīla, samādhi, and paññā (precepts, concentration, and wisdom), which are the three essential factors, known as tri-sikkhā (three ways of studying), for attaining Nirvana. It is interesting that Buddhāsā pointed out in this quotation that by reading his poetry, the reader can practice the three components of tri-sikkhā at the same time and this implies that reading and contemplating on the poetry may be one way to attain Nirvana.

In general modern Buddhist teaching, the meditation techniques can be classified into two levels, the samatha – practice that aims for the concentration, and the vipassanā – practice that aims for the wisdom. Buddhāsā maintained that both samatha and vipassanā meditation is not the right way to attain nirvana, because in the time of the Buddha, there was no such classification. The poem ‘Vipassanā Study’ said:

The study of vipassanā happened later.
There is no such word in the Pāli of the Buddha
There is no samatha or vipassanā.
There is only the dharma practice.
Because we cannot stand the suffering.

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9 Ibid.
So we have to leave the house for the peace
Lead the life according to its activity,
In order to see the nirvana.¹⁰

The poem above mentioned that the aim for every dharma practice is to attain nirvana. It is above the classification of samatha or vipassanā, which happened later after the time of the Buddha. However, in order to prove that Buddhadāsa’s poetry can be regarded as an object of contemplation. The classification of samathā and vipassanāis needed to be discussed.

Samatha is the feeling of concentration. P. A. Payutto said that “Samatha in the easiest way means peace, but in generally usage it means the way of the mind to have peace; or to concentrate the mind. Sometimes it can refer to the concentration itself. In fact, the meaning of samatha is the concentration.”

Buddhadāsa taught that reading poetry is the origin of concentration. In his poem ‘Reading Poetry is the Origin of Concentration’ he said:

Each of this dharma poetry can be used-
As an object to create the concentration.
Only by reading a poem a day
And contemplate until you see the truth - the general truth.
If it is deeply hidden, and you cannot see it,
You need to stare at it, just like making a hole on the cliff
Hit it hard with the ‘thunder-’
Of the incredibly sharp wisdom.¹¹

Buddhadāsa said that the emotion generated by reading dharma poetry is not the same as the emotion generated by reading other type of poetry. Emotion, in poetic study, normally makes the reader ‘feel’ or ‘sense’ something. It is the feeling that the readers get when they read the poetry.¹² In general, emotion creates the sense of love, hate, encouragement, disappointment, happiness, sadness, etc. This is quite opposite to the feeling that appears when practicing dharma. Buddhadāsa pointed out that dharma poetry gives not the same emotions as general poetry do, rather it creates the ‘emotion’ of peace, calm, and concentration; especially in the process of reading it. Therefore, the right way to read dharma poetry is to ‘look closely’ and read with wisdom. The mind needs to focus only on the combinations of words in the poem and interpret them. This process keeps the mind concentrating and it finally generates samatha meditation.

As for vipassanā meditation, P. A. Payutto said that this type of meditation is ‘the enlightenment, or the way that leads to enlightenment – that is the wisdom to see things as they really are. In other words, vipassanā is the wisdom, or the practice that leads to wisdom.’

Buddhadāsa also explained that the practice of ‘chit wang’ or empty mind is not different from the vipassanā meditation; especially, as they share the ultimate aim of attaining wisdom, and as they use such wisdom to perceive the emptiness within all things. Buddhadāsa said that “Empty mind is the same as vipassanā, that is, it is the eye that can see the dharma. It is the living with no feeling of wanting to have or to be. It is the practice of the mind to see the ultimate nature of the world - that there is not any part of it has the self or belongs to the self.”

In order to create wisdom, Buddhadāsa’s poetry needs to have the ability to challenge the mind of the reader and let the reader interpret and make personal understanding of the poem. This process enables the poem to be an object of contemplation. In other words, Buddhadāsa’s poetry is an “upāya” or skillful means for the reader to think about more profound meaning the lies beyond the verse. John Hick explained that:

“In general of upāya, or the skillful means, it presupposes that a teacher knows some truth which is to be communicated to others so that they may come to see it for themselves; and the skillful means are the devices which the teacher uses to do this.”

It is important to emphasize on the word ‘skillful’ as it makes upāya different from other means. Hick maintained that the master must know exactly the knowledge they want to teach and skillfully created the device, the skillful device, which must not be too easy or too difficult but it needs to ‘challenge’ the student to think and make understanding of such device. If taking this explanation into consideration; it is possible to say that Buddhadāsa’s poetry is a skillful means. Buddhadāsa’s constantly use of artistic techniques, such as, imageries, parables and provocative questions, make his poetry an “upāya” or skillful means; to connote the concept of emptiness. Buddhadāsa said in one of his poems that:

The present dharma poetry is very diverse.
They tease and teach, or some teach and tease.
Some provoke, some tempt some emotions.

The diversity in Buddhadāsa’s poems derives from the poetic techniques that make his poetry a good puzzle for the reader to unlock its mystery. In order to do that, Buddhadāsa used various techniques in his poetry. The first, and the most prominent, technique is to put the picture with the poem. This set of poetry comes together with the pictures that the poem describes. He said in a poem that

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I have collected free pictures that some have taken.
For many years, I have got many of them.
I don’t know what use I can do with them.
But I want to give some merit to the taker
So I gradually compose the poems
That can possibly teach the dharma.
Some is only the saying that is useful
For the wisdom and the faith in Buddhism.17

Buddhadāsa stated clearly that the purpose of writing this kind of poems is ‘for the wisdom and faith in Buddhism’, which means his poems is aim to stimulate the reader to think and realize the dharma that lies between word and finally receive the wisdom of the Buddha – that is – to see the emptiness within all things. Buddhadāsa explained how to use the poem with picture that.

Read one line of the poem and then look at the picture;
Stare at it with concentration,
You will receive the taste of dharma.
Do not rush or carelessly do it.
Read one line of the poem and then look at the pictures;
There will be many emotions generated;
At the face, eye, ear, etc. look at them closely-
They are combined and composed in the poem.
Read one line of the poem and then look at the pictures;
You can see the ultimate truth more clearly than listening to the teacher;
But if you just read through the poetry,
Even until you are dead, you won’t see the wisdom.18

It is important to note that in reading the poem with picture, Buddhadāsa suggested, one need to read only one line then look at the picture then continue reading further. The picture will help the reader feel the depth of the poem and absorb what the poem trying to communicate. In other word, the picture is the guideline to the poem and it sets the mind context for reader to be ready to understand dharma, as in the poem ‘the sound of one hand clapping, for example:

I clap my one hand and it is very loud;
But you need two hands to clap.
My clapping can be heard around the world.

Your clapping can be heard only a few meters.
The sound of happiness covers up the sound of business.
It also gives more happiness.
The sound of peace is louder than the other sounds on earth.
My ears can only hear such sound.
No matter how loud the sound on the earth, I cannot hear
Because my soul can only perceive the sound of peace
It is the sound that is different from the normal sound.
It is so loud that it cannot be explained.
Only one hand clapping can give such the grand sound.
Because the mind [of the clapper] do not search for anything.
It won’t grasp any emotion;
It always speaks and challenges the suffering.¹⁹

From the poem, Buddhadāsa used paradox to connote the greatness of the realization of emptiness within all things. He said that in order to hear the sound of one hand clapping, one must possess the empty mind. This sound of one hand clapping is louder, and greater than other sounds in the world, just because it’s the sound that resonant in everything on earth. It is the sound of emptiness. The poem suggested that in clapping one hand, we can hear nothing; that is to say, on the other hand, we can hear the emptiness, and this sound of emptiness can be heard from everything in the world. The mind that can hear the emptiness is the mind that is empty; or the mind that is awakening by the realization of the emptiness of the world.

Another technique that Buddhadāsa used is the conversation technique. This type of poetry imitates the conversation between two people; one is questioning and another is answering. This technique presupposes the question the reader of the poem may have during the reading and it gives the answer to the questions. One example of this type of poem is ‘Conversation: The Buddha City’:

What is the biggest thing in the world?
It is the Buddha city, it is obvious!
What is the Buddha city, tell me more?
It is the cool state of the empty mind!
Where is it? Again please.
It is in the mind that has no desire!
How can a city appear in the mind?
It is the great emptiness that has no body!

Buddhadāsa maintained that the state of nirvana is cool and empty. From the poetry, it is clear that nirvana can only be achieved in the mind since this city appears in the mind that has no desire. This poetry uses conversation technique, which is, using question and answer to communicate the main idea to the reader. The questions posted in the lines are the questions that Buddhadāsa supposed that the reader might wonder and he gave the answer to the question. This conversation can be regarded as ‘dharma talk’ and the reader is the participant. This technique helps the reader to understand more about the content the poet wants to suggest. Also, the reader needs to pay more attention to the poem in order to follow the conversation, which is the practicing of concentration in a way.

The metaphor is another artistic technique that is used by all writers and thinkers. The metaphor challenges the reader to think and link the individual experience the reader have with the metaphor to what the metaphor trying to compare. The advantage of the metaphor is it can explain the condition and characteristic of one thing by comparing and linking with the condition and characteristic of other things that the reader might be more familiar. For example, in the Tripitaka, the concept of nirvana is portrayed by various metaphors, for example:

“Just as a flame put out by a gust of wind
goes down and is beyond reckoning,
so the sage free from name-and -form
goes down and is beyond reckoning ...
There is no measuring of one who has gone down,
There is nothing by which he might be discussed.
when all attributes (dhammā) are removed
so have all ways of speaking been removed.”

The extinguished flame is one of the best-known images of nirvana. In one text, the ascetic Vacchagotta questions the Buddha about where the enlightened person is reborn; on replying that the verb ‘is reborn’ is inapplicable, the Buddha uses the analogy of a fire gone out: just as without fuel, a fire goes out and one cannot say where it has gone to, so it is impossible to point out the enlightened person. The image of fire, therefore, is the symbol of suffering in Buddhism. And aiming for nirvana is like getting on the boat and sail through the sea of fire:

Human boat sails through the sea of fire.
If It cannot get through, do not dare to do it.
The boat of dharma is all that is needed
To smoothly get across the rain and sea of fire.
Some may say I’m crazy by saying this
Because they cannot see what I’m seeing.
They cannot even identify

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What is the real ‘fire’?
Human body is just like a boat
If we practice and hold dharma in our mind
We can certainly sail through the sea of fire -
The fire of suffering that is caused by the fire of desire

Buddhadāsa defines the ‘fire’ in the poem as the fire of suffering that is caused by the fire of desire. He uses the characteristic of the fire, that is it is hot and burning to communicate the characteristic of the suffering. He tried to link that the suffering is burning us like a fire even in our daily life. He said that to lead the life wisely we need to have dharma as the shield to protect us from the fire of suffering, which means no matter what problems in life we may face, dharma will help us get through.

It is also interesting in this poem that Buddhadāsa used another imagery of the sea that has the reference from the Tripitaka. The Buddha said that the enlightened person after death is ‘profound, immeasurable, unfathomable like the great ocean’22. But nirvana is also, very commonly, the escape from the ocean, river, or stream of rebirth and consciousness, and reaching the heaven of the further shore. The image occurs in many texts; one example is in an extended metaphor from the Samyutta Nikāya:

A man is in danger from four venomous snakes, five murderous enemies, and a burglar with a sword; he finds an empty village, but is told that it is about to be plundered by robbers. He sees a great stretch of water, and finds that ‘this shore is (full of) uncertainties and fears, the further shore is safe and without fear’, but he can see no boat or bridge to take him across. He makes a raft and crosses over.23

The metaphors are explained: the four snakes are the four Great (material) Elements: earth, water, fire, and air; the five enemies are the Five Aggregates; the burglar is passion and lust; the empty village is a name for the six internal Sense-Bases; the robbers are the objects of sense, the six external Sense-Bases; the great stretch of water is ‘the four floods of pleasure, (repeated) existence, (wrong, harmful) views, and ignorance; this shore is the psycho-physical individual; the further shore, safe and without fear, is nirvana; the raft is the Path.

The metaphor is one technique that allows the reader to think and interpret the poetry. The process of linking the metaphor to the main idea the poet wants to communicate enables the poetry to be an upāya. And when the reader can solve the mystery of the metaphor, the more understanding of the content is created and this leads to the appreciation of the poem and established the connection between the reader and the poem itself.

23 Ibid., p.45.
Apart from the metaphor from the Tripitaka, Buddhadāsa also invented his own metaphor in his poetry. For example in the poem ‘The Taste of Heaven is Addictive’:

The stories of gods, or heaven, are like rubbers-
Which stick in the middle of the mind.
They are the golden cages that capture us
They are disgusting, but we, instead, love them.
The cessation is not sweet like the sugar tree.
It is not sparkling like the diamond.
The taste of heaven is addictive, and poisonous.
We are trapped in it, but we don’t notice,
Just like crab and shell,
Which always stay in the hole,
Never know about the little bird,
That flies freely in the endless sky.²⁴

The main idea of this poetry is the letting go of the happiness that one obsessed in this world. Buddhadāsa used the image of ‘crab and shell’ - that stayed in the hole and they both have a strong body cover that disable them to know anything about the outside world - to represent the people who addict to the happiness in this world but they don’t realize that the happiness they are having now will disappear and change into suffering in the future. The image of the golden cage is also used to represent the limitation that happiness in this world can give. Happiness is a precious cage that locks us from our ultimate freedom. On the other hand, the little bird that is not trapped in any cage and flies freely in the sky represents that one that can let go of such happiness of this world and find the eternal happiness of nirvana.

Another technique that Buddhadāsa used to communicate his teaching of emptiness is the provocative question. This technique will ask the question to the reader with no intention to receiving the answer back. Rather the question arouses the reader to answer the question in their mind. It is a good way to let the reader think and interpret the intention of the poet. One example says:

Buddhadāsa still lives forever,
In order to serve my fellow human beings-
With the dharma advertising.
Can you see, my fellow, what is really dead?²⁵

This is an excerpt from the poem “Buddhadāsa shall live forever.” Buddhadāsa played with the world live and death; the cessation and eternal, to arouse the reader intention. He said that when he died the only thing that died with him was his body; but his works still live. Within his works

lie his intention to serve the Buddha, as his name ‘Buddhadāsa’ means the servant of the Buddha. Buddhadāsa called his teaching ‘dharmaghosa’ or ‘dharma advertising’, which is the revolutionary way in teaching dharma especially at the time when Thai society still see the monk institution as the passive preacher and need to preached only in the temple on only certain occasions. Buddhadāsa said that even his body is dead; the dharma of the Buddha will live on. The death of Buddhadāsa’s body is not the real dead because it will wake the public interest for Buddha teaching. What is really dead should be the suffering and the desire. This poem shows Buddhadāsa ultimate intention for promoting Buddhism in the society.

Another characteristic of Buddhadāsa’s poetry is the use of the story to teach dharma. In many occasion, Buddhadāsa composed the stories setting the situation for the reader to solve the problem the situation demands. Sometimes the story reveals the surprise answer to some situation which arouses the reader to think along. One example is the poem ‘sharpen the brick into the mirror’:

A student asked a teacher with anxiety that
“how can I attain nirvana?”
“Oh it is so easy, I will tell you -
It is sharpening the brick to become the mirror”
“My teacher, other would think we are crazy-
Because the task you ask is impossible.
“This is it! It is teaching us-
To stop searching, and stop our craziness.
No one can sharpen the brick to become the mirror-
You understand it very well.
Same as nirvana, it can be reached only by not going.
Just get rid of the self, you will see nirvana.
If you sharpen the brink, do it until nothing left;
Until there is no cause for rebirth in the cycle.
We need to sharpen the business into the emptiness.
You are crazy if you sharpen the brick to become the mirror. 26

The poem above tells the story of a teacher with his students having a conversation about nirvana. The first student asked how to reach nirvana. The teacher answered with the impossible statement of sharpening the brick into the mirror. He elaborated that to do that is impossible. The best way to attain nirvana is to let go even the nirvana itself. Keep sharpening the brick until nothing left, that way one will find nirvana. Buddhadāsa implied from this story that the will to reach nirvana make human being get stuck to this world. Reaching nirvana itself is one of the desires that need to get rid of. This will to attain nirvana stop us to achieving it.

Moreover, many of Buddhadāsa’s poetry composed in the easy-to-read manner. With the simple vocabulary and easy to understand sentence, Buddhadāsa poem is accessible by various types of readers. But one thing that all of his poems share is the profound meaning that is hidden in the poem. Some examples is ‘be and live with empty mind’:

\begin{verbatim}
Do all kind of works with empty mind;
Give all the result of the work to the emptiness;
Eat the fruit of emptiness like the monk eats;
Die completely in this life.
Who can be empty like mentioned above
They will not suffer any pain
This kind of the “art” of life -
Is a “means” to happiness for those who can figure it out.27
\end{verbatim}

This poem is one of the most famous poems of Buddhadāsa bhikkhu and it concludes everything that need to be done in Buddhadāsa point of view. It pointed out that emptiness need to be focus in every step of life. This is the art of living that will end the suffering. The main idea of the poem builds on the concept of ‘no self’, that is, when we have no self, we will not take anything as ours. This is what Buddhadāsa called “give all the result of the work to emptiness.” It doesn’t mean we won’t care at all about the result of the work, but it rather means we need to stop our obsession and expectation of the result. We can get the result of the work but do not grab it, or expect it to be ours. “To eat the fruit of emptiness like the monk eats” means we need to learn how to stop; do not take too many things; just take it only for living. If we can do all of these, we could get rid of the desire and lead the life happily.

There are many artistic techniques that are used by Buddhadāsa bhikkhu to communicate the idea of emptiness. One thing that needs to be mentioned here is, as we can see, all the poem cited in this paper, as well as most of Buddhadāsa’s poetry in general related to the concept of emptiness. Therefore, it is possible to say that all the techniques that Buddhadāsa applied is an attempt to make his poetry an upāya, or skillful means to connote the profound meaning of the emptiness. Buddhadāsa’s poetry, then, is a kind of object of contemplation that could lead the reader to the realization and understanding of the emptiness. This is, in another word, the meditative function of Buddhadāsa’s poetry.

\footnote{Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu. Buddhadāsa dharm kam klon: sen tang sookwamsuk yen (Buddhadāsa’s Poetry: The Path to the Cool Happiness). (Bangkok: Sukkhabhabjai, 2010), p.220.}
Appendix

Possess without the Possessor

If you feel tired from possessing things,
And are always aware that you are the owner;
It is obvious that there is ‘I’ and there is ‘mine,’
There is a ‘Self’ appearing in this possession.
If you possess things and realize they are illusion,
And don’t grasp it as yours,
And your mind perceives such possession
in the right way,
This is the possession without the ‘Self.’
Therefore, whenever you possess things,
don’t let the ‘Self’ appear,
The good consciousness will prevent it.
The awareness and wisdom
also appear in this possession.
This is the right way to possess.
This is the great art of possession:
Possessing without holding the fire from hell,
Possessing with emptiness,
And see emptiness in possessing
This is a joyful way to possess things
Let’s possess thing in this way. 28

For Dharma poetry, it is not necessary-
That the words must be beautiful,
Or the verse is put so finely,
As general poets do.
Mainly, it needs to convey Dharma,
Clearly, explicitly; first and foremost.
It gives emotional taste of Dharma,
Which will ripen the elevated mind.
The previous habit will be changed;
From melancholy to happiness.
The mind will be strong; not lacking or excessive.
Please, taste the dharma, not the beauty.29

The study of vipassanā happened later.
There is no such word in the Pāli of the Buddha
There is no ghandha or vipassanā.
There is only to practice dharma.
Because we cannot stand the suffering,
So we have to leave the house into the peace
Live the life according to its activity
In order to see the nirvana.
Nowadays, there are schools of vipassanā.
It is specially created.
It seems more serious than in the Buddha time.
I wish you are real and teach real vipassanā

Each of these dharma poetry can be used -

As the object to create the concentration.

Only by reading a poem a day

And contemplate until you see the truth - the general truth.

If it is deeply hidden, and you cannot see it,

You need to look closely, just like digging a hole on the cliff

Hit it hard with the ‘thunder-’

Of the incredibly sharp wisdom.

If you only look at it, not examine or survey it,

You will not see the valuable words.

There need to be the combination of eye effort and heart effort

In order to accumulate the wisdom.

Normally we are clam when we wake up at night

Keep that emotion and use it to concentrate

The deeper and more profound dharma

Then you can find the happiness.

---

Many Characteristics of Poetry

The present dharma poetry is very diverse and

They tease and teach, or some teach and tease.

Some provoke, some tempt some emotions.

Some are crazy in others’ eyes,

---


Because they challenge the reader.

Some praise the reader

Some create the sadness and hit the reader

Some are so deep that cannot see the point

Some create misunderstanding.

Some are funny but they teach good lesson.

Some teach us to see and grab the self.

Compose the dharma poem for the picture

I have collected free pictures that some have taken.

For many years until I have got a certain of them.

I don’t know what use I can do with them.

But I want to give some merit to the taker

So I gradually compose poems

That can possibly teach the dharma.

Some is only the saying that is useful

For the wisdom and the faith in Buddhism.

The happiness from dharma is the profit

Some poems give happiness, some give sadness

Read a line and see the picture, and keep doing it.

Each time you read it is full of dharma.

Alternate reading poem and look at the picture

Read one line of the poem and then look at the picture

Stare at it with concentration.
You will receive the taste of dharma
Do not rush or carelessly do it.
Read one line of the poem and then look at the pictures
There will be many emotions generated
At the face, eye, ear, etc. look at them closely
They are combined and composed in the poem.
Read one line of the poem and then look at the pictures
You can see the ultimate truth more clearly than listening to the teacher
But if you just read through the poetry
Even until you are dead, you won't see the wisdom

The sound of one hand clapping

I clap my one hand and it is very loud
But you need two hands to clap
My clapping can be heard around the world.
Your clapping can be heard only some meters
The sound of happiness covers up the sound of business.
It also gives more happiness.
The sound of peaces is louder than other sounds on earth.
My ears can only hear such sound.

No matter how loud the sound of the earth,  
I cannot hear

Because my sound can only perceive  
the sound of peace

It is the sound that is different from the normal sound.  
It is the sound that is so loud that cannot be explained.  
Only one hand clap can give the sound,  
Just because the mind do not search for it.  
It won't grasp any emotion;  
It always speaks and challenges the suffering.  

Conversation: the Buddha City

What is the biggest thing in the world?  
It is the Buddha city, it is obvious!  
What is that the Buddha city, tell me more?  
It is the cool state of the empty mind!  
Where is it? Again please.  
It is in the mind that has no desire!  
How can a city appear in the mind?  
It is the great emptiness that has no body!  
So how can that be the Buddha city?  
Because there are wisdom and loving kindness in it!

สนทนา: พุทธนคร

ในโลกนี้มีอะไร ใหญ่ที่สุด?
นั่นคือ "พุทธ-นคร"ใครก่อนเห็น!
นั่นคืออะไร ว่าไป ให้ตรวจสอบ?
ภูมิที่เป็น เก่ง "จิต ไม่คิดอะไร!"
อยู่ที่ไหน ว่าไป อีกที่นี้?
ตรงจิต ไม่คิด ก็เลสดี!
ในจิตนั้น มีเมืองบ้าน สถานใด?
คือความว่าง ชั่วใหญ่ ไร้ตัวตน!
แล้วเป็นพุทธ-นคร ตอนไหนกัน?
ถ้าในนั้น มีปัญญา เมตตาล้น!
ถ้าห่อนavn ใครจะอาศัย ในนคร

Then who live in that city? is it not human being?

Emptiness is even more substantial than human being!”

Human boat sails through the sea of fire.
It cannot get through, do not dare to do it.
The boat of dharma is what is needed
To smoothly get across the rain and sea of fire.
Some may say I’m crazy in saying this
Because they cannot see what I’m seeing.
They cannot even identify
What is the real ‘fire’
Human body is just like boat
If we practice and hold dharma in our mind
We can certainly sail through the sea of fire -
The fire of suffering that is caused by the fire of desire

The taste of Heaven is addictive
The schools of thinking cause us headache.
You really need to get away from them.
The stories of gods, or heaven, are like rubber-
Which sticks in the middle of the mind.
They are the golden cage that captures us

It is disgusting, but we, instead, love it.
The cessation is not sweet like the sugar trees
It is not sparkling like the diamonds.
The taste of heaven is addictive, and poisonous.
We are trapped in it, but we don’t notice,
Just like crab and shell,
Which always stay in the hole,
Never know about the little bird,
That flies freely in the endless sky.  

Buddhadāsa shall not die
Buddhadāsa shall live forever,
Even when my body is dead
It is normal for the body to be dead
It is the law of nature and time
Buddhadāsa will live forever,
Good or bad, I will live with the religion
As I have devoted this body and mind to it,
By the order of the Buddha, I won’t stops
Buddhadāsa still lives forever,
In order to serve my fellow human beings-
With the dharma advertising.
Can you see, my fellow, what is really dead?

Be and live with empty mind

Do all kind of works with empty mind;
Give all the result of the work to the emptiness;
Eat the fruit of emptiness like the monk eats;
Die completely in this life.
Who can be empty like mentioned above
They will not suffer any pain
This kind of life’s “art”
A “means” to happiness for those who figure it out.

Sharpen the brick into the mirror

A student asked a teacher with anxiety that
“how can I attain nirvana?”
“Oh it is so easy, I will tell you -
It is sharpening the brick into the mirror”
“My teacher, other would think we are crazy-
Because the task you ask is impossible.
“This is it! It is teaching us-
To stop searching, and stop our craziness.
No one can sharpen the brick into the mirror- You understand it very well.
Same as nirvana, it can be reached by not going.
Just get rid of the self, you will see nirvana.
If you sharpen the brink, do it until nothing left;

Until there is no cause for rebirth in the cycle.

We need to sharpen the business into the emptiness.

You are crazy if you sharpen the brick into the mirror.

ไม่มีเหตุ ไว่ ไ ๆ ในสงสาร
ฝนความวุ่น เป็นความว่าง อย่างถ่รับทาน
ฝนริจิตาน ให้เป็นเงา เรานำอง"40

An Anthropological Study on the Rituals Pertaining to Life Crises Events among Sri Lankan Buddhists

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University of Sri Jayewardenepura, Sri Lanka

Introduction

Ritual is derived from the Latin term ‘ritus’ which means custom. There are two distinct trends of common usage for the words rite-ritual, ceremony- cereminoial and custom-customary¹. A ritual is the meeting point of myth and metaphysic or reflective thought and religious living. It is the frontier between time and eternity; the known and the unknown. Rituals are necessary because they enable man to comprehend and to realize that which is the ultimate basis of life, to communicate with the powers that preside over the destinies of the universe to which she/he belongs. Man cannot afford to live in a state of giving up one’s beliefs or faiths, once the awareness of the unknown has downed on him. Rites and rituals possess an intellectual character when considered as ‘practices’ requiring the participation of all members of the community².

According to Kelly and Kaplan³ study of ritual has to run to history and raise fundamental questions for Anthropology. The definition of ‘ritual’ has long been debated. Proposed delimiting features range from biological bases; to functional values; to linguistic, symbolic, or semiotic forms; to rejection of the category altogether; to rejection of all general categories, and insistence that the proper starting point is indigenous experience and category. Nevertheless, the definitions of ritual that have been offered have tended to share a presupposition about their object. In part many rituals are indigenously represented as ‘ancient’ and unchanging; rituals unlike riots, for example carry an albatross of connections to ‘traditions’, the scared - to structures that have generally been imagined in stasis. While riots are obviously events in history, scholars have had a great deal of difficulty conceiving of rituals as anything more concrete than types of events. Until recently the unique ritual event has been an anomaly, understood only when the function or transformation is discovered that identified its place in structure. It is the possibility that rituals are historical events that now intrigues many anthropologists.

In fact there are different views and approaches to the study of ritual. Some scholars study ritual as expressions of relations between historically specific selves in theories of identity and alternatives. Others study ritual within dynamic cultural systems and articulations in the colonial encounter. Still others focus on rituals of rule and resistance in studies of domination, which some following William’s and Gramsci, call ‘hegemony’⁴. Accordingly there are number of theories on ritual such as sociological, anthropological and psycho-analytic. This study examines the rituals pertaining to life crises events among Sri Lankan Buddhists.

¹ (Leach, 1968:520).
² (Paliyaguru, 2010:96).
³ (1990:120).
⁴ (Kelly and Kaplan, 1990:32).
Sri Lanka is predominantly a Buddhist country. More than seventy percent of the population in the country is Sinhalese - Buddhists. Buddhism was officially introduced to Sri Lanka during the third century B.C. by Maha Mahinda Thero from India, who was a religious emissary of the Emperor Ashoka. Subsequently, myths, rituals, religious observances and practices of the pre-Buddhist era as well as Hindu and other belief systems crept into Sri Lankan Buddhism and this religious admixture could be called as Sinhalese Buddhism.

The focus of this paper is the rites and rituals among Sri Lankan Buddhists which they perform during their illnesses, calamities and deaths etc. This study covers the anthropological and sociological perspectives of those rituals and the psychological adaptation to such events. Therefore a multi-disciplinary approach was employed to analyze the real sense of Sri Lankan Buddhist cosmology.

Methodology

The questionnaires, interview method and case studies were used as the tools of primary data collection. Accordingly sixty (60) questionnaires and five (5) interviews and case studies were employed. Simple random sample method has been used. The sample was consisted of respondents’ i.e.: disciples, Buddhist monks, shamans, soothsayer, astrologer, etc. Secondary data was collected through relevant literature. Out of all kind of rituals the present study was limited to the rituals pertaining to life crises events among Sri Lankan Buddhists.

The Sri Lankan Buddhist Rituals and Cosmology

The Sri Lankan culture has been nourished and shaped by Buddhism. Religious beliefs have brought in ritual practices to the civilizations. All these are performed in order to overcome the crises of life and to gain health and prosperity. In all these occasions astrology also played a major role as it is a strong component of the Sinhala tradition. Accordingly there is a deep-rooted cosmology behind the Sri Lankan Buddhists rituals.

In the first place the Sinhalese Buddhists are mainly concerned about the beliefs affecting melova (this world) and paralova (the other world) which center on the fundamental Buddhist notion of karumaya (the popular term for the Buddhist concept kamma). The individual is responsible for his karumaya which is carried over from his earlier lives into his present existence. The balance sheet of an individual’s good deeds (pin) and bad deeds (paw) determines his potential for attaining a better or worse state in this life and the life hereafter. Karumaya has two extremes, i.e.: vasana (luck) and avasana (bad luck). Even though human life is bound by karumaya, one can avoid its effect to a certain extent and achieve vasana (luck, prosperity, health) by propitiating various supernatural categories of being, as a long term measure by performing meritorious deeds (pin) such as, performing religious rites and rituals, and living a virtuous life.

Life crises events such as illnesses, accidents, deaths, failures etc., are also viewed according to the notion of karumaya. Planetary gods (graha deviyas), demons (yakas) and malevolent spirits (pretas) cause misfortunes or illnesses and s/he may request a Buddhist monk to chant piri
(Buddhist verses) or recite benedictory verses (seth kavi) for the gods (devas), and at the same time he may go to a soothsayer or an astrologer and on the basis of his instructions propitiate the demons or malevolent spirits. This does not mean that he is confusing Buddhist rituals with non-Buddhist rituals. It simply means that misfortune may be interpreted as a consequence of karmaya, or as an affliction caused by spirits or as both working in conjunction.⁵ To avert these kinds of misfortunes and crises, Sinhalese Buddhists perform various kinds of rites and rituals and they could be categorized into three main groups:

- Calendrical rituals (recurrent, cyclical);
- Life crises rituals (recurrent, non-cyclical);
- Life cycle rituals.

As mentioned earlier this study is focused only to the life crises rituals among Sri Lankan Buddhists.

**Life crises rituals (recurrent, non-cyclical)**

According to Sinhalese Buddhists beliefs, life crises whether physical or mental, could be caused either by natural or supernatural agents. The naturalistic theory of the cause of life crises is entirely based on the indigenous medical system. According to that, life crises are caused by an imbalance among the three humors basic to human organism namely vata (wind), pitta (bile), sem (phlegm). These are collectively known as tun dos (three factors). In addition to the diseases that spring from within the organism, diseases are also caused by supernatural agencies such as the Yakas (demons), Pretas (malevolent spirits of lower class), Devas (gods), and Graha deviyas (planetary gods).

If a person is suffering from being possessed by a Yaka (demons), a yakuma or thovilaya, or samayama (Sinhala rituals performed to alleviate illnesses and other life crises) is performed or if he suffers from unfavorable planetary movements caused by planetary god, a bali yagaya or baliya is performed.

If none of these remedies work, it is due to the influence of a strong bad karuma done by the affected person in this or previous life and s/he has to suffer the consequences. The patient or his relations will then engage in rituals in order to gain some solace to the affected person.

They also perform boddhi puja (a ritual performed under a bo-tree chanting verses pertaining to Lord Buddha), deva kannalau (praying for gods asking for protection and prosperity), bara hara veema (making vows in order to carryout them once the requests are granted), pol geseema (smashing coconuts against a piece of hard rock), seth kavi keema (benedictory verses) and yanthra demeema (wearing talisman for protection and prosperity).

Bo-tree represents the tree of wisdom and the wishing tree, the tree under which Buddha attained enlightenment. The main ritual is that after paying respect to the Buddha with recitations, seven pots of scented water is poured at the base of the bodhi-tree, offer flowers and joss tick, light oil lamps and chanting piritth and meditating under the bodhi-tree by the patient or his relative.

⁵ (Palliyaguru, 2010:97-98).
There are some cases where certain individuals who have attained healing powers through higher levels of Buddhist meditation (specially *metta bhavana*) healing patients with grave illnesses by applying herbal medicine at various sensitive points of the body of the patient.

*Deva kannalau, bara hara veema, pol gesemma and seth kavi keema* are also very popular rituals among Sinhalese Buddhists. They expect solace and relief through these rituals. People select deities according to their beliefs and wishes. When someone passes any bad time, s/he performs those rituals for avoiding and alleviating the effects. These rituals are extremely common not only among the villagers but among the city dwellers as well.

As people believe that ill-effects could cause due to the bad planetary arrangements found in the horoscope and evil spirits around them that bring illness and bad time to their lives. With the identification of the cause they engage in different rituals and practices to avoid and eliminate these bad effects to their lives. The above mentioned remedial rituals adopted and performed are always socio-cultural based and some are performed in public.

These rituals are performed by traditionally trained persons who are well conversant with astrology, the use of charms known as mystical graphics (*yanthra*) and repetition of incantations (*manthra*) to ward off evil forces. Sometimes these are accompanied with the above mentioned more elaborate rituals known as *yakuma, thovilaya, samayama, bali yagaya* or *baliya*. In *bali thovil* (exorcisms), offerings are made to various divinities and evil forces in order to mitigate the effects of evils believed to cause, diseases. The simplest form of such a ritual is known as *santhikarma*; the prayers to the planets. If the diseases are more serious, then the *shanthikarma* involves the performance of such ceremonies as devil dancing. In most of these ceremonies the performer or shaman (*adura*) prepares a *yanthra*. It is a form of inscribing letters with pre-designed pictures and graphics on a sheet of copper or gold. This is rolled and put into an amulet or talisman tied or hung on the patient’s neck with the repetition of incantations. These *yantras* constitute religious, astrological or numerological perspectives.²

All these healing rituals are connected with chanting, singing, drumming, dancing and certain other ritualistic procedures. It needs an auspicious day, an auspicious time and different ingredients for various rituals; preparation of colorful facades and structures, masks and dresses. Chanting, singing and dancing create a rhythmic vibrant atmosphere that could facilitate the healing of the body and mind.

*Thovil* is accompanied by mask dances, incantations, astrological rituals, etc., all of which have a mutually integrated tradition. Even these performances vary from simple ones to more elaborate performances with masked dancing etc. *Gam-Madu* and *Devol-Madu* are ceremonies held to bring prosperity to the whole village where these are performed. Theses rituals have evolved in numerous dance forms existing in Sri Lanka connected with artistic traditions and folk medicine. All these rituals are performed to bring health and prosperity to people individually or as a community. When the community rituals are performed they bring most of the villagers together to perform one collective task leading to social harmony.

² (De Silva, 2010:141-142).
Data Analysis

Data has been collected in urban, semi urban and village level. Age of the respondents could be categorized as follows:

**Table 1: The age group of the respondents:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45+</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Table 1, the majority of those who follow the rituals are from the age group of forty-five years and above. But the least followers are from the age group of eighteen to twenty-five. This is the general situation that the elders are more religious and mature than the younger in their beliefs.

**Table 2: The gender differentiation of the respondents involved in the rituals:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person:</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Table 2, the majority of those who follow the rituals are female. There is a significant number of females who involve in rituals compare to the male followers.

**Table 3: Status of the respondents:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 reveals that the majority (73%) of those who follow the rituals are married and also 22% of the respondents are unmarried. Here the respondents who are divorced and engage in rituals are five percent (5%). But still it is a significant amount because three out of sixty respondents is a significant figure in a random sample of data collection.
Table 4: Employability of the respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Table 4, the differences between employed and unemployed respondents are only four. It reveals that there is no significant relation between the employability and the rituals following to life crises events.

Table 5: Crises events of life:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crises Events</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illnesses</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing Exams</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family problems</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorces</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thefts</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court cases</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No crises events</strong></td>
<td><strong>04</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 reveals about the events of the life crises and how much respondents face such experiences. Since one respondent experienced more than one or two such events it is difficult to explain the situation by percentage form. For instance those who face to the illnesses in the same time experienced about death or accidents. Accordingly respondents have mostly experienced illnesses, deaths, fail of examinations and family problems respectively.
Table 6: The belief of the concept of merit and sin:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Table 6, it clearly shows that hundred percent of the respondents believe in the concept of the merit and sin in the light of the Buddhist cosmology.

Table 7: Belief in Horoscopes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief:</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Total   | 60  | 100%

Table 7 reveals that the majority (60%) of the respondents believed in the horoscopes. Those who do not believe in horoscopes maintained that competent astrologers can’t be found at present. Therefore the belief in horoscopes leads to more trouble to one’s life, accordingly to them.

Table 8: Whether the rituals followed or not

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion:</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Table 8, almost all the respondents followed rituals pertaining to life crises events. Only one respondent commented that, as he hasn’t experienced any crises so far, there was no need in following rituals. In case he faces such kind of calamity he would also do the same.
Table 9: The Nature of the Rituals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ritual</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boddhi puja</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deva kannalau</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bara hara veema</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol geseema</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seth kavi keema</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanthra demeema</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali Thovil</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 reveals that the most popular ritual is *boddhi puja*. Next *bara veema, deva kannalau* and *pol geseema* are popular among the people. These rituals are directly related to Buddhism. And also everybody could follow these rituals easily because these rituals are simple and they fit with the hectic life style. Here also one respondent followed more than one or two rituals and it is difficult to understand the situation by percentage form.

Table 10: Deities of worship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deities</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vishnu</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paththini</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vibeeshana</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluth Nuwara</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katharagama</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalu Bandara</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satharavaram</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kali</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambara</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saman</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gana</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakshmi</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All deities</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Table 10, *Paththini* is the most popular Goddess among the Sri Lankan Buddhists. The Goddess *Paththini* is considered as the God who grants solace for many ailments including communicable diseases. She is also the Goddess who helps conception among the women who are frustrated at not bearing children and who protects the pregnant mothers from miscarriages. Next *Vishnu, Katharagama* and *Vibeeshana* Gods are also popular respectively. These Gods are considered as the Gods who bring prosperity and protection. Goddess *Lakshmi* is also considered as a symbol of wealth and prosperity. Goddess *Kali* is considered as the God who punishes the offenders. All the other deities also serve people by many ways. These beliefs are strongly penetrated into the Sinhalese community and the cosmology of this people has been shaped by them.
Table 11: Solace from the rituals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solace in Ritual</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Table 11, all the respondents who have followed rituals pertaining to life crises events have obtained solace and comfort by them.

Five case studies also reveal the same that the rituals pertaining to life crises grant them immense consolations. All the respondents who belong to the age group of 30-60 bear the same notion and engaged in these rituals to protect them and alleviate the calamities of their lives.

Conclusion

Schechner\(^7\) says that rituals are performable: they are acts done; and performances are ritualized; they are codified, repeatable actions. The functions of theater, identified by Aristotle and Horace-entertainment, celebration, enhancement of social solidarity, education, and healing-are also functions of ritual. The differences lie in context and emphasis. Rituals emphasize efficacy: healing the sick, initiating neophytes, burying the dead, teaching the ignorant, forming and cementing social relations, maintaining (or overthrowing) the status quo, remembering the past, propitiating the gods, exorcising the demonic, maintaining cosmic order. Rituals are performed in order, at special locations, regardless of weather or attendance. They mark days and places of importance: or are hung on life’s hinges where individual experience connects the society.

This study reveals that the Sri Lankan Buddhists gain relief and comfort from their life crises and misfortunes through the Buddhist rituals involving the powers of *pirith* chanting, reciting benedictory verses, *bodhi-pooja*, intervention of gods, meditation etc.

\(^7\) (1994:613).
References


The principal purpose of this paper is to explore the philosophical foundations which underpin the little studied Tibetan Buddhist tradition of **mardung** (*dmar dung*).\(^1\) I will begin this study by offering a brief overview of the phenomenon, before looking at previous work in this area and noting the shift in emphasis in relic studies from textual representations to a greater interest in what Buddhist practitioners actually think and do. As a result in an attempt to identify the philosophical influences for this tradition in Tibetan Buddhism this paper will not only take account of previous studies on Buddhist bodily preservation and Buddhist relics and their veneration, but also draw heavily on ethnographic data collected over a period of one year in Tibetan Buddhist communities in India, Tibet/China, and Buryatiya. Initially this paper will consider the Tibetan Buddhist rationale behind the process of ‘physical transformation’ which results in the body resisting decomposition after death, and latterly the philosophical justifications offered by Buddhists for maintaining and venerating the tradition. In summarizing it will be noted that for many Buddhists the immediate social, cultural, religious, and personal contexts play a significant role in determining views about **mardung** and the philosophical understandings which underpin these beliefs. This insight suggests a dynamic relationship between Buddhist beliefs and philosophy, and reveals how the lived experience and the practice of Tibetan Buddhists informs a continual reinterpretation of doctrine and philosophy.

\(^1\) Wylie transliteration of Tibetan terms will be shown in brackets following phonetic versions, e.g. *tulku* (*sprul sku*), or more commonly known Sanskrit terms, e.g. *sambhogakāya* (*longs sku*). Where both Sanskrit and Tibet terms are placed in brackets I will use the prefixes S. for Sanskrit and W. for Wylie equivalents.
What is mardung?

The phenomenon of mardung or kudung (sku gdung) is the post mortuary state whereby the bodies of advanced Buddhist practitioners remain intact after death; more commonly known in the west as mumification. It is possible to divide instances of mardung into two broad categories; revered practitioners that were ‘artificially’ preserved after death using complex mortuary techniques, and ascetics and practitioners that have become ‘spontaneously’ preserved as a direct result of their advanced spiritual attainments (rtogs). However as we will see, whilst a convenient division ‘artificial’ preservation is very rarely seen to preclude the spiritual adeptness or level of attainments of the individual. Instances of ‘spontaneous’ preservation can perhaps be divided into two further sub-sections; those individuals that have intentionally chosen to strive for bodily preservation during their lifetime; and those individuals whose bodies are believed to have remained as a by-product of extreme ascetic practices and/or spiritual attainments. Again whilst useful it is important to acknowledge the limitations of these categories. All forms of spontaneous preservation are typically attributed by Buddhist practitioners to spiritual attainment. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult if not impossible in many cases to assess to what extent intention can be attributed to the individual whilst alive, or is retrospectively invoked by practitioners after death. In my experience Buddhists themselves rarely draw distinctions.

Previous Studies on Buddhist Bodily Preservation

Broadly speaking previous scholarly work on the subject of Buddhist bodily preservation has been concerned with ascertaining the historical and philosophical origins of the phenomenon in Chinese and Japanese Buddhist traditions. Justin Ritzinger and Marcus Bingenheimer’s excellent article Whole-body relics in Chinese Buddhism (2006) offers a comprehensive outline of previous work in this area (see also Faure 1991, 1993; Sharf 1992; Franke 1957; Needham’s 1974). The relative prevalence of research into bodily preservation in Japanese Buddhism is attested to by the publication of five monographs devoted to the subject; four in Japanese and one in Italian (Andō 1961; Matsumoto 1985; Nihon Miira Kenkyū Gurupu 1963 and 1993; Naitō 1999; Raveri 1992).

There has been a range of conjecture on the philosophical and doctrinal foundations of bodily preservation in China and Japan. There has been a propensity for some scholars to look at pre-Buddhist influences to explain the tradition, with Andō Kösei in his 1961 Nihon no miira (Japanese Mummies), and more recently Doris Croissant (1990), arguing that Taoist afterlife beliefs were a stimulus for the tradition. However, arguably the most popular approach has been to situate the phenomenon of bodily preservation within the context of studies and understandings of Buddhist relics and their veneration. Kosugi Kazuo’s seminal study Nikushinzō oyobi yuikaizō no

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2 Many Tibetans refer to a preserved body or the tradition of bodily preservation with the more general term for relics kudung (sku gdung). Many Buddhists suggest that the more accurate and honorific term for the phenomenon of bodily preservation is mardung (dmar gdung)

3 I have argued elsewhere that the term mummy is inappropriate because of the cultural connotations associated with it in the west, see Owen 2008: 217-8. Therefore in the course of this study I will use the Tibetan term mardung, or simply preserved body or bodily preservation.

4 The methods of preservation used in the Tibetan Buddhist traditions are one of the few areas of this phenomenon which has been relatively well documented. See David-Neel 2002; Demiéville 1965; Elias & Sofman 2002; Evans-Wentz 2000, 26; Johnson 1913; Owen 2008; Ramble 1988; Yetts 1911.
kenkyū (Studies in “flesh-body icons” and “ash icons”) published in 1937 “was the first to assert a relationship between portrait sculpture in China and Japan and the whole-body image; [Kazuo] also was the first to perceive a connection between the relic cult and mummification” (Ritzinger and Bingenheimer 2006, 41). Ritzinger and Bingenheimer have also rejected attempts to link the rise of bodily preservation in China with pre-Buddhist Taoist beliefs and suggest that it can only be made sense of in the context of the Buddhist relic traditions (2006, 88). Robert Sharf has proposed a more multifaceted interpretation of the tradition and argued that there are a number of apparent stimuli for the practice from indigenous Chinese, Buddhist, and India sources. These include:

- the ancient Chinese attempts to prevent the decomposition of the corpse, the pan-Chinese belief that the soul must be furnished with a suitable resting place …the Indian Buddhist cult of relics, the evolution of the Chinese ancestral portrait as a focus of offerings to the dead, the ritualization of the charisma of the Ch’an master, the economics of Chinese Buddhist monasteries, and the logic of enlightenment (1992, 27).

In contrast scholarly work specifically addressing bodily preservation in Tibetan Buddhism is extremely scant. Most of the information that is available comes to us by way of asides in publications concerning more general investigations into Tibetan Buddhism or aspects of it (Evans-Wentz 1927; David-Neel 1929; Wylie 1964; Demiéville 1965; Ramble 1982; Mullin 1986; Kolmaš 2001; Sofman & Elias 2002; Gildow & Bingenheimer 2002). Yetts’s early study on Chinese bodily preservation attributes the practice to two main motives, “the ancient beliefs in corporeal immortality of persons who have attained great sanctity, and secondly, to a pious desire to keep, in their most perfect form, relics of revered and distinguished exponents of the faith” (1911, 709). Yetts suggests that the Tibetan tradition may well have been the origin of the practice in China thereby implying the motives are analogous; a view also taken by Reginald Johnston (1976) in his broader study Buddhist China. However this hypothesis has been rejected by Demiéville on the grounds that preservation techniques between the two countries differed significantly, and evidence therefore suggests independent origins (1965, 161).

Accounts by Evans-Wentz (2000) and Alexandra David-Neel (2002) have recognised the role status plays in determining bodily preservation; the bodies of revered monks often of prominent lineages, such as the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, were preserved. Customarily the mardung were left on display for an indeterminate period of time before being entombed in a chorten or less frequently enshrined and remaining on display at the principal seats of power of their respective schools and lineages. Wylie (1964) and Ramble (1982) have recognized that in some instances bodily preservation of infants in Tibet was traditionally believed to be linked to the continuation of fertility; an area of research which requires more work but one that I will not stray into in the course of this debate. More recently Gildow and Bingenheimer have understood the preservation of a Taiwanese Kargyu-pa nun as “an expression of the growing empowerment of women in the Sangha, and the increasing presence of Tibetan Buddhism on the island” (2005, 123).
Buddhist Relics and Methods of Study

As this brief exposition of previous work demonstrates, so far there has been relatively little work undertaken in attempting to specifically understand the philosophical motivation for bodily preservation specifically in Tibetan Buddhism. In attempting to more clearly understand the philosophical foundations of this tradition it seems prudent to draw on methodological developments from the related area of Buddhist relic studies. In recent times in this subject area there has been an increasing recognition of the problems inherent in assuming the validity of textual representations of Buddhist traditions (see Germano & Trainor 2004; Lopez 1995; Schopen 1997; Strong 2004; Swearer 2004, amongst others). Gregory Schopen has argued that a conception of Buddhism predominantly derived from textual and scriptural sources historically resulted in an idealized notion of what constituted Buddhist practice (1997, Ch. 1). Robert Sharf has warned about “the dangers attendant upon the explication of “Buddhist” or “Ch’an” conceptions of death based solely upon the uncritical analysis of normative and prescriptive sources” (1992, 27). Whilst Ritzinger and Bingenheimer have acknowledged that:

canonical histories are of course elite, normative texts. They provide not simply descriptions but representations that their authors and editors hoped would be adopted. How broadly accepted were these understandings of the spiritual significance of mumification outside of educated monastic circles? (2006: 88).

As a result of these observations there has been a significant shift in emphasis towards examining what Buddhist individuals and communities actually think and do.

With this in mind in attempting to understand the philosophical foundations of the phenomenon of bodily preservation in Tibetan Buddhism I will draw heavily on contemporary Buddhists’ understandings of the tradition. Most of the data presented here was collected during a one year period of fieldwork in India, Tibet/China and Siberia, in several different Tibetan Buddhist communities and cultures where mardung existed. This approach will also enable us to at least briefly explore the relationship between the lived experience of Buddhism and its philosophical foundations. Whilst not all the Buddhist practitioners interviewed had personally witnessed the phenomenon of bodily preservation, typically in my experience when talking about the subject individuals frequently use particular cases as a point of reference for their views and beliefs. In recognition of this, and in order to make the debate less abstract, I will refer to historical and contemporary cases where relevant throughout the discussion.

Understandings of the Bodily Transformation Process

The ‘physical’ transformation of the body which results in its preservation is frequently understood by Tibetan Buddhist’s as result of the individual’s direct spiritual attainments or realisation (rtogs). Parallels can be drawn here with the work of Ritzinger and Bingenheimer who conclude their study of bodily preservation in Chinese Buddhism by proposing that evidence from historical sources support the assumption that “the origins of mumification are to be sought in a Buddhist notion of the transformative effect of attainment on the body” (2006, 88). Whilst the narrative of spiritual realisation is commonplace, there are a number of possible practices and philosophical explanations which inform these understandings.
Drukpa Kagyu tulku Choegyal Rinpoche attributes the phenomenon of mardung to the practice of Dzogchen, seeing it as a lower stage on the progression towards the ideal of attaining ‘ja’ lus, or a ‘Rainbow body’. Bodily preservation, “is not the very highest stage, it is quite a good stage, like relics they are about the same”. Dzogchen is itself part of the broader school of Tantra or Vajrayāna, whose practitioners strive to attain an understanding and control of the ‘Vajra body’ (sku rdo rje). Tantric teachings and practices place significant emphasis on the importance and potentiality of the physical body. Although in Mahāyāna Buddhism the attainment of human form is often seen as auspicious because it provides a vehicle for carrying out bodhisattva activities, “in Vajrayāna the value of the body lies in the very structure of the physical body itself. The human body is valuable not only because of what can be done with it, but also because of what it actually is” (Williams in Coakley 1997, 221).

The Vajra or ‘illusionary body’ “is not physical in the normal, gross sense but rather energetic or psychic in nature” (Ray 2002b, 231–2). It comprises of a series of ‘psychic centers’ of chakras (‘khor lo) connected by nadis (rtsa) or subtle channels along which the prana (rlung) or energy currents of the body travel, and where bindu (thig le) or the ‘mind essence’ also manifests. Through inner yogic practice the practitioner works with the subtle energies and winds in the body, which are inextricably related to and condition the state of the mind, in an attempt to “loosen the karmic blockages” in the energy flow, which have accumulated over the course of numerous lifetimes (see Ray 2003b, Ch. 11). In short resolving or overcoming these karmic blockages results in increased spiritual development which in its most progressive form culminates in the attainment of ‘enlightenment’; “thus the winds are said to be the root of samsāra and nirvāṇa” (Williams in Coakley 1997, 22 from Donden 1986: 63–4).

As Paul Williams reveals, the understanding and control of the Vajra body is intimately related to deity yoga, during which the meditator visualizes the form and attributes of an enlightened deity or yidam and then integrates one’s own being with them (Williams in Coakely 1997, 224). When an individual has perfected this practice they are believed quite literally to transform both physically and mentally into the deity. As a result of this process they acquire a subtle ‘enjoyment body’, or sambhogakāya (longs sku), which resides in a celestial dimension only accessible to beings with high levels of realization. It is here that deities and Buddhas exist in glorious spiritual manifestations teaching and perfecting the dharma for the good of all sentient beings. As Choegyal Rinpoche suggests, these beings are believed to have attained profound realizations, one of which is an attitude of pure and boundless compassion, or bodhicitta.

The sambhogakāya is one of the three bodies, or trikāya, of an enlightened being; the other two being the nirmanakāya (sprul sku) a Buddha’s ‘physical’ presence and the dharmakāya (chos sku), or the ‘body of enlightened qualities’; although in fact at different points in history anywhere between two to five different bodies have been proposed (see Makransky 1997; Williams 1993). The relationship between the three bodies is complex and nuanced, however “even when one attains the pure illusory body and can rapidly reach Buddhahood it remains possible to use one’s coarse physical body if that would be of benefit to sentient beings” (Williams 1997, 225). A being of such high realization is widely believed to be able to manifest in a variety of different physical forms, such as in animal form as in the Jatākas, and perform various miracles or siddhis. It is relatively easy to see how Buddhists might then formulate the understanding that mardung is

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5 The interview with Choegyal Rinpoche was carried out at the Jangchub Jong Buddhist Institute of H.E. Dorzong Rinpoche, near Palampur, Himachal Pradesh on the 22nd May 2006.
just one of a number of ways in which a highly realized being might employ their spiritual powers for the benefit of others.

However, according to Buddhist philosophy it would be wrong to simply to conceive of the transformation process as purely ‘physical’. The level and nature of spiritual realization required to achieve bodily preservation is believed to profoundly alter the practitioner’s view of the embodied state, the physical world, and conceptions of existence. Whilst by its nature the condition of enlightenment has historically proven challenging to conceive of and articulate, one of the primary ways in which this predicament has been attempted in Mahāyāna Buddhism has been through the highly influential ‘Buddha nature’ (bde gshes snying po) or Tathāgatagarbha doctrine. In common with numerous Buddhist concepts the precise definition of Buddha nature is contested. Paul Williams has revealed discrepancies in germane texts such as the Tathāgatagarbha and Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutras and this has led to a number of interpretations and understandings by different philosophical schools (Williams 1989, Ch.5).

However, whilst differences do exist, the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine is popularly interpreted as affirming that the true or primordial state of all beings is that of Buddha nature, and therefore all sentient beings possess the inherent potential for enlightenment. It is only obscuration by ignorance and defilements that prevents beings from realizing their true state, and in fact it is only in perception that nirvāṇa is distinguished from samsāra (khor wa). Subsequently, as Mills aptly summarizes:

[I]nstead of attaining enlightenment—or Buddhahood—meaning a departure from the world, Mahayana philosophers saw the nature of Buddhahood as an attainment of omniscience and, in certain respects omnipotence, whilst at the same time…Buddhas were seen as being able to ‘act’ in the world through localized manifestations, or ‘bodies’ (sku), whose actions responded to the sufferings of the world through ‘skillful means’ (2003, 267).

It is impossible to do complete justice to these intricate concepts in this short discussion, and in fact many Buddhists believe that the relationships between the different bodies of enlightened beings require a significant amount of time and practice to fully comprehend.6 However, as a means by which to attempt to explore Buddhists’ views on the physical state of mardung this outline does have some limited use. In perhaps overly simplistic terms, on attaining certain spiritual realizations the practitioner comprehends that he has always been a Buddha and always possessed the qualities and bodily manifestations of one. Consequently, rather than some sort of physical transformation taking place during the realization process, it is more accurate to suggest that the opposite is true. It is the practitioner’s understanding and mental state which alters to realizing that the ‘physical’ body is in fact inherently empty of any attributes, and exists in an array of increasing subtle forms and dimensions, which can be manipulated for altruistic purposes. The spiritual realizations are often conceived of and understood in terms of knowledge of the ‘nature of things as they truly are’, the realization of emptiness (S. Śūnyatā, W. stong pa nyid), and in its most extreme interpretation, the attainment of enlightenment or Buddhahood.

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6 For more information see Cozort 2005; Williams 1993, 1997; Ray 2002b; Hopkins 1990 amongst others.
A less common conception of the ‘physical’ state of the mardung, but one that is not infrequent in communities where cases exist today, Itigelov Khambo Lama in Buryatiya and the mardung of Sanglak Tenzin in the Spiti valley, India being two examples, is the belief that a measure of consciousness of the individual remains in the body; in short they are still ‘alive’. A monk in a monastery on the outskirts of Lhasa revealed how this was believed to be possible:

There is also one practice called ‘gog pa’i’. To describe this meditation is very hard but there are some practitioners who can go into this deep meditation, and they seem dead but they are not dead. They can stay like this for thousands of years. There is no time limit. When they come out of meditation they are just the same. It is extremely rare. (Monk, Nethang Drolma Lhakhang 2007).

Some Buddhists believe the practitioner remains in this state in order to be reborn in a more auspicious place or time. The belief in advanced spiritual beings having the ability to determine their rebirth is a common belief in Tibetan Buddhism, perhaps best exemplified by the vow of the practitioner par excellence, the Bodhisattva, who consciously rejects the attainment of enlightenment in order to be reborn to help the liberation of all other sentient beings. The notion of an eschatological motivation for bodily preservation also has precedents in Buddhist literature and other cases of bodily preservation. John Strong in his study of the relics of Buddha Śākyamuni reveals that that:

[T]he first “master of the Dharma,” the elder Mahākāśyapa, for example, is not even cremated after he parinirvāṇizes. Instead, his entire body (or alternatively, his whole skeleton [asthisamghata]) is enshrined intact underneath the mountain Kukkuṭapāda, where it will remain until the advent of the next Buddha Maitreya (2004, 46).

Parallels can also be drawn here with the founder of the Shingon branch of Japanese Buddhism Kūkai, also known as Kōbō Daishi an honorary title meaning ‘Great Teacher who promulgated the true teachings’. The lifetime and achievements of Kūkai have achieved legendary status in Japan, and even in death he maintained his god-like status. Hakeda records how “in the memory of the faithful, the image of his death remained unearthly. Kūkai had not died but had merely entered into eternal Samādhi and was still quite alive on Mt. Kōya as a savior to all suffering people” (1972, 60). On death it was believed that Kūkai had become a ‘Buddha in this very body’ (Sokushinjōbutsugi). Bernard Faure suggests that:

[I]n Japan the cult of the so-called sokushin butsu had a distinct eschatological connotation. It was explicitly linked to the legend of Mahākāśyapa entering into samādhi to wait for the coming of the future Buddha, Maitreya. The legend of Kūkai’s “becoming a Buddha in this very body” on Kōyasan is based on that of Mahākāśyapa (Faure in Law 1995, 216).

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7 A typical response in the village of Ghue in the Spiti valley where the body of Sanglak Tenzin remains would be something like the following; “He is dead but his atman remains inside his body. People of this power can chose their place of rebirth and he remains deep down inside his body waiting for a more auspicious time to be reborn. We believe this age is not so good so he is probably waiting for Sat yuga to be reborn.” Extract from interview with Lobsang, Ki Gompa, Ki; 21/04/ 2006.
Buddhist Understandings of the Tradition of Bodily Preservation

Having suggested several philosophical influences on which understandings of the transformation of the physical body are premised I will now attempt to establish some justifications for the widespread acceptance of the tradition and the reverence afforded to mardung.

A frequent explanation for bodily preservation often proposed by Tibetan Buddhists is that it is an indication of the advanced spiritual state of the deceased individual. This explanation however presents us with the first of several apparent inconsistencies. Evidently spontaneous preservation is invariably seen as a result of highly advanced spiritual attainments. However, although artificial preservation in no way precludes the spiritual adeptness of the subject, in fact all the evidence suggests that artificial preservation is invariably seen to indicate the advanced spiritual state of the individual. The argument that “only spiritually advanced individuals are preserved” would seem to be a relatively unconvincing justification for such a persistent and widespread belief. However, a more persuasive explanation becomes clearer if we assess the tradition of artificial preservation within the context of wider beliefs and accounts concerning the death process, and practitioners’ views about the agency and role of mardung.

David Germano in his article ‘Living Relics of the Buddha(s) in Tibet’ reveals that according to the dzogchen teaching *The Blazing Relics Tantra*, natural manifestations such as lights and earthquakes are among “a quintet of signs marking saintly death”, images on bones, small spheres emerging from cremated remains, and sounds being the other three (Germano & Trainor 2004, 51-91). Ling Rinpoche the senior tutor of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama died on the 25th December 1983. On the recommendation of the Dalai Lama his body was artificially preserved and is presently kept in the Dalai Lama’s personal temple. The following account of his death is taken from an official biography on the FPMT website:

In the early hours of the morning of his entrance into the state of peace, on Christmas day, the weather became turbulent and strong winds swept across Dharamsala, with much agitation. The same phenomenon recurred after dark, with thunder and lightning, and left a blanket of snow. A few days later... there was a mild earthquake in the Dharamsala area... Wondrous cloud formations were seen throughout this period. (Sherpa Tulku 1984)

Another contemporary account of this phenomenon has been recorded during the death rituals carried out for the highly respected Kalu Rinpoche, who died on Wednesday 10 May, 1989. Kalu Rinpoche’s body was also preserved and:

“[W]hen it was brought to the monastery, lots of lights and special rainbows appeared in the sky. It was an unusual day in this part of the country. This reveals that an awakened mind can affect nature” (Mullin 1986, 45).

‘Official’ reports and firsthand accounts also describe how on the point of death Ling Rinpoche entered into a state of meditative absorption which lasted for two weeks (Elias & Sofman 2002, 57; Kangyur Rinpoche 2006; Konchok Tenzin 2007; Sherpa Tulku 1984). During this period his body remained in perfect condition and sounds of celestial music and the melodious chanting of male and female voices were heard from the room where his body lay (Kangyur Rinpoche 2006; Sherpa Tulku 1984). This state is widely known in Tibetan Buddhism and “is the practice of tuk-dam
(thugs dam)\(^8\), when a yogi retreats to the heart in death meditation” (Mullin 1986, 103). Biographical accounts of the death of accomplished masters often record this intermediate state when the physical body appears ‘dead’ but the consciousness remains present within the body (Blackman 1997; Sogyal Rinpoche 2002, 6). “If a person is an accomplished meditator, consciousness can sometimes remain for days or even months. For example, one of the previous Panchen Lamas remained in his body in meditation for almost a year after he stopped breathing. During this time the body showed no signs of decomposition” (Mullin 1986, 79).

In the case of Ling Rinpoche, reports also reveal that throughout the actual preservation process there were numerous indications of the advanced spiritual status of the deceased Rinpoche. Lisa Sofman who was responsible for the embalming of Ling Rinpoche recalls that although the Rinpoche was aged eighty-one when he died his body had an ‘unnaturally’ young appearance; “it was golden and it was wrinkleless and it was like a 16-year-old”. Glen Mullin reveals that the youthful appearance of Ling Rinpoche’s body has a precedent in Tibetan history. The First Dalai Lama “remained in meditation for thirty days without any signs of death. His body transformed from that of an old man into that of a youth, and emanated lights so radiant that few could bear even to look upon him” (1986, 105–6). Kangyur Rinpoche relayed another instance whereby the spiritual attainments of Ling Rinpoche were believed to have been confirmed through a physical manifestation after death.

[A]fter a few months his body had become dry…and so one very special sign we have seen. We believe that Ling Rinpoche is the reincarnation of Yamantaka Buddha. So we have seen Yamantaka Buddha’s name in Sanskrit on his forehead. Before it was not really clear, slowly, slowly the body dried and then it became very clear. The mantra of Yamantaka. This is really amazing. It just came itself (2006).

Dan Martin also reveals a record of this phenomenon in the writings of Sanggye Dorje. He recounts that on examination of the Sakya scholar Kunga Gyaltse’s remains, “[I]n the middle and top of his head were pure and vivid images of Hevajra and Manjugosa. In the area of his forehead was the divine assemblage of Cakrasavara” (1992, 188). Similarly the work of Pabongka Rinpoche also “refers to the ability of advanced yogins to condense their meditative realizations and absorptions on to and within their bodies, thus leaving behind bodily remains inscribed with their spiritual practice” (Mills 2003, 267).

The examples presented here suggest that even when a more spontaneous form of preservation does not take place there are often any number of other indications of the spiritual qualities of the individual that justify and legitimate the decision to keep the body. Typically unusual natural phenomena occur during the initial stages of the dying process, and evidence suggests that the state of thugs dam is a fundamental aspect of the decision making process. Whilst by no means are all practitioners who enter into thugs dam are preserved, all accounts of individuals whose bodies are kept include a report of this phenomenon. Indeed, even when artificial techniques are used in preserving the body, the state of preservation is often conceived of and talked about in terms of an extension of thugs dam; a point also recognized by Sharf in The Idolization of Enlightenment: On Mummification of Ch’an Masters in Medieval China (1999, 9).

\(^8\) My addition of term in extended Wylie transliteration.
\(^9\) According to Mullin (1986) references to this event can be found in the two main biographies of the 1st Dalai Lama ‘The String of Gems’ (Norbu-pheng-ba) and ‘The Twelve Wonderous Deeds’ (mDzad-pa-ngo-mtshar-bcu-nyis).
Altruism

Many Buddhists also conceive of the phenomenon as an act of altruism by the deceased. Itigelov Khambo Lama in Buryatiya is a contemporary example whereby Buddhists believe that the preservation of his body was an event predetermined by the deceased Lama in order to assist in the revitalization and re-establishment of Buddhism following the demise of the prevailing Soviet communist ethos. This reading of bodily preservation is relatively common amongst Tibetan Buddhists, and can certainly be seen to be consistent with the qualities and characteristics of a spiritually advanced individual. There are obvious precedents in Buddhist tradition and history. One can draw parallels between this conception of mardung and Reiko Ohnuma’s work on the genre of writings she terms ‘dehadāna’ or ‘gift-of-the-body’ stories. In these accounts, many of which are found in the jatākas, bodhisattvas are often depicted as giving the gift of their body to others; “the bodhisattva’s body is clearly intended to serve as a symbol for the Buddha’s dharma, and thus, the bodhisattva’s gift of his body (dehadāna) is made parallel to the Buddha’s gift of dharma (dharmadāna)” (Ohnuma 1998, 325).

Ohnuma also notes that stories often recounting bodhisattva’s gift of their body to others “were extremely popular in Indian Buddhism, appearing in innumerable variations throughout the history of the literary tradition and exerting a profound influence on Buddhist art, philosophy, and culture. They exist in the literature of all Mainstream Buddhist schools and (unlike many other types of stories) seem to fully retain their popularity within the literature of the Mahāyāna” (1998, 323). The accounts of predetermined resolutions (S. adhiṣṭhānas) made by the Buddha concerning the enshrinement of various bodily relics popular in South East Asia and Sri Lanka (Strong 2004, 150–1), and the Ter tradition in Tibetan Buddhism are two other notable examples; particularly when bodily relics are considered in terms of ‘seeds’ of dharma, as proposed by Swearer and Premchit in their Legend of Queen Cāma (1998).

Faith

Inextricably linked to altruism is the conception that the mardung can be used for the generation of faith both in the individual teacher, and more generally in the Buddhist philosophy and teachings. Buddhist monk Konchock Tenzin:

The Lamas have gone on beyond and we are no longer able to meet them directly. His Holiness has Ling Rinpoche’s body in his private chapel and is able to pray to it and remember his teacher. They act as a basis for this. For example, we place pictures in our houses (of our Lamas) and also we place statues of our teachers which are made to resemble them, but it is not certain that they are really similar to the actual person. If you have the actual body then the faith of the mind will be much firmer. (2007).

Many Buddhists I have spoken with attest to a deepening of devotion in the deceased master as well as a strengthening of belief in the dharma after personally witnessing a preserved body.
Speaking more specifically about gratuitous accounts of Bodhisattvas sacrificing their physical body, but in many ways equally relevant to this discussion, Reiko Ohnuma suggests that the emotional response inspired by ‘sacrificing’ the human body plays an important role for many Buddhists in strengthening their faith and belief in the dharma:

The bodhisattva’s gruesome and intensely physical gift of his body, I would argue, is used to concretize, instantiate, and “embody” the more abstract and bloodless notion of the Buddha’s gift of dharma to living beings... despite being extolled over and over again throughout Buddhist literature, the Buddha’s gift of dharma remains a fairly abstract notion that seems to lack emotional appeal. Because the Buddha is so perfected and so detached, we do not get a sense that the gift of dharma really costs him anything. From a doctrinal perspective, of course, perhaps there is no reason why it should, and yet, as human beings (and as readers), I believe, we demand that sense of cost, of deprivation, of sacrifice. Thus, I would argue that the Buddha’s gift of dharma is not only concretized but also given the emotional weight it truly demands when it is symbolized by the bodhisattva’s miraculous and unbelievable deed of sacrificing his own body (Ohnuma 1998, 357).

A similar strengthening of an emotional bond to the deceased was certainly an experience of many Buddhists I spoke to who had witnessed the phenomenon.

Merit & Blessings

A further facet inexorably related to the altruistic reading of the preservation process is the widely held belief that mardung provides a basis for the generation of merit. This conception evidently has strong resonances with beliefs about relics and Buddhist observances and practices more generally, and prayers and offerings made to the body are often believed to generate positive merit for the individual. A development on this theme is that some Tibetan Buddhists also believe that mardung retain the power to bestow blessings on devotees. Conceptions of the nature of the blessings again vary widely; ranging from merit which can assist with fortuitous future births, to significant interventions in an individual’s present lifetime such as the ‘miraculous’ healing of serious diseases. Furthermore, opinions also differ over the extent of the agency of the mardung in conferring blessings, with some Buddhists believing that the blessings are: a) generated by the compassion of the teacher and the innate power of the mardung; b) are in fact a result of the power of one’s own devotion; or c) are to varying degrees a combination of both these conceptions.

In talking with Buddhists many invoke the widely known tale of ‘The Dog’s Tooth’ in order to qualify their beliefs about the power of the mardung. Kevin Trainor interestingly proposes that this popular story may well reflect a Mahāyānist critique of the relic cult, emphasizing the view that everything is believed to be imbued with Buddha nature. He goes on to suggest that this belief is in direct contrast to “the dominant ethos of the Theravāda relic cult... (which) has been concerned to trace the relics back to a historical person” (1997, 165), thereby implying that their efficacy is dependent on their authenticity. Although many Buddhists believe faith does play some role in the attainment of merit and blessings, many also suggested that the preserved body did retain some form of objective residual power. Chökyi Nyima Rinpoche outlines the scriptural support for this belief:
The tantras explain that after the passing of one’s guru, and while his kudung, his body, is still kept, his mind of original wakefulness has departed into a state of unbound vastness. Many texts describe how during the first 49 days the kudung has power and blessings. Therefore, it is taught that when in the presence of the kudung, if we disciples supplicate him and mingle our minds with his we receive blessings swifter than if he was still in his body. In particular, someone who is a practitioner of mind essence can have great enhancement by sitting near the kudung, supplicating one-pointedly, and resting in the state of indivisible mind. This is described as the king of enhancements. Jamgön Kongtrül Lodrö Thaye mentioned this in his writings many times (1996).

Despite the time limitations detailed by Chökyi Nyima Rinpoche many Buddhists I spoke to believed that the period when it is possible to communicate and receive blessings was indefinite. The level of conviction in this belief was aptly illustrated in a practice carried out during the preservation of Ling Rinpoche. The barley flour which was used to draw the oil from the deceased Rinpoche’s body was rolled in small balls, or tsha tsha, and distributed to the Tibetan community. Many devotees then ate them believing that in doing so a small degree of the qualities of deceased Rinpoche would be transferred to them. Demiéville also recognized the existence of this practice in Tibet, although he suggested the external application of the paste was a more common practice (1965, 160).

John Strong reveals that in *The Questions of King Milinda* the Venerable Nāgasena offers a threefold explanation for the residual power of bodily relics of Buddhist saints after they have ‘departed’ from the world; “by virtue of the resolve and faith of devotees, by virtue of the actions of gods, and by virtue of a resolution (adhiṭṭhāna) made by the parinirvāṇed saint in question prior to his death” (2004, 151). Whilst there is little evidence in my experience for practitioners considering the second of these stipulations, clearly a belief in a combination of the first and the third of these conditions are often held by Tibetan Buddhists. However, it would also seem fair to suggest that a precise understanding of how blessings were attained or bestowed was rarely articulated and participants usually did not express the extent to which they could be attributed to the individual or the power of the deceased. A perhaps typical response in this situation would be something like, “There are three factors that enable you to get a blessing from a mardung; your own faith, the power of the Lama, and karmic relationship. The main is the faith but the others also play an important part” (Monk, Sera monastery, Lhasa 2007).

**The Role of Ritual Consecration**

Many Tibetan Buddhists also believe that the ritual consecration of the body plays an integral role in the ‘re-empowerment’ of the mardung after preservation. Lisa Sofman who was instrumental in the embalming the Dalai Lama’s teacher Ling Rinpoche revealed that during the consecration ceremony (rab gnas) the ‘spirit’ of Ling Rinpoche was invited to return to the body. This description is comparable to a response given by Venerable Karma Gelek Yuthok to Chandra Reedy during his study into the opening of consecrated Tibetan bronze statues; “A capable holy Buddhist priest invites the real Buddha or Buddhist deity depicted by the statue in its spirit form to inhabit the statue and then seals it to abide permanently unto the end of the world” (1991, 30). As Donald Swearer notes, “In the Dge-lugs-pa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, the most widely used consecration manual was
composed by Khri-byang Rin-po-che (1901–81) based on a text written by the first Panchen Lama in the early seventeenth century” (2004, 222).

In her study Reedy also describes how “The consecration ceremony first purifies an image in order to make it suitable for habitation by the Buddha or other deity involved. Then it invests the statue with the power and presence of that deity. Unless it has been consecrated, a statue is not considered suitable for use in religious practices” (Reedy 1991, 14). Yale Bentor in her work on ritual consecration proposes that in the transformation and subsequent empowerment of ritual objects:

“[T]hree central Mahayana philosophical notions underlie the ritual: the three bodies (trikāya) of the Buddha, emptiness (śūnyatā), and the doctrine of two truths” (Swearer 2004, 223).

Although perhaps not formally ritualized, practitioner’s justifications of bodily preservation often invoked comparable ideas and philosophies. As we have already seen the doctrines of trikāya and śūnyatā are integral to many Buddhist’s philosophical understandings of the preserved body and the maintenance of the tradition.

Interestingly in my experience the doctrine of two truths was most often invoked by participants when faced with the apparent contradiction between bodily preservation and the historical Buddha’s teachings. The existence of tradition has led some Buddhists such as Suzuuki Bokushui to suggest that:

“The whole idea is an insult to Śākyamuni’s teachings of the impermanence of all compound things, and cannot be praised” (1986, 283).

Kevin Trainor also recognizes an apparent contradiction in relation to the practice of relic veneration in his discussion of the argument over, and subsequent division of, the Buddha’s remains in the *Mahāparinibbāna –sutta*. 

This episode lays bare a fundamental tension inherent in the Buddhist relic cult, even as it illuminates its appeal. Relics, as material objects that one can possess, fully engage the human capacity for attachment and manipulation. Therein lies part of the attraction... there is something potentially disturbing about this in the terms of the Buddhist ideal of nonattachment. Relics can be objects of desire; they encourage the human tendency to cling...

The episode serves to instruct the faithful that the Buddha’s relics are worthy of veneration, while it simultaneously demonstrates the potential threat that the practice represents to the tradition’s fundamental religious ideals (1997, 119-20).

In my experience Tibetan Buddhists often cited the difference between ultimate and relative truths as a means by which to explain apparent contradictions between their views and beliefs and Buddhist doctrine. The ways of enlightened beings are simply beyond comprehension, and the belief that bodies of spiritual masters were not subject to the same ideals and rules as normal people were common explanations. Furthermore attachment to relics was seen as a relatively acceptable and justified response, but one ultimately of no significance when considered in relation to the emptiness of inherent existence. Others suggested that although the state of mardung might imply impermanence this was only the relative truth, and in fact in my experience most Tibetans did not seem to believe that the body would remain indefinitely.
In Summary

As this short discussion has attempted to demonstrate, a wide range of philosophical ideas and concepts are employed by Buddhists to understand the preservation process and the agency and authority of the preserved bodies. From the perspective of contemporary practitioners frequently the phenomenon of bodily preservation was seen to have its roots in tantric practices and the latent potential of Buddha nature inherent in every human being. Whilst it is impossible to generalize, and evidently in day to day life most Buddhists understand the body as having inherently ‘physical’ attributes, ethnographic evidence supports the assumption that in certain conditioned contexts many Tibetan Buddhists do display some willingness and level of understanding in accepting the inherently empty nature of the physical world and illusionary nature of embodiment. When faced with ‘unusual’ natural phenomena such as bodily preservation, many Tibetan Buddhists displayed no apparent difficulty in unquestionably accepting the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and apparently esoteric conceptions of embodiment and the physical world.

Whist understandings about how the process by which body becomes preserved are relatively uniform, as I have attempted to demonstrate contemporary perceptions about the function and role of the mardung are more diverse, and at times even contradictory. Philosophical ideas and concepts of emptiness, embodiment, eschatology, merit, blessings, and the nature of enlightenment are drawn on and negotiated in order to create understanding and meaning about the tradition. Whilst the lack of any specific doctrinal or scriptural support for the tradition goes some way to explaining this variance, I would also strongly argue that context plays a significant role in shaping this process; a point also noted by Sharf in his study of the Chinese tradition (1992). The role and function of mardung were often understood in relation to a particular event or situation, and Buddhists appear to draw on existing knowledge and beliefs in order to give the mardung philosophical and doctrinal legitimacy in relation to existing contextual factors. Furthermore, the fact that the tradition can be explained by existing beliefs and knowledge in turn reciprocally validates pre-existing beliefs and philosophical understandings. Whilst certainly not intending to trivialize the matter, in short Buddhists make the best use of the knowledge they have at their disposal to make sense of a phenomenon of which they may have little direct experience, and this process maintains and validates existing knowledge.

However, due to the diversity of contexts in which mardung are situated or can occur perhaps inevitably in some cases it results in different, even mutually exclusive, understandings. In my experience Buddhists rarely suggested another conception was wrong, but understood and articulated these contradictions in the form of relative truths. Additionally, differences in understandings or practices were often attributed to the deceased’s ‘skill in means’ (S. upāya-kaññāya; W. thabs mkhas); the body was left for different reasons for different individuals depending on their needs and predispositions.

In light of the process by which instances of bodily preservation acquires meaning and legitimacy it is also necessary to offer some initial observations on the relationship between the lived tradition of mardung and the philosophy which is used by Buddhists to legitimate and justify it. It seems apparent that in the process of formulating understandings and assimilating bodily preservation into existing belief structures, practitioners are continually re-interpreting the tradition and underpinning philosophy in a form that is appropriate to, and enhances the relevant and immediate needs and conditions. A simplistic and linear understanding of how knowledge is gained
and exchanged appears to bear little resemblance to the fluid and dynamic process of negotiation and assimilation which serves to renew and make relevant the tradition in a wide variety of contexts. It also fails to recognize the integral and dynamic role practitioners play in informing and sustaining the tradition.

As highlighted at the outset of this discussion, bodily preservation in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition has so far been largely neglected by scholars. Whilst this study has attempted to understand the philosophy underpinning of the tradition predominantly from the perspective of Buddhist practitioners, there is evidently still considerable work to do in this area. Whilst ostensibly a subject of relatively limited relevance, as the burgeoning study of Buddhist relics and relic veneration has demonstrated, studies in this area have the rich potential to offer greater insights into a wide range of Buddhist concepts, and the complex relationship between Buddhist practice, philosophy and doctrine. It is hoped this study will go some way to stimulating further debate and developments in this fascinating area.
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Dangerous Dharma, Death, and Depression: The Importance of ‘Right View’ for Practicing Contemplation within a Western Buddhist Tradition

Bethany Lowe

Introduction:

The set of contemplations known variously as ‘the four mind-turning reflections’ or ‘the common preliminary practices’ appear in some form in various Buddhist traditions, and incorporate reflections on the preciousness of life, on death and impermanence, on karmic actions and consequences, and on the sufferings of cyclical existence. In the Tibetan traditions where this practice is formulated as part of the initial scope of ‘lamrim’ meditations, our inevitable death is linked to the trajectory of subsequent rebirth, and human suffering is placed in the context of our ultimate liberation and enlightenment. The Buddhist practitioner is encouraged to contemplate these ‘facts of life’ in order to develop the motivation for further practice and a greater insight into reality.

However, in certain Western Buddhist contexts, where a belief in rebirth or even enlightenment cannot be taken for granted (due to cultural residues of Christianity and the countervailing prevalence of atheism and secularism), and such beliefs are even presented as optional, the repeated discussion and contemplation of suffering and death tends to be undertaken out of their broader philosophical context. The consequent focus on death and suffering in isolation can produce unintended effects that are psychologically unhealthy, particularly for those who are susceptible to depressive illness: ruminating on negative future events (such as suffering and death), without the leaven of positive future events (such as liberation and enlightenment), leads easily to mind-states such as pessimism and nihilism, as has been proven by primary research in the field of mental health studies by Nolen-Hoeksema and others. This paper thus provides a critique of some aspects of the teaching in the group known as Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (also known as Tiratna) on the grounds that its secular and agnostic tendencies can misrepresent the Dharma, in ways that could prove counterproductive or even harmful to some.

The paper encourages the development of a holistic context of ‘right view’ in Buddhist teachings, so that such reflections can instead realize their potential for increased insight and mental well-being in the practitioner. The original Buddhist teachings of the Four Noble Truths and the Twelve Links of Conditioned Existence constitute a more positive framework into which these challenging contemplations can be fitted (as provided by the Dhammacakkappavattana, Sammādiṭṭhi and Mahānatthipadopama Suttas from the Saṃyutta and Majjhima Nikāya collections of the Pali canon): the Third Noble Truth, pointing to the possibility of the cessation of suffering, is the crucial gateway that distinguishes Buddhist soteriology from mere endurance of life and makes spiritual practice possible and worthwhile. Furthermore, starting from Buddhaghoṣa’s discussion of the suitability of certain meditational practices for particular temperaments, a different balance of practices can be recommended for the practitioner who is prone to low mood. Thus when practiced correctly Buddhism has beneficial results to offer for the welfare of those whose mental health is most at risk but has potentially the most to gain.
The impetus for this paper derives from two experiences I had on a regular weekly basis. One was a Buddhist study group where we read various formulations of the Dharma and discussed their application to our lives; the other was reflecting on this experience before the group with a close friend. My friend Josie and I had both spent several years studying and practicing with two successive Buddhist organizations; my own meditation practice began in 1995 and I had formally become a Buddhist in 2004. Having for some time been part of a group known as the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (or ‘FWBO’, now known as ‘Tiratna’), first Josie and then I moved to an organization called the New Kadampa Tradition (or ‘NKT’), with which for various reasons we both later became disillusioned. I underwent some independent Dharma study through an online course with a different organization, but gradually drifted back to the FWBO and its ‘mitra studies group’ in 2008; whereas Josie became disillusioned and stopped practicing yet remained nostalgic for the positive elements of Buddhism we experienced.1

Josie and I have both suffered from depressive illness, she from self-diagnosed dysthymia (a chronic low mood that falls within the depression spectrum, with additional episodes of major depression),2 and I from clinically-diagnosed seasonal affective disorder (a form of depression with seasonally-fluctuating symptoms).3 One reason for our concern and ambivalence towards the Buddhist teaching and contexts we had experienced was that certain aspects of the teaching in these groups appeared to worsen our symptoms of depression and increase our malaise. Since Buddhism purported to offer a more constructive state of mind and an increased sense of benevolence, we were nonplussed and frustrated with these instances of what we termed ‘depressive Dharma’, but also keen to analyze what might have gone wrong. The aim of this paper is not to critique the western adaptation of a guru-based approach to group structure and the interpersonal difficulties that can arise from this system in organizations like the NKT.4 Instead I wish to discuss the Dharma teaching that formed the content of the FWBO’s Mitra Studies group during one particular module based on ‘the four reminders’. My studies and reactions during that module formed the initial foundation for this response and contribution. In this sense then this paper begins from a point of self-ethnography but draws on both Buddhist sources and research in mental health in order to move to a broader and more objective perspective.

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1 This paper has been written in consultation with Josie and has her full support and approval.
2 ‘Dysthymic disorder is a chronic, low-grade depressive condition that affects as many as 6% of individuals in the community.... Although dysthymic disorder is characterized by mild to moderate symptoms, more than 75% of individuals with dysthymic disorder have exacerbations that meet the criteria for a major depressive episode’ (Daniel N. Klein, Stewart A. Shankman, and Suzanne Rose, ‘Ten-Year Prospective Follow-Up Study of the Naturalistic Course of Dysthymic Disorder and Double Depression’, American Journal of Psychiatry 163:5 (2006), pp. 872–80: p. 872).
4 Some relatively balanced discussion of the organisation by ex-members and defenders can be found at http://buddhismnewkadampa.wordpress.com/. A historical critique of the NKT, though omitting more recent developments, is given by David Kay, Tibetan and Zen Buddhism in Britain: Transplantation, Development and Adaptation (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
Contemplating Suffering and Death:

The set of contemplations that we studied under the name ‘the Four Mind-Turning Reflections’ (or ‘the Four Reminders’) in the FWBO comprised ideas about the preciousness of life, on death and impermanence, on karmic actions and consequences, and on the sufferings of cyclical existence. The members of the group were encouraged to contemplate these facets of existence in order to develop the motivation for further practice and a greater insight into reality. The origin of these reflections is in the traditional Tibetan cycle of meditations known as ‘lamrim’, where they form the early stages or ‘initial scope’ of practice. Although the overall inspiration for this cycle, and its structure into three parts, came from the 11th-century teaching known as ‘Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment’ by Atisha, this text itself does not feature the topics under consideration, focusing instead mostly on bodhichitta (the altruistic aspiration) and the wisdom of emptiness. The ‘initial scope’ topics were added into later forms of the practice by other teacher–scholars, notably Gampopa (1079–1153, an initiator of the Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism) and Je Tsongkhapa (1357–1419, the founder of the Gelug school). Table 1 shows the sequence of reflections in each of these traditional redactions, alongside the contents of the two parallel contemporary western sources I have studied. (The relevant topics are shaded in grey, with the other contextualizing meditations described briefly in italics.)

The NKT views itself as a Gelugpa tradition following Je Tsongkhapa, and so the Meditation Handbook that is a central and compact resource for their lamrim practice accordingly follows the outline of that teacher’s treatise. The meditation on ‘Our Precious Human Life’ reflects on how fortunate we are to have been born with sufficient human faculties to study the Dharma, so that ‘we can become free from uncontrolled rebirth and attain the peace of liberation’ (p. 35). Proceeding to the contemplation of ‘Death and Impermanence’, one is encouraged to ‘mentally repeat over and over again “I may die today, I may die today”’ (p. 37) in order to remember life’s unpredictability and avoid wasting time in mundane pursuits. In the ‘Danger of Lower Rebirth’ reflection that follows, the importance of karma is emphasized, and we are asked to generate ‘a strong fear of taking rebirth in the lower realms’ as an animal, hungry ghost, or hell being (p. 42). The culmination of this sequence is in ‘Going For Refuge’ in which we recognize the power of the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha to ‘permanently eradicate [ ] all our delusions and free [ ] us once and for all from suffering’ (p. 43). The final contemplation is on ‘Actions and Their Effects’, which develops conviction in the operation of karma and thus a determination to perform only virtuous actions.

In all these sources the emphasis is towards possible negative outcomes, which are expressed in a serious and potentially terrifying way; reflections that one may die today and even be reborn in hell are intended to jolt the practitioner out of any residual complacency. In the longer-length

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5 These are sometimes referred to as the outer preliminary practices, to distinguish them from another set of (inner) preliminary practices, comprising refuge, bodhichitta, purification, mandala offering, and guru yoga (see for example The Third Dzogchen Rinpoche and Cortland Dahl, Great Perfection: Outer and Inner Preliminaries (New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2007)).

6 The root text can be found on pp. 151–59 of Atisha’s Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment, with commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen, trans. and ed. Ruth Sonam (New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1997).


9 That Western practitioners may not possess the psychological resilience of the Tibetan practitioners for whom these
NKT lamrim handbook, *Joyful Path of Good Fortune*, the hideous torments of the hell realms and the imminence of death are even more strongly labored. 10 Nonetheless, the remembrance of our inevitable death is shown within the trajectory of subsequent rebirth, and the awareness of human suffering is placed in the context of our ultimate liberation and enlightenment, which are at the heart of the intermediate and higher scope of the practice. 11 The sequence of these contemplations of the ‘lower scope’ provides a preparation for the function and destination of the ensuing practices, such as renunciation, bodhichitta, tranquil abiding, and the realization of the wisdom of emptiness, as they do in the later parts of Tsongkhapa’s treatise.

In the form that we studied these practices in the FWBO mitra study group, however, the contemplations of the lower scope were isolated into a self-contained unit, and were relabeled, reinterpreted and trimmed of any extraneous or supporting reflections. The principal study materials were not traditional sources but recorded talks by members of the organization, reflecting freely (and sometimes tangentially) on what each subject evoked for them. 12 Although the material dealt with the principal subjects, ‘The Preciousness and Rarity of Human Life’, ‘The Transitoriness of Life and the Certainty of Death’, ‘Karma and the Consequences of Our Actions’, and ‘The Defects and Dangers of Samsara’, the topics of rebirth and enlightenment were not emphasized; when in group discussion I referred to rebirth, the typical response from members of the organization was along the lines of ‘well yes, if you believe in that’ with the strong implication that it was optional or even eccentric. The view that as Westerners we cannot be expected to believe in rebirth (or even enlightenment), and that such beliefs are detachable from being a Buddhist, was one of the central differences I noticed between the FWBO and other (Tibetan-based) organizations such as the NKT (and also the FPMT or Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition), where the view was that rebirth and enlightenment are the case and that one had better come to understand them in order to proceed with valid practice. 13 From the latter perspective, unpicking the doctrine of rebirth leads to a weakening of the operations of karma as an explanation for what happens to us in this life (such that we have to fall back on the ‘luck of the draw’ in the form of environment and genetics, making us powerless to affect our circumstances except in worldly ways); and without the full operation of karma the reach of dependent origination is much curtailed, 14 potentially leaving little of the Buddha’s key philosophical insight remaining. 15

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13 Indeed the necessity of accepting rebirth as a working hypothesis as a basic prerequisite for engaging with this practice is supported by the implications in Atisha’s root text that there are practitioners of small, middling, and great capacities, and that those who ‘seek for themselves no more than the pleasures of cyclic existence’ are those of the least capacity (p. 151). The implication is that striving merely to improve one’s lot in this life does not meet the entry requirement for spiritual practice (see also Gyatso, *The Meditation Handbook*, p. 6–7).


15 ‘Now this has been said by the Blessed One: “One who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma; one who sees
The centrality of rebirth is questioned in the fourth recorded talk of the Mitra Studies course, where Ratnadharini acknowledged that ‘the teaching of karma is obviously very bound up with the idea, the concept of rebecoming or rebirth’ but claimed nonetheless that ‘you don’t have to necessarily embrace both [karma and rebirth]’. Of the latter she reassured her listeners that ‘we don’t have to take it on, it’s foreign to our culture; it may take a bit of time to see whether it fits for us, whether it makes sense for us’. That accepting rebirth is an optional part of being a Buddhist in the FWBO is confirmed by the book Exploring Karma and Rebirth by Nagapriya, an ordained member of the organization but an overt agnostic on the subject. Nagapriya speculates, ‘Had it emerged from a different cultural background, would Buddhism have taught rebirth at all?’ concluding that it is not necessary for practice and serves primarily as means of social control and encouragement. The British Buddhist writer Sangharakshita, who founded the FWBO in the late 1960s, and whose books provide the study material for much of the organization’s teaching, set the tone when he reflected as follows:

It must be admitted that the topic of karma and rebirth is not as fashionable in Buddhist circles as it used to be. [This is so despite] the central importance of this teaching to all schools of Buddhism.... Nowadays many people seem to be able to contemplate with some degree of equanimity the possibility that after death they might not continue to exist... The present generation of Buddhists are less interested in karma and rebirth, because they are more concerned... with realization here and now.

Sangharakshita opines that ‘one cannot isolate the history of Buddhism in the West from Western religious history in general’, and that western religious history was dominated by Christianity until the later nineteenth century, when, due partly to the prominence of scientific theories such as evolution, many people started to rebel intellectually against Christian beliefs and look for alternatives. Whilst in the early days of Buddhism’s adoption in the West, Victorians may have found the potential for life after death comforting, as it echoed the Christian notion of heaven, throughout the twentieth century the scientistic, atheistic worldview has become more widespread and many find it implausible that any continuity can survive the death of a body. Hence the resistance to such doctrines even amongst those wishing to engage in spiritual practice.

In general, Sangharakshita’s books and the teachings and discussions of the FWBO are ‘double coded’ such that they can be understood by listeners who accept rebirth in the traditional sense but also by those who are interested merely in its weaker sense of ‘the way life unfolds from day to day [and] choos[ing] the direction our life will take’. Similarly Ratnadharini’s talk states that even though the realization of rebirth is said to have been a fundamental part of the Buddha’s enlightenment experience, and it is a traditional doctrine held by Buddhist schools through the ages, still if we prefer ‘we can see the workings of karma and karma-vipaka simply as they operate in this


16 Ratnadharini, ‘Karma and the Consequences of Our Actions’, track 3 (02:30-02:49 and 03:41-03:55).
17 Nagapriya, Exploring Karma and Rebirth, pp. 131–32.
18 Sangharakshita, What is the Dharma? The Essential Teachings of the Buddha (Birmingham: Windhorse Publications, 2000), pp. 35 & 39–40. This book was edited together from talks given by Sangharakshita ‘over the years’ (Editors’ Preface, p. 2) and thus represents views that would have been in circulation prior to its publication date.
19 Ibid., pp. 36–39.
20 Ibid., p. 40.
Liberation (or Enlightenment) is less overtly questioned in the writings of the FWBO, and some feel we have the possibility of getting enlightened in (and for the duration of) this one life only. Sangharakshita’s chapter on ‘Nirvana’ in What is the Dharma prefers to skip quickly past the question ‘What is nirvana?’, presumably again in order to avoid alienating those who are skeptical, focusing instead on questioning the wisdom of goal-setting and suggesting that our interest in liberation may be merely curiosity, duty or vanity. One might question whether it is possible to be a Buddhist without a clear belief in the centrality of Enlightenment; without it, ‘the Buddhist saint becomes a human exemplar, not a cosmic superman’ and what remains of Buddhism is a humanistic self-help program with an ascetic flavor and rather vaguely-defined outcomes.

I will focus the potential problems of tone and content using a pair of written contemplations on death and suffering taken from the journal Madhyamavani; this is an FWBO publication in which senior practitioner–members of the organization can present their perspectives on ‘the timeless principles of Buddhism in ways appropriate to the modern world’. In the text by Vishvapani on ‘The Four Reminders’, the tone of the contemplation again is relentlessly negative and shocking, as can be gathered from the sample below:

**Reflection on Death:**

One day I will die. 
*I cannot avoid it.* It comes to everyone, and it will come to me....

I am [like] a fish caught in a net.
I am like a prisoner condemned to execution.
I am like an animal in a slaughterhouse.
In my fantasies I am exempted from the general truth of death.
But that is a delusion, and death will come to me, even me, as well....

Even if I live a full span, that is just a few decades.
But death could come at any moment – in a few years, or a few weeks, or even today.
There are many causes of death in addition to old age: illness, accident, disaster and violence.
Every day people die in these ways, all of them having expected to live longer....

*Everyone I know will die as well.*
All my friends, all my family, everyone I know, everyone I love, *everyone who loves me.*
In a hundred years we will all be gone....

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22 ‘If we discard rebirth as conventionally understood... we are aiming... to shake off our spiritual fetters in this very life... if we have just one life, we will have to get a move on’ (Nagapiiya, Exploring Karma and Rebirth, p. 137).
23 Sangharakshita, What is the Dharma, pp. 69–76. He adds that ‘my approach in this chapter will appear to some people... to be perhaps rather unorthodox’ (p. 71).
24 Nagapiiya, Exploring Karma and Rebirth, p. 137.
The Defects of Samsara:

Suffering is part of my life.

Everything I experience is tinged with incompleteness.

I cannot escape unsatisfactoriness.

My life involves stress, striving and struggle.

The same is true of others.

Almost everyone I know is searching for something their lives do not give them....

People’s lives include many other kinds of suffering.

There is illness and physical pain: that goes with having a body.

There is the mental anguish of depression, fear, madness and many other afflictions.

The possibility of such experience goes with having a mind.

All this is within the spectrum of experience I occupy.

This is human life, and these things can happen to me....

Nothing is solid, or final; nothing can be fully relied upon.

Consider this present moment, and you see this is true.

Look around and you see it is true everywhere.

I want the world to be substantial and knowable, but it isn’t.

This causes me to suffer. These are the defects of samsara.

It’s futile to expect the world to make me happy...

Here death is presented as terminal (in that we will ‘all be gone’), and the expectations that the world can be knowable or that we can be happy described as ‘futile’; the advice given is to ‘change the way I see the world’, ‘establish positive conditions’, and ‘be free from regrets’26 (with vague final references to practising the Dharma though no specifics of how to do so). The emphasis is on our own powerlessness and the all-pervading dismalness of life; the call to pessimism and despair is almost irresistible in the face of this description of life as ontologically torturous.

This FWBO version of the contemplations covers the four topics of the precious opportunity, death, karma, and the defects of samsara, but does not mention rebirth or enlightenment as such, except to say that the Dharma can offer us ‘a path away from being trapped in Samsara’ (defined merely as suffering)27. The author refers in a preface to what he considers the ‘inaccessible character’ of Buddhist doctrines such as the sufferings of ‘non-human beings’ (i.e. hungry ghosts and hell beings) – presumably inaccessible since we are not convinced that we could become such beings – and the ethical implications of karma. Given that ‘many features of the traditional accounts are somewhat alien to people who have not been brought up in a traditional Buddhist culture’, Vishvapani says that he decided in his text to ‘discard[ ] concepts and references that raise difficulties’, preferring a common-sense approach based in this single life.

In traditional Buddhist thought, then, death is understood to lead to rebirth (both negative and positive) as part of a natural process; and suffering is presented in the context of leading to liberation from suffering. Without these balancing beliefs to motivate our practice and draw us forward, all we have left is the chilling prospect of suffering and death. In response to this prospect, we have only palliative options: we can choose meditation, rather than some other means (such as

26 Ibid., in sections 4, 3, and 2 respectively.
27 Ibid., section 4 and opening section.
hedonism, materialism, or philanthropy), to make our time alive as pleasant as possible, but none of these will fundamentally change our mortal predicament; alternatively we could choose to recoil from life through self-medication, stoic pragmatism, or lying down and giving up. Furthermore, dwelling on these terminal aspects of existence can be actually injurious to our quality of life, and one might wonder why we would bother when there is nothing much we can do about them. These are the implications of a stripped-down “westernized” Buddhism that can cause problems for those who already sense the difficult and hopeless quality of human life.

Research: depressives are vulnerable to rumination on negative topics:

Whilst I intuitively felt that the effect of musing on the inevitability of suffering and death so intensively, without the leaven of rebirth and enlightenment, is likely to be unhelpful and possibly even dangerous for people prone to depression (as well as to repel many of those who prefer to keep what is thought of in the West as a ‘positive mental attitude’), I wished to investigate the literature on mental health to see whether this intuition was borne out amongst a wider selection of people. My first inkling that those prone to depression should ‘strictly avoid frightening ideas’ had come from reading Norman Rosenthal’s pioneering book on Seasonal Affective Disorder, in which this piece of advice is offered amongst others drawn from a first-century Roman medical guide (including ‘live in rooms full of light’, ‘take massage, baths, exercise, and gymnastics’, and ‘indulge in cheerful conversation and amusements’).

More recent academic research supports this advice that dwelling on frightening or negative ideas is potentially injurious to those with depressive tendencies. In a study which is particularly pertinent here, daydreaming about death has been found to be an attractive pastime for some severely depressed people, who use it ‘as a method of mood regulation (including increasing positive affect)’. This is the more so when death represents an escape from the pain and suffering that are thought to pervade life; in such cases death replaces other future life events that one might look forward to. Nonetheless such preoccupation can have ‘maladaptive and pernicious’ consequences: by habituating a depressed person to the prospect of death, it has been linked to increased likelihood of suicide attempts (and also physical self-harming). There is some logic to this; after all, if life is only suffering, and death is inevitable – and final – why wait and suffer more in the meantime? (Indeed, an online article by an FWBO member cautiously defends the practice of suicide, based on a misreading of certain suttas, against the conclusions drawn by non-FWBO Buddhist writers.

28 Norman E. Rosenthal, Winter Blues: Seasonal Affective Disorder, What It Is and How to Overcome It (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1993), p. 151. The cited source, Cornelius’s Celsus’s De Medicina (book III), advises those caring for melancholics that ‘melancholy thoughts are to be dissipated… and [the patient’s] mind slowly and imperceptibly is to be turned from the irrational talk to something better… causes of fright excluded, good hope rather put forward…; his depression should be gently reproved as being without cause; he should have it pointed out to him now and again how in the very things which trouble him there may be a cause of rejoicing rather than of solicitude.’ (Celsus, On Medicine, vol. 1, trans. W. G. Spencer (London: Heineman, 1935), vv. 18.10, 18.17, transcribed at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Celsus/3*.html.)


30 Ibid., p. 868.

31 Ibid., pp. 868 & 878.
Meditating on death and suffering can lead to further distress. Further research has shown that depressed people and people at risk for depression have trouble preventing negative material from entering and remaining in working memory (WM). These ‘inhibition deficits’ lead them to rehearse or ruminate about negative content. Depressed people differ from others in the degree to which they are able to repair their mood once they experience sadness or other negative emotions. Hence a small amount of frightening or saddening material (such as we have already examined) may have a profound effect on them. Because ‘negative mood yields activation of mood-congruent cognitions’, with ‘difficulties in accessing mood-incongruent material to repair the negative affect’, the sad mood tends to lead to other sad and depressing thoughts in an inescapable downward spiral.

This negative thought process is known as ‘rumination’, and there is considerable evidence to show its unhelpfulness for those with symptoms of distress. Extensive research by Susan Nolen-Hoeksema and others has confirmed that the consequences of rumination ‘make it more likely that initial symptoms of depression will become more severe and evolve into episodes of major depression’. This happens through several mechanisms: rumination enhances the effects of depressed mood on thinking, interferes with effective problem solving and action taking, and if prolonged erodes social support for the ruminator. These effects were particularly noticeable if dysphoric people were induced to ruminate for a set period, for instance about their long-term prospects and the meaning of their current feelings; by contrast, an invitation to reflect on a neutral stimulus such as a fan rotating served as a distraction and temporarily improved dysphorics’ mood.

Michael Attwood (also known as the FWBO order member Jayarava) claims that ‘Although it would seem that in principle suicide is self-harm, some of the cases cited in the Pali Canon are exceptions in that they result not in suffering, but in the complete release from all suffering!’ (‘Suicide as a Response to Suffering’, Western Buddhist Review 4 (2004), online at http://www.westernbuddhistreview.com/vol4/index.html). Attwood cites the Harvey and Keown sources detailed below, but does not reach the same conclusions.

Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 286–92, considers this and other doctrinal implications.


Ibid., p. 161.

Ibid., pp. 161–2.


Ibid., pp. 400–1.

Ibid., p. 402.
Unfortunately, inducing rumination not only prolongs the experience of negative mood in dysphoric individuals but also leads them ‘to appraise their problems as overwhelming and unsolvable’; it saps such people’s motivation and initiative, and even when they think of a worthwhile solution to a problem ‘may impede him or her from implementing it’.\(^{41}\) All this has negative implications for inviting Buddhist participants with depressive tendencies to meditate on suffering and death, with the aim that it will encourage them to embrace the Dharma actively and give them energy to practice meditation, since it is thus more likely instead to make them passive and discouraged. The FWBO contemplation which ends ‘It’s futile to expect the world to make me happy... Therefore let me commit myself to practicing the Dharma’, as well as being a non-sequitur in that context, is hence likely to seriously backfire for many people. Rumination, certainly in the forms we have seen here, ‘provides depressed individuals with evidence that their situations are uncontrollable and that further action is futile’.\(^{42}\)

One clue to the difference between depressed and non-depressed thinking is that the former think that they have little positive in their life to look forward to. When depressed and non-depressed participants in a study were asked to brainstorm things that were likely to happen to them in the next week, year, and 5–10 years, and then to rate the likelihood and welcome of those events, the depressives generated similar amounts of negative expectation to the others, but far less positive expectation. The study concluded that ‘reduced anticipation of future positive events is a defining characteristic of depression’.\(^{43}\) It is easy to see that telling people that their life is mostly suffering, that impending death is its key feature, and that there is nothing potentially enjoyable to look forward to\(^{44}\) would thus play into the hands of any depressive tendencies that may be lurking ready to be triggered. In fact, ‘recurrent thoughts of death’ is one of the nine diagnostic indicators for major depression presented by the DSM-IV,\(^{45}\) along with depressed mood and diminished interest in activities.\(^{46}\)

The Context of ‘Right View’ and Suggestions for Skillful Practice:

In rejecting this kind of contemplation on death and suffering as an option for those prone to depression and dysphoria, I propose three alternatives whereby Buddhist practice can instead be healthy and nourishing for them: the first is to embed these ideas appropriately into the context of Buddhist philosophy, and the second is to focus on practices that break the cycle of negative mood

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44 The habit of looking forward to simple future pleasures (such as having a bath or reading a good book) is disparaged at the opening of Maitreyi’s recorded talk (talk 5, ‘The Defects and Dangers of Samsara’, track 1, 00:29-01:02).
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and cognition. These categories replicate the elements of ‘right view’ and ‘right intention’ (the latter also known as ‘right emotion’),47 the first two stages of the ‘eightfold path’ that is at the heart of the Buddha’s early teachings. The third consideration is to tailor the choice of meditative practice to the personality type and individual capabilities of the practitioner to ensure their maximum benefit.

An appropriate framework for understanding any Buddhist doctrine is the core teaching of the Four Noble Truths; as the Buddha’s great disciple Sāriputta taught: ‘Friends, just as the footprint of any living being that walks can be placed within an elephant’s footprint, ...so too, all wholesome states can be included in the Four Noble Truths’48. The Four Noble Truths observed and taught by the Buddha discuss the nature of suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the way leading to the cessation of suffering, a pattern that imitates a medical pattern of diagnosis–aetiology–prognosis–treatment.49 Since the Buddha also taught the cause, cessation, and cure for suffering, to focus only on the first truth of the existence of suffering is to take a one-sided view of Buddhism; and to insist that suffering is an unavoidable experience is to nail up the exit route that Buddha has helpfully provided. In particular it is to ignore the third noble truth, of which the Buddha states, ‘This noble truth of the cessation of suffering is to be realized’.50 That the cessation of suffering is possible is confirmed by the teaching in the suttas that when a practitioner has abandoned underlying tendencies to lust, aversion, and ignorance, he is said to have ‘made an end to suffering’.51 Similarly, in the teaching of the Twelve Links of Existence (shown in Table 2), the sufferings of life come along with aging and death as the final link in the chain, and have birth as a requisite condition, which in turn relies on the preceding string of causes, back through clinging, craving, unskilful volitional actions, and originating with ignorance – so it is clear that any work we can do to lessen these bad causes should reduce the build-up of suffering and ultimately remove it.52 It is these teachings of cessation of suffering that assert that there is hope for the trajectory of life, that there is a point to spiritual practice, and that Buddhism is not a nihilistic, stoical or passively pessimistic philosophy.

The First Noble Truth is sometimes casually referred to as ‘everything is suffering’ or just ‘suffering’ for short; but this is an over-generalization, as Thich Nhat Hanh has pointed out.53 The Buddha is more specific in his description in the suttas – for instance in this set of definitions

47  The Buddha evokes this quality (samma sankappa) with reference to renunciation, non-ill will, and harmlessness (Samyutta Nikaya 45.8, ‘Analysis’, in The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2000), pp. 1528–29: p. 1528), but Sangharakshita expands it around various positive scriptural states and gives possible translations as Right Resolve, Perfect Will, or Integral Emotion, adding that ‘until the heart is involved and we begin to feel what we have understood – until our emotions are engaged – there is no spiritual life, properly speaking’ (Vision and Transformation, pp.30–31).
50  Samyutta Nikaya 56.11, Dhammacakkappavatthana Sutta (‘Setting in Motion the Wheel of the Dhamma’), in The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, pp. 1843–47: p. 1845.
52  The Buddha is explicit that ‘With the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; ... [and so on until] with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering’ (Samyutta Nikaya 12.1, Paticca-samuppada (‘Dependent Origination’), The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, pp. 533–4: p. 534). The process is helpfully discussed by Bhikkhu Bodhi on pp. 516–26 of the same volume, where the Pali terms are given.
most of whose specifics are straightforward to agree with: ‘Birth is suffering, aging is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering; union with what is displeasing is suffering; separation from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering; in brief, the five aggregates [of existence] subject to clinging are suffering’.\(^{54}\) As two of the ‘three marks of conditioned existence’, suffering and impermanence apply only to formations – that is, things subject to conditions, including our unenlightened mental and bodily aggregates – whereas the third quality of non-self applies to all things, including nirvana, equivalent to the cessation of suffering.\(^{55}\) Thus suffering is experienced by those who are unenlightened, but not by those who have achieved the final goal of enlightenment.\(^{56}\)

That getting this right is an important part of Buddhist belief is shown by Sāriputta who, when asked about all the ways in which a disciple might be of ‘right view’, answers ‘When, friends, a noble disciple understands suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the way leading to the cessation of suffering, in that way he is one of right view... and has arrived at this true Dhamma’.\(^{57}\) One might be inclined to conclude, then, that not to understand these factors correctly is to be not of right view as a Buddhist and to have arrived at a wrong Dhamma.\(^{58}\) In order to develop right view, close attention to the primary sources found in the Pali suttas would seem to be essential.

If depressive people are indeed to contemplate suffering and death, a correct philosophical context is crucial, but so is an appropriate emotional and psychological nuance. For this reason I also recommend the books of Stephen Levine, who worked for over twenty years counseling terminally ill patients, concentration camp survivors, and Vietnam war veterans.\(^{59}\) His ‘years of Buddhist practice and teaching’ (plus the influence of other teachers in the Advaita tradition)\(^{60}\) have evidently developed in him a great compassion for the dying and for all of us who will face this challenge. Though often emotionally challenging, his writings on developing an acceptance of death are warmer in tone than the typical Tibetan-derived and Western-styled accounts sampled above. In a meditation to work with fear, he exhorts us gently to

\(^{54}\) *Samyutta Nikaya* 56.11, *Dhammacakkappavatthana Sutta* (‘Setting in Motion the Wheel of the Dhamma’), *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, p. 1844. The five aggregates of existence are form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness, and they characterise unenlightened life (see Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, *The Middle-Length Discourses of the Buddha*, pp. 26–27).

\(^{55}\) This is clear from for instance Āṅguttara Nikaya III 134 (‘The Three Characteristics of Existence’), where it is stated ‘that all formations are impermanent, that all formations are subject to suffering, that all things are non-self’ (or in Pali, *sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, sabbe saṅkhārā dukkha, sabbe dhammā anattā*). (In *Numerical Discourses of the Buddha*, trans. and ed. by Nyanaponika Thera and Bhikkhu Bodhi (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 1999), pp. 77, 289.)

\(^{56}\) This is confirmed in *Samyutta Nikaya* 56.11 in the Buddha’s discussion of the fourth noble truth: ‘The Tathāgata has awakened to the middle way, ...which leads to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna’ (‘Setting in Motion the Wheel of the Dhamma’, in *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, p. 1844).


\(^{58}\) ‘That a bhikkhu with a wrongly directed view, with a wrongly directed development of the path, could pierce ignorance, arouse true knowledge, and realize Nibbāna: this is impossible. For what reason? Because his view is wrongly directed’ (*Samyutta Nikaya* 45.9, ‘The Spike’, in *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, p. 1530).


Let go of the hardness. Let it float in something softer and kinder...

Let the healing in.

Let the pain go...

Letting go into the softness, fear floats in the gentle vastness we call the heart.61

His moving book *A Year to Live* thus focusses on the practical emotional tasks that one can undertake in preparation for death, including softening our fear, reviewing our life, developing gratitude and forgiveness, and working out how to prepare ourselves. Contemplating these constructive reflections can then productively draw individuals away from the sense of powerlessness and futility that has been associated with depression and empower them to engage with death – and life – with dignity and serenity.

Whilst contemplating death and suffering can (thus) be done in a way that is safe for those of a more pessimistic nature, other practices may be more productive and empowering for them. It has long been recognized in the Buddhist tradition that not all meditation practices are suitable for all people or states of mind (even though this is often ignored for a ‘one size fits all’ approach). Buddhaghośa’s fifth-century commentary *Visuddhimagga* (or The Path of Purification) sets out forty standard meditational subjects, along with the types of people for whom they are suitable.62

It is notable that meditations on death and corpses are not particularly recommended for those of a ‘hating’ temperament, the one that might be assumed to be closest to a negative depressive outlook (the other types being greedy, deluded, faithful, intelligent, and speculative).63 Instead this type of person is recommended to take as their meditative object either a color *kasiṇa*, an attractive disc of blue, yellow, red, or white,64 or the four pleasant emotional states called the divine abidings. While I have not known the *kasiṇa* meditation to be taught in any Buddhist groups in the UK, the neutral quality of the suggested stimulus recalls the ‘distraction induction’ (such as the rotating fan) used by Nolen-Hoeksema and may thus work to temporarily improve the mood of dysphorics.

The divine abidings (or ‘Brahma-viharas’) appear more often in Buddhist circles, usually beginning with the development of loving-kindness,(with the addition later of the qualities of compassion, rejoicing, and equanimity). In the FWBO this ‘metta bhavana’ practice is one of two principal meditations (along with the mindfulness of breathing), and takes the form of five stages: ‘While sitting quietly, you cultivate [a] well-wishing attitude first towards yourself, then towards...

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63 Buddhaghośa, *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 104–7 explains entertainingly how one can work out which temperament a person is from observation of their habits, but the key passage is on p. 106: ‘In one of hating temperament there is frequent occurrence of such states as anger, enmity disparaging, domineering, envy and avarice.’ Some depressives may identify more with other states such as the ‘deluded’, who have ‘frequent occurrence of such states as stiffness, torpor, agitation, worry, uncertainty, and holding on tenaciously’. The deluded are recommended to work with the mindfulness of breathing (as described in the text below) or else any of the kasiṇas so long as its dimensions are ‘measureless’ rather than limited (p. 114).
64 The *kasiṇa* meditation is mentioned by the Buddha in *Anguttara Nikāya* X 29 (Numerical Discourses of the Buddha, trans. Nyanaponika & Bodhi, pp. 245, 311). The total set of ten *kasiṇas* are the same except that where the Buddha has space and consciousness for the final two, Buddhaghośa has light and space (*Visuddhimagga*, p. 110).
a good friend, then a “neutral” person..., then towards someone you find difficult, and then to as many living beings as possible’. While this initial focus on oneself can be healing and reassuring, most of the depressives I have known have found it all but impossible to wish themselves well convincingly; as Vajragupta points out in an FWBO book:

We first need a sense of our own self-worth and an appreciation of life and its potential. In our culture this seems difficult for some people. An unforgiving self-criticism, and subtle, underlying sense of worthlessness, is surprisingly common.

In order to avoid returning to rumination on one’s own mental state through this practice, the more impersonal formulation of the practice in the Buddha’s original Metta Sutta may be more helpful:

May all be well and secure,
May all beings be happy! ...

Cultivate an all-embracing mind of love
For all throughout the universe,
In all its height, depth and breadth –
Love that is untroubled
And beyond hatred or enmity, ...

Pursue this awareness with your might:
It is deemed the Divine State here.

What is translated here as ‘happiness’ is in Pali the quality of sukha, mentioned in various places in the Pali canon, but perhaps most memorably as a quality to experience and develop in the sixth stage of the Anapanasati or mindfulness with breathing. This vital 16-stage practice explores the cultivation of the four bases of awareness, the body, feelings, mind, and mental objects, providing a balanced attention across the human psycho-physical system. Its focus on positive states in stages 5 & 6 in particular may be helpful to those prone to depression, by helping to generate positive affect, and hence more constructive cognitions and further improvement in mood:

[5.] He trains thus: ‘I shall breathe in [and out] experiencing rapture [piti]’...

[6.] He trains thus: ‘I shall breathe in [and out] experiencing pleasure [sukha]’...

In the FWBO the related practice of the ‘mindfulness of breathing’ restricts the practitioner to awareness of only the breathing and the body, restricting the opportunity for one to attend to one’s mind and feelings. (Likewise, the currently-fashionable decontextualized ‘bare mindfulness’ as a western way of treating various psychological or chronic conditions only appears to skim

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65 Vajragupta, Tools for Living Your Life, p. 32.
66 Ibid., p. 33.
67 Sutta Nipata, 1.8. This is the particular translation by Buddharrakkhita, one of several presented on the Access to Insight web resource (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/buddharakkhita/wheel365.html). A less poetic published version can be found in The Sutta-Nipata, trans. H. Saddhatissa (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 1994), pp. 15–16.
69 An account of the Mindfulness of Breathing short practice can be found in Kamilashila, Meditation: The Buddhist Way of Tranquillity and Insight (Birmingham: Windhorse Publications, 1996), pp. 16–19.
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the surface of the traditional practice. The best-known books and courses on this subject prefer to focus on preventing relapse into depression, excluding those currently depressed.70)

Other translations of the Metta Sutta gloss sukha as ‘bliss’, an experience which is cultivated in a much more focused manner in some Tantric Buddhism traditions, where it is used as a powerful mind with which to meditate on wisdom.71 Committed practitioners are enjoined to generate bliss six times a day;72 although the full range of tantric commitments may be too much for some depressed people to undertake, regularly remembering and generating a small burst of positive feeling (which is always available irrespective of one’s life circumstances) may prove beneficial, both in breaking the cycle of low mood,73 and in giving a person something positive to anticipate.

Of course I would not wish to propose a new orthodoxy of meditation regime that should be enforced on vulnerable people; my point is exactly that individuals should choose for themselves which practices they intuitively find beneficial and conducive. Some depressive people (such as my collaborator Josie) may for instance identify more with the devotional faith type, and derive inspiration from recollection of positive objects such as the Buddha, the Dharma, the Sangha, virtue, generosity, or deities.74 Josie and I have both gained great solace from the Vajrasattva practice, where one confesses one’s perceived negativities to a radiant white deity and visualizes receiving healing and purifying white nectar that washes them away.75 The versatility of this practice lies in its ability to turn negative self-conceptions to good spiritual use, and to switch the practitioner’s focus from these to the powerful purity that is one’s potential.76

70 This is made clear for example in the subtitle of the popular Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for depression: a new approach to preventing relapse, by Zindel V. Segal, J. Mark G. Williams, and John D. Teasdale (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 2002). That the authors were ‘encountering and then testing a very different paradigm from that in which they were trained professionally and in which they were recognized as experts’ (p. vii) is an admission that, despite the use of the buzzword ‘mindfulness’, this project belongs to the cognitive tradition of Western psychotherapy or clinical psychology. Their later more meditatively-founded collaboration with Jon Kabat-Zinn, The Mindful Way through Depression: Freeing Yourself from Chronic Unhappiness (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 2007), explicitly cautions those experiencing clinical depression against embarking on the programme (pp. 8, 228). Such reluctance to engage with these vulnerable people is disappointing and throws the effectiveness of the approach into question.

71 For example in Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, Clear Light of Bliss (Ulverston: Tharpa Publications, 1992), p. 7: ‘Realising emptiness with the mind of spontaneous great bliss is the quickest method for attaining full enlightenment.’

72 This practice is esoteric and hence taught orally, but there is reference to it in, for instance, Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, Tantric Grounds and Paths (Ulverston: Tharpa Publications, 1994), pp. 57–58.


74 Buddhaghoṣa, Visuddhimagga, pp. 114, 110. Meditating on deities focusses on our positive potential and offsets the obsession with lower states found in the Tibetan tradition. Recollection of the Buddha can be performed by giving offerings, either real or imagined, a particularly recommended practice for generating future merit and hence improvement in one’s life circumstances (Gyatso, Joyful Path, pp. 47-50).


Conclusions:

In conclusion, without a constructive state of mind (and emotions) one cannot practice, and will have no motivation or strength to do so, so tipping practitioners into depression – leaving aside whether or not it is compassionate – is likely to be counterproductive in motivating them to engage with Dharma. These forceful meditations on death and suffering are not right for everybody, and caution should be exercised in presenting such material and asking group participants to dwell upon it. Those who are not prone to depression or dysphoria do not experience lowered mood and agency following rumination, so they will not necessarily appreciate the dangers for others whom they may lead in meditation. Considering these issues led me to wonder what proportion of people have depressive tendencies – that is, whether this issue concerns a tiny minority of those likely to be affected or a more substantial risk group. One large-scale formal psychiatric survey estimated that around 11% of the general population of England had been suffering from a depressive disorder in a given week, so it is likely that any study course of more than a few participants will have at least one actively or recently depressed person in the room. This figure may be higher amongst those attracted to Buddhism than in the general population, as many of us in the West approach it initially motivated by the sense of dissatisfaction or disappointment that ‘there must be more to life’. Furthermore, if Ken Jones is right in identifying the typical FWBO personality as ‘the Angry (or, rather, vehement) Young Man (of all ages)’, whilst typically ‘women are relegated to a lowly place’ (both anger and subjugation being potentially correlated with depressive experiences), then FWBO groups will certainly have their share of those prone to depression – which is the impression I have gained from involvement in them.

Furthermore, asking people to dwell on what is effectively a wrong view is surely going to have negative consequences – rather like hammering a nail into the wrong part of a structure, where it will only split the wood rather than fix the components together. ‘Westernized’ Buddhism can distort the fabric of the teachings and hence produce unintended meanings, if it diverges from well-established primary sources, or views important aspects of doctrine as dispensable. Extracting techniques or reflections out of context can be questionable and reductive, in a similar way to that in which western medicine isolates chemical essences out of herbal plants, making them more pharmacologically powerful but also introducing harmful side effects. Dwelling willfully on wrong views about reality, derived from incomplete or inauthentic sources, would seem to be the very opposite of skillful Dharma practice.

Better sources of the word of the Buddha, both published and online, are available now to us in the West, removing the justification for relying on outdated, questionable, or eccentric renderings of Dharma. The production of translated volumes of the Pali Canon by Wisdom Publications has been a real blessing, thanks to the immaculate care taken by the translators, the insightful prefatory essays, and the wealth of topic indices. This series known as ‘Teachings of the Buddha’ began with the Dīgha Nikāya in 1987, and has gone on to complete volumes of the Majjhima and Samyutta

77 ‘It is also important to note that the rumination and distraction inductions did not significantly alter the moods of non-dysphoric students’ (Lyubomirsky et al, ‘Why Ruminators are Poor Problem Solvers’, p. 1052, n. 3).
78 9.0% had a mixed anxiety and depressive condition, and a further 2.3% suffered from a depressive episode (‘Adult psychiatric morbidity in England, 2007: Results of a household survey’, ed. Sally McManus et al (Leeds: The NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2007), pp. 28, 30–31).
Nikāya collections, with a version of the Aṅguttara on the way.\textsuperscript{81} 1995 saw the appearance of the *Access to Insight* website, whose provision of suttas in various English translations has grown along with people’s internet usage since that time. It is an indexed and searchable resource, making the suttas and other supporting material available for free to anyone with a computer.\textsuperscript{82} There are also resources available for Mahāyāna sutras, particularly online, but due to their considerable length and number (as well as the varying languages of the surviving texts) there is as yet no canonical published set in English that I am aware of. Reputable secondary literature too is flourishing: Snow Lion is a notable publisher that has produced over 300 books on Tibetan Buddhism and culture since 1980, some of them selling over 70,000 copies, and other publishers both academic and commercial have contributed to this flourishing area.\textsuperscript{83} That these are just samples suggests that a purge of less adequate sources, such as recorded talks, used as primary materials might be undertaken by some Buddhist traditions (such as the FWBO), whilst the strict reliance on the writings of a single teacher (as in the NKT) might well be opened up.

On an uplifting note, it is said in certain Mahayana traditions that the Bodhisattva Kṣitigarbha goes even to the hell realms to teach unfortunate beings,\textsuperscript{84} and likewise Vajrasattva is described as ‘the one who saves from hell’,\textsuperscript{85} so we can hope that depressive and dysphoric individuals will not be excluded from receiving Buddhist teachings however negative their state of mind. Indeed they stand to greatly benefit if it can be done appropriately and with consideration for their particular needs. But it is crucial that the Dharma be presented in a context of right view – and right emotion – in order to cause good and not harm. Only then can Buddhism in the West avoid the pitfalls and embrace the possibilities of teaching Buddhism to all whatever their psychological starting point.\textsuperscript{86}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[81] See ‘Teachings of the Buddha Series’ at http://www.wisdompubs.org/Pages/c_teachings.lasso.
\item[83] ‘About Snow Lion publications’, http://www.snowlionpub.com/pages/about.html.
\item[84] Vessantara, *Meeting the Buddhas*, pp. 198–201.
\item[85] Ibid., p. 234.
\item[86] Heartfelt thanks to my collaborator Josie Flood, and also to Claire Davison, Tim Allan, David Clarke, and Ian Biddle for their encouragement, reading and discussion of this paper. My appreciation also to Newcastle Buddhist Centre, and the Durham University Project for Spirituality, Theology and Health, for their part in stimulating this project.
\end{footnotes}
### Table 1: The sequence of reflections in various sources

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Table 2: The Twelve Links of Existence

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The Practical approach to the Enlightenment through the Buddhist Meditation

Venerable Bhikkhuni Anula Devi (Kyeong-Hee Yoo)
Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies

Buddhism starts from the point of the Buddha’s Enlightenment. And thereby, the teaching of the Buddha becomes the way to the solution for the problems of human beings, i.e., the cessation of suffering. When it works it becomes meaningful. But, nowadays, the enlightenment has become rather treasure in the casket than in use. As the materialism goes extreme and the morality too extremely corrupted, the world urgently needs to balance it. Therefore, this is the high time to call for enlightenment.

Then, what does the enlightenment mean? It simply means the total cessation of all kinds of suffering, or the solution for the existence. Then, now our concern comes on the possibility of enlightening in this very life. Before we deal with the possibility of enlightenment here and now, first of all I would like to trace the enlightenment appearing in the Suttas in four stages in two ways: One way is Theravāda Vipassana Meditation and the other way is Mahāyāna Zen Meditation.

In Theravāda Vipassana meditation, four stages of Enlightenment are rather clearly mentioned in comparison with Mahāyāna Zen tradition. It talks about 10 fetters or bonds that tie us to this samsāric world of existence and as we overcome these fetters, we progress to higher state of enlightenment. I will show this in a diagram in comparison with Zen tradition. Actually, there are no criteria to distinguish states like 10 fetters in Zen, but there are some mystery words left by the enlightened one from which we can have clue to judge their state. They use some specific type of words, and we call it “Malhugu” in Korean. If I interpret I would say in simple parlance “Some-words beyond the ineffability”. Ten fetters or bonds that tie us to this samsāric world of existence are shown below:

1. The belief in a permanent personality, ego
2. Doubt, extreme skepticism
3. Attachment to rites, rituals, and ceremonies
4. Attachment to sense desires
5. Ill-will, anger
6. Craving for existence in the Form world (heavenly realms)
7. Craving for existence in the Formless world (heavenly realms)
8. Conceit
9. Restlessness
10. Ignorance

1 (from Anguttara Nikāya 10.13)
Then, I will refer to one event of each state of enlightenment. First of all, we will see the Sotāpanna who shattered off lower 3 fetters and we call her/him as Ariya or Saint. But, when we have the word “saint”, we rather think of something special and abnormal or something miraculous. But, in case of Visākhā who was a Sotāpanna at the age of 7 years, who after getting married gave birth to 10 sons and 10 daughters, still much being involved in sense desire. Ones like Visākhā are said to be attached to the round because of so many lives where they took pleasure in the sense objects. Even after becoming a Sotāpanna, it is said that Visākhā would spend a long time in samsāra - but only in very good conditions - because of so much accumulated clinging to sense pleasures. Sotāpannas have eliminated all wrong views; but they still have the type of lobha (desire) that arises for sense objects. As we see in the above diagram, Sotāpannas still have their own tendency of Kāmarāga, sensual pleasure and patīgha, ill-will. So, seemingly, on the face of it, we are not able to distinguish Sotāpanna from ordinary.

2 This is the story of what happened between the Zen master Hoeyang and Majo, who were the 7th and 8th patriarchs of the Chinese Zen tradition.

3 One of the famous Zen master in China called Joju.
Many writings say that Sotāpanna person cannot believe that any dhamma lasts or is ‘theirs’. They know that this type of lobha is conditioned and so are not fooled into thinking it is self. But this is wrong. Though Sotāpanna just experienced the cessation of consciousness one second, if she/he does not continue their practice on the arising object they do not have that knowledge. But, when they recover that awareness of appearing and disappearing on the objects then they understand immediately those are impermanent, non-self. Then, they are gradually detached from the objects. One thing different from ordinary is that she/he understands when she/he are in suffering, they recognize suffering as suffering – this is actually very important point – whereas ordinary do not, or cannot think suffering as suffering, but they take them for granted as an inevitable part of life.

I have seen many Sotāpannas who after attaining Sotāpatti didn’t practice and immediately back to their own sensual pleasure, even try to use this Sotāpanna-hood as their part of Ego, like a prize. Thereby, I couldn’t see any wisdom on them but stronger māna, conceit. They may return to the wisdom of this Sotāpanna state, after experiencing the extreme suffering as she/he couldn’t hold this Ego anymore, then they release this ego yielding to wisdom. So, when we think of Ariya, saint in Buddhism, we should have a clear meaning of this word. Not for like extraordinary psychic power but knowingness to some extent, of the way to reduce suffering.

Then, having understood this suffering as suffering, they try to overcome and set into practice again. Then, they, somehow, sometime later, attain Sakadāgāmi. A Sakadāgāmi (once-returner) has eradicated the first three fetters of the 10 fetters to enlightenment and greatly weakened the fourth and fifth; attachment to sense desires and ill-will. Such a person will be re-born to either the human or heavenly realm and will attain enlightenment there.

According to Visākha’s story who was a bhikkhuni Dhammadinna’s ex-husband, when he attained Sakadāgāmi he didn’t make any change in his Marriage life with the wife Dhammadinna but he wanted to end the marriage life after attaining Anāgāmi. Mahānāma known as Sakadāgāmi was advised to practice higher concentration to remove sensual pleasure for further progress to enlightenment. Further Isidatta and purāṇa story shows that celibacy is not compulsory to attain Sakadāgāmi. Thus Sotāpanna and Sakadāgāmi can still enjoy sensual pleasure and they live normal lives depending on their nature. Some might renounce the world and become monks and nuns; others might stay as laypeople but live a simple life without husband or wife; others might take 8 precepts; while still others indulge in sense pleasures as is their nature. What they can never do is going back to having a wrong view. This is not non-retrogressive, nor can they ever drink alcohol or lie or steal or kill even an ant. Even Sakadāgāmi too, there is no saintly look as we think for the concept of saintliness. We have to think this term more practically. The transformation happens innerly in the busiest way in the mind. Just she/he becomes more aware what brings her/him suffering due to understanding of suffering as suffering.

Sakadāgāmi though he doesn’t have strong sensual pleasure and ill-will, she/he still has them to some degree, due to these, they get suffering, again, realizing suffering as suffering, they try to practice harder. So, in the process to Enlightenment, realizing suffering as suffering is the strongest motive and teacher as being the first Truth. Then, one day, they attain Anāgāmi.

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4 In fact, a stream-enterer can be living in negligence, such as when he or she neglects to regularly retire into seclusion for the purpose of meditative practice and, due to neglecting the practice, gains neither concentration nor deeper insight (S.V. 398).
5 MA. II. 61
An Anāgāmi (non-returner) has completely eradicated the first five fetters and never returns to earth or any other world system (planet, solar system). Such a person is re-born to a heavenly realm and attains enlightenment from there. As we see in the story of Visākha ex-husband of Bhikkhuni Dhammadinnā, who was an Anāgāmi, since he removed sensual pleasure completely he did not necessarily need marriage life. From here, we may have some saintly outlook from them.

In Zen tradition, there is a story: one disciple came to his master and showed his attainment making some sort of sign. He drew a circle with stick then he removed this circle with his feet. The master without saying anything He shut the door with a bang. The other day, another disciple came and he too showed the process of his practice. He too drew a circle and removed it but again he drew a new circle on it. Then, the master smiling entertained him into his room. In Mahāyāna, if one, after attaining Enlightenment, does not share his Bodhi of Enlightenment to the world then she/he is called a great thief. In Theravāda Suttas, this trend seems to be not much emphasized. The Buddha often says that so and so attained Anāgāmi without returning to this earth, he will attain final Enlightenment there. But, in Mahāyāna Zen tradition, it is strongly emphasized. If one does not return to the world with his enlightenment, they say that it is totally useless. I think, this is the state of this Anāgāmi, returning to the world could be helpful to remove Anāgāmi’s remaining five fetters.

Overcoming Anāgāmi’s five higher fetters she/he attains Arahat. The last stage is the Arahat, and is marked by the eradication of the last five Fetters. This state is not restricted by age, sex or social status. It is open to lay people as well as ordained monks and nuns. The Arahat will continue to live for his body’s natural span.

I would refer to the story of Santati, the king’s minister who attained Arahatship on the elephant. He was sad seeing the dancer’s death caused as the result of entertaining him. With knife-like pains, he sought for solace before the Buddha, then the Buddha uttered this stanza:

Purge out the things belonging to the past
Let there be naught to rise in future times.
If what’s twixt past and future you don’t grasp,
You will be one who wanders forth serene. 7

Listening to this stanza, instantly, he attained Arhantship and entered into Nibbāna. We may wonder how Santati could attain Arahatship after listening to only one stanza. We may be advised to listen to his past story but somehow the moment of entering into Arhatship has happened at that very moment of hearing a stanza.

I would refer to some story in Zen tradition, as you know, Zen started from the Master Bodhi Dharma, second master was Haega, when Haega was preaching in the town a man came and pleaded to cure him. The man said that he was in serious disease because of his bad karma, sin. Listening to him, Haega said “Can you show me your sin?” then, this man suddenly realized there is nothing called sin, but just his own mis-grasping, when he understood this instantly, his disease disappeared. Then he became the 3rd master of Zen tradition named Sungchan. He wrote the very famous stanza called “Sinsimmyung”, summarizing in this : “Don’t distinguish anything, then at that moment, you will be enlightened.” So, enlightenment comes not from anything but clear and right perception at the specific moment.

7 “Yam pubbe taṁ visodhehi, pacchā te mātu kiñcanaṁ; Majīhe ce no gahessati, upasanto carissati”ti. (su. ni. 945)
Those were in the history, then how about now, for us? Can we be enlightened here and now in this very life in this 21st century amongst strong materialism? Of course, Yes.

We found in the *Suttas*, many of them were instantly enlightened after listening to the Buddha’s sermon without any intense meditation course or PhD degree of Buddhism, no seminar attending. Even the kings too attained some enlightenment amongst business of the secular world, like king Bimbisara known as Sotapatti. How about heavenly king Sakka, he too attained Sotapatti.

We should refer to the event of Enlightenment of five bhikkhus. For their perfect Enlightenment, they needed only 2 Suttas. Enlightenment comes through the way of perception, so, it depends on the sharpness of the awareness not the long period, when there is awareness, there, automatically pañña is revealed. So, knowledge is not much necessary. We can pay attention to the way of Satipatthāna’s teaching, some misunderstand it as all of them should be practiced step by step. Then, at the end of the course, we might have the chance of enlightenment. But, it is wrong. Each item has same refrain that says to observe arising and disappearing of that each and every phenomena. The more she/he is aware of disappearing of phenomena the closer to be enlightened. When one follows each phenomenon closely, it actually means the awareness of consciousness being caught up just by following consciousness, then, they shortly experience the cessation of consciousness. This is so called the moment of Sotapatti. It appears as if the man who is going in the dark night, suddenly sees a flash of lightning. It happens while walking meditation, while eating in the dining room, while sitting, while listening. Actually, through my teaching experiences, while observing the sound, they experience this more. Because the end of sound is easy to be aware of:

*I quoted from my meditation student’s records: “I was observing mind and body while walking meditation when the bell was ringing giving the sign of the end of walking meditation, I was observing the bell-sound, just closely following (anupassana) up until the end of the sound. The just moment the sound disappeared completely, my mind (consciousness) that followed it too disappeared absolutely. I felt “I am” disappearing”- new to this meditation, this was 5th day.*

*I quoted from my meditation student’s record: After experiencing the cut-off stillness between thought and thought: “when I went out to have breakfast, the things outside appeared new and clear, even the stones too looked ripe and tender, as if they are going to talk to me. Flying birds appeared to me like slow motion”.*

I can bring the example of Dipama® who was a woman Buddhist master. Under her instructions, so many enlightened ones appeared and it didn’t take longer time, sometimes few days. Among her devoted students were Jack Kornfield, Sharon Salzberg, and Joseph Goldstein — all members of the Insight Meditation Society.

*Extracting from Dipa Ma book: “I could be aware of all subtle phenomena arising and

® Dipa Ma The Life and Legacy of a Buddhist Master Amy Schmidt, BlueBridge Books 05/05 Paperback ISBN: 0-97424-055-9:Dipa Ma Bura, who died in 1989 at the age of 78, was the first truly accomplished meditation master in the Theravada tradition to teach in America. Among her devoted students were Jack Kornfield, Sharon Salzberg, and Joseph Goldstein — all members of the Insight Mediation Society. In this presentation of the life and teachings of Dipa Ma, Amy Schmidt has gathered many quotations and anecdotes that reveal the startling presence and many spiritual gifts of this diminutive woman. These tributes come from her American and Calcutta students and from some family members.
disappearing. It was like a bubble as if bursting out right now. There is only arising and disappearing then stillness again. The intention arises then disappears. There was a huge space between thought and thought. Due to awareness, great transformation arose. I felt as if I went out somewhere at which there is no-body, no thing: “I” was not there.”

By the way, now to talk about the way of approaching to enlightenment, I would like to mention about two western enlightened persons. One is Eckhart Tolle\(^9\), and the other is Lester Levenson\(^10\).

“I felt myself fall into that void. I have no recollection of what happened after that. ...I opened my eyes. Without any thought, that soft luminosity filtering through the curtain was love itself. Tears came into my eyes. I got up and walked around the room. I recognized the room, and yet I knew that I had never truly seen it before. Everything was fresh and pristine, as if it had just come into existence. As if I had just been born into this world.” – From Eckhart Tolle’s book [The Power of Now]

“With many diseases Lester Levenson was told he would not live much longer. He was at the end of the lien. This made him realize that the accumulated knowledge of man was of no use.

“I went through my life then I found happiness equated to one’s capacity to love rather than to being loved. Therefore, I began correcting all my thoughts and feelings. During three months period, all the ailments, I had in my physical body corrected. All my miseries dropped away. And I ended up in a place in which I was happy all the time without sorrow”. – From Lester Levenson’s book [Keys to the Ultimate Freedom]

I found the common thing; when they really want enlightenment, more than anything else, it comes. According to Lester Levenson’s expression, “you must want to know Truth as much as a drowning man wants air.” Then what is the transformation after the realization I agree with the Lester Levenson’s word:

“One of the things that happened in this process was my identification with others. I saw we are all related, we are all inter-connected - each mind is like a radio broadcasting and receiving station; that we are all tuned into each other unconsciously - that we are just not aware of it.”

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\(^9\) Eckhart Tolle (born 1948) is a German-born Canadian resident, best known as the author of: The Power of Now and A New Earth, which were written in English. In 2011, he was listed by the Watkins Review as the most spiritually influential person in the world. In 2008, a New York Times writer called Tolle “the most popular spiritual author in the [United States]”

\(^10\) Lester Levenson was a man who had mastered life’s greatest challenge. In 1952, at age 42, Lester, a physicist and successful entrepreneur, was at the pinnacle of worldly success, yet he was an unhappy, very unhealthy man. He had many health problems including depression, an enlarged liver, kidney stones, spleen trouble, hyperacidity, and ulcers that had attacked his stomach and formed lesions. He was so unhealthy, in fact, that after having his second coronary, his doctors sent him home to his Central Park South penthouse apartment in New York City to die. Lester was a man who loved challenges. So, instead of giving up, he decided to go back to the lab within himself and find some answers. Because of his determination and concentration, he was able to cut through his conscious mind to find what he needed. What he found was the ultimate tool for personal growth - a way of letting go of all inner limitations. He was so excited by his discovery that he used it intensively for a period of three months. By the end of that period, his body became totally healthy again. Furthermore, he entered a state of profound peace that never left him through the day he died on January 18, 1994.
Arahant has no-self therefore “you are me”. I think when we consider others as if myself, that is the last and the best transformation we would meet in the process of practice. Thereby, enlightening is not looking saintly in fantastic way but most caring way of other beings. It leads to the state that “Now” is the most important time and “the one who is in front me” is most important person whosoever. And this is the climax of the causality, I think.

Nowadays, we think the world is fast developing day by day. But, day by day people despise other beings thinking others are inferior to themselves by mostly measuring in materiality. This is not the real development. This is like building the house over and over towards the sky but the down part is decaying and about to break up.

As we know the materiality which consist of earth, water, heat and wind cannot move but with the support of consciousness. If human-beings using materiality ignore other beings’ mind, then this collective mind will move unconsciously finding out the outlet. Earthquakes or Tsunamis cannot arise alone.

Now is the crucial time we should be enlightened into the higher spirituality, thereby the world and the earth is purified. With the caring and respecting others, we can build morality again which will be resulting in total peace for all.
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If we do not believe that a spiritual state of mind is something more than material constituted of physical particles, then there is no way to think about sentient beings and we can treat them as material substances. But Buddhists believe that the mind is more than the sub-atomic particle and there is much to think about the mind, hence meditation and spiritual practice is essential. Given the existence of mind, just as body need washing, feeding and medicating, mind needs similar things too, washing the mind through tranquility or calm abiding meditation, feed the mind with morality and medicate the mind with supreme wisdom or the insight meditation. Morality, concentration and wisdom or insight meditation are indeed the three tools for nurturing the mind. Similarly, body needs clothing to cover nakedness and mind needs discipline to prevent its mental nakedness.

Bhāvanā or meditation means mind culture or mental development. It aims at clearing the impurities and disturbances such as desire, hatred, ill-will, worry, doubts etc. and cultivating qualities such as concentration, awareness, intelligence, tranquility. Eventually, the realization of ultimate truth or the reality is in fact the goal of the meditation in Buddhism. Meditation is a vast subject and there are many variations among the different religious traditions. According to Nyanaponika, Thera, “It is a significant fact and worth pondering upon the words found in major religious scriptures, for instance, it is said in the Bible ‘In the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth….’, while in Dhammapada, the Buddha says ‘Mind precedes things, dominates them, creates them’. These momentous words are quiet and uncontenting, but unshakable reply by the Buddha to that biblical belief. Here the roads of these two religions part: the one leads far away into an imaginary beyond, the other leads straight home, into man’s very heart”1

In this manner, we can divide it in to two forms. The latter is those teachings and methods which are concerned with the discovery of the nature of existence and its reality, and the former concerns communication with external or universal concept of God. Where there is a concept of an external higher being, there also is an internal personality which is known as soul or self. In this case, meditation practice becomes a way of developing communication with an external being. This means that one feels oneself inferior and is trying to contact something higher or greater. Such meditation is based on devotion and they are mainly found in the teachings of Hinduism, Christianity and Islam, hence, meditation is the only way to put the teaching into practice.2

In this paper, I would like to discuss the form of meditation that deals with the discovery of the reality as it is according to different major Buddhist traditions. Because of people’s varying disposition and capacity, that which is appropriate to one may not be appropriate to the other, therefore, in Buddhism there are three vehicles - Sravakayana, Pratekabuddhayana and

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1 Nyanaponika, Thera. The Heart of Buddhist Meditation: Satipatthana: A Handbook of Mental Training Based on the Buddha’s Way of Mindfulness. BPS, Candy, 1996. p. 21
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Bodhisattvayana and four tenets Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Cittamatin and Madhyamaka. According to their different views on phenomena, the natures of their meditative practices are slightly different. For example, among the four tenets, the philosophical view of the first two aligns with the substantialist’s view, the view of the third tenet aligns to idealism and the fourth asserts a centralist view and they are known as the sunyavads. All eighteen schools starting from Theravada comes under the substantialist view following the Dhammapada’s words that talks of the fundamental principles that are, all compounded phenomena are impermanent, all contaminated phenomena are suffering, all phenomena are selflessness, those who realize these principles through wisdom attain Nirvana. The followers of the eighteen schools strictly follow the above principles and in fact their practices largely depend on them as they carry their meditative practice based on the discourse on the Satipatthana or foundation of mindfulness.

The Buddha’s original ‘Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness’ (Satipatthāna Sutta) occurs twice in the Buddhist scriptures: (1) as the 10th Discourse of the ‘Middle Collection of Discourses’: (Majjhima Nikāya), (2) as the 22nd Discourse of the ‘Long Collection’ (Dīgha Nikāya). Satipatthāna Sutta is the sole way for the purification of beings and they are the four Foundations of Mindfulness. “What are the four? Herein a monk may dwell practicing body-contemplation on the body… practicing feeling-contemplation on feelings… practicing mind-contemplation on mind… practicing mind-object contemplation on mind-objects, ardent, clearly comprehending and mindful, having overcome covetousness and grief concerning the world.” The Satipatthana based vipasyana meditative practice is very popular and well-known in Burma, Sri Lanka and Thailand and I will not elaborate on it here. I personally have sat a couple of ten-day courses on Vipasyana and I found that the mindfulness techniques there is exactly the same as found in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa as per Sarvastivada tradition.

The Abhidharmakośa discusses of six steps in the breathing meditation - 1. The first is simply to count our breath a certain number of times say 1 to 10 times, by inhaling for 5 seconds, abiding for 5 seconds, exhaling for 5 seconds, gradually increasing the duration. Once the mind becomes a little still we should go on to the second step, which is to watch the breathing, at this stage we are not counting the breath anymore but simply watching the breath in and out. Here do not conceptualize it; all we have to do is observe the breathing. 3. The third step is not only watching exhalation and inhalation of our breath but also observing its rhythmic movement. 4. At the fourth step we observe the feeling and sensation accompanying the movement of the breath throughout the body. 5. The fifth step is to analyze how the breathe changes from moment to moment. 6. The last step is called the stage of shifting; here we shift from mediation on breath to meditation on feeling, meditation on impermanence, arising-ceasing and selflessness of the body which is known as Insight or Vipasyana Meditation.

3 Yatra tr’i yanyani Iravakayanu Pratyekabuddhayanu / Mahayana ceti. Sthitayascatasra’ Vaibhasika Sautrantika-Yogacara-madhayamakabhedena. (Advayavajrasajagraha p.14)
6 Nyanaponika, Thera. The Heart of Buddhist Meditation: Satipatthana: A Handbook of Mental Training Based on the Buddha’s Way of Mindfulness. BPS, Candy, 1996. p. 139
However, certain people have problem with anger, while other have problem with desire, jealousy and attachment. We should try to practice meditation focusing on specific object that directly counteract the particular delusion. The object must be natural; if it evolves any strong feeling of lust, hatred etc., then it cannot calm your mind but will only make it restless and agitated. Object can be either internal or external. It is said that the mind is a ramping elephant, tie it fast with the rope of mindfulness to the steady post of topic, and settle the mind in calm. Internal object is inside you, like breathing, focusing on the middle of eyebrow, looking on the tip of nose, visualizing oneself as divine deity, watching, sensation, etc. External object may be a statue of Buddha, a flower, a syllable, a dot, candle flame, gazing moon, etc. The object must be pleasing and acceptable to the mind. By focusing the mind on the object, it will slowly become calm and relaxed. Meditation on ugliness is the antidote to the feeling of lust and attachment, meditating on skeleton is the antidote for all categories of craving, meditation on love and kindness is the antidote to anger, meditation on interdependent origination is antidote to ignorance and meditation on breathing is antidote to discursive mental thoughts. There are so many methods for developing single pointed meditation, but many experienced Buddhist practitioners recommend breathing meditation as being very effective method for controlling discursive thoughts. Obviously, the reason is that the mind and inner psychic wind are inseparably interrelated. Therefore, when we pacify this inner wind by meditating on the breath, the mind naturally becomes still.

According to Mahayana Tradition, among the three special trainings, the second is the training in meditative stabilization. The mind abiding one-pointedly, without distraction on any virtuous object is called meditative stabilization. In order to cultivate calm abiding, one must abandon the five faults and utilize the eight antidotes. The eight antidotes abandon these faults in the following way, the first of the five faults laziness – it has four antidotes, and the others have one each. The four antidotes to laziness are faith, aspiration, effort, and pliancy. The antidote to the second fault forgetting is mindfulness, to the third, laxity and excitement, is introspection, to the fourth, not applying the antidotes, is an intention of application. The antidote to the fifth, over-applying the antidotes, is the equanimity to leave the mind naturally. In short, in the Maitriya’s Discrimination of Middle and Extreme, the above mentioned five faults of calm abiding and eight antidotes of removing those five faults are explained in detail. Likewise, in Maitriya’s Ornament of the Middle and Extreme, as cited in Jr, Donald S. Lopez, and The Dalai Lama. Opening the Eye of New Awareness. Rev Sub. Wisdom Publications, 1985. p.65
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for the great vehicle sutra, in order to achieve perfection in calm abiding, nine mental abiding\textsuperscript{13}, six powers\textsuperscript{14} and four mental engagements\textsuperscript{15} are mentioned.\textsuperscript{16} The nine mental abiding function in the following ways; for instance setting the mind etc. functions having directed the mind at the object\textsuperscript{17} of observation, not allowing its continuum to be distracted, having noticed distraction quickly return the mind to that object. The awareness also withdraws the mind inside more and more and seeing the good qualities, tame the mind in meditative stabilization. Through seeing the faults of distraction pacify dislike for meditative stabilization. Desire and so forth as well as discomfort and so forth likewise should be pacified immediately upon arising. Then, those who make effort at restraint make endeavor in the mind. Eventually, natural arising is attained and calm abiding is established. Similarly, the functions of six powers and four mental engagements can be known from the same text and its commentary by Asanga.

Vipasyana or Insight Meditation according to Mahayana tradition as described in the ninth chapter of Shantideva’s Bodhicaryavatara from verse 79-106\textsuperscript{18} is as follows; the four mindfulness are of, kaya/body, vedana/feeling, citta/mind and dharma/phenomena. First, kaya-smritiupasthāna/mindfulness of body - generally, the human body is regarded as a single entity, whereas, in actual fact, it is not so. None of the many parts of the body can be called the body. It is only their ‘samudāya’ or collection which is erroneously termed as the body. There is no truly existent body in any of these parts because the parts have their own name, for example hands and feet, we do not call a hand a body and neither a foot a body. Likewise, the hands and feet are merely a collection of fingers; again fingers, in themselves, are a collection of joints; the joints too comprise different elements or parts. How can, therefore, the hands and feet or other joints be credited with true existence? Even the parts of fingers consist of atomic particles which are further divisible. These atomic particles have their own directional parts, some having a pull in the east, some in the west or north or south or even downward or upward according to their nature. They are ‘śūnya’ like space itself in the ultimate analysis. There is no atom, no particle of atom; there is only ‘śūnyatā’ or energy like. Śūnyatā does not mean nothingness, if it so, there will not be any arising and, yet it cannot be pointed as to what it is, but it is not like a sky flower or a unicorn, it is simply beyond words. Śāntideva says, ‘śūnyatā is unattainable by intelligence’.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, no wise man should, therefore, be attached to forms which are just dream and illusory like.

Second, ‘vedānā smritiopsthāna’ - Neither suffering nor joy is real or truly existent; if suffering were real it should affect everyone including those in a state of so-called joy. ‘vedānā or feeling is of three kinds; the feelings of joy, of suffering and of neither joy nor suffering. Therefore, both happiness and grief must be regarded as only by fancy super-imposed on the mind. On the other hand, vedana or feeling is born of contact, contact or touch is born of three factors: the object, the senses and consciousness. All contacts are born of six situations\textsuperscript{20}; if the six-fold contact from

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. the power of hearing, 2. the power of thinking, 3. the power of mindfulness, 4. the power of introspection, 5. the power of effort, 6. the power of familiarity
  \item 1. forcible engagement, 2. interrupted engagement, 3. uninterrupted engagement, 4. effortless engagement
  \item Chapter 4, Verse 48-49
  \item As mentioned in p. 3 earlier
  \item Sharma, Parmananda. Sāntideva’s Bodhicharyavatara, Aditya Prakashan, Delhi, 2001 pp. 424-438
  \item 9th chapter 2nd verse, Bodicaryavatara of Śāntideva
  \item contact of six organs and six objects and six consciousnesses
\end{itemize}
the three-fold factors does not occur, the requisite situational material for feeling would be obviated. If there is a gap between the sense faculties (like eyes) and their objects or seen form, the chances of contact would be nullified. Not only that, there is no contact between atomic particles either, that is, atomic particles of the sense faculty and those of the objects. There is no union of atomic particles and they have no space inside of them. They are also equal in size. How can these partless atomic particles merge? Consequently, there is no meeting and hence no question of a contact. Without having contact, there is no feeling as the contact is the cause of feeling. Furthermore, only a physical object can contact another physical object. A physical object cannot contact a non-physical thing like consciousness. Hence, in the absence of contact, all the bother about obtaining pleasure and discarding pain is meaningless, because both joys and sorrows have no true existence.

Third, citta-smritupasthāna: There are two things in terms of mindfulness of mind, the senses that cognize and the objects of their so-called cognition. Does cognition, if any, come about simultaneously with or prior to or after the disappearance of objects? If simultaneous, knowing and knower will not be interdependent, if prior or after, there will be a knower without knowing or there will be a knowing without a knower. Therefore, there is no independent or intrinsic knowing and knower. Ratnakuta-sutra says, “What does please, antagonize or attract that mind? Is it the past or the future or the present? That which is past is dead, that which is future is not yet present, and that which is present will not stay. O Kaśyapa! The mind is illusory and seems to grasp different aspects from imagination.” 21

Fourth, dharma-smritupasthāna: No phenomena exist truly or intrinsically at the ultimate level. Nagarjuna says, “Never are things born, nor do things exist by themselves, nor from other or from both, nor from no cause.”22 Similarly, all that appears as real are not in fact real but like dreams, mirages and magical illusion, because all phenomena come into existence only when the necessary causes and conditions get together. “Whatever that appears depending on others is emptiness. There is nothing that arises without depending on others.”23 None that exists because of causes and conditions can ever be truly existent and independent. Take for instance a reflection, there needs to be certain things like a mirror, light and a thing for the appearance of a reflection of that particular thing. Similarly, all phenomena depend upon certain causes and conditions to arise and they do not exist inherently in reality. As Nagarjuna says in the Precious Garland, “all phenomena are selfless just as a banana tree with nothing inside when all its parts are torn apart”.24 Similarly, it is said, Everything is dependently co-arisen and that is to be the emptiness. There isn’t anything that is not dependently arisen, thus a non-empty thing does not exist.25 In this way, the practice of mindfulness or insight meditation according to Madhyamaka tradition is to indeed to see and realize that form is empty and empty itself is form, thereafter realizing that all suffering comes from cherishing the self and phenomena as well as knowing that those who have not come to the realization of such as suffering. With such a realization comes the aspiration to benefit all those sentient beings as long as space endures, this is the result of vipāsana or insight meditation.

22 Muladhayamakakarika, 1st chapter 39 verse
23 Muladhayamakakarika 22:18-19
25 Apratyasamutpanno dharma’ kascinna vidyate / yasmattasmadasEnyo hi dharma’ kascinna vidyate// (Madhyamakasastra 24.19)
According to the Mahamudra practitioners or the 84 Siddhas’ tradition, all sentient beings possess Buddha nature which is only adventitiously covered by defilements, hence in this tradition it is emphasized that we maintain the uncontrived nature of body, speech and mind. Similarly, it is said in the sutra that neither there is anything that needs to be cleared nor anything to be maintained, view things as it is, because seeing everything as it is will free you from all obscurations. The way of maintaining the uncontrived nature of mind is as explained below with analogies. The guarding of mind is as described through the analogy of a lion and a dog, for instance, if a person throws a stone on the lion, the lion will react to the person who threw the stone and not to the stone. But an ordinary dog will chase the stone and not the person who threw it, in the same way, a good practitioner will chase the source of the discursive thoughts and not the thoughts themselves. When chasing the source, the thoughts will disperse naturally, for example, it is like snowing in the ocean where snows get dispersed with the water as soon as it falls into the oceanic water. Similarly, one way is to actually look at the thoughts themselves instead of suppressing or trying to ignore them. This prevents us from being carried away by a train of thoughts, if we act like an ordinary dog; each thought leads into another and takes us far away from our original nature. By simply watching the thought in this fashion it will dissolve back into the mind just as waves eventually dissolve back into the ocean. Another method is to “spy” on the invading thoughts: “Where did it come from?” “Where is it going?” “What is its nature?” By investigating it in this way it loses its power to captivate our attention and it dissolves back into the mind. Furthermore, mahamudra practitioners meditate upon the mind as shown below through six analogies.

The first is meditation like the sky illuminated by brilliant sunshine and which is completely unobscured by the slightest disturbance. The second is meditation like a child staring at the complex frescoes found in temples. Older people generally begin to analyze the paintings immediately according to their own tastes, but a child stares at them without judgment or evaluation. The third method is likened to an eagle soaring in the sky – flying long way without having to flap its wings often. In the same way, practitioners need slight analysis occasionally only for preventing sinking and agitation of lucid nature as well as maintain the lucid nature of the primordial mind. The fourth example is the stillness of a great ocean. In the same way as small fishes move about in the depth of an ocean without disturbing it, distracting thoughts may arise in our meditation but they do not have the power to overcome the profound stillness of the mind. The fifth example is a bird which flies through the sky without leaving the slightest trace behind it. In the same way if we experience a pleasurable sensation during meditation we cling to it and attachment arises or if we experience an unpleasant sensation, aversion arises. But when engaged in the actual fruit of calm-abiding no such trace remains to indicate our feelings since there is a complete lack of attachment, aversion or indifference. The sixth method is to meditate in the same way as a piece of fluff floats on the breeze, very soft and light. When we are absorbed in concentration on the nature of the mind, we will experience a sensation of physical and mental lightness and suppleness. These are some of the famous examples how to guard our mind as said by the Siddhas in order to achieve the perfection of meditation. In short, by keeping our body, speech and mind relaxed without any fabrication, as said by Gampopa, not stirring the water will keep the water clear; similarly, not contriving the mind will bring the manifestation of its primordial nature.

26 Abhisamayalankara 5th chapter verse 21
According to Tantra, all sentient beings possess Buddha nature or divine qualities, if the nature of the sentient beings is not divine then they can never be transformed into divine beings. For example, as said in various Tantric Literatures, one can only get sesame oil from sesame seed and butter from milk; one cannot get butter from water and oil from sand. Therefore, if all sentient beings do not have buddha nature, they cannot become buddhas, so sentient beings are indeed have the nature of buddha. In fact, Tantra literally means ‘continuity’ or ‘continuum’ of innate nature, Primordial nature, Tathāgatagarbha, Samantabhadra, Mahāmudrā, Great Consummation, Tantra, Great Śūnyatā and so on. Tantra is the inseparable subtle wind and luminosity, which is the base of all appearances. I think this is the main crux of Tantra. Sometimes, this is referred as wisdom and wind or energy, which cannot be separated from the clarity/mind and wind/its dynamic nature. It is like the fire and its warmness or flower and its odor. In Tibetan, we use the term rlung/energy-sems/mind-dbyer-med/inseparable. This is the tantra, which is continuous from the beginning less time. In Tantra tradition there is no mention of terms such as calm abiding and insight meditation, instead of that there appears two stages of meditation known as generation stage and completion stage. Generation stage is to generate oneself or one’s subtle energy and mind in the form of divine deity and this is an alternate to calm abiding meditation. To see and realize this generated divine deity lacking inherent existence etc. is the completion stage and this is as same as insight meditation.

The practice of generation stage according to Guhyasamaja Tantra is done in the form of approach, close-approach, accomplishment and great accomplishment. According to Krishnayamari Tantra, it is practiced through yoga, anu-yoga, ati-yoga and maha-yoga. In Hevajra Tantra, generation stage is practiced through four parts/branches. According to Mahamaya Tantra, it is practiced through three yogas and according to Kalachakra Tantra, it is done through four yogas. The completion stage is practiced through six-fold yoga, yoga of psychic heat, yoga of clear light, yoga of illusory body, yoga of intermediate rebirth, yoga of dream, yoga of consciousness transference.

Conclusion: Theravada, Vaibhasika, Sautrantika assert atom as existing in reality and hence view the four noble truths as the object of knowledge of the noble beings. Therefore, the noble beings see the cyclic existence as in the nature of suffering, impermanence, impure and emptiness of self and practice this in their meditation. It is just as one has a very good friend and is usually very fond of the friend but when suddenly one day one comes to know that the friend is cheating and since then generates a feeling of aversion towards that friend. Similarly, from the beginning less time we have befriended with the cyclic existence and we are very attached to it. But once we start practicing samatha meditation and gain through the vipasyana or insight the faults of cyclic existence in the form of suffering, impermanence, dreamlike and so on, that insight makes us turn away from the cyclic existence and leads to Nirvana.

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27 Sevavidhanam prathamaṃ dvitiyamupasasadhanam //Sadhanaṃ tu tṛtīyaṃ vai mahasadhanam caturthakam // (Guhyasamajatantra 18.135)
28 Prathamaṃ bhavayet yogamuyogam dvitiyakam //Atiyogam tṛtīyaṃ tu mahayogam cathurthakam // (KRS’ayamar’tantra 17.8)
29 Prathamaṃ sEnyatabodhi dvitīyāṃ bijasaṃgraham //Tṛṭīyāṃ bimbaniSpattiscaturthāṃ nyasamakSaram // (Hevajratantra 1.3.2)
30 Sa yogstrividhiriprakara’ mantra-saṣṭhama-dharmatma.(Mahamayatantra gu’avaṭṭ’ka)
31 Buston collecton vol. 14, p. 888, Lokesh Chandra, Delhi 1980
From the Mahayana point of view, all phenomena are of interdependent nature, for instance, the existence of a piece of paper depends in the following manner, it has come from tree, tree has its origin in earth, open space, light of sun, oceanic vapor, wind etc. Tree cannot come into existence on its own without depending on these elements, as if all these elemental contributions are reduced, there will not be something as a tree existing. Hence, all phenomena are dependently arisen and whatever is dependently arisen is empty of intrinsic existence. So, from the Madhayamaka point of view, body, feeling, mind and phenomena are viewed as not existing inherently but merely as an illusion and practicing meditating on this is the insight meditation. In Tantra, it is the practice of generation and completion stages and for the Siddahas it is to maintain the uncontrived nature of mind. These are some of the fundamental principles in terms of meditative practice in Buddhism.

Meditative Attainment: the ultimate result of such meditative practices is to attain Liberation and Buddhahood. From the mundane view, as said by His Holiness the Dalai Lama “Modern world creates excitement but not happiness. This excitement disturbs our mind and upsets our nervous system. Meditation is the only way to calm the mind and nervous system and in order to help us to lead a healthy life through spiritual development. Health is highest gain if we neglect our health no matter what we gain. We will lead a very miserable life. It is already established that meditation is the remedy for physical and mental sickness. So medical science or therapy are not so effective in helping a person to eradicate mental disturbances such as frustration and worries because they arise not only as a result of organic disorders, but are mind created. Therefore the remedy for these problems is meditation.”

The result of meditation is something that cannot be measured by a physical scale; it can only be individually experienced by analyzing the changes after the meditation practice by seeing how our delusion is decreasing and how the loving kindness is increasing. The detail results of the Vipasyana meditation can be read in ‘Impact of Vipasyana in Government, A research report.’

33 Published by Vipasyana Research Institute, Dhammagiri, Igatpuri, Maharashtra, India, 2005
Breathing Mindfulness: Text and Practice

Dr Sarah Shaw

In the Mahāsaccakasutta, the Buddha gives some rare autobiographical recollection, describing the turning point of his abandonment of the mortifications as the memory of practising jhāna as a boy during the ploughing festival, when left for a while by his father under the shade of a rose-apple tree; the earliest ‘biography’ we have of the Buddha, the Jātaka-nidāna, describes the practice he undertook at that time as meditation on the breath (J I 58). Whether or not the attribution of breathing mindfulness is correct to this incident, the fact that such an early source regards the practice as crucial in Gotama’s decision to take food and to put aside fear of ‘the joy that is free from sense desires’ (M I 246–7) in his search for awakening offers testament, even outside extensive suttanta sources, to the centrality of this practice in Pali Buddhist meditation and doctrine. Within the suttas, the Buddha frequently recommended breathing mindfulness, describing it as a ‘complete method for attaining Nirvana’ (S V 326), praising it as the noble abode (ariyavihāra), the divine abode (brahmavihāra) and the Buddha abode (Tathāgatavihāra). In the famous incident in which a group of monks become severely unbalanced as the result of unwise attention to the foul (asubha), the Buddha resorts to breathing mindfulness in its aspect as a samādhi practice to restore their health of mind, saying as a preliminary to the basic instructions: ‘It is just as if, monks, in the last month of the hot season, when the dust and dirt fly up, a great rain cloud out of season were to disperse and settle them. In just this way, monks, concentration by means of breathing mindfulness, when cultivated and made much of, is peaceful and choice: it is a sublime and happy abiding too, that disperses and settles harmful states of mind whenever they arise (S V 322).’

The breathing mindfulness discourse, or Ānāpanasati-sutta (M III 78–88), describing all sixteen stages of the practice, is one of core texts of the Pāli canon and the subject of extensive commentary by Buddhaghosa and Upatissa; it describes what has become now one of the most popular meditations for modern practitioners, throughout the world.1 As Buddhism travelled both practice and text remained important: one version of the sūtra is the earliest extant Buddhist text we have, introduced to China by An Shigao around 148 CE. Indeed breathing practices appear to have remained popular, though subject to a number of modifications within different doctrinal and ritual frameworks: many schools of Buddhism employ some breathing techniques as part of or as a preliminary to other practices.2 Within Southern Buddhism, however, breathing mindfulness techniques, text and practice have retained a centrality at all stages of path, so that the breath itself is explored with a complexity and range of practice not obviously shared by all other forms of Buddhism. This comprehensiveness is perhaps associated with or dependent upon the great breadth and scope both of the original texts, doctrinal and practical explanations of the practice in the commentaries, and, in modern times, in the diversity of modern meditative contexts. This paper will explore briefly some modern variations in technique and orientation in three modern breathing mindfulness schools. It hopes to demonstrate that the spirit and the letter of the text,

1 It will be referred to as AS in this paper.
2 See, for example, Luk 1964, Donner and Stevenson 1993, Kaplau 2000 and Zahler 2009. The attribution of the influence of early Buddhist breathing mindfulness techniques in each instance is difficult and would need very specific examination of the sources and background in its own context. For instance Taoist practices connected with the breath appear to have been widely cultivated before the arrival of Buddhism (Roth 1999: 110-111, 118, 134, 135-6).
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described within the first tetrad of the early *sutta*, also given in the (*Mahā*)satipatthāna-*sutta* (M I 56 and D II 291), have accommodated a great deal of variety and diversity, evinced by the range of practices on the breath, not only from this sample, also available now. The focus will just be on the original *sutta*, some early commentarial advice, and some variations in three schools.

The Practice of Breathing Mindfulness

The extent of practices within various Buddhist contexts that relate to or take as their primary focus the breath, the nature of these practices and their possible relationship with early sources, such as AS, would be the subject of an extensive research program in itself: it is outside the scope of this discussion. But as the leading twentieth-century monk and scholar Vajirañāṇa notes, the practice of mindfulness of breathing, the twenty-ninth object selected by Buddhaghosa, is regarded from the early days of the tradition as the “root” (*mūla*) meditation object (Vajirañāṇa 1975: 227), as it could be said to be in modern Southern Buddhism. While all Buddhaghosa’s forty *samatha* subjects are employed for *samatha* practice, many of these are considered less suited to the practice of insight and the recognition of the three marks of anicca, dukkha and anattā (see also Cousins 1973, 1984b). The *sutta* itself, particularly through the instructions of the last tetrad, often associated specifically with the insight and *vipassanā* stages of meditation, stresses the full salvific possibilities of the practice conducted through all sixteen stages. As argued elsewhere, AS itself suggests a complex interplay, through the integration of the seven factors of awakening, between *samatha* and *vipassanā* (Shaw 2006: 146–153). Indeed its perceived immediacy and availability marks breathing mindfulness out from the other *samatha* objects: it is the only object of the forty that, according to Buddhaghosa, is apprehended in its early stages solely by touch, as the practitioner has to feel the breath as it enters his body, rather than by sight or hearing (*suta*), the means by which other objects are apprehended.3 It is associated from the earliest texts with the suppression of discursive thoughts, and is particularly recommended in the *suttas* (Ud 34–7; A I 449), the Niddesa (Nidd I 360) and the manuals (PF 69; Vism III 121) for those prone to excessive or troublesome thinking (*vitakka*) or delusion.

In AS, after a warm address to his followers, the Buddha speaks in praise of mindfulness of breathing, claiming that it is a practice that leads, to the establishment of all four foundations of mindfulness, and then to the seven factors of awakening. He asks the rhetorical question: what are the benefits of mindfulness of breathing? How is it to be cultivated and “made much of” (*bahulikata*)? His instructions begin with some preliminaries and brief physical directions. Curiously, it is the only meditation object of the forty routinely introduced with specific instructions regarding posture and possible location.4 This preliminary series of instructions is found throughout the canon (see, for instance, D II 291, M I 59, S V 317). One must find an “empty space,” perhaps at the roots of a tree or in a forest, sit cross-legged, make the body straight.5 There is no specific instruction to close

3  By being ‘heard’ Buddhaghosa probably means that it is brought to mind by attributes that have been heard about through teachings (Vism III 119). The subsequent development of the *nimitta*, the visual sign that works within this practice at a later stage when calm has been established, involves an internal “seeing” of what is in the mind’s eye. Buddhaghosa differentiates this feature in one passage from other objects (Vism III 119).
4  The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* does not specify a particular object in its instructions for the preliminaries and sitting for the pursuit of *jhāna*.
5  The commentary to the *Satipatthāna sutta* that the posture is taken for three reasons: for its firmness, its ease for breathing and for its expediency in apprehending the object (Soma 1981: 46).
the eyes, though this is usual for most Southern Buddhist breathing practices; the meditator is asked to “set up mindfulness before [oneself]”.

The practitioner follows sixteen sets of instructions. For the limited space of this discussion, I shall confine this comparison to the first tetrad, mindfulness of body.

1. “Mindful, he breathes in; mindful, he breathes out. As he breathes in a long breath, he knows, ‘I am breathing in a long breath’, or, as he breathes out a long breath, he knows, ‘I am breathing out a long breath’.

2. As he breathes in a short breath, he knows, ‘I am breathing in a short breath’. Or, as he breathes out a short breath, he knows, ‘I am breathing out a short breath’.

3. He trains thus: ‘Experiencing the whole body I shall breathe in’; he trains thus: ‘Experiencing the whole body I shall breathe out’.

4. He trains thus: ‘Making tranquil the bodily formation I shall breathe in’; he trains thus: ‘Making tranquil the bodily formation I shall breathe out’.

In AS, where all sixteen instructions are given, the audience is monastic. In the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta these first four instructions are given to an audience the commentaries say was constituted by those from the four assemblies of monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen (Soma 1981: 18). In that sutta, the four stages are given after instructions for the practice of mindfulness in daily activities, under mindfulness of body. In that text, though not in AS, the attention of the meditator is compared to a skilled wood-turner, who knows if he is turning a long turn, or a short one (M I 56).

The Commentaries and Early Manuals

The practice is discussed by early commentaries, texts and manuals (Paṭis I 163–196; Vism VIII 145–244; PF 156-166: Soma 1981). Some variation is evident even from this time. The commentary to this practice in the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta treats this tetrad primarily as a samatha practice, a preliminary to insight. It says that through practicing long breaths, the breath becomes finer because of the desire (chanda) of the practitioner, until joy (pīti) arises in him, and the breath becomes yet finer. At this stage the practitioner turns away from the long breath, with equanimity firm. For the third stage, the practitioner may be less aware at the beginning, the middle, the end of the breath, or at all three. So, this stage marks his resolution to experience the whole of the breath body as it enters and leaves the body (Soma 1981: 47–8). The commentary describes the fourth instruction, the making tranquil of the breath, within the parameters of an entire salvific path. The meditator finds that coarseness of breath is associated with coarseness of mental state. Through calming the breath body, the mind and body become rested. The mental image (nimitta) can then arise, and the four jhānas undertaken. Emerging from these, he/she makes the breath body or

More generally, Buddhaghosa gives under the earth kasina, the paradigm samatha practice, some physical instructions concerning guarding the sign, which refers to location, posture and place of practice (Vism IV 34-41) and the list of the ten skills in absorption, that include basic care of the body (Vism IV 43).

The commentaries say that he ‘fixes the attention by directing it towards the breath which is in front’ (Soma 1981: 47). Although there is no canonical text to my knowledge which specifically enjoins that the eyes be closed for breathing mindfulness practice, there are commentarial passages recommending this for the main part of the kasina practice, as a contrast to the preliminary stage where there is an external visible object, and the eyes are half shut and half open (Vism IV 125).
Buddhaghosa’s manual (Vism VIII 163–225) takes the practice in this tetrad also firstly a *samatha* exercise, leading then to insight and arahantship. But he in addition describes four stages: counting (*gaṇanā*), following (*anubandhanā*), touching (*phusanā*) and settling (*ṭhapanā*). These stages successively count the breaths, follow the breath in and out of the body, take a point of contact with the nostril or mouth as the practitioner breathes, and settle upon the mental image (*nimitta*) that arises as the basis of *jhāna* practice. For the touching, the attention is compared to a man using a saw, who concentrates upon the point of contact with a tree trunk he is cutting, but is mindful of the movement of the saw itself (Vism VIII 202; *Paṭis I* 171). In the settling the image is described, and the practice to develop it is compared to awareness of the sound of the gong, that requires more subtle attention as the sound fades away (Vism VIII 206). When the *nimitta* is clear in the mind’s eye, the practitioner develops the *jhānas* and then insight, through awareness of name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*), and the three marks, overcomes doubts, abandons the ten defilements of insight, and becomes established in the four paths. Upatissa, in a commentary extant only in an early Chinese translation (PF 156–166), also describes the image and the four stages for this tetrad, and terms the ‘body’ that is experienced in the third instruction as the breath body as the inbreath and the outbreath, along with the body (*kāya*) of mental factors in the mind. He teaches this tetrad solely as a *samatha* practice, showing some variation even in early commentaries. For the fourth instruction of the tetrad, the practitioner is described as calming the bodily formations and progressing through the *jhānas*.

### Some Points of Debate

As well as these slightly differing slants, there are a number of features, even of the first line of these instructions, which have been the subject of debate since the earliest times. These give some indication of the subtle practical implications involved in the exegesis of just a few lines of texts involving meditational advice. For instance, is *ānā* the in-breath or the out-breath, and *pāṇa* the out-breath or the in-breath? There was an ancient controversy on this issue, with the *Vinaya* (Monastic Rules) and Upatissa’s *Vimuttimagga* (*Path of Freedom*), placing the outbreath first (see PF 157, 160). Most sources, however, take the inbreath first, on the grounds that it is the first breath taken at human birth (see Vajiraṅgāna 1975, 230-3). Indeed, where it is stated, the practice is usually translated and undertaken with the inbreath as the first breath, as it is in Upatissa’s manual when actually described (PF 160). In this regard, all Southern schools this writer has encountered take the inbreath first in their instructions.

Hardly surprisingly, they do vary in some practical interpretations. In this regard, it is worth noting that the language of the instructions, through its rhythms, repeated words and pace, seems to have been composed to support the meditational advice it enjoins: it feels like instructions to be used. The advice for the first two stages is given in the first person, an inevitable byproduct of the Indic languages’ means of communicating indirect speech, but an effective one, used elsewhere, for instance, for instructions for the mindfulness of death (A III 303–6). Immediacy is further
communicated by the use of the present tense: the practice of loving kindness is sometimes described through employing the optative, for instance, suitable to its ‘wish’, that the practice is pursued and that there will be well-being for others (Sn 143–152). But the present tense, also sometimes used for loving kindness practice when described in the third person, is descriptive rather than prescriptive (M I 283–4). Does this suggest that these first two stages, where the practitioner simply notes ‘I breathe in a long breath’ etc, simply observe rather than express intention? Do instructions three and four, and indeed all remaining fourteen stages, where the future is used, and a new verb, ‘he trains’ (sikkhati) suggest active choice in length of breath for each instruction?

So to see how modern practitioners apply these instructions for teachings, and other issues connected with the first tetrad, we will look at Buddhadāsa’s instructions for breathing mindfulness, the method taught by Boonman Poonyathiro, an adaptation of traditional Thai practices, and modern vipassanā methods, as represented by Nyanaponika Thera’s Heart of Buddhist Meditation. It should be stated right first that the teaching of meditation is often privately conducted, and specific schools may not publish all of their instructions, or how they would adapt the practice to individual needs, as the tradition to this day still follows canon and commentary and places much emphasis on suitability, the good friend (kalyāṇamitta) and personal contact (see eg. Ud 34–7, Vism III 74-103, PF 54–62; Shaw 2006: 4–20). So information that has been placed in published material in the public domain is used here, on the grounds that it probably indicates a broad underlying approach, which, this paper assumes, may be modified in different situations. All three teachers received extensive training in traditional monastic meditative settings.

1. Buddhadāsa

Buddhadāsa (1906–1993) was one of the great reformist monks of the twentieth century, who, dissatisfied with shortcomings he perceived in monastic meditative practice, set up his own meditation center, Suan Mokkh (literally ‘Garden of Liberation’), that fulfilled his wish for tranquil, rural and simple conditions for the practice of meditation. He taught there until his death. His ideas on many subjects were controversial; his meditation practices, as described in Mindfulness with Breathing, follow closely both the letter and the spirit of the earliest texts.

He treats the tetrad as part of the whole process of the sixteen instructions. He teaches each of the four instructions separately, in line with the recommendations of the sutta. He does not list the four stages described by Buddhaghosa and Upatissa, except through allusion, but gives a thorough practical exegesis of them in this indirect manner as part of work on the practice and as contributory to the development of jhāna (Buddhadāsa 1988: 40). He differentiates carefully between the two lengths of long and short breath, noting that how the breath lengthens as the mind becomes calm and that the ‘long breath brings a greater sense of peace and well-being’ (Buddhadāsa 1988: 27). He advocates noticing the things that make the breath short or long, fine or coarse, introducing an investigative element. For the short breath he shows how to make the breath finer at each length, which ‘will calm down our bodies. They become cool. When we wish to cool down our bodies, we bring out a fine breath’ (30). Buddhadāsa treats the tetrad as primarily a samādhi practice, offering considerable encouragement and explanation on the cultivation of joy and happiness as integral to these initial stages (44–7). In line with Upatissa’s approach and much traditional interpretation, he sees the tetrad as a samatha stage leading in the last tetrad to insight, though always emphasizes
investigation. Throughout his work he stresses the practice of mindfulness in daily life, consultation, suitability of practice to individual and what he terms the ‘cool’ of ‘nibbāna in daily life’, with the development of samādhi leading to insight (100–2). The cultivation of mindfulness is emphasized throughout. Mindfulness of the breath in a more general sense than the meditation during the day is taught, a feature that all three schools described here share and which renders their respective practices perhaps particularly suited to a modern setting.

2. Samatha Trust, UK.

One of the most longstanding groups practicing breathing mindfulness in the United Kingdom is the Samatha Trust. Its honorary president, Boonman Poonyathiro, now in his eightieth year, started teaching after being a monk in Thailand for many years. Unable to obtain a visa to teach meditation in the West, not then a policy of the Thai government, he disrobed and started teaching in Britain in the early 1960s (Poonyathiro 2004). A Samatha Trust was formed in 1973 and a national centre founded in 1987. As a lay organization the Trust has no formal links to the sangha, but has strong and frequent contacts with the monastic communities of Britain and Southeast Asia, including chant and meditation. A number of practitioners have taken temporary ordination in Thailand and Sri Lanka. The centre was granted relics of the Buddha by the Thai government and its Buddha figure was commissioned and cast in Thailand, generously donated to the Trust.

Boonman Poonyathiro also teaches a graduated, samatha breathing mindfulness practice, aimed at jhāna, with insight usually as a culmination of this process, although the form of the practice is occasionally adapted with an insight emphasis. The method has sixteen stages, largely corresponding to the four stages of counting, following, touching and settling described by Buddhaghosa. The instructions of the method have not as yet been made publicly available in detail, mainly because of the emphasis accorded by this school to personal teaching, freshness of contact and suitability in teaching stages to individuals. Information for this paper is derived from personal observation, Bluck’s *British Buddhism* (Bluck 2006: 49–64) and publications produced by the Samatha Trust. The instructions for this practice make a clear differentiation between a long and a short breath. Employing Buddhaghosa’s and Upatissa’s terminology of counting, following, touching and settling, the stages are graduated, and changed by the meditator when he/she is ready. The instructions for the practice take six months to a year to learn. The first stages involves ‘breathing the longest comfortable breath without straining’ to a count of nine, followed in turn by breathing to account of six, then three, then one as ‘the shortest comfortable breath’. These four stages, known as the ‘longest of counting’, the ‘longer of counting’, the ‘shorter of counting’ and the ‘shortest of counting’, in each case involve ‘tracing the sensations down as you are breathing in, from the nose down to the navel, and on the outbreath from the navel back to the nose’ (Peter Harvey, quoted in Bluck 2006: 51). Care is taken that there should not be strain in this practice, and that the breaths feel natural and comfortable. The school emphasizes joyful alertness as a feature of the practice, and, in line with its intention to develop the meditations, takes care to ensure the practice retains flow and a good feeling at each stage. The meditator allows the breath to become finer and more subtle, with its flow smoother and more even, so that joy and happiness can develop. At the end of the practice a return to the ‘normal’ breath, usually somewhere between the longer and the shorter stage in most people, is recommended thus establishing a clear distinction between the seclusion of the meditation and daily life. A general awareness of the breath in daily life is encouraged. This is
felt to be appropriate for a practice where jhāna is being actively cultivated, and it is important for
the meditator to be able to put aside the meditation for the return to daily life. This school places
great emphasis on personal teaching and adaptation to the individual. Other articles in newsletters,
journals and publications of the Samatha Trust explore the movement towards a finer appreciation
of the breath within the practice, taking joy as the feature that refines the attention and mindfulness.
Recent research conducted by Dr Paul Dennison of the Samatha Trust has demonstrated that
brainwave patterns of those practicing at certain stages of the meditation, registered on an EEG,
undergo dramatic changes (Samatha 2011: 23–8).

3. Nyanaponika Thera

Nyanaponika Thera (1901–94) was a German born Southern Buddhist monk, who founded
the Buddhist Publication Society in Kandy. He ordained in 1936, and lived at the Island Hermitage,
Dodanduwa. Although interned in the war, he worked extensively on translations and practice. Invited
by the Burmese council to participate in the sixth Buddhist Council, he decided to do mindfulness
training with Ven Mahasi Sayadaw, and subsequently worked extensively on perhaps his most famous
book, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation. This has become a standard reference work and authority
on mindfulness and practices associated with its cultivation. It emphasizes both the practice of
breathing mindfulness and, alongside it, what the author terms ‘the Burmese Satipaṭṭhāna method’.
This method is increasingly popular today, in varying forms: it would be outside the scope of this
discussion to discuss its many varieties, in the popular U Ba Khin and Mahasi Sayadaw schools, so
Nyanaponika’s book is taken as one, classic description. It is widely respected, and used, for instance,
by those working within the scientific communities to establish definitions of, for instance,
mindfulness (eg Brown and Ryan 2003). It describes the practice of breathing mindfulness under
the section on body mindfulness, as the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta does, so also employs, as this sutta
does, the first tetrad, integrating it with other practices the Thera recommends. He does not advise
any ‘control’ or intervention in the breath, but says that the movement towards a longer breath will
happen naturally:

The length or shortness of the breathing is noticed, but not deliberately regulated. By regular
practice, however, a calming equalizing and deepening of the breath will result quite naturally;
and the tranquilization and deepening of the breath rhythm will lead to a tranquillization
and deepening of the life-rhythm (Nyanaponika 1962: 61).

He says that because of this, the practice is associated with mental and physical health: and that ‘even
such a brief and casual application of the mind to the ‘breath-body’ lays the foundation for a very
noticeable feeling of well-being, self-sufficient happiness and invulnerable quietude’. (Nyanaponika
1962: 62). He advises an application of a ‘few, conscious, deep and calm respirations before starting
any continuous work’. The factors he associates with the practice are concentration and mindfulness,
‘for ordinary as well as higher purposes’. Breath ‘stands on the threshold between the voluntary and
the involuntary bodily functions, and thus offers a good opening to extend the scope of conscious
control over the body’ (62–3). In accordance with the principles explained in the Sutta, he says that
it is primarily a samatha object, but can be used for insight too, because of its nature of rise and fall.
So while he does not teach its samatha characteristics, he acknowledges their importance.
In another section he describes how attention to the breathing process is conducted as what he describes as the Burmese Satipaṭṭhāna method. After extensive instructions for the sitting posture, moderation in food, and mindfulness practice in daily life, he describes the sitting practice. For this he describes turning one’s attention to the rise and fall of the abdomen as the breathing is going on, attending to the ‘slight sensation of pressure’ of the breath, not visually observing it. This makes this point of contact the primary object (mūl’ arammanā) of the practice. Insight then arises naturally, he says, as a result of this attention. But this is not, he says, a variety of mindfulness of breathing: the attention is on the abdomen, and the sensations there. Elaborating on this method as an insight practice, he describes the process of labeling touching-sitting for this purpose, instructions associated with what he terms ‘Bare Insight’ (sukkha vipassanā), a method he says develops both concentration and mindfulness, though not jhāna. He recommends that for some many, the jhānas and calm should be cultivated first, through a method such as Ānāpānasati. For others, practicing insight methods, momentary concentration is still needed for the insight to be developed. This can lead afterwards to jhāna. So he recommends this ‘insight’ method as being suitable for many: it may produce more immediate results, it arouses confidence, renders the practice of samatha more accessible, and is a practical way of developing insight for people with busy lives. It is noteworthy that he does not reject the practice of breathing mindfulness as described in the sutta, and indeed recommends it. He rather suggests that the Burmese method he describes and favors may be more suitable for busy people or those discouraged by initial failure in jhāna practice. In the section associated with breathing mindfulness itself, and in this one, he carefully notes the need for the development of jhāna, which he translates as ‘absorption’, for a full salvific path.

As has been demonstrated, all these approaches, although slightly varied in practicalities, feature developments validated within the context of the initial instructions and commentarial advice. These breathing mindfulness schools are adaptive in practice: the word ‘suitable’ is often found in instructions in all these traditions, a reflection of the sense of flexibility to individual need that still characterizes the tradition to this day. All recommend some awareness of the breath and body in a generalized sense during daily activities. In traditionally based Buddhist schools, chanting, and other practices, such as loving kindness, are also recommended, as supports and accompaniments to the practice of breathing mindfulness. This multiplicity has, of course, canonical precedent (see eg Ud 34–7).

Indeed despite distinct variation within the first tetrad, the three methods share more affinities than differences. As indicated, the first three tetrads of the practice, concerned with body, feelings and citta, are sometimes associated with samatha and the last, of dhammas, with vipassanā. The interplay between the seven factors of awakening, however, that include both investigation of dhammas, associated with wisdom, and joy and tranquility, associated with calm, validates a potential slant towards either approach for any instruction within the sutta. Diversity of orientation may be seen. Buddhadāsa proposes simply exploring closely the difference between the long and short breaths, advising changing to a shorter breath for the second instruction and introducing investigation into his calm meditation. The primarily samatha based school, taught by Boonman Poonyathiro, perhaps more formally differentiates between ‘long’ and the ‘short’ breaths within the practice, as described in the sutta. As seen through its instruction to return to ‘normal’ breathing at the end, the normal or ‘middle’ length breath is taken as the basis for daily life outside practice. It should be noted a sense of good humor and joy is also felt to be particularly important within this tradition for the practice to develop well and without strain. Background awareness of the breath in
the day is encouraged. Nyanaponika Thera, in contrast to these two, makes no overt recommendation to influence the length of the breath through conscious decision, and indeed appears to discourage it at first, a feature perhaps vindicated by the use of the present tense rather than the future in the first two instructions as given in the canon, though Buddhaddāsa, in teaching his method, notes that the breath becomes longer as the mind relaxes. The simile of the wood-turner is interesting in the light of these approaches: does the wood turner choose whether to do a long or a short turn? The complexity of the question in a practice context, where slightly different aims color different approaches, is worth bearing in mind. It should be noted that most breathing mindfulness schools emphasize contact with the teacher, as implied by the great detail with which the context of the practice is given in AS, and suitability to individual, also in line with canonical and commentarial recommendations. Most such teachers advocate a great deal about awareness of the breath, and the body, in daily life (Dhammasami 1999).

The meditation, in various forms, has proved particularly popular in non-Buddhist areas, such as the North Atlantic regions, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Its adaptations cannot be considered in detail here and are far-ranging. On one side are the esoteric teachings on the exploration of the breath through yantra and traditional Cambodian/Siamese methods (Dennison 1996, 1997). In these, the practice has become aligned with local alchemical ritual, chant and narrative, with a rich mythology of the five-branched fig tree and its crystal spheres. This is linked to the experience of the breath ‘in the body’ and devotion to the Triple Gem (see Bizot 1976; Dennison 1996, 1997, Harris 2005: 100ff). Another teacher, Ajahn Lee Dhammadhāro (1907–61), also used mantra, with the syllables ‘bu’ and ‘ddho’, employed alongside consciously varied long and short breaths. This, of course, links the first two instructions of AS to recollection of the Buddha practices, other traditional meditations (Dhammadhāro 2006). At the other end of the spectrum, a modified form of the practice features prominently in clinical therapeutic contexts in the West. Instructions based on those of early breathing mindfulness techniques are expressly used, in the case, for instance, of Mark Williams’ Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy program in Oxford, initially closely aligned to the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies (Williams and Penman 2011). MBCT exponents acknowledged their debt to Buddhism and indeed have derived the word ‘mindfulness’ from Southern Buddhist contexts. But yet another development can be seen in, for instance, the popularity of the secular ten-minute ‘mindfulness’ exercise given on a British Mental Health Foundation’s podcast, which, without any reference to Buddhism, draws heavily on Buddhist technique and doctrine in its instructions. The practitioner is asked to sit comfortably, with a self-supporting spine, so that the posture ‘embodies a sense of dignity, of taking a stand, of being awake, aware, and in touch with this moment’. The breath is examined, though without any sense of its length, moving throughout the body. The exercises explore the nature of sensations present ‘in this moment’ and awareness of ‘the body as a whole’. Then a more generalized awareness is encouraged. The words ‘Buddhism’ or ‘Buddhist’ are not used, but the tenor of the instructions, the initial recommendations for posture, closely kin to those given in AS, the encouragement of questioning of features of the breath, and the continuing emphasis on awareness, up to the final bell that ends the podcast, follow the pattern of much Buddhist teaching, both in text and in practice.7

So why is the practice so popular? The paper has considered factors that may have contributed to this, and indicated the strength of the commentarial and canonical textual tradition, as supports to a perhaps inherent adaptability and susceptibility to variation evident from the earliest

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7 Mental Health Foundation: http://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/content/assets/audio/mindfulness-10-mins.mp3
times in breathing mindfulness methods. The breath can be an object of calm and/or insight, can be used to arouse mindfulness in daily life, and needs no prior knowledge of any particular tradition or an object to carry around. Buddhaghosa emphasizes that it is the only object requiring touch, rather than sight or sound, in the early stages, perhaps also an inherently ‘transportable’ feature. It is taught by the schools discussed here with a continuation of the Southern Buddhist emphasis on teacher contact, suitability to the individual and a friendly basis in communal practice. It is perhaps these last features that have sustained the continued popularity of the practice in the three methods in Southeast Asia, and, in recent times, in the West. An inherent capacity to accommodate elements of both vipassanā and samatha, at each stage of path, articulated within AS and subsequent commentarial and explanatory material, have contributed to a great richness of technique, theory and teaching in modern breathing mindfulness based schools. From the practitioner’s point of view, the friendly atmosphere in which the Buddha gives the basic instructions in AS, the centrality of personal contact with the teacher (kalyānimitta), and a sense of a carefully graduated path, are perhaps just as important.
Abbreviations:

AS = Ānāpānasati Sutta M: sutta 118.
A = Aṅguttaranikāya.
D = Dīghanikāya.
DhS = Dhammasaṅgani.
M = Majjhimanikāya.
Nidd = Niddesa.
Patis = Paṭisambhidāmagga.
PF = Path to Freedom. Translation of Vimuttimagga by Ehara et al., an early commentary on meditation.
S = Samyuttanikāya.
Sn = Suttanipāta.
Ud = Udāna.
Vism = Visuddhimagga. Cited according to the method used in the translation by Ēnāmoli.

Bibliography and Further Reading:


1. Introduction

This article attempts to illustrate that the right training is able to lead the practitioner to the supra-mundane path, for example through the experience of one own or in a group or community that has been similarly trained for a period which is no less than four decades.

By focusing on “the behavior of the mind”, the purity of the body and mind arrises. As for the body, it is the purification of the body by siṣṭha (morality) and the mind which is calming of the mind from kilesa (mental defilement) to the level of liberation from the medium class of kilesa, i.e., the five impediments: cravinging in sensual pleasure (kāmachanda), ill-will (vyāpāda), mental torpidity (thīnamiddha), worry-and-flurry (uddhaccakukkucca) and doubt (vicikicchā).

This article is resulted from a research based on the practice of the four satipaṭṭhāna or the bases of the cultivation of sati (mindfulness) that are related to the 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās or the right practice which bring finally to paññā (wisdom) that is very close to the ṇānadassana (the Direct Knowledge and Vission) of vimutti (liberation) and vijjā (knowledge) which transcendental as kilesa has been irrevocably and holistically eliminated.

The 15 Caraṇas and 8 Vijjās is a group of the Dharma which once brought in practice under the rubric of “vijjācaraṇasampanno” which is the third of the series of nine attributes of the Lord Buddha in Buddhist chanting called the “Buddhāmusati”. It is the group of the Dharma that can be brought to practice independently. And when it is related to the Dharma of other groups, it is also supportive of them, strengthening their perfection and potentiating their details in practice. A good example is seen in the case related to the four satipaṭṭhānas as shown in this article.

In spiritual development, one has to cultivate the behavior that purifies the body to evolve to adhisīla and the mind purified to the level of adhicitta which is endowed with adhipaññā.

In the development of behavior that purifies the body, it has to begin with the cultivation of the first 3 sets of carana, i.e., 1st -11th carana which is the development of the behavior of the body that of the mind at the same time. The behavior of the body needs to be pure first, then it can serve as the foundation for the development the behavior of the mind to be more and more pure in the last 3 set of carana, i.e., #12-15 of carana together with the 8 vijjās, presenting 4 sides of behavior, namely: behavior toward oneself, behavior toward society, behavior toward organization and/or institute to which s/he is related as well as behavior toward the world environment. All these train people to know the condition of the mind.

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Having truly purified the behavior of the body, s/he has established the foundation for further development, upgrading the mind to enter the supra-mundane path.

Since the body of knowledge of the Dharma of the Lord Buddha is refined, profoundly complicated, the explanation to express the profoundness and complicatness requires coverage of structure, pattern and model, made easy for understanding. Hereby, the exposition is divided into 3 topics as follows:

1.1 Guidelines of practice are divided into 3 topics, namely:

1.1.1 Understanding the unwinding of the three roots of unwholesomeness: rāga, dosa, and moha;

1.1.2 The practice of #1-8 of caraṇa (1st – 2nd sets of caraṇa) having vegetarianism as behavior training discipline;

1.1.3 Management of the five impediments (nivaraṇa) by following caraṇa #8-11 (3rd set of caraṇa)

1.2 Guidelines for the understanding of the structure, pattern and model of body of knowledge in according to the main related Dharma:

1.2.1 Relationship of the four satipaṭṭhānas and 1st – 3rd sets of caraṇa in the frame of “task in The Noble Truth” is simplified into the series of “know–relinquish-clarify-cultivate”.

1.2.2 Relationship of the four satipaṭṭhānas and 1st – 3rd sets of caraṇa

1.2.3 The three roots of unwholesomeness (akusalamūla) and tool for abandoning (pahāna) related to the four satipaṭṭhānas and 1st – 3rd sets of caraṇa

1.2.4 Under taking the four satipaṭṭhānas in 3rd set of caraṇa, #10-11 comprising sati (mindfulness) and paññā (wisdom) which rise as its result, continuing to set 4th.

1.3 Outcome of the practice and its consequence:

1.3.1 The complete purification of the body eliminates doubt (vicikicchā) which enable one to cross over the five impediments, leading to the supra-mundane level of mind.

1.3.2 From consequence rises the body of knowledge of “kukkucca” or flurry in deeper level of the mind, a body of knowledge which will cause further techniques and methods in the management of kilesa with efficiency;

1.3.3 The consequence carries on to the rise of jhāna that burns off kilesa in level of clinging (upādāna) or briefly speaking, it is the use of the four satipaṭṭhāna to destroy kilesa of the body in the beginning, followed by the complete destruction of kilesa that is buried deeply in the mind in the end.

To understand the content in this article, however, it requires a study according to the phenomenon that really happens in practice because the meaning in topics of the Dharma that has meaning behind the meaning that are most profound but used in rather general terms which is the result from practice that is emphasizing on wholesomeness and holistic mutual that are supportive of each other and interically related.
2. Guidelines of practice are divided into 3 topics, namely:

2.1 Understanding the unwinding of the three roots of unwholesomeness: greed (rāga), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha) by practicing the 1st set of caraṇa decreases rāga, dosa and gives rise to the result of the decrese of moha. However, moha has many levels explained as follows:

*moha*: is avijjā or ignorance, the condition without paññā in the gross level. It eclipses the mind, making it unable to know the path leading to the supra-mundane. However, once rāga and dosa are managed in 1st set of caraṇa, moha gradually and continuously dwindles away until the symptoms of “Awaking knowledge” (jagriyānuyoga) arises. Wisdom (paññā) is gradually and accumulatingly increasing together with this is the the decrease of kāmarāga and vyāpāda in the 2nd set of caraṇa until it is decreased to merely to vicikicchā, doubt or uncertainty in the appraisal of the 3rd set of caraṇa which is obstructed to the progress to jhāna, i.e., completely burning off kilesa in the end.

Diagram Illustrates Unwinding of the 3 Roots Of Unwholesomeness in 1St –3Rd Sets Of Caraṇa:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Set Of Caraṇa</th>
<th>2nd Set Of Caraṇa</th>
<th>3rd Set Of Caraṇa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>rāga</strong></td>
<td><strong>kāmarāga</strong></td>
<td><strong>Kāmachanda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- craving to level of addiction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- but able to control; get more calm in 1st level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- attraction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>dosa</strong></td>
<td><strong>vyāpāda (ill-will)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- dissatisfaction from failure to consume (dukkhavedanā)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- dissatisfied, hatred, displeased, unwanted, anger vyāpāda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- able to calm to 1st level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- repulsion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>vyāpāda (ill-will)</strong></td>
<td>- craving sensation in life between the process of decreasing of kāma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- craving to consume decreased in violence to level of stop consuming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kāmachanda</strong> (sufficiency in sensual pleasure)</td>
<td>- small size, more refined than desire in sensual pleasure of the body to point of non-returning; level of craving in sensation e.g. merely satisfied from seeing, smelling objects of addiction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>vyāpāda (ill-will)</strong></td>
<td>- from addiction of the body but conditions mind not as bright as it should nekkhammasitadomanasavedanā : merely dissatisfactin from not seeing not smelling consumed tastes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- non-anger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>moha (delusion): a type of avijjā in gross level</strong></td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>thīnamiddha</strong> (torpidity of mind)</td>
<td>- generally understood as sleepiness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- known after management of kāmachanda and vyāpāda is done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- conditions mind not to accept, acknowledge, know or new knowledge is expanding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- moha is at the middle between kāmachanda &amp; vyāpāda; Uddhacca &amp; vicikicchā</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>uddhacca-kukkucca</strong> (worry-and-flurry)</td>
<td>- unwinding of vyāpāda of small size &amp; refinement more difficult to be aware of than vyāpāda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- often from thīnamiddha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>vicikicchā</strong> (doubt)</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2 The practice of #1-11 of *caraṇa* with vegetarianism as example of trained behavior

2.2.1 The process of training in #1-4 of *caraṇa* (*1st set of caraṇa*) as follows:

2.2.1.1 *Caraṇa #1*: *sīlasaṃ vara* (moral restrain) is the setting of target behavior that needs to be trained from *kilesa* because of realizing the danger of the behavior, through an intention that is determined, resoluted and unshakable to cultivate the expected behavior of target. There are issues needed for consideration as follows:

A. Try to create the external surrounding factors that are supportive of vegetarianism, to be taken as a life-long habit by eliminating any chance or reasons to stop it. For instance, when we enter a place where vegetarian food is not available, we often feel burdensome to bother other people to fulfill our need, and we tend to create reasons to justify ourselves: “Dispensation of one meal is alright because it is really necessary. Without meal, I would not have energy to work,” for example.

B. Set up a target behavior to be trained by choosing from the behaviors that can be controlled or has been decreased to a certain degree. If we decide to choose any behavior that is strongly addicted to, there is a small possibility to cultivate it as a life-long habit. It could spin out to despair and giving up the training in between. Therefore, we should choose the behavior that has less degree of addiction or already reduced to smaller size, so that there is not difference in whether to consume or not, for example. As for choosing the behavior that is set to abstain from meat eating or vegetarianism, in this example self examination is require in the beginning, i.e., whether on not it will be normal in daily life. Feeling addicted to meat eating, one should try eating less meat until a feeling arises: “To eat or not to eat is okay”. Then s/he should adopt the moderate behavior in of addiction for training, for example.

2.2.1.2 *Caraṇa #2*: Restraining the authorities (*indriyas*) of the senses. This is to be on guard of the *kilesa*, i.e., craving that may arise through the six sense-doors, namely: eyes, ear, nose, tongue, body touch, and the mind from the concurrent contact (*phassa*).

When you have decided to be a vegetarian, you have to watch out of the six sense-doors, namely: eyes, ear, nose, tongue, body touch, and the mind. In the beginning make them controlled under precaution, and certify that all the food ingredients including spices are not from meat. Further, it is the discrimination between attachment to meat which has form, flavor, smell, color (so-called the five attributes of sensual pleasures i.e., *kāmaguṇas*) of the real meat that it is different from flavor tastiness created by the cooking skill in using spices as well as the surrounding atmosphere, people, place and other facilitating factors that potentiate the food flavor. This usually draws one to a misunderstanding that it is the attachment to food flavor because meat is a kind of spice. It can be simply proved by cook the same dish without meat and substitute it with other ingredients such as mushrooms, tofu or artificial meat, whereas all the rest of the ingredients are kept as usual, for example. If you are able to eat it deliciously as before, so there is no need to add meat into it, you are not considered as addicted to meat. Having controlled the external factors so that you can follow the *sīla* or assigned behavior as planned, you should turn to consider the control of the internal factors.
Having clearly understood that attachment to meat means attachment to the flavor of tastiness from meat and not about the flavor or tastiness from other spices and ingredients, you should proceed to appraise the feeling (vedanā) that has concurrently arisen from the sense contact (phassa) during food consumption, whether or not, in every time when there is no meat, there is a feeling of suffering (dukkhavedanā) and whether there is a direction of knowledge to feel decreased with the increase of the feeling of happiness (sukhavedanā) from kilesa (symptom of meat addition) has been dwindling away, making you more relaxed, light-hearted and feeling more satisfied with consumption of meatless food. Further, from consuming with more and more feeling of lightness, in the end it will come to neutral feeling (adukkhamasukhavedanā) arisen directly from abstainance from meat eating. Addiction to meat consumption is no more. This process needs training until there is a change in concurrent sense contact (phassa). But if it is not trained, and left unnoticed for a few more days the symptoms of lightness will disappear. This is also normal in the calming meditation and not about the concurrent sense contact (phassa) causing the gap between the condition of the mind during the rise of concurrent sense contact (phassa) and the condition of the mind 2-3 days later, because by normally the sensation (vedanā) of whatever magnitude, after a lapse of time, it gradually decreases and finally disappears on its own, merely from doing nothing. Therefore, the practice on sensation (vedanā) mentioned in this article is specifically focuses on the cultivation of sati (mindfulness), i.e., be watchful of the symptoms arises from each vedanā as impermanent (aniccatā), that is gradually decreasing (dukkhatā) and finally ceases to exist (anattatā) in the end the practice can be called in the 1st set of caraṇa as the building block for the building up of sati (mindfulness).

Therefore in order to complete the training in concurrent sense contact (phassa) (i.e., observing the sensation (vedanā) that is directed to the decrease of dukkha until seeing the cessation of kilesa) in each concurrent sense contact. Each session may last for 30 minutes or an hour or even longer as days. It is definitely better than letting time to pass by. Not ignoring the opportunity in training that could have shortened the dimension of time is therefore the best.

2.2.1.3 Caraṇa #3: bhojanemattaṁnuta, being considerative in consumption with sufficiency. It is the clarity in the feeling of lightness that arises every time when one is able to abstain from meat consumption, without any feeling of suffering or happiness (adukkhamasukha) and can still further feel the sense of “satisfaction” cultivated morality (sīla) which has been potentiated to accomplish the behavior that has been strongly determined is the calming of kilesa that one has accomplished in the primary level.

2.2.1.4 Caraṇa #4 jagriyānuyoga: this is cultivation of diligence in the awakening awareness to be free from kilesa (meat addition). It arises after receiving respective training, based on the caraṇa #1-3. The cultivation of “AWAKENING” wisdom (paññā) in knowing and seeing that the spiritual path that enables one to be free from the attraction to and attachment of meat consumption is really true. It is able to develop further in caraṇa #5-8 (2nd set of caraṇa).

As for trainees whose symptoms of addiction to meat eating is not so strong, in the beginning the feeling in practice caraṇa #1-4, she is able to do it without any difficulty, bringing more delight and empowerment of the mind to pursue further training.
2.2.2 The process of practice in caraṇa #5-8 (2nd set of caraṇa):

2.2.2.1 Caraṇa #5 faith (saddhā): it is the belief arises from AWAKENING wisdom (paññā) in jagrīyānuyoga, i.e., seeing the spiritual path that enables one to be free from the attraction of meat consumption. From it arises confidence (saddhā) more than what has previously happened, causing more determination in abstaining from meat consumption to be permanent.

2.2.2.2 Caraṇa #6 hiri: moral shame of sinful activities. It is a symptom of the mind which is not really strong enough as passing training for a while, e.g. 1 month, 3 months, 6 month or longer, the symptoms of delight which has been easily acquired in the beginning gradually starts to dwindle, until it gets to normal state that it has been achieved. The symptoms of longing, and craving to eat meat return; now and then the addiction surfaces. Previously the symptom of craving sensation is satisfied everytime when craving starts, but after entering the process of training, the habit feedback to satisfaction at every occasion can no longer happen. In the beginning, it may be under control, but after certain period of time, depending on the length of the symptoms addiction and varies from one person to another. To a certain point, one feels that it cannot be controlled any more. Violation of the precept can then happens. This can ground on several whatever reasons. The symptoms must be examine under the rubric of “ashame” (hiri in caraṇa #6), as whether or not there is a sense of “shame”(hiri). Or it was done based on the reason that it can be done once in a while or it was just done on dispensation of one time, or by any whatever reason.

These cases show that “hiri” has not yet been arisen. The trainee has to start all over by reviewing again the 1st set of caraṇa, and decide whether or not s/he is still standing on the same commitment to set up the behavior for training practice or she should be more vigilant in the training.

In case that there is still “hiri”. The person has to review again to follow the set behavior because of the condition of confidence (saddhā). If there is not enough faith, the person should review danger of breaking away from the committed path.

As long as she found that there is still a chance of violation, the person should take the opportunity to be more determined to free themselves from attachment to meat consumption; the chance must be decreased continuously.

Guideline for correction is that one must be aware of his/her own mind. Through knowing your own mind is possible through the inner process that one has to follow respectively along the course of management of kilesa in #1-4 of caraṇa. Follow by the empowerment of wisdom (paññā) with the tool for abandoning kilesa that emphasizes on reflexion of the Dharma that is direct remedy to specific defilement (kilesa) and craving (taṇhā) which is called by tadaṅgapahāna. In the mean time, one has to maintain the external behavior that is obvious to society for propriety, time and occasion according to values of various belief systems in the mundane society. According to the learnedness (bāhusaccā) radicalism may not be favored in conventional truth, e.g. when she is being pursued again and again to eat meat, She may decide to accept the meat into the dish as a social ritual, but the person should never feel compelled to eat it.

Otherwise, if the person has simply given up or feels compelled to eat meat. She has to re-examin his/herself whether it was done out of craving or satisfaction. If craving is involved it has to be managed according to the process of in the 1st set of caraṇa, but if there is no craving involved the method of the practice has to be reviewed. Living in society, one has to adopt appropriate strategy
as to not to violate the precept in spite of society pressure that views vegetarianism unacceptable in society or whether it is possible to tell the truth bluntly that “I am a vegetarian”. This depends on the condition whether the person is able to tell the truth or it is rather individual’s technique.

Faith (saddhā) and moral shame (hiri) are the obvious indicators to examine whether the 1st set of caraṇa is complete or not. If the practice is successful, the result is the increase of confidence or faith (saddhā), from it arises “hiri” or moral shame.

When faith (saddhā) is raised, hiri is also potentiated; opportunity of misbehavior reciprocally decreased; hiri is then upgraded to ottappa.

2.2.2.3 Caraṇa #7, ottappa: moral dread. The indicator of moral dread is the radical turning away from all sins by uprooting the causes of precept violation that could result in the shame of sin as in hiri. Having completely abandoned it, not only that it is good for mental health, it empowers the person to be brave to confront problems and obstructions, or even pressurizing situation that compelling to eat meat; the mind is also endowed with compassion to all lives of animals including the humans. This never happens to those who cannot stop meat eating.

This perfects the first precept, i.e., abstainance from killing; and it purifies the mind to the point that it is full of compassion endowed with joy of knowing that it has not been easily achieved by others. The sensation of thrills comes with the feeling of joyful lightness with more confidence.

Indeed, certain virtuous qualities such as hiri (moral shame) and ottappa (moral dread) in general could have been foundation in the mind of the beautiful people (kalyanajana). This allows them to adopt the behavior with virtue from the beginning. Further they evolve along the process described above.

2.2.2.4 Caraṇa #8: learnedness (bāhusacca): It is the quality of having acquired great body of knowledge, enough to the level that enables one to discriminate the mundane (Conventional Truth) from that of the supra-mundane (Transcendental Truth). The quality of learnedness (bāhusacca) in #8 of caraṇa is classified into 2 levels, namely:

1. Learnedness (bāhusacca) in the 2nd set of caraṇa: this is the level that focuses on liberation from all corruption for crossing over from the framework of beliefs, values of the world that vegetarianism can deprive one from sufficient nutrition. This learnedness (bāhusacca) empowers one to step beyond the barrier of understanding attached to the conventional world and to adopt clarity and determination to pursue the course to the supra-mundane, i.e., to purify the body and mind from all attachments to meat consumption.

2. Learnedness (bāhusacca) in the 3rd set of caraṇa: This level of emphasizes moral empowerment which is the broadening of the result in the probing into the details of refined kilesa arisen from development of paññā in the 2nd set of caraṇa for supra-mundane (Transcendental Truth). Its focus is on the management of kilesa of middle level of 5 types that obstruct the mind from crossing over, so-called the five impediments (nivaranas). It is also the level where crossing over from doubt and the rise of confidence in vegetarianism take place that it is definitely not the cause of malnutrition as there is many proofs that there is no falling back again to meat eating, the details of which are illustrated in 2.3.1.
The more moral empowerment that happens, the better is the result that potentiates the strength of *hiri* as well as *ottappa*. It is the correction of the mistakes that took place in the 2nd set of *caraṇa*, once moral empowerment of *hiri* has happened, it strengthens *ottappa* to endure more pressure than before. Therefore, if the same level of pressure that has previously cause the mistake, it cannot repeat. This is the pattern that is going to be used for the explanation in the 3rd set of *caraṇa* in 2.3.1 as will be shown below.

2.3 The management of the five impediments by following *caraṇa* #8-11 (the 3rd set of *caraṇa*)

The understanding and significance of the five impediments:

The five impediments (*nivaraṇa*) belong to a set of five kinds of *kilesa* of middle level which obstruct the mind from enlightenment, namely: sensual pleasure (*kāmachanda*), ill-will (*vyāpāda*), torpidity of the mind (*thīnāmiddha*), worry-and-flurry (*uddhacca-kukkucca*), and doubt (*vicikicchā*).

The five impediments are 1 of the 3 levels of *kilesa* of the body. They are refined enough that could hardly be detected as they are not clearly expressed by the body. They appear as symptoms within the body. Therefore, in order to understand them, the level of *paññā* needs to be elevated to the 1st and 2nd sets of *caraṇa*. The five impediments therefore has a great role because they obstruct the path to reach *jhāna*, whether one can reach *jhāna* or not, depends on his/her ability to break the barriers of the five impediments.

The refined and sophisticated nature of the five impediments complicated their management. The treatment needs to be separated into another topic as follows:

In the level of learnedness (*bāhusaccā*) for abandonment of corruption in the 2nd set of *caraṇa*, the level of *paññā* is elevated to the “AWAKENING” *paññā* of *jagriyāmuyoga* in the 1st set of *caraṇa* because it enables one to come out of the *kilesa* in body-base.

The moral empowerment of learnedness (*bāhusacca*) in the 3rd set of *caraṇa* is the origin of *paññā* to discriminate the differences between *kāma-rāga* in the 2nd set of *caraṇa* and *kāmachanda* in the 3rd set of *caraṇa*.

The level of learnedness (*bāhusacca*) of moral empowerment enables one to understand and apprehend *kāmachanda*. *This paves way for caraṇa* #9 or energy (*viriya*) to work in the management of *kāma-rāga* (sensual desire) and *vyāpāda* (ill-will).

Therefore in case of *hiri* in *caraṇa*, *hiri* is confronted with *kāmachanda* and paralized by it. The mechanism of *hiri* then fails to function because it cannot understand and apprehend *kāmachanda*. It has to wait until the 3rd set of *caraṇa* starts to function. Then, it is able to draw the 2nd set of *caraṇa* to continue the work and when the management of *kāmachanda* and *vyāpāda* is complete. The person is then qualified to understand *thīnāmiddha* and *uddhacca*, because these five impediments are mental symptoms of five different kinds, but are related to one another.
As for, thīnāmiddha and uddhacca-kukkucca, they are refined kilesa that are hidden within kāmachanda and vyāpāda; vicikicchā, on the other hand, is another category of mohā. The guidelines for the management of the five impediments in the 3rd set of caraṇa (#8-11) gradually reduces its power; the result of the practice respectively decreases the kileṣa, so that the three roots of unwholesomeness (akusalamēla) are finally extincted. (See diagram illustrating the unwinding of the three roots of unwholesomeness in 2.1.)

2.3.2 The management of kāmachanda and vyāpāda by following #8 of caraṇa #8, learnedness (bāhusacca) at the level of moral empowerment and #9 energy (viriya) as they are from the 3rd set of caraṇa. They emphasize moral empowerment. Therefore, the application of the 2nd set of caraṇa in caraṇa #9 will empower caraṇa #6, hiri and caraṇa #7 ottappa to be stronger.

2.3.2.1 Caraṇa #9 energy (viriya): As soon as clarity the following the path of the supra-mundane is established, (caraṇa #8learnedness (bāhusacca) level of moral empowerment) causing deligece and courage caraṇa #9 energy (viriya) in the management of craving (tanha) in addiction to meat consumption is merely the feeling of gladness or satisfaction in seeing or smelling meat but there is no real craving (kāmachanda) to eat or cloudiness of the mind which is minor, compared to the experience of not seeing or not smelling meat that one is addicted to. The 2nd set of caraṇa should then be bring in to manage kāmachanda and vyāpāda which able to be managed quickly because of the received training, and skills that has been acquired in the management of the three roots of unwholesomeness until it ceases to exist by particularly caraṇa #6, hiri and # 7 ottappa that have been employed in the 3rd set of caraṇa. This will increase mental health more than in first round of the 2nd set in practice, as hiri and ottappa have the support of learnedness (bāhusacca) in level of moral empowerment.

2.3.2.2 Caraṇa #10, sati: This is the active agent of knowing the characters of gladness or satisfaction in sensual desire (kāmachanda) in meat consumption which has ceased. Also, it is the agent that examines the practice of the 15 caraṇas down to the level of indifference or seeing no desire to have. This allows us to understand the five impediments in details so that it can be classified into thīnāmiddha and uddhacca.

2.3.3 The management of thīnāmiddha and uddhacca-kukkucca by following the caraṇa #10, sati:

After management of kāmachanda and vyāpāda is completed, one should proceed to understand the characteristics of thīnāmiddha and uddhacca–kukkucca that have been lying hidden to be revealed. They are infact the majority of the five impediments. Therefore, given that there are still sensual desire that is refined and buried or hidden as thīnāmiddha, deligece, courage (caraṇa : energy (viriya)) have to retreat. They can be understood as phenomena, and examined according to the frame of the 15 caraṇas. This also depends on whether the basic of theoritical knowledge that one has is good enough or not.
If the theoretical knowledge is not sufficient, it will cause an imbalance in the characters of worry (uddhacca) and because the expected result is too high or the symptoms did not yield the result according to the expectation, the trainee may then sunk into thīnāmiddha, e.g., in case of people who have been vegetarian for a long time, but finally turned to eat meat as before. But if it is found that the the mind, in its deeper level, is still gladened by meat eating. Then she is still addicted to it, but without knowing him/herself due to the lack of understanding of thīnāmiddha. Therefore, the mind, in its deeper part, still resists vegetarianism, i.e., not glad in abstianance from meat consumption even if they know that meat is not good for health. Vegetarianism is not only a kind of virtue, but also compassion to animals.

If the deeper part of the mind still resists vegetarianism, the person is not quite happy, or delighted. It is a kind inner subpression which does not have any external manifestation. The point is the person is not aware of it, and has no ability to know that there is such a resistance. Worse than that is the person does not know that it is an ugly thing that needs to be managed. Even though abstinence from meat consumption is the behavior chosen by him/herself as a part of the precept, to be undertaken forever, and having tried their best in giving up meat eating. Seeing the danger, one should always train to control the behavior in all aspects until she is able to practice down to the 3rd set of caraṇa.

In case that his/her paññā is not sharp enough to discriminate clearly between the urge to eat vegetarian dish of mock-chicken with rice due to the worry of the mind (uddhacca) from craving to eat real chicken with rice (khao-man-kai) that they formerly used to be addicted to as uddhacca that from the delight in the concurrent sense contact of eating the vegetarian dish of mock-chicken with rice but cannot apprehend the concurrent sense contact (phassa) for management or whether the she is glad in vegetarianism but the delight in this case does not solve the problem of delight in meat eating. Therefore, it is symptom of worry (uddhacca) by not knowing the approaching danger from the realm of delight in eating meat.

2.3.3.1 Caraṇa #10, sati: Having been able to apprehend these characteristics, and following the process in the 3rd set of caraṇa, i.e., energy (viriya) in #9, she is approaching the technique of management the symptoms of thīnāmiddha that arises from addiction to meat consumption, i.e., the mind is still gladened by meat consumption inspite of the feeling uddhacca that is delighted in vegetarianism, but the person still cannot correct the symptoms of gladness in meat eating by undertaking the process of the 3rd set of caraṇa until seeing the condition ceases or extinguishing the symptoms i.e., leaving the realm of delight in meat eating which able to be managed with not so much difficulty. But it must be continuously repeated every time whenever the concurrent sense contact (phassa) is apprehended (āsevanā bhāvanā bahulikammā). Therefore, to have successful and effective cultivation of sati in level, it is necessary to thoroughly know the level of bhojanemattaññutā where one is able to control gross kilesa in the beginning and able to stop meat eating in level of ottappa. But as craving or taṇhā still prevail, she has to pursue the 3rd set of caraṇa because the kāma-taṇhā (craving in sensual pleasure) is the nourishment for the five impediments. Given that kāma-taṇhā ceases to exist, the five impediments also cease to exist.
2.3.3.2 Carana #11, pañña: knowing that the five impediments have been completely subdued without any doubt (vicikicchā). This is the management of in level kāma-taṇhā by having pursued the course of carana #1-11, respectively.

In conclusion, the result of successful management of thīnamiddha, uddhacca-kukkucca, causes the end of vicikicchā which means that the five impediments has been overcome. This result in the rise of pañña in carana #11. However, in case that the management is not successful, kukkucca still prevails, most people would understand that it is merely the flurry of the mind which is generally found. In fact, kukkucca is the final remant before the the management of thīnamiddha and uddhacca is complete. The details of which are rather complicated; more explanation is in 4.2.

Sufficiency of mental happiness or fun from the management of kilesa and seeing kilesa decreases progressively is certainly a precious gift for any practitioner. It builds up more confidence in the pursuit of the supra-mundane to the final goal of Nibbāna.

The aforemention is an example from real life practice but only one case is brought up to show the process of the work of the 15 caranas. The termination of kilesa in other behaviors can base on the same example that has been demonstrated. If they are able to complete, the further practising in overall picture in shown #3 below.

3. Guidelines for the understanding of the structure, pattern and model of the body of knowledge in according to the Dharma that is important and related to the structure, pattern and model of the body of knowledge according to the main Dharma related to practice in #1-11 of carana (1st – 3rd sets of carana) in the character that is supportive of the building up of the base of sati, sampajñāñña as well as the base of pañña respectively.

As for the preparation for the readiness to evolve to the practice of the four satipatthānas the relationship of which is illustrated in structural of the four satipatthānas with 1st–3rd sets of carana in the rubric of “the tasks in the Four Noble Truths”, i.e., “know–relinquish-clarify-cultivate”. See the diagram illustrating the relationship of the related Dharma
Diagram illustrating the relationship of the related Dharma

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<td>1) silasamvara</td>
<td>5) faith (saddhā ) (confidence)</td>
<td>8) learnedness (bāhusacca) (level of moral empowerment)</td>
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First task in Four Noble Truths: “know-relinquish-clarify-cultivate”

“know” kilesa in but relinquish level in behavior according to sīla-base
“relinquish” kilesa gradually decreasing: gross to medium
“clarify” cessation of Kilesa, gross to medium; relinquish the refined in jhāna & vijjā
“cultivate”: AWAKENING wisdom : gross to medium levels (the five impediments)
3.1 Relationship of the four satipaṭṭhānas and 1st-3rd sets of caraṇa in rubric of “task in the Four Noble Truth 4”: “know–relinquish-clarify-cultivate”

The significance of the Four Noble Truths is referred to in, “The Noble Truth from the Mouth of the Lord” by the Venerable Buddhadasa3 as follows:

1. To relinguish suffering (dukkha) without knowing the Noble Truth is impossible (p.5)
2. Because of ignorance of the Noble Truth, one is trapped in the cycles of Samsara (p.6)
3. Few animals are reborn as humans because of the ignorance of the Noble Truth (p.7)
4. Having known the Noble Truth of Suffering (dukkha) it reduces to the size of suffering to the amount of dust retained in the finger-nail vis-à-vis the whole mass of earth (p.20), etc.

Therefore, knowing the Four Noble Truths is necessary and important for the journey along the path of liberation from suffering (dukkha). The four satipaṭṭhānas is the carrier to the Four Noble Truths, as it appers in the conclusion as follows:

3.1.1 The first task in the Four Noble Truth is “know” that suffering (dukkha) is caused by the addiction to kilesa of the gross and medium levels which lead to the target the behavior that needs to be trained by related it to the body-base in the four satipaṭṭhānas and caraṇa #1, sīlasamavāra (moral restrain), caraṇa #5, faith (saddhā) and caraṇa #8, learnedness (bhūsamucca) level of moral empowerment by establishing the moral-base that is appropriate for meditation that is able to truly apprehend kilesa and able to truly decrease, and relinguish it, respectively.

3.1.2 The second task in the Four Noble Truths is “relinguish” kilesa that is the origin of dukkha that is related to the sensation-base (vedanā) in the four satipaṭṭhānas and caraṇa #2 of caraṇa that advocates the restrain of the sense authorities (indriyas); whereas #6 is hiri and #9, energy (viriya) by caraṇa #2 “restraining of sense authorities (indriyas)” this causes the restrain of craving in the six sense-doors upon concurrent contact (phassa) which is recorded in many places in the Tipiṭaka, e.g. the Official Version of the Tipiṭaka of Thailand, Book 10, in Mahāniddāsutta #574, in Book 9 in Brahmājālāsutta #77-895; Book 24 in Mūlasutta 10 #586 and Book 4 in Mahākhandhaka #17, etc. All these illustrate the significance of sense-contact (phassa) because it is the immediate cause of sensation “vedanā” which most important base in the management of kilesa. It conditions whether or not concurrent contact will cease.

3.1.3 The third task in the Four Noble Truths is “clarify” or being distinctively alert and clear of whenever kilesa has ceased to exist in the mind. The feeling of lightness, and vast emptiness immediately emerges. It is the symptoms of “satisfaction” which is the phenomenon of the mind base in the four satipaṭṭhānas wherein kilesa is trapped in the sensation-base and abandoned or decreased as in #2 of caraṇa through the restraining of the sense authorities (indriyas); #6, hiri and #9 energy (viriya), down to the level of cessation of the kilesa of the gross to medium levels, respectively. Then arises “satisfaction” together with well developed morality (ṣīla) that is progressively strengthened in caraṇa #3, bhojanemattanūtā; #7 ottappa; and #10 sati, which yields its final result #3.1.4.

4 “Mahāniddāsutta” Thai Tipitaka Book 10, Department of Religious Affairs, Thailand.
5 “Brahmājālāsutta” Thai Tipitaka Book 9, Department of Religious Affairs, Thailand.
6 “Mūlasutta” Thai Tipitaka Book 24, Department of Religious Affairs, Thailand.
7 “Mahākhandhaka” Thai Tipitaka Book 4, Department of Religious Affairs, Thailand.
3.1.4 The fourth task in the Four Noble Truths: “the growth” of paññā to Awakening Wisdom, i.e., knowing and seeing the spiritual path enabling one to be free from the attraction of the mundane really exists in caraṇa #4: jagriyāmyyoga caraṇa#8; learnedness (bāhusacca) (for termination of corruption) and paññā related to the Dharma-base in the four satipaṭṭhānas to progressively evolve. All is done to be relinquished through the practice of caraṇa.

3.2 The relationship of the four satipaṭṭhānas and the 1st – 3rd sets of caraṇa:

The four satipaṭṭhānas belong to the group of Dharma which is aimed for abandonment of (pahāna) kilesa under the rubric of “tasks in the Four Noble Truths”, i.e., “know–relinquish–clarify–cultivate” by starting from acknowledgment of suffering (dukkha) that it arises from particular kind of kilesa, i.e., gross or refinement. This is done through the body-base. Having done the abandonment (pahāna) of the gross kilesa, one should probe deeper to the cause of suffering (dukkhasamudaya) and then abandon (pahāna) all kilesa in the sensation-base. Once the kilesa is eliminated or ceased, a sensation of lightness of the mind is then clearly arises (clarify) which is a phenomenon of the mind-base. The practitioner should then proceed in the Dharma-base to increase the activity of paññā in monitoring kilesa that is more and more refined at the Dharma-base, brief explanation is as follows:

3.2.1 The body-base in the four satipaṭṭhānas determines the level of kilesa in caraṇa to be relinquished related to of the Dharma in the first of the series of the three sets of caraṇa: 1st set in caraṇa is sīlasamvara (moral restrain), #5 faith (saddhā); in the 2nd set of caraṇa and #8 learnedness (bāhusacca) for moral empowerment in the 3rd set of caraṇa, i.e., the first two sets manage kilesa of the gross level whereas the 3rd set of caraṇa manages kilesa of medium level.

3.2.2 The sensation-base in the four satipaṭṭhānas serves for the management of abandoning (pahāna) kilesa in oneself related to the Dharma. It is the second set of caraṇa that relinquish kilesa, i.e, #2: restraining of the sense authorities (indriyas) in the 1st set of caraṇa is for the management of gross kilesa through sīlasaṃ vara that conditions behavior training; #6, hiri, in the 2nd set of caraṇa, corrects the kilesa concerning the restrain in moral precept (sīlasaṃ vara) that causes repeated mistakes. But precept violation and its frequency are decreasing; and #9, energy (viriya) in the 3rd set of caraṇa management of kilesa of medium level i.e., the five impediments, (nīvaraṇa) the five types of kilesa that obstructs the mind from enlightenment.

3.2.3 The mind-base in satipaṭṭhāna seves to “clarify” the cessation of gross and medium levels of kilesa by relating them to the Dharma in the 3rd set of caraṇa for relinquishing, i.e., #3 bhοjanemattanuṭā in the 1st set of caraṇa feeling the lightness is symptoms “satisfaction” that arises out of being satisfied with strongly developed morality (sīla) and upgrading the health of mind which is unable by any vicissitude and will not fall back to resume the formal behavior again; in #7, ottappa as in the 2nd set of caraṇa and #10 sati as in the 3rd set of caraṇa fully endowed with health of mind, and the potentiayed sensitivity in knowing the cessation of the gross kilesa so that the medium kelisa is felt and refined, paving the way for the readiness in undertaking the four satipaṭṭhānas.

3.2.4 Dharma-base of satipaṭṭhāna is the growth of paññā related to the Dharma the fourth of caraṇa in each set, i.e, paññā; “AWAKENING” in #4: jagriyāmyyoga in the 1st set of caraṇa. This shows the spiritual path that allows one to be free from the power of kilesa that it is truly exists in the 1st set of caraṇa. and accumulated the AWAKENING paññā; in #8, learnedness (bāhusacca).
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this is the level of abandon of corruption as in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} set of \textit{caraṇa} to enable crossing over from values, knowledge, belief systems of the mundane (Conventional Truth) toward the understand in the path of the Transcendental (Transcendental Truth) in learnedness (bāhusacca) of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} set of \textit{caraṇa} and upgrading the “paññā” in #11 of \textit{caraṇa} which is the result of the practice of the four \textit{satipaṭṭhānas} together with “sati” in #10 of \textit{caraṇa}, the details of which are in 3.4 as follows.

In conclusion, the first set of \textit{caraṇa} emphasizes the control of the gross \textit{kilesa} which is intermingling with the mind. And to establish morality (ṣīla) as the framework in the control, giving rise to \textit{adhisīla}, i.e., calmness of the body. When the \textit{kilesa} is truly subdued, it is paving for path to the base of \textit{sati} (mindfulness).

The seond set of \textit{caraṇa} enables one to control the gross \textit{kilesa} down to the level of stopping them from consuming the body in level \textit{kāma-rāga} (sensual desire), emphasizing on preventive measure for any chance of further attack by \textit{kilesa}. It has the nature of holistic self awareness that barricades the intervention of \textit{kilesa} to get control. Also, it develops mental health to \textit{adhicitta} as the building base for \textit{sampājñā}.

The third set of \textit{caraṇa} is the management of refined \textit{kilesa}, even more refined than sensual desire to the level of no-returning to consume of the body, i.e., merely craving in level of the taste of sensation causing satisfaction with from seeing and smelling things that they used to be addicted to and to be skilful enough to know \textit{kilesa} and not to allow them to mingle with the mind because of the \textit{paññā} that has been sharpened to see clearly beyond the enclosure of the five impediments, from which rises \textit{adhipaññā} directly emergin from the building of the base of \textit{paññā}.

As the body is controlled and calm the first set of \textit{caraṇa}, meat consumption is stopped. The second set of \textit{caraṇa} further calms the mind, enabling it to see the medium \textit{kilesa} (the five impediments). The third set of \textit{caraṇa} concerns the management of the five impediments, decreasing them, making the mind calmer, and empowering \textit{paññā} to have more acuity. This allows the purification of the body. Although, there may be some mistakes, there is a process to explore for the cause of mistake, i.e., how they took place, and further to decreases the chance for the future mistake. This is possible because of accumulated \textit{adhisīla}, \textit{adhicitta} and \textit{adhipaññā} that have been respectively and strongly done from the beginning. The details of which appears in #2 of the guidelines for practice.

3.3 The three roots of unwholesomeness and tool \textit{pahāna} related to the four \textit{satipaṭṭhānas} and the first to third sets of \textit{caraṇa}

3.3.1 Through the practice of 1\textsuperscript{st} set of \textit{caraṇa}, the three roots of unwholesomeness (akulsamūla): \textit{rāga} (greed), \textit{dosa} (hatred), and \textit{moha} (delusion) decreased with the use of the power of the mind. Then, the practitioner should watch and reflex upon the Three Universal Characteristics (\textit{Tilakkhaṇa}) of \textit{kilesa} and engage on \textit{vikkhambhanapahāna}.

3.3.2 Through the practice of the second set of \textit{caraṇa}, the three roots of unwholesomeness cease to exist, causing craving in sensual pleasure (\textit{kāma tanhā}) to decrease. This results in the end of corruption of the actions through body, speech, and mind, with the use of \textit{paññā} contemplating on the Dharma in the management of \textit{kilesa} and \textit{tanhā} (tadāṅgapahāna), from which arises the purity of the body.
3.3.3 The three moral empowerments lead to relinquish the five forms of kilesa that obstruct the mind from enlightenment (nivaraṇa) so-called the five impediments by using tadaṅgapahāna in the beginning followed by vikkhambhanapahāna. This will able one to manage of the five impediments successfully.

3.4 Undertaking the four satipaṭṭhānas in caraṇa #10-11: sati and paññā

The outcome of the practice of caraṇa #1-11 in 2.2 and 2.3, particularly the management of the five impediments in 2.3, is the agent of progress in the course of the four satipaṭṭhāna in cyclic order, initiated by the successful management of the five impediments that progressively increase in refinement. Then the result is to be extended to upgrade to ānāpānasati (mindfulness in breathing) management of clinging (upādāna) in caraṇa #12-15 (4th set of caraṇa), i.e., the four jhānas that rise in relation to the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas and caraṇa #1-11. They are indeed supportive of each other and well integrated into each other and creating a complete single harmony (ekodhammo).

3.4.1 Clarity and significance of the terms “sati”, “sampajjhañña” and “paññā”

“Sati” as in caraṇa #10 is “the mindfulness” originated from the true decreased kilesa respectively from the practice of caraṇa #1-10 which is as follows:

3.4.1.1 Ability to relinquish suffering (dukkha) from the gross kilesa which is kāma-rāga (caraṇa #1-4)

3.4.1.2 Ability to successfully relinquish the mundane happiness from the raisin of taṇhā which is the five qualities of the sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇa) and abandonment of the three corruptions which is corruption of the body, speech, and mind (caraṇa #5-8).

3.4.1.3 The three moral empowerments enable the relinquish of the five impediments which is the obstacle of the mind from reaching virtue (caraṇa #8-11) or in another word “sati” is the shield that protects one against the worldly flux whereas paññā the sword for cutting the flux”, i.e., the five impediments that overwhelm the mind and overflown it with the mundane flux, the person is so-called the one who is deprived of sati. On the other hand, “those who cultivate sati” are always aware of the phenomena of the five impediments that perpetuate the mind to follow the mundane flux. Having contemplated the five impediments until she sees the impermanence (aniccatā), unsustainability (dukkhatā) until the five impediments cease to exist (anattatā). Wisdom (paññā) arises in seeing that the five impediments have ceased to exist, and the mind is not flown by the mundane flux any more. Because of this, it is called “cutting off the circulating mundane flux with adhipaññā”, which is the wisdom (paññā), as in caraṇa #11.

“Paññā” as in caraṇa #11, is the frontier to the victory over kilesa in the realm sensual pleasure (kāmāvacara or kāmabhava), as it is the base for decrease of the clinging to sensual pleasure (kāmupādāna) wherein kilesa in the realm of senses decreases, which is also consequentially conditions the decay of the five impediments, further to the realm of the refined sensual pleasure, and linked to entering the realm where kilesa in the mind is clinged to (upādāna), and further to the realm where kilesa is very refined, but embedded (amusaya) at the bottom of the mind (āsava) which is the reason for practicing caraṇa #12-15 which is the four jhānas down to the level of the eight vijjās.
### 3.4.2 Relationship and mutual integration of sati, sampajjhañña and paññā leading to the practice the four satipaṭṭhānas

The process of practice that happens between “sati” and “paññā” for the destruction of kilesa is called “sampajjhañña”. It is the process that leads to the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas in carana #10-11, i.e., “sati” and “paññā”.

The five impediments belong to the medium type of kilesa, more refined and more delusive to understand. It is therefore raised as a topic of Dharma which has 5 constituents, namely, the five impediments (nivaraṇa), clinging (upādāna), the five aggregates (pancakhanda), six spheres of senses (saḷāyatana), seven limbs of enlightenment (bojjhaṅga) and the Noble Eightfold Path (aṭṭhaṅgikamagga). As for the management of the five impediments, sati (mindfulness) is crucial to the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas. It is the initiator which needs to be strong and quick to sense and apprehend in time of the concurrent sense contact (phassa), i.e, it must be speedy enough to discriminate between name and form (nāmarūpaparipuṭṭhāna), without which the door to the supramundane is closed.

A good metaphor is seen in the General Theory of Relativity of Einstein, regarding the speed of knowledge. If two trains are moving pararal and close to each other with the same speed, a person may walk from one train to another through opened doors on the opposit train. In the same way, the movement out of the kilesa that is the host state (gehitasa) is practicable by renunciation (nekhammasita), but this depends on the skill of sati in the management of the concurrent sense contact (phassa), i.e, it must be speedy enough to discriminate between name and form (nāmarūpaparipuṭṭhāna), without which the door to the supramundane is closed.

Having apprehended kilesa and processed it. Now, it comes the time to practice in management of kilesa to extinguish it with sampajjhañña. Having done all these, one is skilled enough to able to unwind the kilesa of medium level existing in various forms. Then proceed to cross over from all kilesa, as mentioned above.

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#### Diagram illustrating relationships of practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas and carana #1-11 in the management of the five impediments:

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<th>Carana #10-11</th>
<th>Sati</th>
<th>Sampajjhañña</th>
<th>Paññā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The four satipaṭṭhānas</td>
<td>sensation</td>
<td>mind</td>
<td>Dharma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free 5 impediments</td>
<td>Apprehending impediments</td>
<td>Managing impediments</td>
<td>Terminating impediments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The progress of which requires the renewal of faith (saddhā) by the wisdom of caraṇa #5 and learnedness (bāhusacca) as for the level of moral empowerment in 3rd set of caraṇa. Until the acknowledgment of the path ingredients that is good for the outcome pushes the result to paññā as in caraṇa #11. The accumulative result is successful. However, the process of relinquishment involves in every step until one has completely overcome doubt (vicikicca).

4. Outcome of practice and the consequences

4.1 Having purified the body, and eliminated doubt (vicikicca) of the five impediments, one enters the supra-mundane level of mind.

When the result the practice is compared with the principles in Trai-sikkhā, it is clear that relationship between liberation from the five impediments leads to the purification of the body which is foundation of the Right Concentration (sammāriyosamādhi). Further, it is obvious that the Right Concentration (sammāriyosamādhi) is entirely different from conventional meditation practice the concentration (samādhi). From the beginning, its role is to lead to the concentration (samādhi) of higher level for purification of the mind as in caraṇa #12-15 (4th set of caraṇa) and vijjā #1-8 (5th - 6th sets of caraṇa). The details of which are as follows:

Diagram illustrating practice 1st –11th of caraṇa and Trai-sikkhā in sub-structure compared to Trai-sikkhā in the main structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice outcome of Trai-sikkhā in substructure</th>
<th>caraṇa #1-11 (1st –3rd set of caraṇa)</th>
<th>caraṇa #12-15 (4th set of caraṇa)</th>
<th>vijjā #1-8 (5th - 6th sets of caraṇa)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pure body</td>
<td>pure body</td>
<td>pure mind</td>
<td>adhipañña</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free the five impediments</td>
<td>(adhisīla)</td>
<td>(adhicitta)</td>
<td>(adhicitta) jhāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enters supra-mundane level mind</td>
<td>(adhisīla)</td>
<td></td>
<td>the 8 vijjās</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sammāriyosamādhi
(RIGHT CONCENTRATION)
The practice of meditation for mental concentration (*samādhi*) for the cultivation of *jhāna* to free the mind from the five impediments is in fact a merely process that sediments the five impediments. It increases the mass of clinging (*upādāna*). Therefore, it is merely understand that there is a shared goal, i.e., curbing down of *kilesa* in order to attain *Nibbāna*. But because of the process, techniques or methods they employed are entirely different, the more progress they have made, the more they are pushed further into the wrong direction that is too far to retrieve. The outcome is the *jhāna* of the *rishis* which in the end has no chance to reach the level of the Noble Enlightened People (*ariya-puggala*). A good example is seen in the case of the two sages, Ālalatāpasa and Udakatāpasa the gurus who the Lord Buddha did not endorse their spiritual status even merely as a Stream-enterer (*sotāpanna*) even though their level of consciousness is close to that of an *Arahat* or a non-returner (*anāgami*) based on their state of calmness and purity as what they have achived was merely a process of calming the mind (*samatha*) and certainly not for the decrease of craving (*tānha*) but it is merely a dissolution or conversion of clinging (*upādāna*). The more the sediment piles up, the more difficulty is the correction, to the degree that it can be inherited from one existence to the other, making it exceedingly more difficult to correct as the true cause is not yet found.

4.2 The body of knowledge about *kukkucca* abling creation of technique in the efficient management of *kilesa*

The body of knowledge in level of *kukkucca* which is the management of incongruicty between *thīnamiddha* and *uddhacca* which causes problems in the refinement that is very complicated. The body of knowledge facilitates the management of this complicated nature that leads to a better outcome. Its function is to make every single edge and angle fits in well with one another. Another example is the issue of color, whenever the color is divided into three. A minute overlapping of small portion can be noticed in the picture. The color does not make it looks beautiful but every color moves to the right postion in every spot and every edge and every angle we will have a beautiful picture; this is the state that is free from *vicikicchā*. The painting is then finished.
Diagram Showing Relationship of the Five Impediments

\[ \triangle ABC = \text{gross kilesa} \text{ which is the three roots of unwholesomeness} \]

\[ \triangle ADE = \text{gross kilesa} \text{ decreased in violence through practicing the 1st set of carana} \]

\[ \triangle AFG = \text{medium kilesa}, \text{ namely, the five impediments after cessation of the three roots of unwholesomeness through practice of the 2nd set of carana until desire of the body subsides, left alone the medium kilesa of more refinement: 1 / 3 of the complicated refinement, which is the main content of this article.} \]

\[ \square FGHI = \text{medium kilesa, i.e, the five impediments. The expression of which is seen external in the form of satisfaction with seeing or smelling meat, the object that was once addicted to so-called } \text{kamachanda} \text{ and vyapada. This is the practice in carana #9, energy (viriya), through the management process in the 2nd set of carana. The details of which are already mentioned in 2.3.2.} \]

\[ \triangle AHI = \text{is area practice straight to the 3rd set of carana having thinamiddha, uddhacca- kukkucca and vicikicch} \text{ as major target by practice carana #10 mindfulness (sati) through the practising process in the 3rd set of carana. The details of which are shown in 2.3.3.} \]

\[ \Delta \text{AHI shows relationship of thinamiddha uddhacca & kukkucca:} \]

\[ J = \text{kukkucca} \text{ broken in to small fragments} \]

\[ K = \text{kukkucca} \text{ broken in to small fragments} \]

\[ \Delta \text{AJK = kukkucca fragmented into much more smaller pieces} \]
Therefore, if thīṇamiddha and uddhacca are appropriately managed in but to relinquish is to free kukkucca; it is the accumulation of effort to free the mind from vicikicchā. Each time of relinquishment causes the rise of pāññā that is more sharp to have the result in carāṇa #10 sati to be potentiated to rotate and spiral deeper into the consciousness. Therefore, elimination of kukkucca cannot be simply achieved in one occasion.

Therefore, the AJK area will be smaller and smaller in size, and finally will reduce to a small single dot that is point A. This is the point which is free from vicikicchā. Having been free from vicikicchā, she is also free from the five impediments and acquired adhipaññā in the body-base which is free from craving for the sensual pleasure, transcending the realm of sensual pleasure in the end. The diagram clearly shows the relationship of the five characteristics of the five impediments.

Therefore the technique used in the management of incongruity that causes mental flurry (kukkucca) is set on the relinquish of very tiny step, but the success is the commitment to keep on to relinquish down to the end of the the process. Because the success of the relinquishment occurs in a small step each time is a complete success of relinquishment in every step taken, will cause continued mindfulness (sati). Once the example is done, it potentiates the mindfulness consituent of the carāṇa; it will become more sensitive in the in apprehension of kukkucca that is small and refined and yet it keeps on probing deeper into the consciousness. This is the result of carāṇa #9 energy (viriya) management of thīṇamiddha and uddhacca to have higher efficiency, kukkucca is hence gradually decreased until extinction. The effect condition the annihilation of vicikicchā. This is an interplay of supportive relation that arises after one has undertaken the carāṇa #1-11 and the four satipatthānas that gives rise to the perfection of progressive efficiency in the practice. However, relinquishment has to be upgraded in every cycle repeatedly (āsevanā bhāvanā bahulikammanā).

4.3 The consequence

Having well understood the technique and method employed in the management of the five impediments (nivaraṇas), it is a good foundation for the development of a behavior so that it can purify the mind according to carāṇa #12-15 (the 4th set of carāṇa) in jhāna-base with more confidence. This will lead to the liberation and vijjā in the end.

5. Conclusion

This article begins from the illustration as to how the 15 Carāṇas and 8 Vījjas can serve as tools that can be employed for elimination of kilesa from the gross to the medium level, initially from the 1st set of carāṇa (carāṇa #1-4) and 2nd set of carāṇa (carāṇa #5-8) which are able to destroy gross kilesa down to the 3rd set of carāṇa (carāṇa #8-11) which is able to destroy kilesa of the medium level, i.e., the five impediments (nivaraṇa). Having passed the level, the practitioner is then enabled to reach the 1st -4th jhāna which is another tool for the management of kilesa in level of clinging (upādāna) which is the type of kilesa that is delusive, only to be felt through the manifestation of concurrent sense contact (phassa), as normally this kilesa lies hidden deeply in the subconscious mind.
This article only explains the method of practice from the level of beginner right down to the level of elimination of kilesa, i.e., the five impediments. Example of vegetarianism is used in the beginning for concrete illustration of the practice. Because meat eating is a form of violation of lives of other animals which is not compatible with the Five Precepts, the moral base of the Stream-enterers (sotapanna) who have to purify the moral precepts which is the foundation of spiritual progress to the level of mindfulness cultivation and paññā (wisdom) in the middle level. In real-life practice, however, all the moral precepts need to be followed in full from beginning without exception. During the practice, the practitioner is facilitated to be sensitive to various types of kilesa that lie hidden in the body, during the employment of the three sets of caraṇa (1st -11th of caraṇa).

After then, the article proceeds to give an explanation in theoretical knowledge or the principles of in working mechanism of the three sets of caraṇa which are related to the four satipaṭṭhānas as the condition of the Dharma that allows us to proceed to the Four Noble Truths, a path of liberation from suffering (dukkha) in the end. All these are inter-related, initially from “know”, which leads to training for “relinquish”, and then seeing or understand for “clarify”. The goal of which is to extinguish all kilesa in order to “cultivate” the mind to higher levels.

The aforementioned structure of the body of knowledge and examples that are illustrated, including problems and obstructions that have arisen during the practice can be used to compare with other behaviors of practices as well as for comparison with the structure and content in groups of Dharma related to the management of various types of kilesa that are refined. The difference may be seen in the details e.g. the number of process that is increasing, as well as the names of various phenomenon of the mind related to various groups of Dharma. In some cases, the group of Dharma remains the same by the displayed body-base level are diverse in meaning of profundness, deep and exceedingly refined. Upon probing deeper into the details, one can see the diverse relations to the 15 Caranās and 8 Vijjās become more consolidated and profoundly supportive of all the main groups of Dharma the Lord Budda has described. The phenomenon stands for the practicality of various principles of the Dharma which are completely in single harmony with one another (ekodhammo).

Finally, this article illurstates that practice in the three sets of caraṇa is (1st -11th caraṇa) is only able to eliminate the kilesa of the middle level. However, in order to be truly liberated from suffering (dukkha) one needs to be able to eliminate kilesa of middle level in the mind, and kilesa level of refinement in the deepest part of the sub-conscious mind. The article also provides illustration of the course that one may pursue after this. Once the practioner has achieved this level, s/he has established a formidable foundation that is strong enough for elimination of kilesa in the higher level of mind-base.
Transcending the Limiting Power of Karma — The Early Buddhist Appamāṇas

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Introduction:

In this paper I look at the early Buddhist ‘immeasurable’ meditative experiences and mental qualities, the appamāṇas, to explore how their cultivation relates to the dimension of karma and intentionality and thereby to progress on the path to liberation.

Elsewhere I have already analysed in some detail the meditative dynamics of the appamāṇas from the point of view of their soteriological implications, discussing the impact of appamāṇa meditation on the possibility of spiritual growth from stream-entry onwards to the higher levels of awakening.¹

Now I focus my presentation on the ethical aspects of the appamāṇas and their position in relation to the gradual path. That is, quite apart from their beneficial relational and social effects – the outer facets of this cultivation which would fall more under the rubric of social ethics – how are the appamāṇas meant to support the individual’s own growth towards liberation? In early Buddhist thought purity, clarity of mind, and non superficial ethical integrity proceed in parallel, to the extent that these qualities depend on each other for their maturation. Thus the question on the appamāṇas and the gradual path is at also a question of how ethical purification, tackled from the particular standpoint of appamāṇa practice, affects and reflects progress on the higher stages of the path.

In short, by ‘ethical’ I mean ‘intentional’ and, within the early Buddhist soteriological perspective, purification of intention, a purification which entails a gradual removal of the deep-seated causes of wrong intention. Such a removal is in fact indissolubly linked to a progressive refinement of right view, once, by dint of stream-entry, eradication of wrong view has been attained by a noble disciple.

I take as a point of reference for my paper an early Buddhist discourse that has been preserved in parallel versions stemming from the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda reciters traditions. After introducing the text (1), I provide a translation excerpt of the passage most relevant to my present investigation (2). Next, I survey the impact of the practice of appamāṇa meditation on karma and intentionality, cetanā (3), followed by some conclusive remarks on appamāṇas and purification of intention (4).

The sequence of instructions delivered in these discourses stipulates an important correlation between training in clear comprehension and purification of intentions through the gradual path and the appamāṇa practice of a noble disciple, hence the particular perspective I choose for my presentation.

¹ Martini 2011b.
The discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas:

I base my understanding of the discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas on a comparative evaluation of the different extant versions, philologically, and on a close reading of the different components of the discourse, philosophically. As we will see, the titles of the parallel versions differ, hence for the sake of convenience in my paper I use “discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas” with reference to the main topic and teachings of the discourse(s) in question. The parallel versions are:

1-3) The two “discourse(s) on intentional [action]” or “discourse(s) on the intentional” (Sañcetanika-suttas, AN 10.206 and AN 10.207) and the “discourse on the body made of deeds” (Karajākāya-sutta, AN 10.208), at present consecutively located in the Karajākāya-vagga of the Aṭṭhatthā-nikāya of the Theravādins. Anālayo (2009a: 13) has shown that probably these three discourses “were interrelated during oral transmission”, for “in fact the Chinese and Tibetan versions are parallels to all three”, suggesting that “the way the Karajākāya-sutta and the Sañcetanika-suttas have been preserved in the Pāli canon could be the result of a garbling of what originally was a single discourse”.

4) The “discourse on intention” (Si jing 思經, MĀ 15), presently located in the first division of the Chinese Madhyama-āgama, a collection generally held to stem from a Sarvāstivāda line of transmission. This version is abbreviated: the section on the ten wholesome courses of action that in the two Pali Sañcetanika-suttas (AN 10.206 and AN 10.207) and probably in the originally single Pali discourse (AN 10.206 and AN 10.207 [=Sañcetanika-sutta]) + AN 10.108 [=Karajākāya-sutta]) follows (or followed) the section on the ten unwholesome courses of action is not given in full.

5) A complete quotation from the “discourse on accumulated actions” (bsags pa'i las mdo) in the fourth chapter of Śamathadeva’s Abhidharmakośaṭṭhipāyiķī, a commentary on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in the form of a repertoire collecting extended or complete extracts of the canonical quotations in the bhāṣya, extant only in Tibetan translation and belonging to the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition. This version is abbreviated at the same point as the Chinese parallel (MĀ 15), i.e., it does not have an exposition of the ten wholesome courses of action.

I use Pali terminology as I take the four main Pali Nikāyas as my main source representative of the early Buddhist teachings in that they are the most completely preserved literary corpus. The broader textual basis I consider as representing the earliest phases of transmission of the Buddhist teachings includes their counterparts in the Chinese Āgamas and the corresponding material extant in Sanskrit fragments and in Tibetan translation. Unless dealing with particularly noteworthy differences or controversial points related to my main theme, I do not give in each and every case reference to extant parallels in Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, etc., which would make footnotes and text-critical remarks grow beyond the scope of a conference paper.


MĀ 15 ad T I 437b28. On the school affiliation of this Madhyama-āgama preserved in Chinese cf. the references in Anālayo 2011a: 7 note 64 and Bingenheimer 2012. According to Chung and Fukita 2011: 12f the current consensus on the Sarvāstivāda origin of the Chinese Madhyama-āgama cannot be considered established, a position that is critically reviewed by Anālayo 2012b.


The Pali versions have long been available in the Pali Text Society’s English translation by Woodward 1936: 189f and in a more recent rendering by Nyanaponika and Bodhi 1999: 256f. A translation and study of the Madhyama-āgama parallel has been recently offered by Anālayo 2009a (republished with minor modifications in id. 2012b), and I have published a complete trans-lation of the discourse extract in Śamathadeva’s commentary as a separate article, Martini 2012.
Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice

Notably, the different traditions of reciters have attached to the transmitted discourses titles featuring the related notions of intentionality (AN 10.206 and AN 10.207, MĀ 15, Abhidharmakośavākyā) or of accumulation of actions (Abhidharmakośaṭīkopāyikā) or of a ‘body of action’ deriving from one’s own previous deeds (AN 10.208).

Śamathadeva introduces the discourse quotation as extracted from the “discourse on accumulated actions” (bsags pa’i las mdo). The underlying Sanskrit title could be literally reconstructed as *Upacitakarma-sūtra, with bsags pa most likely rendering upacita or an equivalent term. The title takes its cue from the discourse’s presentation of the maturing of the fruits of actions that have been (done and) accumulated. The canonical quotation in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya taken by Śamathadeva as his point of departure gives the title as Sañcetanīya-sūtra, a title which is likewise supplied by the Abhidharmakośavākyā. This Sanskrit form in turn corresponds to the title assigned to the two Pali Sañcetanika-suttas in the Burmese and Ceylonese editions. Besides, the expression sañcetanika kamma appears in the opening statement of both Sañcetanika-suttas, as well as in the identical passage of the closely related Karajākāya-sutta. The Madhyama-āgama parallel has “discourse on intention” (Si jing 思經), which equally emphasises the aspect of intentionality.

Closely related to the discrepancy in the titles, and probably accounting for the title given in the Abhidharmakośaṭīkopāyikā, is a major difference found between the discourse versions (Theravāda Aṅguttara-nikāya, AN 10.206, AN 10.207 and AN 10.208, and Sarvāstivāda Madhyama-āgama, MĀ 15) as well as the discourse quotation in the Abhidharmakośavākyā of the Sarvāstivādin versus the quotation in the Abhidharmakośaṭīkopāyikā of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, in that only the former group of texts explicitly qualify actions as being intentional (or unintentional). Thus, judging from this difference, it would seem that the Mūlasarvāstivāda recension – as witnessed by the Abhidharmakośaṭīkopāyikā quotation in its Tibetan translation – is unique vis-à-vis both the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda transmission as far as the absence of this particular terminology is concerned.

7 Q 5595 ad tu 270a3 or Si 161 ad 577,2. Honjō 1984: 68 suggests to read the title of the discourse quotation as given by Śamathadeva as bsags pa’i >las< mdo.
9 AN 10.206 ad AN V 292,1 and AN 10.207 ad AN V 297,14 (title from Be and Ce; Ee does not provide any title, cf. Anālayo 2009a: 1 note 1).
10 AN 10.206 ad AN V 292,1 and AN 10.207 ad AN V 297,14 and AN 10.208 ad AN V 299,11: nāhaṃ bhikkhave sañcetanīkānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitaṇāma appaṭṭaṇavīdītā vyantībhāvam va’dāmī.
11 Cf., e.g.: sañcetanīkānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ ..., “intentional actions that have been undertaken ...” (AN 10.206 ad AN V 292,1, AN 10.207 ad AN V 297,14 and AN 10.208 ad AN V 299,11) and tividhā kāyakammamanta–sandroṣayāpatti akusalasañcetanīkānaṃ ..., “threefold is the defiling fault of intentional unwholesome bodily action ...” (AN 10.206 ad AN V 292,6, AN 10.207 ad AN V 297,19; passage missing in AN 10.208), etc.; 若有放作業 ..., “if [someone] performs deeds intentionally ...” (MĀ 15 ad T I 437b26) and 身故作三業. 不善 ..., “three are the [types] of intentionally-performed bodily deeds that are unwholesome ...” (MĀ 15 ad T I 437b28), etc.; sañcetanīyaṃ karma kṛtvā ... (Abhidh-kh-vy: 400,9) and sañcetanīya (ed. reads: sañcetanīya) trividham karma kāyenā karma karoti ... (Abhidh-kh-vy: 400,11); cf. also the Tibetan rendering ched du bsams nas lus kyi las mām pa’i gsum byed cing ... (D 4092 ad ngu 51a7 and 51b5 or N 154 ad chu 61a7). Here and throughout translations of passages from MĀ 15 are with minor modifications after Anālayo 2009a.
12 For definitions of the terms sañcetanika and upacita in the Manorathapūrṇa, the commentary on the Aṅguttara-nikāya, cf. Mp V 76,9 and 76,11 respectively. On sañcetanīya-karma in general in the context of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of karma cf., e.g., Dhammajoti 2007: 539f [§14.3] and 542f [§14.4].
Other significant differences in sequence and content between the discourse versions can be seen in the following table:

**Table 1: Significant differences among the parallel versions of the discourse(s) on karma and the *appamānas* ¹³**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AN 10.206 &amp; AN 10.207</strong></th>
<th><strong>MĀ 15 &amp; Abhidh-kh-up</strong></th>
<th><strong>AN 10.208</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>karmic retribution</td>
<td>karmic retribution</td>
<td>karmic retribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>making an end of <em>dukkha</em></td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>making an end of <em>dukkha</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>10 unwholesome actions</td>
<td>10 unwholesome actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exposition of 10 unwholesome actions</td>
<td>exposition of 10 unwholesome actions</td>
<td><em>appamānas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evil rebirth</td>
<td>fruits of <em>appamānas</em></td>
<td>fruits of <em>appamānas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>repetition of the above pattern for the 10 wholesome actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned above, philological inspection and comparative study strongly suggest that the three Pali discourses – and evidently the Chinese and Tibetan parallels to the *Karajakāya-sutta* – stem from an original single discourse (Anālayo 2009a). The most noteworthy signs of (a) transmission garbling of the Pali *Saṅcetanika-suttas* and (b) transmission interrelatedness of the other versions are the following:

1. The doctrinally aberrant statement on the impossibility of reaching the end of *dukkha* unless the whole of karma has been experienced found in the three Pali discourses, formulated differently in the Chinese and Tibetan parallels.¹⁴

2. The loss of the section on the ten unwholesome actions in the *Karajakāya-sutta*.

3. The sudden introduction, in the *Karajakāya-sutta*, of a reference to a ‘noble disciple’ worded in terms of ‘but that noble disciple...’, which would require such a noble disciple to be

¹³ Adapted from Anālayo 2009a: 13 table 1.
¹⁴ I shall not repeat the discussion and conclusions reached by Anālayo 2009a.
already introduced in the preceding part of the discourse. This reference to “that noble disciple...” reads out of place also because the process leading to the condition of having become “in this way free from covetousness, ill will and delusion...” has not been previously expounded. The wording of the Tibetan and Chinese parallels (“a noble disciple” and “that well-taught noble disciple...”) agrees with that of the Pali Karajakāya-sutta, but, unlike the Pali discourse, in their case the process of purification of a noble disciple has been thoroughly explained through the preceding exposition of the abandonment of the ten unwholesome actions, culminating in the abandonment of the last set of them, the mental ones. Further, the Pali Saṃcetanika-suttas have additionally preserved an exposition of the ten wholesome actions (although there, as we have seen, the section on appamāṇa practice starting with the phrase “but that noble disciple...” is missing).

4. The placement of the Karajakāya-sutta in the Tens of the Aṅguttara-nikāya is apparently unsupported, in that in its present form the discourse does not include any aspect or enumeration related to the number ten. If the discourse lost the exposition on the ten unwholesome actions, as indicated by the abrupt shift discussed above (3) and confirmed by comparison with the parallels, this would indicate that at the time of the initial allocation of the discourse in the Aṅguttara-nikāya the exposition on the unwholesome actions was still present in the text.

I hope it will become clearer by the end of this paper, that the restoration of the probable original textual situation of the Pali discourses and the emendation to their opening statement suggested by comparative investigation and by the implications of the Buddhist conception of

15 AN 10.208 ad AN V 299,16: sa kho so ... ariyasāvako. With regard to the Pali version, Woodward 1936: 193 note 1 remarks that “[a]pparently all this is borrowed from some other sutta, for it is introduced without apparent reason thus suddenly. Below we have “that young man [kumāro]”.

16 Evam vigatābhijjhio vigatavyāpado asammuñho ..., AN 10.208 ad AN V 300,17.

17 Q 5595 ad tu 271b8: ‘phags pa nyan thos and MĀ 15 ad T I 438a: 彼多聞聖弟子.

18 Cf. also Q 5595 ad tu 271b8: lus kyi mi dge ba’i chos rnam spong zhing lus kyi (D reads: kyi) dge ba’i chos rnam sgom par byed do, ngag dang yid kyi (D reads: kyi) mi dge ba’i chos rnam spong zhing ngag dang yid kyi (D reads: kyi) dge ba’i chos rnam sgom par byed do, “... abandons unwholesome bodily factors and develops wholesome bodily factors; he abandons unwholesome verbal and mental factors and develops wholesome verbal and mental factors... free from enmity, unsurpassed, free from ill will...”; and MĀ 15 ad T I 438a3: ‘... 拾不善業、修身善業。拾口、意不善業。修口、意善業 ... 如是具足精進戒德、成就身淨業、成就口、意淨業、離患離諸、除去睡眠、無飢、貪欲、新股、度慢。正念正智、無有愚癡，”... leaves behind unwholesome bodily deeds and develops wholesome bodily deeds, leaves behind unwholesome verbal and mental deeds and develops wholesome verbal and mental deeds ... being endowed with diligence and virtue in this way, having accomplished purity of bodily deeds and purity of verbal and mental deeds, being free from ill will and contention, discarding sloth-and-torpor, being without restlessness (adopting the 元和 明 variant掉instead of調) or conceit, removing doubt and overcoming arrogance, with right mindfulness and right comprehension, being without bewilderment...”.

19 Anālayo 2009a:11 summarises: “the way this sentence is formulated suggests that a loss of a piece of text has taken place, creating a lacuna that can be filled with the help of the parallel versions. In the Chinese and Tibetan counterparts, the initial statement on karmic retribution is illustrated through a detailed exposition of the ten unwholesome actions ... Then these two versions turn to the noble disciple, who abstains from these ten unwholesome actions and develops the brahmavihāras. It is at this point that the above-mentioned passage in the Karajakāya-sutta seems to fit in, with its reference to ‘that noble disciple’ who is ‘in this way free from covetousness, ill will and delusion’—the last three of the unwholesome actions—and thus able to engage in the practice of the brahmavihāras’. It would seem quite likely that this textual loss was due to the dropping of an entire passage that took place in the course of the oral transmission, rather than resulting from a copying mistake.

20 Cf. Anālayo 2009a: 11: “[i]t is noteworthy that precisely at the point where the Karajakāya-sutta affirms that to make an end of dukkha requires experiencing karmic retribution, a rather substantial loss of text appears to have taken place. This, together with the absence of such a statement in the parallel versions, makes it quite probable that this statement is also the outcome of some error during transmission”...
Confidence, further support by closer investigation of the purifying role of *appamānas* – prepared by the gradual training in wholesomeness – in transcending the limiting power of karma.

In what follows, I translate the *appamānas* sequence as found in the Tibetan parallel, noting only significant discrepancies between the different versions directly relevant to my main theme.

**Translation of the *appamānas* sequence**

“Furthermore, monks, a noble disciple abandons unwholesome bodily factors and develops wholesome bodily factors; he abandons unwholesome verbal and mental factors and develops wholesome verbal and mental factors.”

With a mind imbued with benevolence, free from enmity, unsurpassed, free from ill will, vast, all-pervasive, immeasurable, well-developed, he dwells pervading one direction, and likewise the second, likewise the third, likewise the fourth [direction], the quarters above and below, he dwells pervading the whole world with a mind imbued with benevolence, free from enmity, unsurpassed, free from ill will, vast, all-pervasive, immeasurable, well-developed.

[He should then] be reflecting in this way: ‘Formerly, my mind was not developed, it was small, whereas in this way now my mind has become immeasurable and well-developed’. Monks, for the mind of a well-taught noble disciple [which has been cultivated in this way] it is impossible to be negligent, [the mind] does not fall [into negligence], it does not abide [in negligence], and becomes beyond measurement.

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21 The translated extract goes from Q 5595 ad tu 271b8 to 272b5 or Si 161 ad 580,16 to 582,10 [based on D 4094 ad ju 238a2 to 238b5] (with variant readings noted ibid.: 738). I use Q as main source and give variants from the other editions.

22 Rather than of bodily, verbal and mental factors (chos rnam, Skt. dharma), M/g1407 15 ad T I 438a3 talks of bodily, verbal and mental deeds (業), a phrasing that is used in the Madhyama-/g1408gama discourse as well when the corresponding Tibetan version speaks of actions (las). The text of the Tibetan quotation and the Chinese discourse parallel is abbreviated: the section on the ten wholesome courses of action that in the two Pali Sañcetanika-suttas and probably in the originally single discourse follows (followed) the section on the ten unwholesome courses of action is not found, cf. part 1 of this paper. A detailed exposition of the ten wholesome courses of action is found, e.g., in MN 136 (Mahākammavibhāṅga-sutta) and its parallels; the emphasis of this discourse, probably owing to the didactic purpose of its presentation, is more on the karmic consequences of intentional actions than on the underlying mental tendencies and habits that determine intentionality; for a comparative study of MN 136 cf. Anālayo 2011a: 775f. On the ten wholesome and unwholesome actions and the five precepts cf. Nattier 2002.

23 For a standard Tibetan rendering of the formula of pervasion with the four immeasurables cf., e.g., *Mahāvyutpatti* ed. Sakaki 1926: nos. 1508–1509.

24 This first part of the review phase of the benevolence radiation in the form of a monks’ reflection suggested by the Buddha is found, with differences in wording and details, in the parallel versions: MĀ 15 ad T I 438a11: "... 我本此心少不善修: 我今此心無量善修; 多聞聖弟子其心如是無量善修, 若未因惡知識, 住善行行, 作不善業, 彼不能將去, 不能瞻汗, 不復相隨,” ... ‘Formerly my mind was narrow and not well-developed, now my mind has become boundless and well-developed.’ [When] the mind of that well-taught noble disciple has in this way become boundless and well-developed, if because of [associating with] evil friends [that well-taught noble disciple] formerly dwelt in negligence and performed unwholesome deeds, those [deeds] cannot lead him along, cannot defile [him] and will not further follow [him]”; AN 10.208 ad AN V 299,23: so evaṃ pājānāti: pubbe kho me idam cittaṃ paritattāhosi abhāvītan, etarhi pana me idam cittaṃ appamāṇaṃ subhāvītaṃ. yaṃ kho pana kiṃci pamāṇakataṃ kammaṃ, na taṃ tātṝavasiṣṭati na taṃ tātṝavatīṭṭhatī ti, “he knows thus: ‘previously this mind of mine was restricted, undeveloped, whereas now this mind of mine is boundless, well-developed. Whatever action has been performed in a limiting way, it neither remains there nor persists there.’” For other occurrences of *pamāṇakataṃ kammaṃ* cf., e.g., DN 13 ad DN I 251,7, MN 99 ad MN II 207,25 and SN 42.8 ad SN IV 322,13 (in the first two cases the Chinese parallels, DĀ 26 ad T...
Monks, suppose there is a small boy or a small girl who has [since birth] developed the concentration of the mind of benevolence. Would [later he or she] change into performing actions of body, speech and mind that are evil and unwholesome actions? Or would [he or she] similarly display for a long time actions that are contrary to the Dharma, unbenevoluntary and [result in] dukkha for others? “It is not so, venerable sir.”

“Monks, it is well, it is well. Monks, a man or a woman, whether being a householder or one gone forth, should develop the concentration of the mind of benevolence. Why is that, monks? A man or woman, whether being a householder or one gone forth, once [he or she] has abandoned this body and will be going to the other world, [272b] monks, [he or she] will enter [the next birth] based on a mind which is determined by the mind that depends on the mental quality that conforms to [that particular] mental state. Monks, one says: ‘With this body of mine formerly I performed evil, still need to develop meditation on benevolence etc. and purify themselves so as to become incapable of evil deeds.'

The Chinese version agrees with the Tibetan in mentioning if that man or woman, at home or gone forth ..., (若彼男女在家，出家 ..., MĀ 15 ad T I 438a18), whereas the Pali version only speaks of “a man or a woman” (ittihiyā vā purisena vā. ittihiyā vā ... purisassa vā ..., AN 10.208 ad AN V 300,8). The presentation of the Tibetan and Chinese versions from this point on shifts from rebirth for a practicing man or woman in general to progress prospects for monastics, as noted by Anālayo 2009a: 9 note 35.

Besides the difference noted above (no mention of monastics), compared to the other two versions AN 10.208 at this point features a significant variation in wording. The whole passage, AN 10.208 ad AN V 300,7, reads: bhāvetabbā kho panāyaṃ ... mettāceto vimutti ittihiyā vā purisena vā. ittihiyā vā ... purisassa vā nāyaṃ kāyo ādāya gamanīyo. cittantarā ayaṃ ... macc. so evaṃ pājānāti: yam kho me idha kiñcī pubbe iminā karajākāyena pāpa–kammāna katanā, sabban taṃ idha vedanīyaṃ, na taṃ anugaṃ (with various ms. variant readings in Ec) bhivassati tī, “indeed, monks, the liberation of mind by benevolence should be developed by a man or a woman. A man or a woman cannot take their body along with them and depart [from this world]. Monks, this mortal [life] is but an intermediate mental state. He knows thus: ‘whatever evil actions I performed before with this physical body, their results will be experienced here and will not follow me’.” After this, the Pali and all versions present the statement of the leading to or the certainty...
unwholesome actions, that have been accumulated. With regard to that, all have been accumulated, let it be experienced [now] and not be experienced further at the time of birth’.

Monks, if at the present time one is [thus] endowed with the concentration of the mind of benevolence, he will directly know the state of non-retrogression or the highest Dharma. Therefore of the attainment either of non-return or of the highest, cf. AN 10.208 ad AN V 300,12: evam bhāvītā kho ... mettā ceto vimutti anāgāmītāya saṁvattati, idha paññāsa bhikkhuno uttarāṃ (Be: uttari) vimuttinni appatiṣṭhijhato, and MĀ 15 ad I 438a22: 若有如是行慈心解脫無量善[與>修]者, 必得阿那含, 或復上得, “if liberation of the mind through benevolence has become boundless and well-developed like this, certainly non-return will be attained, or else that which is even higher”. The interpretation of the Pali passage is particularly difficult due to the ambiguity of the phrase that I provisionally render with “this mortal [life/being] is an intermediate state of mind” (rendered by Nyanaponika and Bodhi 1999: 269 as “mortals have consciousness as the connecting link”), and it presents philosophical implications (interim existence or antarabhava, rebirth consciousness and consciousness continuum or bhavanga, etc.) that go beyond the scope of what is feasible in annotation. Theravāda commentarial explanations of the expression cittāntaro are found in Mp V 77,25: Mp V 78,3 on AN 10.208 ad AN V 300,11 further explains: sabbam taṃ idha vedanīyan ti diṭṭhadhammavedanīyatāṁhānasena vuttaṁ and na taṃ anubhavissatī ti mettaṁ upeptavajvedaniyābhāvāsa upacchinnettā upapajjavedaniyavasena na anugataṁ bhavi-śsati ti idam sotāpanna-sakādāgāmi-ariyapuggalānaṁ paccavekkaṇṇaṁ veditabbaṁ. “It will all be experienced here” is said with regard to karma that will be experienced in this present existence; ‘it shall not follow one along’ means that with regard to what should be experienced in the next existence, it will not come about in the future, because the experiencing in the next existence has been cut off through the practice of benevolence: This passage has to be understood as a reflection made by a noble person who is a stream-enterer or a once-returner”. With different degrees of abridgement for the development of compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity, the three versions display the same pattern of variation noted here and in the notes below. The aspiration to experience the fruits of unwholesome actions resulting from previous negligence entirely now and not in a later world is also found in MĀ 15 ad I 438a21: 比丘應作是念: ‘我本放逸, 作不善業。是一切今可受報。終不後世’, “monks, you should reflect like this: ‘Formerly I was negligent and performed unwholesome deeds. Let the fruits of these be experienced entirely now, not in a later world!’”. The direct expression of any aspiration is completely absent from AN 10.208, probably due to a textual loss on the side of the Pali version, cf. also Ānālayo 2009a: 9 note 35. A comparable statement is, however, found later on in the Pali text, in the form of a further review phase of the practice of benevolence, worded indirectly as a post-meditative reflection, AN 10.208 ad AN V 300,10: so evam pājānāti: yam kho me idha kiñce pubbe imin karajakāyena pāpakammam kataṁ, sabbāna taṃ idha vedanīyaṁ, na taṃ anugataṁ bhavissati ti, “he knows thus: ‘whatever evil actions I performed before with this physical body, all their results will be experienced here and will not follow me’. Cf. a similar statement found in Th 81 ad Th 12,21: yam mayā pakatam pāpa pubbe aṁśasa jāsī, idh’ eva taṃ vedanīyaṁ, vattuḥ aṁśaṁ na vijjati, “whatever evil has been previously done by me in other births, it is to be felt here and now, as there exists no other occasion”. After the aspiration (present only in the Tibetan and Chinese parallels and specifically addressed to monastics, cf. above note 28 and table 2) follows in all three versions a statement of the certainty of non-returning or of the highest goal (Tib. bla na med pa’i chos, Chin. 復上, Pali uttari vimutti).

31 The directly knowing the state of non being subject to retrogression, i.e., the attainment of irreversibility, phyir mi ldog par gnas ... so sor rig par byur (D reads: gyur) is more commonly found as the Tibetan literal counterpart to Sanskrit avāvartika or avinivartaniya, whereas the non-returner (anāgāmin), the third type of noble being in the scheme of the four levels of awakening according to early Buddhist texts, is literally translated as phyir mi ’ong ba, cf., e.g., Mahāvyutpatti ed. Sakaki 1926: no. 1014. In the present passage the Pali and Chinese versions speak of leading to the attainment of the state of non return, anāgāmītāya saṁvattati (AN 10.208 ad AN V 300, 13 and 301,15), and of the certainty of attaining it, 必得阿那含 (MĀ 15 ad T I 438a23 and 438b9), respectively. An epithet related to the irreversibility of a non-returner spoken in the Tibetan version occurs, e.g., in the Mahāpari-nirvāpā-sūtra, cf. ed. Waldschmidt 1950: 166, § 9.12 (Sanskrit): anāgāmya anāvṛttidharmā; DN 16 ad DN II 92,24 (Pali): anāvattidhammo; Waldschmidt 1950: 167, § 9.12 (Tibetan): ‘mi ’byung ba’i chos nidy ’gyur. Non-returning qualified as an irreversible condition (mi ldog pa’i chos can phyir mi ’ong ba zhes bya), distinctive of those who have abandoned the five lower fetters, is found, e.g., in another discourse quotation in the Abhidhammaśāsaṅkopāyākā, in a standard presentation of the four types of (noble) individuals, Abhidh-kh-up, Q 5595 ad tu 20a2 or Si 161 ad 41,17, parallel to SĀ 61 ad T II 15c14), Q 5595 ad tu 21a5 or Si 161 ad 44,3. Thus compounds such as anāvartika or *anāvṛtika (underlying the rendering phyir mi ldog par gnas) and anāvartikearthā or anāvṛtikakaḥdhamma (underlying the rendering phyir mi ldog pa’i chos can) adopted by Śamathadeva to designate a non-returner chiefly from the standpoint of irreversibility (phyir mi
a well-taught noble disciple has abandoned evil and unwholesome bodily actions and develops wholesome bodily actions, has abandoned evil and unwholesome verbal and mental actions and develops wholesome verbal and mental actions.

By [developing] in sequence one after the other33 that which is called a ‘mind imbued with compassion, [a mind imbued with] sympathetic joy and [a mind imbued with] equanimity’, monks, one who having done so is endowed with the concentration of the mind of equanimity, will directly know the state of non-retrogression or the highest Dharma”.

**Appamāṇas and karma:**

In addition to comparative philological evidence, the soteriological principles and dynamics underpinning the individual components of the sequence of the discourse(s) as fully documented by the Chinese and Tibetan versions and the restored single Pali discourse are so closely interrelated that it would make much practical sense if these components had been originally taught as part of a unitary instruction, i.e., delivered in the course of a single occasion, and accordingly recorded in one discourse.

The opening reflection on actions, purification of intentionality and the possibility of spiritual emancipation, followed by an exposition on the ten unwholesome deeds, which, once have been abandoned, properly prepare the mind for appamāṇas practice,34 and eventually the certainty of the attainment of either non-return or final liberation by dint of the practice, reflect an integrated practical perspective:

The process of purifying and reshaping karma by means of increasingly pure moral conduct (mirroring, in turn, purification of intentions) would progressively erode unwholesome mental tendencies and reactions that lead to compulsive (re-)generation of karma and to saṃsāric programs and patterns of reactivity. Karma includes chiefly mental intentions and any ensuing action. The ripening of the results of intentions and actions is subject to contextual conditions that fall outside the full control of the individual. Therefore any liberating openings can only be situated in the new intentional response to sense experience and to the present effects of one’s own and others’ actions. Such a response includes the possibilities of changing the direction of one’s intention upon becoming aware of any unwholesomeness that may have arisen present or else of continuing to act according to already present wholesomeness.35

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33 *Snga ma bzhin du* renders Sanskrit *anupūrvena* or an equivalent expression.
34 In addition to the ten unwholesome actions, AN 10.206 and AN 10.207 have an exposition on the ten wholesome actions, cf. table 1.
35 The Abhidharma traditions developed different and in many respect diverging interpretations regarding the definition, functioning, propagation of and moral weight of intention and mental karma, with the Sarvāstivādins developing a distinction between ‘informative’ (vijñapti) and uninformative (avijñapti) karma, etc. Given the purposes and source materials of my presentation, I do not take into account these later scholastic developments. As far as the early discourses are concerned, a source representative of the attitude to intentionality is the Upāli-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, which makes it clear that greater moral weight is placed on acts of the mind in the sense of their capacity to determine intention and actions, rather than on verbal or physical karma per se, and that an act done without prior intention (asañcetanika) such as killing small creatures while walking cannot be as blameworthy as if one were to intend to do so.
In the case of the instruction of the discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas, the appamāṇas are developed on the basis of a mental condition free from the five hindrances. The process of mental purification is thereby further enhanced: in the absence of mental hindrances – and of the latent tendencies on which they are based – no unwholesome reaction can have a chance to come about. Thus ‘perceptive habituation’ conditioned by reiterated development of appamāṇa mental states ‘imitates’ and foreruns, experientially, the ideal condition of a free mind, expressing only wholesome responses and avoiding unwholesome intentions and reactions. Through such type of training, the roots of the mind’s tendencies to generate deluded karma are deflated from within.

Therefore the training instruction of the discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas does not seem to point to the type of positivistic or materialistic approach to karma that the initial statement transmitted by the Pali parallels suggests. In fact, such ideas reflect Jain rather than Buddhist tenets. In contrast, the point at stake in the discourse(s) appears to be more an organic inner work on the unwholesome roots by way of restraint on the level of not acting them out. In conjunction with the development of wisdom, this will then lead on to liberation.

The raison d’être of the meditative approach presented by the discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas and the outcome of appamāṇa practice do not suggest any expiation of karma, in that the ‘cure’ is of a radical rather than symptomatic nature, concerned with the cause rather than the fruits.

Therefore in addition to comparative evidence and to an assessment of the early Buddhist conception of karma in general, the proposed restoration of the initial statement – that there is no need to experience all results of karma to make an end of dukkha is strongly supported by a close inspection of the meditative dynamics that underpin the discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas. In fact, were it otherwise, the present discourse(s) would contradict the early Buddhist conception of karma, the possibility of emancipation from it, and the meditative enterprise aimed at countering the deep seated drive towards the generation of unwholesome karmic intentions through the powerful tool of appamāṇas.

An eminently ethical characteristic – the intention of abandoning the unwholesome and nurturing the wholesome – is continuously evident in all applications of the appamāṇas. This holds for the context of formal meditation, as shown by the ‘ethical’ content of the review phase of the discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas, as well as for activities outside of it.

Interestingly, a discourse that has several elements in common with the Sañcetanika-sutta begins with the question of what is (genuine) purity of body, speech and mind vis-à-vis purity based on rituals upheld by some brahmins. The discourse parallels the Sañcetanika-sutta exposition (this exposition is given within the context of refutation of the Jain position on the primacy of karma interpreted as resulting acts vis-à-vis karma as a primarily intentional impulse according to Buddhist thought); for a comparative study of the parallel versions of this discourse cf. Anālayo 2011a: 320f. The discourse parallels the Sañcetanika-sutta exposition

36  Cf. Anālayo 2009a: 16f with references.
37  AN 10.206 ad AN V 292,4, AN 10.207 ad AN V 297,17 and AN 10.208 ad AN V 299,14: na tvevāhaṃ, bhi–kkhave, sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitiānaṃ appaṭisamveditvā dukkhass’ antakiriyaṃ vadāmi, “yet, monks, I do not say that there is a making an end of dukkha without having experienced [the fruits of] intentional actions that have been undertaken and accumulated” (with variants in Ee and Be reading throughout: appaṭisamveditvā, cf. Anālayo 2009a: 1 note 2). The passage is also discussed by Vetter 1988: 90, who considers the statement on the need to experience karmic retribution in order to make an end of dukkha as original, thereby interpreting the presence of the immeasurables in AN 10.208 as a purposeful effort “to overcome the power of former deeds”, cf. also Anālayo 2009a: 12 note 37.
38  AN 10.176 ad AN V 263,1. On bodily, verbal and mental misconduct as three things endowed with which one is
on the three ways in which one is made impure by bodily action, four ways in which one is made impure by verbal action, and three ways in which one is made impure by mental action, followed by their abandonment and the performance of the ten wholesome actions as the ways in which one is instead purified. When a person is endowed with these ten wholesome actions, then no matter what ritualised behaviours are undertaken or not undertaken, the purity is not lost, “because these ten wholesome courses of action are pure and cause purity”. In other words, mental purity due to wholesome mental actions is based on non-greed, non-ill-will and non-delusion. As the Karajaka-sutta and its parallels make clear, such ethical purity and clarity of understanding with regard to one’s motivations furnish the necessary pathway that leads from the initial insight gained by the noble disciple with the attainment of stream-entry to the complete fulfilment of non-greed and non-ill-will by reaching non-return as well as the acme of non-delusion on attaining arhatship.

A similar progression mirroring the intimate correlation between ethical purity and practice of the path is found in a discourse in the Majjhima-nikāya. This begins with an initial recognition of the presence or absence of mental defilements. Such recognition then leads to the effort to abandon them, followed by a reference to the acquisition of perfect confidence in the three jewels, i.e., the attainment of stream-entry. Then comes concentration based on the happiness derived from such confidence, which is followed by instructions on appamānas radiation, which in turn leads to insight and eventually to the realisation of final liberation.

Progress to non-return or arhatship is related as much to meditative attainment as it is to ethical and emotional purification. Remarkably, the content of the ‘review phase’ of the appamānas radiation according to the instruction of the discourse(s) on karma and the appamānas (Table 2) is of an ethical nature: the practitioner becomes aware of the ethical transformation brought about by appāmāna practice, in its private implication (abandonment of personal negligence, which is a cause of dukkha for oneself) as well as in its relational and altruistic aspect (before long one will no longer behave in a way that is not in accordance with the Dharma and causes dukkha to others).

to be recognised as a fool cf. also AN 3.2 ad AN I 102,1; on having done what is admirable and wholesome, having given protection to those in fear, and having done nothing that is evil, savage or cruel as two things that cause no remorse, and having abandoned the three types of misconduct and whatever else is flawed and unwholesome as leading to heavenly birth cf., e.g., It 30 ad It 24,21.
39 AN 10.176 ad AN V 268,21: ime ... dasa kusalammapatthā suci yeva honti sucikaranā ca.
40 The fact that in the discourse paralleling the Saṅcéṣṭika-suttas exposition an explanation is given of the lower fetter of belief in religious rites and ritualised behaviours as if these were in themselves able to lead to liberation, indicates that the teaching is clearly addressed to someone who is not yet a noble disciple (nor, for that matter, a Buddhist disciple as yet, since Cunda, to whom the discourse is addressed, goes for refuge only at the end of the discourse). The perspective of the higher levels of awakening is not mentioned, but as a result of being endowed with the ten wholesome actions, rebirth among the devas and among human beings or “any other good destination” is declared, a mundane perspective that dispenses with higher soteriological pursuits that would require irreversible eradication of the unwholesome roots.
41 MN 7 ad MN I 37,1; on variations in the parallel versions cf. Anālayo 2011a: 49f.
Table 2: The *appamāṇa* sequence in the discourse(s) on karma and the *appamāṇas*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AN 10.208</th>
<th>MĀ 15 &amp; Abhidh-kh-up</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>man or woman</strong></td>
<td><strong>man or woman, at home or gone forth</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>all-pervasive radiation</td>
<td>all-pervasive radiation</td>
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<td>∫</td>
<td>∫</td>
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<tr>
<td>review:</td>
<td>review:</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) mind qualities (before &amp; after)</td>
<td>a) mind qualities (before &amp; after)</td>
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<td>b) ethical qualities (before &amp; after) with small boy or girl simile</td>
<td>b) ethical qualities (before &amp; after) with small boy or girl simile</td>
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<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
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<tr>
<td>knowledge that:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) body made of deeds (<em>karajakāya</em>) will not be taken along</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b) fruits of accumulated actions must be all experienced here &amp; now (= non-return/highest)</td>
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<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
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<tr>
<td>liberation of the mind through loving kindness</td>
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<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
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<tr>
<td>attainment of non-return in this life for a wise <em>monastic</em> who has not yet penetrated release beyond that</td>
<td>aspiration:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>not to take body along (= birth above <em>kāmadhātu</em>)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>↓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>same pattern for other <em>appamāṇas</em></strong></td>
<td><strong>monastics</strong></td>
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<td>aspiration to experience fruits of accumulated actions all here &amp; now (= non-return/highest)</td>
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<td>liberation of the mind through loving kindness (MĀ 15) / concentration of the mind of loving kindness (Abhidh-kh-up)</td>
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Although intentionality is central to the Buddhist conception of karma, *cetanā* and karma are not total equivalents, in that once an intention has been conceived, then acts of body etc. need to actually ‘perform’ karma.\(^{42}\) In several discourse passages intention appears alongside longing or yearning (*patthanā*) and wish (*panidhi*), which were to be interpreted by commentarial literature as stages of the process of forming and realising intentional action.\(^{43}\) An intention may not be in itself able to completely fulfil its conative momentum and translate into an action – whereby the development of commentarial and Abhidharmic analysis of the psychophysical factors involved in such process – but as far as moral responsibility and ultimate purification from all unwholesomeness are concerned, the early discourses seem to emphasise strongly the importance of mental inclination, of cherishing and then endeavouring to implement it, so that it becomes established as the object of one’s consciousness.\(^{44}\) In fact, reiterated intentional decisions and different factors, such as the effort and energy required in endeavouring to undertake any action, during the different phases of the conditioned process, continue to carry their own moral weight.

The Abhidharma traditions developed different and in many respects diverging interpretations regarding the definition, functioning, propagation of and moral bearing of intention and mental karma, with the Sarvāstivādin envisaging a distinction between ‘informative’ (*vijñapti*) and uninformative (*avijñapti*) karma, etc.\(^{45}\) As far as the early discourses are concerned, a source representative of the attitude to intentionality is the *Upāli-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, which makes it clear that greater moral weight is placed on acts of the mind in the sense of their capacity to determine intention and actions, rather than on verbal or physical karma per se, and that an act done without prior intention (*asaṃcetanika*) such as killing small creatures while walking cannot be as blameworthy as if one were to intend to do so. This exposition is given within the context of a refutation of the Jain position on the primacy of karma interpreted as resultant acts, vis-à-vis karma as a primarily intentional impulse according to Buddhist thought.\(^{46}\)

The crucial importance of *cetanā* stands behind the training sequence of the discourse(s) on karma and the *appamāṇas*. Karma as intentionality is the active force behind *samsāra*, feeding on craving and ignorance, which are mutually dependent on deluded intentions and wrong view. If karma were invariably to bear fruits that are precisely commensurate with the deed, i.e., if karma were deterministic, liberation from *samsāra* would be impossible, in which case there would be no prospect for the religious life and no opportunity for the complete end of *dukkha*.\(^{47}\)

A discourse in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* stipulates the possibility of knowing karma, the arising of karma, its consequences, its different varieties, and the way to end it. As in the discourse(s) on karma and the *appamāṇas*, karma is here divided into intended actions and intended actions that have been carried out; the cause for the arising of karma is contact; the consequences of karma are positive, negative or neutral; the different varieties of karma are those leading to different types of

\(^{42}\) *AN* 6.63 ad *AN* III 415,7: *cetanāhaṃ, bhikkhave, kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā*.
Cf. also Abhidh-kh-vy: 400,20 commenting on a quotation from the *Saṃcetanīya-sūtra*: *cetanā karma cetayitvā ceti vacanāt* and id.: 400,24: *cetanā-matāṃ bhikṣavaḥ karma vadāmi cetayitvā cety etad virudhyate.*

\(^{43}\) E.g., *AN* 10.104 ad *AN* V 212,26: *yā ca cetanā yā ca patthanā, yo ca panidhi, ye ca sankhārā ....*

\(^{44}\) E.g., *SN* 12.40 ad *SN* II 67,1: *yāh ca kho ... cetetī yāhā ca pakappeti yāhā ca anuseti, ārammaṇāṃ etat hoti viññānassa thitīyā, ārammaṇe sati pattiṭṭhā viññānassa hotī; cf. also *MN* 19 ad *MN* I 114,19.

\(^{45}\) Given the purposes and source materials of my presentation, I do not take into account these later scholastic developments.

\(^{46}\) For a comparative study of the parallel versions of this discourse cf. Anālayo 2011a: 320f.

\(^{47}\) *AN* 3.99 ad *AN* I 249,7.
birth; the end of karma is the coming to an end of contact; and knowing the way leading to the end of karma is to know the noble eightfold path.\textsuperscript{48}

This stipulation is complemented by yet another discourse in the \textit{Aṅguttara-nikāya} that explains that the goal of the religious life is not to change or end karmic retribution, but to cultivate insight into the four noble truths.\textsuperscript{49} That is, the early Buddhist way of practice is not concerned with any exhaustion of karmic results. Much rather, its aim is the exhaustion and destruction of the influxes. This purpose, which leads all the way to the final goal, translates, in practice, into a gradual purification of intentions and the eventual uprooting of the ‘existential intention’ that generates birth and becoming.

In early Buddhist thought the very existence and field of operation of karma are considered co-extensive with the samsāric existential predicament, in that karma is beginningless but not necessarily endless.\textsuperscript{50} Liberation is not by necessity teleologically intrinsic to such samsāric predicament – not all beings are bound to reach emancipation. Yet the potential for liberation does exist and remains an open possibility. In other words, if and when one reaches complete emancipation depends on the level of purification of one’s view and intentions. The process of purification can be more or less effectively directed, without, however, being mechanically determined or liable to wilful manipulation.

Karma – action with intention, including in a broader sense also its results – remains thus irreducible to mono-dimensional and quantitative models of apprehension and its actual ‘figures’ keep escaping epistemological and psychological totalising interpretations. Yet its principles, as highlighted by the above quoted \textit{Aṅguttara-nikāya} discourse, falls within the range of direct knowledge. The dependent variables may be uncountable but the result obtains within a scheme operated by fixed principles.

In view of this background, I would now like to look more closely at the relationship between \textit{appamāna} practice and the fine dynamics of intentionality. Progress at the higher stages of the path is described in standard terms as the eradication of the fetters. The fetters are mental tendencies that, when present, can be manifest or latent, strong or attenuated. On looking at them in terms of karma, i.e., they can be described as patterns of reactivity to experience that are to some degree present in the mind or else have been left behind forever. This viewpoint helps understand the practical implication of the passages in the discourse(s) on karma and the \textit{appamānas} that set forth a clear correlation between \textit{appamānas} and progress on the path. In other words, how do \textit{appamānas} have an impact on karma? Since it is said that through the destruction of greed, aversion and delusion the concatenation of karma (\textit{kammanidānasambhavo}) comes to an end (\textit{kammanidānasañkhayo}),\textsuperscript{51} then how does the set of teachings in question contribute to the actualisation of this soteriological enterprise?

\textsuperscript{48} AN 6.63 ad AN III 415,4; with parallels in MĀ 111 ad T 1 600a23 and Abhidh-kh-up at Q 5595 ad tu 228a5 or Si 161 ad 487,6 (on this parallel cf. Hiraoka 2002: 458 note 42); cf. also Abhidh-kh-bh ed. Pradhan 1975: 192,9 (Pāśādika 1989: 73 no. 262).

\textsuperscript{49} AN 9.13 ad AN IV 382. This and similar statements need be put in perspective against the background of the ongoing debate with the contemporary early Jain tradition holding that the chief purpose of the spiritual life is precisely the shaking off of the fruits of past actions. According to a commentarial gloss that does not seem to fit too well with the early Buddhist definition of the purpose of the going forth, the ‘religious life’ (brahmacariya) stands for “a religious life lived for the destruction of karma”, Mp II 360,14: evam santanā ... brahmacariyavāso ho ti kammakkhayakarassa brahmacariyassā khepetakammasambhavato vāso nāma hoti, vuttham suvuttham eva ho ti attho.

\textsuperscript{50} SN 15.3 ad SN II 180,23.

\textsuperscript{51} AN 10.174 ad AN V 262,7.
How can the appamāṇas experiences of someone who is (by definition) endowed with right view, i.e., at least stream-entrant, affect the mind’s tendencies? How does the necessary restructuring of intention come into place?

Karma is said to be immeasurable and cannot be quantified. The immeasurable characteristic of these boundless states of mind is able to provide a special treatment to help release the constrictions and afflictions of the condition of being subject to karma: the immeasurables can impact karma in the sense they have an effect of mental tendencies and habits. One perspective on the appamāṇas vis-à-vis wholesomeness or unwholesomeness is to contemplate intention from the point of view of the conditioned process of personality building, that is, the five aggregates affected by clinging. Here intention functions as an agent of craving arising as a reaction to sense experience. The special task of the appamāṇas in this respect is to re-condition intention with regard to any mental object, making the mind less and less responsive to defilements that arise in relation to objects due to the impulse of craving.

On the other hand, the discourses tell us that, eventually, by dint of sustained appamāna practice, “no limiting action remains therein”. The commentary on the Ariyuttara-nikāya explains the implications of this statement in terms of rebirth and progress on the path. That is, limiting actions that would cause one to take birth again in the sense realm are temporarily neutralised and lose their conditioning power because the corresponding mental inclinations have been superseded. In other words, with the attainment and mastery of liberation of the mind through benevolence, the karmic potential of this experience will take precedence over sense-sphere karma and result in rebirth in the form realm. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, the appamāṇas qua appamāṇas fall short of being able to lead to the final emancipation from karma that is full liberation unless they are developed in conjunction with insight and liberating wisdom.

Thus they are instrumental to the final goal in the above described process of purification and transcendence of karma.

Coming back to intentionality, the early Buddhist discourses, as far as I am aware of, do not give a definition of sañcetanā. Judging from the discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas, sañcetanā seems to be the by-product of mental states such as sensual passion or non-sensual passion, ill will or non-ill-will, delusion or non-delusion, prompted by which they occur, and of the conditioning force of saṅkhāras, mental reactivity that co-determines the arising of karmically effective volition. The discourses do, however, indicate that all types of actions are based on intentions or motivations

52 E.g., MN 14 ad MN I 91,1.
53 Cf. the text excerpt translated in section 2 and the discussion in section 3 of this paper, above notes 23 and 29 and below note 53.
54 Cf. Mp V 77,17: pamānakatam kammaṃ nāma kāmāvacarakammaṃ, “limiting karma” refers to sense-sphere karma”, and also the similar gloss at Spk III 105,27: yaṃ pamānakataṃ kammaṃ ti, pamānakataṃ kata nāma kāmāvacarāṃ vuccati: appamāṇa-katam kammaṃ nāma rūpāvacaraṃ (cf. also above notes 23 and 29). As already explained by Anālayo 2009b: 9 note 35, pace Maithrimurthi 1999: 76, the effect of appamāṇas practice on limiting actions described in the discourse(s) on karma and the appamāṇas and other parallel passages refers as such to the next rebirth and does not imply complete elimination of karma. By further deepening of the practice through wisdom and insight, full liberation is possible. A discourse in the Dīgha-nikāya employs the simile of a strong conch-shell blower that can resound a tone to the four directions with just a little effort: in the same way, for one who continually the practices meditative radiation of the four immeasurables in every direction, no limiting action will remain and become established, cf. DN I 251,5; on this passage cf. also Aronson 1980: 62f and esp. 69
55 Martini 2011b.
that come into being in relation to the body, speech or the mind, and that provide the cause of corresponding actions (of the body, speech and the mind). This takes place whether a deed is deliberate to the extent that there’s clear comprehension and full understanding of its consequences (sampajāṇo) or without it (asampajāṇo).\textsuperscript{56}

A passage in a discourse in the Sañcetanika-vagga of the Aṅguttara-nikāya presents four ways in which a newly reborn being arises in dependence on previous actions based on intention (sañcetaṇā): through fruition of one’s own intention (attasañcetaṇā), through karmic results produced by another person’s intention (parasañcetaṇā), through the combination of these two, or without either.\textsuperscript{57}

Other passages explain that in the presence of a body, with intention related to the body as a cause, pleasure and pain arise within, and likewise with intentions related to speech and the mind.\textsuperscript{58} These contexts throw into relief an intimate relation and continuity between intention and the subsequent act where it becomes manifest. Intentional urge provides the cause for action and for its consequences, in this case pleasure and pain that will be experienced on being reborn. What a person intends, plans or inclines to, that becomes the object that gives shape to the mind, and therefore conditions the arising of a corresponding consciousness.\textsuperscript{59} Consciousness thus carries along the whole inheritance of mental tendencies, habits and inclinations that lead an individual to seek to act, faring on in the round of births and existence.

A practical question to raise at this point is precisely at which juncture of the conditioned response to initial sense input appamāṇa training intervenes vis-à-vis intention?

It appears to me that sustained practice with the immeasurables can be considered as yet another means of breaking the self-reproducing cycle of reactivity to sense-objects, which is to varying degrees conscious, semi-conscious or unconscious. Intention is not determined once and for all, and it is part of a mental cycle that requires the ongoing redetermination and reactivation of intention, therefore the liberating possibility of becoming aware of one’s motivations is present throughout different stages of the process. The immeasurables have a liberating role to play in order to weaken the unwholesome capacity for reactivity because (a) they positively develop and strengthen qualities opposite to reactions to sense experience in terms of passion or aversion, thereby contributing to cognitive and emotional reorientation based on wholesomeness, and (b) they slowly undermine the fundamental habit to reactivity, in that their mental cultivation results in a \textit{de facto} weakening of reactivity and craving with clinging. In this way they impinge on different junctures of the process of the coming into being of personality afflicted by clinging.

The Pali exegetical work \textit{Nettippakarana}, for example, explaining a discourse passage about the end of \textit{dukkha} and emancipation from any form of dependence or wavering, highlights the positioning of intentionality as dependent on cravings and views and leading in turn to karmic reactivity:

\textsuperscript{56} SN 12.25 ad SN II 40,9.
\textsuperscript{57} AN 4.172 ad AN II 159,6, cf. also DN 33 ad DN III 231,5.
\textsuperscript{58} E.g., SN 12.25 ad SN II 39,33 and AN 4.171 ad AN II 157,31.
\textsuperscript{59} Cf. above note 43.
“With regard to ‘for one who is dependent, there is wavering’, dependence is of two types, dependence through craving and dependence through [incorrect] views. Here the intention of one who desires is dependence through craving, the intention of one who is confused is dependence through [incorrect] views. Intentions [become then] volitional formations, dependent on volitional formations consciousness [arises], dependent on consciousness name-and-form [arise], thus all dependent arising [comes into being]. This is the descending due to dependent arising”.60

Interestingly, another Pali exegetical treatise, the Paṭṭakopadesa, in its exposition of ‘origin’, ‘cessation’ and the ‘path’ (leading to cessation) according to the four truths of the noble,61 quotes from a so far untraced Sañcetaniya-sutta an example of crooked, flawed and faulty bodily, verbal and mental actions opposite to the uncrooked, flawless and faultless as illustrations of the two truths of the origin of dukkha and of the path respectively.62 Then the Paṭṭakopadesa quotes the same discourse excerpt on independence and unwavering discussed in the Nettipakaraṇa as an illustration of what is ‘origin’, ‘cessation’ and the ‘path’, continuing with eleven supportive conditions for liberation from non-remorse etc. up to knowledge-and-vision of liberation as regards the ‘origin’, the being provided with such eleven supportive conditions as regards the ‘path’, and any liberation thus attained as ‘cessation’ (yā ca vimutti ayam nirodho).63

This passage reflects the central position of wholesome intentionality within the fundamental soteriological paradigm of the four truths, paralleling a diagnostic scheme that was apparently employed in ancient Indian medicine.64

Applied to the context of appamānas training, the ‘disease’ is the existential karmic predicament itself; the ‘cause’ an ignorant and unwholesome conduct of the body, speech and the mind; ‘cessation’ the noble disciple’s attainment of the liberation of the mind through the immeasurables and eventually the reaching of non-return and of the higher goal through further development of insight; and the ‘appropriate remedy’ wholesome conduct in conjunction with the establishment of right view. Right view, the forerunner and precursor of the four truths as they really are,65 in the context of the discourse(s) on karma and the appamānas results especially from

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60 Nett 12 ad Nett 65,2; cf. MN 144 ad MN III 266,6. Cf. also Ud 8,4 ad Ud 81,6.
62 Ṛṣyaṅamoli 1964: 21 note 56/1 comments that that “the name ‘Sañcetaniya-sutta’ for this sutta remains unexplained” and refers to AN II 112-113 instead of SN II 247 given in the PTS edition (p. 17 note d).
63 Paṭṭ 57 ad Paṭṭ 17,21f, transl. Ṛṣyaṅamoli 1964: 21f.
64 Cf., e.g., de la Vallée Poussin 1903: 580 and Wezler 1984, according to whom, because there is no evidence for this scheme having predated the Buddha’s formulation of the four truths, it cannot be excluded that ancient Indian medicine adopted it from the Buddhist teachings (pp. 312f). The Buddha is the skilled physician who teaches the path to freedom from craving, the destroyer of the dart of craving, SN 8,7 ad SN I 192,6. On a discourse that correlates the four aspects of this scheme with four qualities required of a physician (identification of a disease, diagnosis of its cause, knowledge of the remedy and administering the cure until the disease is over), SĀ 389 ad T II 105a25 and Q 5595 ad thu 32b6 or Si 162 ad 747,3, cf. Anālayo 2011a: 802 note 220 and Anālayo 2011b (forth-coming). Notwithstanding the appellation of the Buddha as ‘the great physician’ and the quasi-thaumaturgic or thaumaturgic qualities and powers attributed to him by later Buddhist religious traditions, in early Buddhist thought it is the Dharma as a medicine that remains the constant point of reference, cf. also the famous Dhammapada stanza according to which “you yourself must strive, the Tathāgathas can only show the way”, Dhp 276: tumhehi kicca kicca akkāhātā tathāgatā, etc.; this is still echoed, for example, by later Tibetan sources, cf. Wangchuk 2007: 33f.
65 SN 37,7 ad SN V 442,9, comparing the function of right view as a forerunner and precursor of the breakthrough to the dawn in relation to the rising of the sun.
the abandonment of the last group of unwholesome actions, those entailing mental unwholesome attitudes rooted in the holding of wrong view. Moreover, the dynamics of the practice are in harmony with a liberating shift through which the dependent generation of karmic bondage, dukkha and unwholesomeness is replaced by the ‘nirvānic dynamics’ of their dependent cessation (i.e., the standard reverse form of dependent origination).  

In the light of the sequence of the teachings in the discourse(s) on karma and the appamānas, the practical principles underlying the proposed mental training become now more explicitly evident. The practitioner is reminded that unwholesome actions of the body, speech and the mind are rooted in intentionality. Intentionality entails a certain mental attitude resulting from past conditioning, tendencies, habits, etc. and, ultimately, is formed on the basis of either the wholesome or unwholesome roots (leaving aside neutral intentions which bear no karmic consequence).

Thus, practically speaking, each and every act of abstention from sensual passion and aversion and from behaviours rooted in delusion means that the intention becomes one of non-greed, non-aversion and non-delusion. For an arahant it is impossible to (re-)act under the influence of sensual passion, aversion, delusion or fear. For a practitioner in training, this effort of abstention needs to be an ongoing cultivation. Positively worded from the perspective of the immeasurables, such intentions are naturally akin to the pure mental abodes. In terms of karma, these acts of abstention indicate that the strength of the patterns of reactivity, i.e., the overpowering activation of saṅkhāras, that manifests itself in the performance and reenacting of unwholesome (re-)actions, comes to be gradually ‘compromised’, so to speak. The implications of developing clear comprehension of the purpose and suitability of one’s intentional actions by becoming aware of the arising of saṅcetanā directly relate to the path factor of right mindfulness. These implications have consequences on the personal and interpersonal level and are at the same time ethical, cognitive and emotional. For a practitioner well-established in the training, the refinement of the practice of purification of intentionality will then progress to its farthest, that is, to the complete eradication of the purposive conatus for becoming and existence, including any more ‘wanting to be’ in the form and formless spheres.

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66 E.g., SN 12.2 ad SN II 2,11. Parts of the foregoing discussion have already appeared in Martini 2011b.
67 DN 29 ad DN III 133,14.
68 I have discussed the appamānas in relation to the factors of the noble path (as well as to the factors of awakening) in Martini 2011b. For passages in the early discourses in which clear comprehension of purpose and suitability (sāthaka-sampajañā and sappāyasampajañā), commentarial rubrics detailing the implication of clear comprehension (sampajañā), Ps I 253,1, Sv-p I 315,19 etc., are implicitly adumbrated, cf. Anālayo 2003: 143f . The awakening factors of right mindfulness and right comprehension are in fact expressly mentioned in the Chinese version of the discourse(s) on karma and the appamānas, MĀ 15 ad T I 438a37: 正念正智, as being established through successful relinquishment of the ten unwholesome actions. For any form of liberation of the mind to be able to lead to any of the stages of awakening, it needs to be developed in conjunction with the factors of awakening. I intend to come back to the role of the awakening factors and insight in the appamānas training in a separate paper.
Concluding remarks on *appamāṇa*s

I would now like to close with a few final general considerations on the *appamāṇa*s. Because his or her fetters have been worn away and clinging has been destroyed,⁶⁹ a fully awakened being no longer reacts in unwholesome ways during his or her encounters with other beings. Instead, he or she responds from an *appamāṇa* attitude, where inner nuances of benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy or equanimity, as occasion requires, become prominent when coming into contact with the ‘world’, a world that has, in a way, long been left behind. According to a discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the Buddha’s own being endowed with the qualities of benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity was precisely the result of his having eradicated the mental defilements that are opposed to *appamāṇa*s.⁷⁰ According to another discourse in the same *Majjhima-nikāya*, a noble disciple in higher training with developed faculties dwells in mindfulness with clear comprehension (*sato sampajāno*), being able to see what is repulsive as not-repulsive and what is not-repulsive as repulsive or to remain equanimous.⁷¹

The genuine arising of *appamāṇa*s can be quite spontaneous when the negative states they counter are absent, and they can be independent from the presence of real or fictive interactions with individuals or ‘the other’ in a broader sense. One such ‘other’ or perhaps the epitome of ‘other-ness’ in early Buddhist discourse can be said to be ‘oneself’, that is, one’s being subject to self-alienation caused by craving. A recluse gone to a remote and desolate retreat is still haunted by the company of his or her ever-present second and companion, craving, the fundamental root of the *sībi displīcere* of *dukkha* whereby all discontent springs forth, which makes a solitary dweller someone who is still accompanied by a partner.⁷² The natural arising of the *appamāṇa*s needs not stem from any internalised perception or mental image of such ‘other(s)’ and of the ‘world’ itself, and in fact, also meditatively, it relies on transcending such duality.

The mental training through the immeasurables is an integral part of the spiritual cultivation of intentionality which is the ethical ‘core’ of early Buddhist teachings, an ethical education that begins with mental training.⁷³ For spiritual progress to happen, full mental-cum-ethical development is mandatory, in that the weakening (once-return) and complete eradication (non-return) of the two fetters of sensual passion (*kāmarāga*) and ill will (*vyāpāda*) are required.

Thus it seems to me that besides their resulting in happy destinations, the *appamāṇa*s are not merely positive social emotions,⁷⁴ nor just the dynamic aspect of an awakened individual’s relationship to the world of his or her inner and outer relationships, nor are their benefits confined to their function as antidotes to anger, irritation, envy, conceit and so on.⁷⁵ As Bhikkhu Dhammajoti (2010: 174) comments:

⁶⁹ Cf., e.g., It 27 ad It 21.4: yo ca mettaṁ bhāvayati / *appamāṇa* paṭissato / tānū samyojanā honti / passato upadhikkhayāṁ, “for one who develops boundless benevolence, mindful, seeing the destruction of clinging, the fetters become weakened”.

⁷⁰ The statement is in response to a reference to Brahmā’s abiding in benevolence, MN 55 ad MN I 370,36: yena kho ... rāgena yena dosena yena mohena byāpādavā assa so rāgo so doso so moho tathāgatassa paḥño; the reasons for the Buddha’s abiding in benevolence is absent in the parallel version, cf. Anālayo 2011a: 320.

⁷¹ MN 152 ad MN III 301,8.

⁷² SN 35.63 ad SN IV 36,25 and Sn 740; cf. also Anālayo 2009: 10.

⁷³ The implications of mental purity as a foundation for Buddhist ethics are discussed in detail by Anālayo 2012b.

⁷⁴ Cf. Pāṇādīka 2007: 263f, critically reviewing the position of Conze 1962: 80f; a more nuanced statement on the social dimension of the qualities of benevolence etc. is found in Kuan 2008: 56.

“the cultivation of the four immeasurables brings about moral transformation. Although in the Śrāvakā tradition, it is generally prescribed for counteracting hatred, and in both the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda, it is subsumed under the samatha practice, its significance in one’s success in ethical alignment has been emphasized since early Buddhism. In fact, for Buddhism, love and compassion are the very foundation of ethical behaviour: A Buddhist observes the precepts fundamentally out of maitrī [metta] and karuṇā”.

The all-pervasive dimension of boundless appamānaṃ radiation in all directions is illustrated with the image of a trumpeter who makes himself heard in all directions. To my knowledge, this is the only ‘formalised’ way of appamānas practice known to the early Buddhist discourses. In terms of theory of meditation, a boundless radiation independent from the presence of an object to be aroused and extended in consciousness seems to be particularly effective in refining intentionality towards progressively higher levels of freedom from arising as a conditioned, often automatic response, to experience.

Parallel to this affective and cognitive feature, appamānaṃ ethical self-cultivation focuses on a boundlessly pure ethical dimension independent of restraint or else reaction (negative and unwholesome, but also positive or wholesome) in relation to any inner or outer dimension of the individual. Thus the practitioner’s independence from the world is much strengthened, as is his or her insight into the ultimately deluded nature of any fabrication of a subject appropriating its objects and of the perceptual field itself. In this way the movement of identification with and appropriation of a self is all the while de-potentiated by genuine appamānaṃ practice.

Developing a perception of benevolence and of the other boundless experiences on the basis of a given conceptual object (oneself, a friend, a stranger, an enemy) by directing it to oneself first as an individual and then to other single individuals or to group(s) of individuals as prescribed for example by later Theravāda texts and in popular modern approaches to benevolence etc., seems to be somehow not fully exploring the whole range of this thorough exercise towards independence from ‘objects’, grasping at and reification of experience, a training in inner independence and kindness by means of which the end of all conceivings, influxes, karma, and dukkha become possible. Such an ultimately ‘unprompted’ quality and fruit of appamānas squares well with the discourses’ ‘method’ of all-pervasive practice, a method in which the perceptual training seems to be particularly consistent with the soteriological goal and also with the final existential mode of a liberated being who has escaped from any form of conceptual identification and mental impurity.

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76 Commenting on a passage in the Chinese parallel to the above-mentioned SN 42.8 ad SN IV 322,31, stipulating the karmic implications of appamānas practice, cf. SĀ 914 ad T II 232a20.
77 E.g., MN 99 ad MN II 207,22: sāyathāpi ... balavā sāṅkhadhāma appakasīren‘ eva cūttudissā viññāpeyya: evam eva kho ... evam bhāvītāya kho ... mettāya cetovimuttiiyā, yaṃ pāmānakataṃ kammaṃ, na taṃ tatrāvāsissati, na taṃ tatrāvātiṭhati. ayam pi kho ... brahmānaṃ sahāyatāya maggo. The example of the trumpeter is also found in the Chinese parallel, MĀ ad T I 669c10; for differences in the two versions cf. Anālayo 2011a: 578. Aronson 1979: 31 comments that the trumpeter’s “is not a measured performance. Similarly, when one cultivates love and the other attitudes according to the method given ... no measured intentions remain”. Objectless and conceptualisation-free immeasurables as these were to be defined in later scholastic treatises stemming from Sarvāstivāda-Yogācāra meditative milieus, on which cf. Dhammajoti 2010 and Martini 2011a: 169f, seem to me to be particularly akin to this type of earlier non-conceptual meditative development.
Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Bhikkhu Anālayo, Bhikkhu Pāsādika, Letizia Baglioni, Peter Skilling and Alberto Todeschini for discussions and corrections.

Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abhidh-kh-bh</td>
<td>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</td>
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<td>Abhidh-kh-up</td>
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<td>Abhidh-kh-vy</td>
<td>Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (ed. Wogihara)</td>
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Note

All references to Pali texts are to the PTS editions, unless otherwise indicated. For Pali and other languages, on occurrence, I have adjusted the sandhi, punctuation, capitalisations, etc.
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A Study of the Meditation Methods in the DESM and Other Early Chinese Texts

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Introduction:

The Discourse on the Essential Secrets of Meditation (abbr.: DESM) 『秘要法經 (T15, No. 603) is an oldest and interesting text dealing with various methods of meditation of the ancient Buddhist tradition. It is probably the earliest Indian text on the subject translated into Chinese, and as such important for the understanding of the development of dhyāna practices in Chinese Buddhism. It is our belief that the DESM has actually influenced the Tien Tai and early Chan School of China.

The value of this text lies in the fact that many of the meditation techniques and guidelines have hitherto never been exposed to the modern reader, and was composed long before these well-known texts such as the Vimuttimagga and the Visuddhimagga, the information concerns early meditation methods. Here, we try to make a study on them to find out what the different are the Buddhist traditions in practicing meditations.

The Discourse on the Essential Secrets of Meditation (=DESM, T15 No. 613) is a valuable work of the early Yogācāras. It was composed by certain Indian or Central Asian master(s)\(^1\) around the 2nd or 3rd century A.D. Its translation from Sanskrit into Chinese, influenced the development of the theory and practice of the existing traditions of Chinese Buddhist meditation. A slightly later dhyāna sūtra entitled The Dhyāna-samādhi Sūtra which presupposes our text, developed a dhyāna system which greatly influenced two Chinese Buddhist schools, Tien Tai and Chan.

It appears that this work belongs to the Dārṣṭāntikas who were combined being popular preachers and meditators. The Dārṣṭāntika is historically a very important school. So far, there is very little concerning this school or movement known to us. Only a few modern scholars (mostly Japanese) have discussed its history and doctrines. We therefore believe that it is worth making an in-depth study of the DESM, preserved now only in Chinese from the source.

1. The subjects of meditation in the DESM

This work is primarily a discourse on various meditation methods and the types of experiences that the meditators may expect during meditation. Along with the instructions, there is also other practical advice for meditators, such as the choice of congenial environment and ways of restoring vitality if in the course of meditation training one is weakened.

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\(^1\) The catalogues speak of “the sages of the West”- “the West” while usually implying “India” in the mind of the ancient Chinese Buddhists, may also include Central Asia.

There are altogether thirty specific methods of meditation mentioned and detailed one by one. For each more than one names is given, Of these thirty, the fourteenth is repeated three times, and the twenty-eighth appears to be missing. Apart from these thirty methods, there are also a few others such as the “Four Apramāṇa”, mentioned only by name. These meditation or contemplation methods fall into three major divisions.

The first division consists of eighteen meditation subjects (from No. 1 to No. 18) [T15. P.242c-255a]. These are suitable for those who are intelligent and knowledgeable, but careless (pramāda), arrogant (mada), and overwhelmed by sensual desire. Such persons have to learn and practice various aspects of the contemplation on the impurities of the body, on the dead person, on the nine stages of decay of a corpse, and on the white skeleton or bones. The eleventh object is to contemplate on the impurities. The twelfth to the seventeenth are further practices (with additional details) of contemplation on the impurities. These are explained in connection with meditation on the Four Great Elements, mindfulness of the body and soullessness (nairatmya). The eighteenth object further develops from the previous contemplations on the impurities. Also mentioned briefly is the contemplation on the Buddha and the fruit this practice brings.

The second division deals with only two meditation objects (No. 19 & No.20) [T15. P.255a-258b]. These are meant for those whose mind is distracted, (viksipta, asamāhitam), or those who have transgressed against the precepts (adhyācāra), or possess wholesome karma. The nineteenth contemplation on the Buddha or Buddha-anusmrti is regarded as the way of overcoming the wholesome and can lead to mental calm and bliss. This practice is to concentrate on the Buddha’s thirty-two characteristics (laksanas), on his four respect-inspiring forms of demeanor in walking, standing, sitting and lying (四威儀), on the Buddha preaching the dharma, and on the Buddha making the consecration (abhisekara). The Twentieth contemplation is that of counting the breath. This makes up a deficiency in the nineteenth contemplation. This counting of the breath is based upon the contemplation on the impurities; thus, it is the medicine for curing the diseases of lust and the distracted mind. Both these contemplations are said to be able to yield the fruit of arhatship.

The third division deals with nine meditation objects (No.21 to No.30) [T15. P.259c-263a]. These are said to be for those who are not intelligent, or who are arrogant and conceited, or who are heedless, or who have a distracted mind. The contemplation on the white bones discussed earlier is further developed [to a higher level of practice] with the help of the contemplation on the Four Great Elements. From No.21 to No.25, the white skeleton is the main object for the practitioner to contemplate. Within this context also discussed is the contemplation on each of the Four Great Elements. The meditation experiences of āśma-gata and Mūrdha, two stages of progress in meditation, are also explained. The 21st contemplation is named āśmagata-dharma. The 26th contemplation onwards includes the contemplations on the Four Great Elements explained according to the contemplation on the white bones; and then the steps and the procedure of the Four Stages as ’srotāpanna, sakṛdāgāmi, anāgāmin, arhat, and the Four Fruitions (catur-phala), are explained accordingly.
Other subjects discussed in the DESM

The final portion of the work begins with the last of the four occurrences of the phrase “Thus have I heard...”. In this part, the following problem is discussed: In some cases, a practitioner, through the practice of various dhutanga and dhyānas, may attain anāgāmīship. But he may be stuck and incapable of progressing towards the final goal of arahatship. The Buddha in discussing this problem, explains that such practitioners should practice the following meditations: The contemplation on loving-kindness (maitri) and compassion (karuna), on the Buddha’s dhammakāya, on the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination (Pratityasamutpāda), on counting the breath, on the Four Great Elements, on emptiness (śūnyatāsamādhi), on the absence of characteristics (ānimittasamādhi), and on the absence of intention (apranihita-samādhi).

In its concluding part, several alternative titles of the text are enumerated. Also emphasized are the four practices which conduce to the four fruits. These are: (i) non-transgression of precepts, (ii) dwelling in quietude, and practicing dhutangas, (iii) doing such labor as cleaning the stūpa, etc., by way of repentance of wrong-doing, (iv) constantly sitting in meditation.

The text points out that there are people who pretend to be meditators for the sake of gain. In reality they are heedless and dishonest within. Such people and their activities are strongly condemned. Those who are honest and pure meditators, are advised to keep their meditation practice and experiences secret, not letting others know. The text here also praises highly the merits gained by practicing the contemplation on impurities and on other methods of meditation.

Finally, the text mentions that, the Buddha had long passed away, and the faculties (indriyas) of living beings are now weaker than during his lifetime. Therefore, the number of practitioners who could achieve emancipation by practicing contemplation on impermanence, has progressively decreased. The period of this progressive decrease is given as from the first hundred years up to 1500 years after the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa.

2. The structure of the DESM

The DESM comprises four parts. Each begins with “Thus have I heard”. This beginning phrase might indicate that the work was actually made up of four separate discourses united as one. These four parts are not just joined together there is a coherent continuity running from the first part to the fourth. The first part, beginning with “Thus have I heard”, deals with meditation objects from 1 to 18; the second part deals with objects 19 and 20; the third part deals with objects 21 to 30. In the last part, after all the 30 meditations are detailed, follows a discussion on other objects relevant in the meditator’s life and the problems encountered in his progress towards arhatship (e.g. how to deal with the problem of being stuck in anāgāmīship).

The first part (T15, P.242c-255a) is a teaching given to a bhiksu named Mahakakilananda in Rajagṛha at Karandavenuvana. He was intelligent, knowledgeable, but conceited, and heedless (pramāda). As such, he was unable to achieve any margasya-phalam. The Buddha explained his previous life and also taught him the way of fixing the mind for emancipation. Then, the Buddha taught Ananda how, in future, practitioners could correct their heedlessness, arrogance, and wrong way of life. For this, the Buddha taught 18 kinds of contemplation on the impurities. Here, it says

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that by correcting the wrong way of life, and following the contemplation on the impurities, one can be reborn in the Tusita Heaven to meet Maitreya, and attain arhatship.

The second part of the text (T15, p. 255a-258b) is a teaching given to a bhiksu called Dhyānanandī on how to attain the arhatship. It was a discourse in Śravasti at Jetavana-anathapindasya-vana. Here, a bhiksu called Dhyānaanandī who had already gained arhatship asked the Buddha as to how in future those who have accrued much unwholesome karma, can overcome this and purify themselves for the attainment of arhatship. For this, the Buddha taught Dhyānanandī and Ananda to give such people the contemplation on the Buddha (Buddha-anusmṛti) or on consecration (abhisekara), or on the Buddha’s image (which is given in detail). Here, the Buddha taught that through the contemplation on the Buddha, the bhiksu would be able to eradicate the defilements of craving and attachment. The contemplation on counting the breath and on the impurities are also taught. When the Buddha finished this discoursing Dhyānanandī and others who were listening, were greatly pleased. This second part of the text covers the 19th and 20th contemplation.

The third part of the text (T15, p258b-263a) is a teaching given in a village called Tala in Śravasti. There, the Buddha taught a pupil of Kātyāyana called Panthaka who was dull-witted (mrdu), heedless (pramāda), unable to understand even a verse for years. The Buddha told him his previous life. He then taught him the contemplation on the white human bones and the contemplation of āsma-gata in order that he could attain arhatship. The Buddha went on to instruct Kātyāyana and Ananda to teach the contemplation on the impurities, on āsma-gata, on mūrdha, and on the Fire Element, for the sake of those who are dull-witted, ignorant and conceited, for the attainment of śrotāpatti-marga. The Buddha went on to discourse on the attainment of sakrāgāmi-marga through the contemplation on the Water Element, and the attainment of anāgāmi-ship through the contemplation on the Wind Element. The Buddha further spoke on the contemplation on the Fire Element for the attainment of arhatship. Thus, the Buddha taught in this third part, the contemplations from the 21st to the 30th.

The fourth part of the text (T15, p. 263a-269c) is, as in the case of the second part, given in Śravasti at Jetavana-anathapindasyavāna. A pupil of Mahākāsyapa called Agnidatta who had gained anāgāmi-ship was unable to attain arhatship despite five years of practicing austerity. The Buddha explained that in the past life of Agnidatta he the Buddha had become a humble and patient prince. He then taught him the contemplation on maitri. Agnidatta immediately attained arhatship. The Buddha for the sake of beings in future discoursed on how to progress from anāgāmi-ship towards arhatship. The methods he taught are: the contemplation on the Buddhas (Buddhanusmṛti-samādhi), on compassion (maitri), on the aspects of Dependent Origination (pratītya-samutpāda), on counting the breath (ānāpāna-anusmṛti), on the Four Great Elements, and on emptiness (sīyātā-samādhi). Finally, the Buddha told Ananda that successful meditators would be born in the Tusita Heaven, where they could meet Maitreya, and gain emancipation, as in the teaching in the first Part of this text.

From the above description, one can see the unified structure of four parts organized into a single text. In all thirty different meditation subjects are given as the methods for attaining the arhatship.

There is a hint in the text as regards the order of meditation subjects. The Buddha says: “If you want to become a meditator, first of all, you should practice the contemplation that
Kakilananda followed. Then practice Dhyānanandani’s contemplation, and [then] Panthaka’s contemplation” (see the 21st contemplation, T15, p.259b).” This same hint on order again recurs elsewhere from the mouth of Ananda: “The Tathāgata first discoursed on the contemplation on impurities for Kakilananda. Then he taught the contemplation on counting breath to bhiksu Dhyānanandani. Then he taught the contemplation on the Four Elements to bhiksu Agnidatta. These various subtle teachings [of meditation] were taught by the Buddha. How should we hold them in mind? Under what titles should they be proclaimed in the future? He taught that this text should be called ‘The Discourse on the Essential Secrets of Meditation, or The Ways of the Contemplation on the White Human Bones, or ‘The Gradual Way of the Nine stages of Contemplation on a Corpse, or ‘The methods of the Contemplation on Wandering Thoughts, or ‘Ānāpāna Contemplation, or ‘The Gradual Way of Contemplation Leading to the Attainment of the Four Fruits (catul-phala), or also ‘The Distinguishing of the Meditation Experience.’

In this latter quotation can be seen, various alternative titles for the text. We could perhaps also look at the schematic structure of the whole text as follows: By starting each part with “Thus have I heard”, its editor intended to emphasize that the various meditation objects were transmitted by the Buddha himself (i.e. based on the sūtras and vinaya texts) under different circumstances, and to people of different types and needs.

We could even say that this text is made of different discussions taken as a kind of notes from the four Āgamas and elaborated with relevant material from the Dārstantika meditational tradition. All the four parts of this text are about sitting meditation. The author of the text united the four parts into one continuous text. Accordingly, we have the DESM in three fascicles. It is quite probable that the first three discourses constitute the original compilation, because the 30 kinds of meditation objects were put forth in these three parts systematically. The fourth discourse was added to the main text later on to yield the present form of the DESM. This seems to be the case at the time of the last revision of the work. For further discussion on its original structure and subsequent reorganization, see the section below on “The history of translation of the DESM”.

3. The history of the translation of the DESM

Our findings concerning the history of the compilation and translation of the DESM as follows:

(1) The DESM was composed by certain Indian or Central Asian master(s)4 around the 2nd or 3rd century A.D. The period of its compilation can be inferred from the fact the first Chinese translation was made by Zhi Qian in the early part of the 3rd century A.D., A.D. and the second and third translation were made before 441 A.D.

(2) In the ‘Old Translation’ period (prior to the ‘New translation’ standards laid by Xuan Zang), the EDSM was highly respected, and regarded as an important meditation manual. It was translated three times within a period of two hundred years (A.D. 223-424). This also suggests that a group of Chinese people, both before and after Kumarajiva, were greatly interested in practicing meditation. We may say that we can judge the knowledge of the Chinese Buddhists on meditation;

3. See the last fascicle, next to the contemplation on emptiness, T15, p.267c.
4. The catalogues speak of “the sages of the West”- “the West” while usually implying “India” in the mind of the ancient Chinese Buddhists, may also include Central Asia.
in that period of Chinese Buddhism, by the meditation methods prescribed in the DESM which contained the greatest number of meditation methods to date.

(3) The original of the DESM seems to be in Sanskrit. As such, it was more probably by an Indian rather than a Central Asian, since most of early Buddhist texts from Central Asia were in Prakrit or hybrid Sanskrit. With regard to its content, it should reflect some of the major trends of thoughts in Indian Buddhism around the 2nd or 3rd century. This reflection may be seen in the frequent discussion on emptiness (śūnyatā) - of the skandhas, and on pratitya-samutpāda. It was Nagarjuna of this period (around 3rd century A. D.) who rigorously developed the doctrine of śūnyatā on the basis of the Buddha’s teaching on pratitya-samutpāda. Subsequently, all Buddhist schools, in their doctrinal formulation, paid at least a lip service to the doctrine of śūnyatā. At the same time, the text also reflects-as it naturally should—the author’s own doctrinal attitude. This attitude is clearly seen to be one of being centred on the Buddha’s teaching in the early (non-Mahayana) sūtras. There is indeed nothing in the DESM - except possibly the stanza line apparently from the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā - which is characteristically Mahayanic

4. Stūpas and the way of repenting evil deeds in the DESM

As the historical Buddha no longer exists, his stūpa has been conceived to represent him. According to Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, people’s hearts can be made peaceful by seeing or at the thought of four kinds of stūpas. After death they will go to a good destination and re-arise in a heavenly world. The following is a quotation from the sutta.

There are four persons worthy of a stūpa. Tathagata, Arhat, perfectly enlightened One is one, a Pacceka Buddha is one, a disciple of the Tathagata is one, and a wheel-turning monarch is one. And why is each of these worthy of a stūpa? Because, at the thought: “This is the stūpa of the Tathagata, of a Pacceka Buddha, of a disciple of the Tathagata, of a wheel-turning monarch,” people’s hearts are made peaceful, and then, at the breaking-up of the body after death they go to a good destiny and rearise in a heavenly world. That is the reason, and those are the four who are worthy of a stūpa.

Stūpas were built over the relics of the Buddha and by the time of Asoka had become the predominant way of paying homage to the departed Master. Worshipping a stūpa, eventually as qualified faith, produces the thought of enlightenment. One who pays homage to a stūpa is said to become ever-fortunate, alert and set on the path of virtue leading to enlightenment. This act of deep reverence would be accompanied by offerings of flowers, incense and perfume. By fixing network coverings to stūpas he becomes able to escape the net of Mara and gain the supreme status of the Buddha. Bodhisattvas are also instructed to pay homage to stūpas in all possible manners, such as removing withered flowers from those places, and offering fresh flowers, incense, and perfumes, etc. Any act of service in the name of the Buddha would certainly help them acquire enlightenment.

5 However, this stanza line, even if actually derived from the Vajracchedika, has nothing characteristically Mahayanic. Indeed, the content of the whole of the Vajracchedika can easily be seen to accord well with the standpoint of early Buddhism as found in the nikaya/agama.

6 Taken from Thus Have I Heard, tr. by Maurice Walshe, p.264-265.


8 ibid., ii.393. 5-394.23.

9 ibid., ii. 391.3 ff.
In brief, in the Mtu, the ritual obeisance and ceremonious homage paid to the Buddha’s relics and stūpas are emphasized as a sure path leading to heavenly abodes.\(^{10}\) This counts to be another instance where the DESM harmonizes with the old Buddhist texts, which also stresses this type of worship as being conducive to the attainment of heaven.\(^ {11}\) The Avalokita-sūtra (ii. 257. 6ff) presents a detailed exposition of the efficacy of the worshipping of stūpas.

Stūpas in the DESM are important to meditators and ascetics, especially after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa. Because, the premier condition for any one to practice meditation is pure, without committing any evil both past and present. Many people have committed offences, and want to purify themselves here and now attain emancipation. According to the DESM, to clean stūpas and smear their ground is an effective way to overcome the meditators’ unwholesome deed done in the past. After this, the meditators can develop their samādhi to a higher level. For example, ‘If the meditator, under the rays and lights, sees each of the meditational experiences and spheres as impure and unclear (vyāmisralambanatarve), he should rise up to clean the stūpas, and smear their ground… They should practice various kind of repentance and confessions’ [T15.p.255c]. ‘If they hid and covered their sins they could see the lights as the color of a rotten wood. On seeing this they should realize that they had offended the precepts [in the past]. Then, they should feel shame, confess and blame themselves, and make themselves clean stūpas and smear their ground and do various kind of labor…’ [T15.p.257b]

“The Sūtra on the Secret Importance of Curing the (Mental) Disease of Those Who Engage in Contemplation”\(^ {12}\) also shows the way of saving the person who has committed an offence. In this text it is said if the meditator in practicing contemplations saw the Buddha in a black color, or as the foot of a black elephant, or like an ashy person, these are the signs of having committed offences. He should take off his saṅghāti (assembly robe), put on his antarvasaka, go to the pure place (e.g. the place of stūpa), and go to the wise. He should place his knees, elbows, and head on the ground, and confess his evil deeds with honest mind. He should carry out the duties of the saṁgha, do various kind of labor, and clean the toilets for 800 days. Then he should bathe his body, put on his saṅghāti, and enter the stūpa, with one-pointedness of mind. Crossing his hands together he should contemplate on the lights emitting from the urnā\(^ {13}\) of the Buddha… The wise should advise him to clean the stūpas, smear the grounds, contemplate on the Buddha or the seven past Buddhas. When the practitioner sees the Buddha’s golden body and lights he is suitable to be taught to contemplate on impurities.

The Buddhādhyāna-saṁādhisagara-sūtra\(^ {14}\) says that the contemplation on the Buddha-saṁādhi is the way to reduce or alleviate serious transgressions. Therefore, the contemplation on the Buddha’s thirty-two characteristics or the Buddha’s image is regarded as the medicine for offenders, as a shelter for those who had broken the precepts, as a guide to those who have lost their way. as a lamp for those who are in the dark.

\(^{10}\) Mtu., III.318. 14-15.

\(^{11}\) ibid, iii 327. 10-12.

\(^{12}\) Zhi-chan-bing-bi-yao-jing 治病秘要經 was translated by Tsu-khu kin-shao, A.D. 455, of the earlier Sun dynasty, A.D. 420-479. 2 fasciculi; see Taishao, vol. XV .p.333.

\(^{13}\) The soft white hair that grows between the Buddha’s eyebrows, is one of the Buddha’s thirty-two characteristics.

\(^{14}\) Taishao, vol. XV , p.645. 観佛三昧海經 Guan-fu-san-mei-hai-jing was translated by Buddhhabhadra, of the Eastern Tsin dynasty (A.D. 317-420), 10 fasciculi; 12 chapters. Deist in Tibetan.
From this, we see not only the Gospel, but also the significance of the Stūpas and the Buddha’s image in the practice of meditation in the later Buddhism.

Early Buddhism taught various precepts based upon different human relationships, e.g. between parents and children, husband and wife, teacher and pupil, employer and employee, friend and comrade, religious preceptor and devotee, and so on. Those were finally systematized in the teaching for Sigal (Sigalovada), which has been regarded as the guiding principles for laity. Some of those aspects of teaching is given in the DESM in the form of offering to the needs of the teachers and parents in order to overcome the meditator’s past evil deeds. It says that the meditator should make offerings to his teachers, elders and parents, regarding them as the Buddha and have great respect for them. In front of them, he should make the great vow and will, and have this saying: ‘I now make those offerings to the teachers and parents. By these meritorious deeds, may I, throughout the ages and lives, obtain purification.’ Having perfectly done the above, the meditator is able to see that the lights are clear and lovable as before.

5. The connection of the DESM with other dhyāna sūtras in the early (non-Mahāyana) Yogācāra

Methods of meditation in the dhyāna texts

In the period of Abhidharma development of the northern traditions, there are the Dārṣṭānatikas some of whom were subsequently known as the (non-Mahāyana) yogācāra masters. These acāryas seemed to be virtuous preachers and meditators. A good number of the meditational sūtras or texts which are preserved in China seem to have originated from them. There are at least seven such texts recognized as belonging to this tradition. They are:

(No.1) The Yogācārabhūmi-sūtra
(No.2) The DESM
(No.3) The Dhyāna-samādhi Sūtra

15 The Yogācārabhūmi-sūtra, whose Sanskrit text has been lost, sets forth the stages of meditation for yonins. This is virtually an anthology of passages relevant to meditation composed by Samgharakṣa, a well-known Yoga master, 700 years after the Buddha’s nirvāna. The Yogācārabhūmi-sūtra (修行道地經) translated by Dharmarakṣa into Chinese in A.D.284, first came into existence in the form of one volume of 7 chapters, grew into a sūtra of 27 chapters and then the 28th chapter (第２善品修行品) and other chapters were added, to assume the present form of 7 volumes of 30 chapters in the Chinese version. The Yogācārabhūmi-sūtra of 27 chapters and that of 30 chapters are of a later production than the original of the Saddharmapundarika. That is to say that the last three chapters were translated into Chinese separately and were added to the latter.

16 This is our Text.

17 There are five treatises on meditation in the extant Kumarajiva corpus. The chief one is the Tso-ch’an-san-mei-ching (T 614) also called The Meditation Concentration Sūtra, or the Bodhisattva-dhyāna. The first part of this work is a composite of pieces that Kumarajiva selected from the works of Kumaralata, Asvaghosa, Vasumitra, Samgharakṣa, Upagupta, Samghasena and other masters of meditation. (It might be compiled by Kumarajiva and his pupil. in A.D.407). These all propound Theravada jhāna (dhyāna). The last part, which explains the Bodhisattva path, Kumarajiva took from the Vasudhara-sūtra. (T14, No. 482.)

See 佛陀法師三師“僧中出 輔證”, T55, p.65a-b;
We carefully examined the above mentioned meditation texts, and compared the methods of meditation contained therein with the forty subjects of Kammatthana in the Visudhimaga. We noticed that it was comparable to the latter in that the DESM is like an encyclopedia of the methods of meditation, which were existing in the Northern Tradition of Buddhism at the time of its compilation and translation. This is because the 30 methods of contemplation or meditation in the DESM not only cover all kinds of meditation from the time Buddhism was being brought into China until the date of the DESM being translated into Chinese, but also provide the basis and inspiration for the later meditators and translators of meditation texts to do further and more articulate translated works on the subject. The extent to which our DESM is connected with the above mentioned meditation texts may be seen from the tabular comparison below:

It was translated into Japanese by Taishun Sato in KIK., Kyoshubu, vol.4. It presupposes The Sūtra on the Secret Teaching of Meditation (思惟略要法), and sets forth a system of the practice of the Fivefold meditation which greatly influenced Master Tien-tai of China in his work (次第門)...


This text sets forth ten kinds of meditation, among which the Amitayurbuddhadhyana meditation, the tattva meditation and the Saddharmapundarika meditation were very influential in later days.

19 Two vols. T15, No.618. Translated into Chinese by Buddhahadr, A.D. 398-421. This was translated into Japanese by Taishun Sato in KIK., Kyoshubu, vol.4. This text gives a systematical explanation of the meditation of Dharmatara and Bhuddhasena. It became very important in Chan Buddhism, and also was a forerunner to the mandalas of Vajrayana.

20 Taisho, vol. XV, P.645. Translated into Chinese by Buddhahadra around 413. This text (觀三昧海), resembling the Pratyutpann-samādhi-sūtra in some respects, has much in common with the Amitayurdhyāna-sūtra with regard to the structure and contents of the sūtras; the main difference being that, whereas the former taught meditation on the Buddhas in general, the latter enjoins the meditation on Amitabha alone.

21 Fo-shwo-ta-an-shen-i-jing (佛大安般守意經) was translated into Chinese by An Shi-kao in about A.D. 147-170, during the period of the Eastern-han dynasty, A.D25-220. Shan-xing-fa-xiang-jing (行法想經), ‘Sutra on Perception in the Law of Practice of Meditation’ was also translated by An Shi-kao.

See also Ekottarāgama-sūtra, chapter 17, fasc. 8.
### Table A: The Methods of meditation contained in the above-mentioned meditation texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text Number:</th>
<th>Contents:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. The DESM</strong></td>
<td>30 methods of meditation (as given in this work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. The dhyāna-Samādhi-sūtra</strong></td>
<td>Fivefold meditation: 1. Contemplation on impurities (asubha); 2. Contemplation on the maitri; 3. Contemplation on the twelve links of Pratityasamutpada; 4. Contemplation on counting the breath; 5. Contemplation on the Buddha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. An Epitome of Meditation</strong></td>
<td>Ten kinds of meditation: 1. The contemplation on the four immeasurable minds; 2. The Contemplation on the impurities (asubha); 3. The Contemplation on the white skeleton; 4. The samadhi of Recollection of Buddha’s thirty-two characteristics; 5. The contemplation on the physical body of the Buddha (rūpākāya); 6. The contemplation on the Dharma-kaya of the Buddha; 7. The contemplation on the Buddhas in the ten directions; 8. The contemplation on the Buddha of ’immeasurable life; ’ (Amitayu Buddha); 9. The contemplation on the real nature of dharmanas; 10. The method of meditation towards the trance of the Lotus of Good Law (sad-dharma-pundrika). [the contemplation on the causes and conditions, and the contemplation on in and out-breathing are mentioned also]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. The Great Discourse by the Buddha on the Mindfulness of Ānāpāna</strong></td>
<td>Counting the breathing with mindfulness (The sixteen stages of its development are given therein)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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24 See T15. p. 693 ff; the seven Buddhas are 晃娑羅佛, 尸棄佛, 晃舍佛, 拘留尼佛, 拘那含牟尼佛, 迦葉佛, 釋迦牟尼佛 (Vipasyin, Sīkīn, Visvabhu, Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni, Kasyapiya, Sakṣayamuni-buddha).  
25 This contemplation says that “one who has achieved the contemplation on the Buddhas and seen the Buddhas in this Samādhi, and found oneself in their presence, should make the body, speech and mind to be secret. He should not have an immoral life, he should not be proud. If one is pride, if he leads an immoral life, one is a destroyer of the Buddhadharma, and the person who causes the immoral mind to rise in many people. He is one who causes the unit of samgha to become a divide he shows the power to cheat others. He is the follower of the Evil One (Māra), See T15, p.695 ff. This kind of advice is appearing in the DESM too.
Also:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sūtra Number</th>
<th>Time of Being Translated</th>
<th>Translator</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A. D. 148-170</td>
<td>An Shi-kao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A. D. 284</td>
<td>Dharmaraksha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A. D. 405</td>
<td>Kumarajiva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A. D. 223-253/401-413</td>
<td>Zhi Qian/Kumarajiva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A. D. 407</td>
<td>Kumarajiva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A. D. 317-420</td>
<td>Buddhhabhadra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A. D. 413</td>
<td>Buddhhabhadra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above two tables show that the most important meditation texts were translated into Chinese between the second century A. D. and the beginning of the fifth century A. D. Dharmaraksha and Buddhhabhadra were both great dhyāna masters amongst the translators. An-shikao, Zhi- Qian and Kumarajiva were famous translators in China. As regards the methods of meditation, we can see that there are common topics appearing in their translations. There are five major methods of meditation commonly introduced in them. These five kinds of meditation are (1) the contemplation on impurities, (2) the contemplation on the counting the breath, (3) the contemplation on loving kindness, (4) the contemplation on the twelve links of Dependent Origination, (5) the Contemplation on the Buddha’s thirty-two Characteristics.

In addition to these five, the Contemplation on the dhātus (elements) in the DESM is seen in the above mentioned sūtra: No. 1; No. 4; and No.5 only. The Contemplation on the white bones is seen in sūtra: No. 1; No. 2; and No. 4. The contemplation on the emptiness of all dharmas in the DESM is seen in sūtra: No. 4 only.

The eighth contemplation on a fresh corpse, the sixteenth contemplation on the Four Great Elements and restoring vitality, and the remaining contemplations in the DESM are not seen in the other early Chinese dhyāna sūtras. The bodhisattva’s meditation in sūtra No. 1 and the contemplation on the Amitayu-buddha in sūtra No. 4 are not in the DESM.

The characteristics of the methods of meditation in the DESM

One of the characteristics of the text is that it describes in detail the meditation experiences of the person who practices these meditation subjects. In particular, it gives in detail the mental phenomena occurring in the practice of the contemplation on the impurities. Every so often, it requires the practitioner to contemplate on one subject of meditation first; then, to contemplate on the whole of the same subject (e.g. the white bones) still to be gradually all over the Trisāhasra Universe. This has the characteristic of contemplating the ten universal spheres (dasa- kasināyatanas)\(^{26}\). From the state of impurity up to the state of purification this text describes the methods as the contemplation on the impurities and emptiness that are followed by such a practitioner.

\(^{26}\) 十遍處觀 Dasa-kasināyatanas has been discussed by Paravahera vajirañāna mahā thear in his Buddhist Meditation, p.139ff (Malaysia 1978).
Another characteristic of the text is that it gives the different kinds of meditation to the different categories and characters of persons. For instance, (1) to the person who has the conceited and heedless character, the contemplation on the impurities is given; (2) to the person who has the character of having much evil tendency and karmic hindrances (pāpa-karma and antaraya), the contemplation on the Buddha is given as the medicine for curing that kind of disease; (3) to the person who has the character of having much craving, desires, and distraction (viksipta cittaka), the contemplation on counting the breaths is taught; (4) to the person who has the character of being conceited (māna) and dullness, the contemplation on white bones is introduced; (5) For the attainment of arhathood, the contemplations on compassion (maitri), on the Buddha’s supreme qualities, on the twelve links of Dependent Origination, on counting the breath, on the Four Great Elements, on emptiness, on the absence of non-action, on the absence of characteristics (animitta) and on the absence of intention (apranihita), are taught as essential.

From the beginning to the end of the text, the contemplation on the impurities stands out as the fundamental key. On this basis the other contemplations are taken up and progressively completed. The various kinds of meditations mentioned above for various characters are more systematically developed in subsequent works as the five meditations for settling the mind and getting rid of the five errors: desire, hatred, ignorance, self-attainment, and distraction. It is to be observed that the various types of meditation given as medicines for curing the spiritual diseases (of rāga, etc.) in our text, had provided inspiration for later meditation masters, both with respect to their own practice as well as to guiding their pupils.

It is noteworthy that the text does not employ such terms as mentioned specially in the Abhidharmika texts. This text deals with the meditation topics in a very simple manner. Such technical details as the number and categories-characteristically given in the Abhidharmic texts-of klesa upaklesas abandoned at the different stages of progress are not to be found in our text.

Only a couple of Abhidharma terms like āsma-gata and Mūrdha, are given. For these achievements, various methods of meditation are mentioned, such as basing on the contemplation on the impurities.

Neither does our text contain such details as sixteen aspects (akara) of the Four truths etc. All these are in contrast to the expositions on meditations given in the Abhidharma texts, such as the Abhidharmakosa.

This may be the deliberate intention of the compiler: to base himself mainly on the agama texts, rather than following the abhidharmika tradition. When the author says, “detail as given in the Abhidharma” (T15, p.267c), it shows unmistakably that he is familiar with the Abhidharma expositions. Yet he seems to virtually ignore them altogether.

Finally, our text also does not give any terms that remind us of Mahayana Buddhism. The closest to this is the mere mention of the terms:” six pāramitas”, “the noble lineage (arya-vamsa) of the three vehicles” (this threefold vehicle is not necessarily Mahayanic.), and “suchness”.

27 There is only one place where it says, rather casually, “details as given in the Abhidharma”.
The frequent mention of śūnyatā once again is not necessarily Mahayanic. Rather, it seems to indicate certain influence from the śūnyatā doctrine prevalent in the period of the author-3rd century—which is the time of Nagarjuna. That Nagarjuna is not necessarily a Mahāyanist has already been convincingly argued by some scholars.28

Yet another important feature of the text is that it deals conspicuously with the practical (as opposed to theoretical) aspects of meditation. Among the practical advice, one finds such instructions as the methods for restoring vitality after the body is weakened in the process of practicing the contemplation.

6. The methods of meditation in the DESM compared with those in the nikāya/āgama texts and such works as the Vimuttimagga and the Visuddhimagga

6.1 The subjects of meditation in Pali texts

The following discussion is a survey of major kinds of meditation practices preserved in the Pali tradition.29

In the Pali scriptures, we come across some detailed descriptions of the numerous methods of meditation. Among them is the mention of nine successive stages of meditation (nava-anupubha-vihara) which culminate in trance. These are in the old scriptures as well as in the later works such as the Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa. They are: the four rūpa-jhāna, the arūpa-jhāna, and the ninth “suppression of consciousness and sensation (saññā-vedayita-nirodha).”30 The first four are so called as they are attained with the help of rūpa subject (i.e. subject with form) of meditation. They are known respectively as the first, the second, the third and the fourth jhāna. The next four are so called on account of the fact that they are induced by using arūpa subjects (formless subjects) of meditation. They are named respectively as ākāsānañcāyatana, viññāna-ñcāyatana, akiñcāññāyatana, and neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatana.31

Venerable Dr. Rahula remarks that the treatment of the dhyānas found in the Mahāyāna and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma is on the whole closer to the original Pali Suttas than that found in the Theravāda Abhidhamma, particularly in the later Abhidhamma texts.32 He has also pointed out that the list of five rūpāvacara-jhāna is not found in the original Pali suttas, and is a later development in the Abhidhamma.

In the DESM, we have only the mere mention of āsta-samāpatti (eight-attainments or emancipations) (八解) attained by every arhat, i.e. four rūpadhyānas and four ārūpadhyānas. But it is not clear of the factors in each dhyānas, as no details are given.

29 See Vis.
30 See Vis. XXIII, also ‘Path to Deliverance;’ Nyanatiloka. Lake House Bookshop, Colombo.
31 For the eight absorptions as objects for the development of insight (vipassanā), See samatha- vipassanā.— Full details in Vis. VIII-X.
Details of the following are not found in the DESM. How to enter step by step, into the nine stages of trance; how he who wishes to practice meditation should proceed, what objects for meditation he should choose according to his taste and capacity. They are found in subsequent meditation texts translated into Chinese.

In the Vimuttimagga and the DESM, it is said: he who wishes to practice meditation, should first of all search for a good spiritual friend and well-wisher (kalyana-mitra). This “friend and well-wisher” will be his guide. Like a friend, like a relative, he will look after him (the novice). He (the kalyana-mitra) must be well-versed in all the sections of the scriptures and also must have an insight into the Four Noble Truths.33

Without such a “friend and well-wisher” the novice may go fatally wrong as an elephant without its driver or a chariot without a charioteer. In the Pali scriptures, specially in the Visuddhi-magga, there are long discussions about the places which are suitable and those which are unsuitable for meditation.34

One should practice meditation in a solitary place where there is the least possible distraction for the mind. In this treatise it is said: “Sounds cause disturbance in meditation, like entering a jungle of thorns”.35

The Pali commentary of the Satipatthana-sutta36 similarly advises a bhikkhu meditator conditioned by sensual attachment to seek a secluded place to have his mind concentrated and freed from such sense objects. The same kind of advice as to the need for spiritual guides and solitude is given in the DESM (see the monks’ life in the DESM).

There are forty subjects mentioned in the Visuddhi-magga, by means of which, one may practice meditation. They are as follows mentioned: ten “devices” (kasinas), ten “impurities” (asubhas), ten “recollections” (anussatti), four kinds of “immeasurable minds” or “divine states,” four “formless states,” one “perception,” and one “specification”.

Many among these forty are also to be found in the DESM, though often with considerable differences in detail.

We may note that the XII, XIII, XIVb, XIVc, XV, XVI, XXIX contemplations in the DESM correspond to the first four devices in the Visudhimagga.

Contemplation on impurities:

In the DESM, the contemplation on impurities stands out as the fundamental contemplation to be achieved by a meditator as a necessary foundation (cf. supra. V). We give below a description (taken from Nāṇamoli’s translation of the work).

In order to have aversion to the body or the physical beauty, the contemplation on impurities is practiced. The sage Bali practiced contemplation by means of the dead body of a woman which was swollen and rotten. First, he observed it minutely and very carefully. Afterwards, he concentrated thoughts on its image. At the end (of this contemplation), he saw his own body just like that without any difference. He attained the first trance with the help of this carcass.

Buddhaghosa in his *visuddhi-magga*, has discussed elaborately this contemplation on the carcass.

This is the general rule regarding this contemplation that one should not practise it with the help of a fresh carcass. One should practice it by means of a dead body of one’s own sex. This is rule applying to ordinary practitioner. But one who has extraordinary merit (as this sage Bali) may do even the contrary.

It is said: one should approach such a carcass very carefully, because it may be guarded by ferocious animals. One should inform the other mendicants of the monastery, before going for such a purpose. One should go there with a stick, and not go too near, nor should one remain too far from it. One should not stand to the lee side (wind blowing side) of the corpse. If one goes too near, one may be frightened at the very beginning and thus one’s contemplation may be disturbed. If one stands to lee-ward, the excessive bad smell may disturb one’s contemplation. If one stands too far away, one is unable to see each part of the carcass clearly. One should observe it minutely with care. When it is impressed in one’s mind, when one can see it even closing one’s eyes, one should leave it and go to a suitable place to concentrate one’s thoughts on its image.37

This kind of contemplation is also given in the *DESM*. The important difference, regarding the way of getting the mental visualization, is that the DESM teaches the practitioner to imagine a part of one’s own body festering then developed this visualization to one’s whole body, and the others, finally the beings in the whole cosmos.

**Contemplation on the skeleton:**

In the *DESM*, there is a long discussion on the contemplation on a skeleton. As mentioned before, the aim of this contemplation is to cultivate aversion to the attachment of physical beauty. It may be practiced even by means of a single piece of bone.

He who has practiced it well, can see whenever he wishes --- his own body or others’ body, as a body of bones, without flesh and skin. So, physical beauty can not tempt him.

In the *Visuddhimagga* it is said: a young and a beautiful woman, beautifully decorated, was running away from her husband. On the way she met the Elder Mahātissa. Wishing to tempt him, she laughed aloud. The Elder Mahātissa, being startled by the sound of her laughter looked at her. As soon as he saw her teeth, they immediately, brought to his mind, the image of a skeleton---a body of bones.

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After a while, the monk met the husband of that woman who asked: “Sir, have you seen a woman passing by this way? The Elder replied:

“Whether it was a man or woman
That went by I noticed not;
But only that on this high road
There goes a group of bones.”

This kind of contemplation parallels in the IX, X, and XI contemplations of the DESM. But once again, in the case of DESM, it teaches the meditator to start from a part of his body; then develop the visualization to his whole body, then to others, and then to cover the whole cosmos.

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6.2. The methods of meditation in the DESM compared with those in the Vimuttimagga (Vim.) and the Visuddhimagga (Vis.)

Regarding the list of kasiṇas in the Vimuttiimagga and the Visuddhimagga, there is a difference, as the Vimuttiimagga takes the consciousness as one of the ten kasiṇas and Visuddhimagga takes the light. The Path of Freedom (Vimutti-magga) by the Arahant Upatissa, translated into Chinese (解行論) by Tipitaka Sanghapala (in A.D.50, of the Lain dynasty, A.D.502-557), translated from the Chinese into English by the Rev. N. R. M. Ebara, Soma Thera and Kheminda Thera, first BPS edition 1977, reprinted 1995, p.63.
The Doctrine, (23) of Characteristics,
The Order, (24) the Eighty Minor
of Morality, (25) Marks of the
of Liberality, (26) Buddhas, or of
The Devas, (27) of Consecration
The Body, (28) of (Abhisekara), of the
The Breath, (29) of Doctrine (i.e. the
Peace, (30) impermanence of the
five Aggregates, the
Twelve Parts of
Dependent
Orignation, etc.), of
the Arhats, the
Morality, Liberality,
The Devas, (XVII) the
mindfulness of the
Body, (XX)
Contemplation on
Counting the Breaths;

(iv) Four (31) Friendliness,
Excellent (32) Compassion,
Qualities (33) Sympathetic joy Qualities
(Brahmaviharas) within the XXVI
Compassion are given (Brahmaviharas) (34) Equanimity
(iv) Four (31) The Great
Excellent (32) Friendliness and

(V) Four Formless (35) The Sphere of Infinite Space,
Spheres: (36) the Sphere of Infinite
Consciousness, of Samadhi which are
Nothingness, (38) just as a term
The Sphere of XXX Contemplation
Neither Perception of the text.
Nor Non-perception;

(vi) The (39) The (vi) The
Perception of the Perception of the Perception of the
Loathsomeness of Loathsomeness of Loathsomeness of
Nutriment: Nutriment: Nutriment:
The Analysis of (40) The Analysis (vii) The Analysis (XIVc) The External
The Four Elements:→ Four Elements. Elements:→ or the Contemplation on the Sunyata through gradual understanding. (XV) Internal Four Great Elements; and the last part of the XIVb contemplation on the Earth Element;

Contemplation on the Earth in text

The above comparative table shows that the subjects of meditation in the *Vimuddhimagga* and the *Visuddhimagga* are mostly found in the *DESM*. However, some descriptions of the subjects in the *DESM* are not as clear as in both the *Vimuddhimagga* and the *Visuddhimagga* while others are just mentioned by name in the *DESM* without any details. For instance, the contemplation on counting the breath is shortly described thus: “[The practitioner] should fix the mind on the navel or the middle of the waist to follow or pursue the exhaled breath and inhaled breath in such manner: first counting second following, or second counting third following, or third counting fourth following, or fourth counting fifth following, or fifth counting sixth following, or sixth.

Counting seventh following, or seventh counting eighth following, or eighth counting ninth following, or ninth counting tenth following; when he comes to end of the tenth following [the process of respiration] He should in the same way repeatedly pursue the exhaled breath and inhaled breath up to ten times, then he should give up counting the breaths, but concentrate. The practitioners may use the odd or even to count the breathing out or in. They may count quickly [or slowly count], according to their will.” While the terms of its sixteen stages of development is just mentioned thus: “This contemplation on counting the breaths consists of sixteen bases or divisions.40”

Both the *Visuddhimagga* and the *DESM* have the contemplation on the Buddha. But in the former, one is asked to recollect the Buddha’s virtues as given in the phrase: “Iti pi so Bhagavā, arhat, sammā-sambuddho…”

In the *DESM*, the practitioners contemplate in detail on the thirty-two Mahā-purusa-laksanas of the Buddha. The so-called eighty secondary marks are also mentioned though only in name.

According to the *DESM*, the method of contemplation on the Buddha is of two kinds. One is for those who are not intelligent and other is for those who are intelligent. Those who are not intelligent should begin it with the help of the contemplation on a skeleton.

They should see an inch of space on their forehead as without flesh and skin. They should see only the naked bone and fix their thoughts on that object. After they have seen this, they should see, by gradually increasing the size of the bone, their whole body as skeleton. They should see it as white as white-snow-jade. After that, they should see it in blue colour. At the end again they have to see it as white.

When they see that the white skeleton is sending forth absolutely white and bright light, they will see in it, the “Sakyamuni-buddha”. The intelligent persons at the very beginning should contemplate the bright and transparent light. When seeing it, they see in it the former seven Buddhas.

The XV the XVII and the first part of the XVIII contemplation in the DESM deal with the subject of meditation on the body. The contemplation on body in the Visuddhimagga is the meditation upon the thirty-two parts of the body. These thirty-parts are arranged in six groups. It is also said in the Visuddhimagga that, the disciple who wishes to attain Arhatship through the practice of this Kammathana should approach a good teacher for instruction. The teacher should give him instruction in the subject, explaining the sevenfold method of study and the tenfold method of practice.

In the DESM, the contemplation on the body is the meditation upon the thirty-six parts of the body (as opposed to thirty-two in both the Vimuttimagga and the Visuddhimagga.) but not all these parts are clearly explained. There is also no classification as in the Vis regarding these thirty-six parts. The sevenfold method of study and the tenfold method of practice as given in the Visuddhimagga are also not to be found.

The meditation on the Four Great Elements is the last of the forty subjects of samatha meditation as they are set forth in both the Vimuttimagga and the Visuddhimagga. The main object of this meditation is to free the mind from the conception of individuality in regard to the physical body, and to realize its elemental nature with no thought of personal distinction.

These Four Great Elements are called “mahādhatu” The Mahā-rahulovada Sutta gives an additional element, space which is described as twofold: personal and impersonal. “Personal space” refers to the cavitory organs of the body such as the mouth, nostrils, ears, etc.

In the Dhātuvibhanga Sutta, we find six elements described, the sixth, consciousness (Viññana-dhatu) is given as a subject of meditation that deals with the immaterial objects (Arūpa-kammathana). In the EDSM, too these six elements are given as subjects of contemplation.

It is said in the Visuddhimagga that the practitioner of sluggish intellect, who wishes to develop this subject of meditation, should study the four elements in detail from forty-two aspects after receiving instruction from his teacher. Living in a suitable dwelling, and having performed all his duties, he should retire into solitude and seclusion and develop the subject from aspects: (1) Synthetic contemplation on the constituents of the four elements; (2) Analytic contemplation on the constituents of the four elements; (3) Synthetic contemplation on heir characteristics; (4) Analytic contemplation on their characteristics. When these are done the elements manifest themselves to the practitioner without any individual conception, and the mind attains to access-concentration. Furthermore, the four elements should be contemplated according to eleven methods.

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41 The Path of Freedom (Vimutti-magga, 解道論), first BPS edition 1977, reprinted 1995, P.171
43 See M. vol. i.
44 See M. 140.
In the DESM, the meditation on the external four great elements is the XIVc contemplation; the meditation on the internal or personal four great elements is the XV contemplation, and the last part of the XIVb contemplation in the text. The following are some of the practical instructions given in the DESM:

“The body originated from the Four Great Elements. It is dwelling in the same village of the six entrances.” “The practitioner should not be finding pleasure in too much speech, but retire into solitude and seclusion to contemplate the emptiness of all the dharmas. Within the emptiness of these dharmas, there is no earth, no water, no fire and wind. Rūpa-skandha is upside down, and arises from the illusions. Vedanā-skandha comprises causes and conditions; it arises from the deeds (karmas). Samjñā-skandha is upside down; it is not suspending. Vijñāna-skandha is not seen; it comprises the karmic causes and conditions; it produces the seeds of craving and attachment. In such ways, he meditates on the body. The earth element came to exist from the appearance of emptiness (空見); the appearance of emptiness is also empty. What is there solidity or hardness that could be considered as the earth element? In this way he can infer and analyze the earth element….”

While he contemplates thus upon the four elements, the concept of “I” or “mine,” “man” or “woman” will disappear. The mind will be become established in the thought that there are merely elements, without owner, without entity.

“Again, the practitioner should contemplate that the fires outside the body originate from the causes and conditions. When there are the necessary causes and conditions they arise; with the cessation or separation of these conditions they come to cease. When these fires are produced, they do not come from some other place; when they disappear, they are not going to be stored up in another place. They are illusory, decaying and never ceasing.”

“Again, the practitioner should contemplate on that ‘the external water elements of the body are the running waters in the rivers, in the oceans and lakes, so on. When those water and other are produced, they do not come from some other place; when they disappear, they are not going to be stored up in another place… The wind elements are united with the space (or atmosphere); the wind is originated from causes and conditions. The wind elements are neither in the body, nor outside of the body, and nor in the middle. Owning to the upside-down mind (or the perverted thought), they are seen.’ When one is thinking of this, the external wind elements do not arise.”

“The practitioner should contemplate the earth elements in the body. The earth elements in the body are the bones, teeth, nails, hairs, intestines, stomach, belly (or abdomen), liver, heart, lungs, so on; all those solid things are the earth elements.” The practitioner should know all the earth elements in the body. One should know that “the bones become having not been before; having become they cease to be;” so are the water elements, the fire elements, the wind elements in the body.

The practitioner also should know that: “The external Earth Elements are impermanent; so are the Earth Elements in the body. The external fires without suspending; how can the warm of fires in the body be last long?” “The external water elements are impermanent; their force can not last long. The water elements in the body are also impermanent, because they are dependant on [the external water elements] as causes and conditions.”

“The external wind elements are impermanent; their force can not last long because they originate from causes and conditions; they come to cease when their causes and conditions come to
cease. The wind elements in the body are compounded of unreal things; … When he is contemplating on these, all the wind elements in the body come to cease and disappear.” Having such a variety of contemplation and thought, where could the person, the earth elements, the water elements, the fire elements and the wind elements exist? They are the corruptible, unreal, impermanent and erroneous thoughts. The practitioner who devotes himself to this practice will soon realize the state of emptiness, and will eliminate the idea of individual existence, and will then be free from all attachments. Consequently, he concentrates on the body calmly, does not have the sense or characteristic of the body (不識身相); but both body and mind will be at rest, tranquil and happy.”

The Six Great Elements in the DESM are also described in the following words: “The practitioner should contemplate on the Six Great Elements. The Six Great Elements are the Earth Element, the Water Element, the Fire Element, the Wind Element, the Element of Space, and the Element of Consciousness. One should carefully infer and analyze them one by one in such a way: ‘Does the body belong to the earth elements? Does it belong to the water elements? Does it belong to the fire elements? Does it belong to the wind elements? Is it belonging to the element of consciousness? Is it belonging to the element of space?’ So one contemplates on them in such a manner: From which element has the body originated? From which element will it be separated? [Herein, one comprehends that] “the six elements have no controller; the body also has no self.” “This body is compounded of the six elements, originated from the causes and conditions. When the six elements depart from each other, and come to cease; the body is also impermanent.”

The aspects and methods of developing the contemplation upon the four elements as given in the *Vimuttimagga* and the *Visuddhimagga* are not clearly seen in the DESM.

Another point worth mentioning is that whereas the *Vis* divides meditational practices into two broad categories: *samātha* and *vipassanā*; there is no such division in the DESM. From this point of view, our text may be said to be more in conformity with the spirit of the *nikāya* and *āgama* texts.

Another important difference between the *Vis* and the DESM is that the latter gives a considerable amount of advice on how to restore vitality of the weakened meditator. (For more details, cf. supra IV.). Finally, the contemplation on *sunyata*, recurring many times in the DESM is not to be found in the Vis. (For more details, cf. infra VII.).

6.3. The methods befitting various character – types

The main object of our text, the DESM, is to induce the meditation students to achieve the arhatship. Accordingly, when the text was composed its author probably only laid stress on two main points: (1) the subjects of meditation, (2) the way of befitting character. The first point has already been discussed above. As regards the second point; as it seems to have inspired various practicable aspects of Buddhism in China, we discuss here in some detail.

The *Visuddhimagga* gives a long description as to how to judge a person’s character. The DESM has no such kind of description. We propose here to compare the way of befitting a certain character in the *Visuddhimagga* with that in the DESM.

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46 六大散滅，身亦無常。See T15, p.247a.
According to the *Visuddhimagga*, the character (carita) of human beings is of six kinds: disposed to lust, to hate, to delusion, to faith, to intellectuality and to agitation. Although there are a great variety of dispositions, owing to the mixed nature of mental states, these six types are generally stated as predominant. The commentaries explain that the character of a person is the expression of his mentality and is determined by his previous *kamma* and by the condition of his physical elements. Human beings are also of different temperaments as determined by racial differences, geographical situation and climatic conditions. Just as there are many kinds of individual character, so there are many kinds of individual character, so there are many methods of meditation. The following table is the way of befitting character in the *Visuddhimagga* compared with that in the *DESM*. See a table in next page:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character or nature of the Meditation student:</th>
<th>The suitable subject of meditation for the special nature in the Vis.</th>
<th>The classification of the Nature or Character of meditation student in the <em>DESM:</em></th>
<th>The way or method of Meditation befitting nature according to the <em>DESM:</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rāga or Lust</td>
<td>10 Asubhas &amp;Kāyagatā-sati</td>
<td>Rāga or Lust</td>
<td>The first 13 methods, the XIva methods, the XVI Method, the VII Method, and the XVIII method of meditation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dosa or Hate</td>
<td>4 kasinas: Nila, Pita, Lohita, Odāta, 4 Brahma-vihāras</td>
<td>2.Dosa or Hate</td>
<td>4 Brahma-vihāras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Moha or Dullness; Vitakka or Agitation</td>
<td>Ānāpāna-sati</td>
<td>3.Vitakka or Agitation</td>
<td>Ānāpāna-sati, the XX method of meditation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Saddhā or Faith</td>
<td>6. Anussatis: Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha, Sila, Cāga, Devatā (6 subjects)</td>
<td>4.Moha or Dullness; Saddhā or Faith</td>
<td>The XIX method of contemplation on the Buddha’s Ten Titles; the thirty-two marks; the eighty minor marks; of Arhats; of the Doctrine; of Devata; of Sila,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Buddhi or Intelligence</td>
<td>Marana-sati, Upassamānussati Āhārepatikkūla-Saṅñā, &amp; Catudhātuvattāvattāna</td>
<td>5.Buddhi or Intelligence</td>
<td>The XIVc method, the XV method, and the last part of the XIVb method of meditation, the VIII method of contemplation on the fresh corpse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sabba Carita or Mixed Character</td>
<td>6 Kasinas: Pathavi, Āpo, Tejo, Vāyo, Ākāsa, Āloka, &amp; 4 Arūpas</td>
<td>6.Sabba Carita or Mixed Character</td>
<td>The XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV; XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXIX, and XXX methods of contemplation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the above tabular comparison, according to the *Visuddhimagga*, eleven of these subjects of meditation; i.e. the ten Objects of Impurity and Mindfulness of the Body, are suitable for the person who is of a lustful nature. Eight of the subjects; i.e. the four *Brahmaviharas*, and the four color-*kasinas*, are suitable for him who is disposed to hatred. For him who is deluded or who is excitable, the only subject suitable is Mindfulness of Counting the Breaths. The first six Recollections are suitable for him who, by his disposition, is prone to faith. There are four subjects, Recollection or Mindfulness of Death, Mindfulness of Peace, the Perception of the Loathsomeness of Nutriment and the Analysis of the Four Elements, which are suitable for the intelligent. The remaining *Kasinas* and the four Formless Spheres are suitable for all kinds of dispositions.

Vis. III.
On the other hand, the methods of meditation befitting character in the DESM, as seen in the above table, can also be roughly classified into six types, as given above.

**Conclusion:**

The DESM is, described in the Chinese Buddhist Catalogue, as one of “the Works of the Sages of the Western County (i.e. India).” It is a collection of meditation teachings based on those in the āgamas and the works of the Indian sages. As the author used the style of a Buddhist sūtra to compose the DESM; his name is hidden from us. His intention was not to forge a sūtra, but to stress that the teachings he compiled were those of the Sūtra-Pitaka. The text shows that meditation is the gateway to nirvana, the path for attaining arhatship and enlightenment. It is neither an Abhidharmic exposition, nor a polemics. The author was quite clearly a sutradhara, and must have been a meditator as well as a preacher-the characteristics of a Dārśāntika. Judging by the content and the time the text was brought to China, the author was living around the 3rd century A.D.

The final goal of practicing meditation, as given in the text, as well as the doctrines contained therein; indicate that the author was not a follower of Mahāyana Buddhism. This contention is supported by the author’s expressed attitude towards meat-eating—a taboo for all traditional Mahāyanaists. It is stated explicitly that the meditator, to regain his vitality after the body having been weakened in practicing meditation, may eat “meat of threefold purity” (i.e. meat may be taken under three circumstances). It seems reasonable to assume that the author belongs to the Dārśāntika-yogācāra lineage.

According to the catalogues of the Chinese translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka, there were in all three translations made from the original. However, two of the three have been lost. The present text was retranslated (or revised) by Kumarajiva in the early 5th century A.D. The original seems to have been in Sanskrit.

The DESM provided the Chinese people with much information on methods of meditation. It explained in graphic detail about 30 kinds of meditation. It served as a manual of Buddhist meditation in the Northern Tradition of Buddhism. It had inspired such eminent translators as An shi-kao, Zhi-qian, Kumarajiva, Tsu-khu Kin-shan and Dharmamitra, to subsequently translate more meditation texts into Chinese to remedy the deficiency of the DESM, to serve as supplementary material for the need of the Chinese practitioners.

There are many similarities between the DESM and Visuddhimagga. For instance, for attaining Arhatship and Nirvana, both texts stress the importance of virtue (戒), meditation (定) and wisdom (慧). Regarding wisdom, the text stresses insight into the Four Noble Truths. The subjects of meditation, unlike in both the Vimuttimagga and the Visuddhimagga, are given in brief. This deficiency of details seemed to have been noted by kumarajiva, who supplemented them by translating the following texts:

Articles of the Practice of Meditation (佛說禪行三十七道品經), (6) The Great Discourse by the Buddha on the Mindfulness of Ānāpāna (佛說大安般守意經), (7) Sūtra on Perception in the Law of Practice of Meditation (禪行法想經), (8) the Yogācārabhūmi-sūtra (修行道地經), (9) The Dhyāna-samādhi Sūtra (坐禪三昧經), (10) Dharmatara-dhyāna-sūtra (達磨多羅禪經), Sūtra on the Important Explanation of the Law of Meditation (禪要解經), (11) Sūtra on Blaming Human Desire or Lust, and on the Importance of the Meditation (禪要欲經), (12) Vimukti-mārga-śāstra (解脫道論), (13) Satyānāda-sastra (成實論), (14) Abhidharma-kosa-bhāsyam (阿毗達磨俱舍論), as well as many others.

The meditation methods given in our text, as well as translations in those of the Sarvastivada, must have influenced the Chinese meditation tradition.

Before the introduction of Buddhism into China, Chinese spiritual practitioners, particularly the Taoists, had been greatly interested in finding secret methods for longevity and gaining psychic power. We can well imagine how eager these Chinese practitioners must have been, to learn about the meditation techniques from the “Western Region” (India and Central Asia). These techniques provided for the transformation of consciousness as well as ways for spiritual experiences and visions. The Buddhist method of ānāpānasamṛtī, in particular, must have attracted the Taoists interested in “Vital Energy” - even though the Buddhist method of teaching mindfulness of breathing differs from the latter. It is therefore no accident that some of the earliest Buddhist works translated in China deal with the subject of meditation. An-Shikao, as early as 148 A.D., translated the Ānāpāna-anusmṛti-sūtra (An-ban-shou-yi-jing). Cheng-hui 陳慧, a scholar in the time of An Shi-Kao, did a commentary on the Ānāpāna-anusmṛti-sūtra. Kang Sheng-hui 康僧会, a pupil of Cheng-hui, using this commentary and his own understanding, wrote several important expositions on Samatha and Vipassana in the Collection of the Practices of the Six Perfections.

The earliest translation of our DESM must have been to fulfill this need. Other meditation texts translated in the early period of Chinese Buddhism include Sangharaksa’s Yogacara-bhūmi-sūtra (translated by Dhamaraka in 284 A.D.), and several other works (see supra V) translated by Kumarajiva and others.

The clear expositions on samatha and vipasayana by Zhi-zhe (-da-shi) 智者大師, A.D. 530-597, founder of the Tien Tai School, with the master’s stress on the gradual steps to be taken up systematically in meditation progress, must have been influenced by these above-mentioned translations. He combined samatha and vipasayana in the practice of the mindfulness of breathing, with detailed steps such as counting and following the breaths. This is clearly reminiscent of ānāpāna-anusmṛti described in the Indian Buddhist texts. Zhi-zhe’s also emphasises the need for selecting a competent kalyana-mitra as instructor, and for a conducive environment, indications of the influence of these translations.

The early Chinese Chan (a transliteration of dhyāna) School was closely connected with the Yogācāra tradition. The principal text of the school49 (until the time of the Sixth Patriarch, Hui Neng (636-712) had been the Lankavatara Sūtra, a major Yogācāra text expounding the doctrine of Vijñāpatimatrata. The earlier (non-Mahāyana) Yogācārins appeared to have evolved from the Dārstāntika meditators.

49 It was said to have been brought to China by Bodhidharma, until the time of the Sixth Patriarch, Hui Neng (A.D 636-712).
Discussions in the ancient Chinese meditation tradition on “Chan”:

Discussions can be seen in ancient Chinese meditation tradition on “Chan sickness”) (病) – i.e. What can go wrong in meditation practices, and how to deal with them-must have been inspired by the Restoration of the Health of the Meditators as found in our DESM. Similarly, a later work, entitled 病秘要經 (Sūtra on the Secret Importance of Curing the (Mental) Disease of those who Engage in Contemplation), should also be noted.

The earliest Indian sources of influence in the Chinese Buddhist meditation tradition, needs an in-depth study. It should be a topic of interest for the Buddhist historians. It is our hope that some competent scholars and meditators will in the near future enlighten us further in this field.
ABBREVIATIONS

“T.” is used to indicate the *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* (大正新修大藏経).

All the references of the Pali canonical texts are to the Pali Text Society editions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKB</td>
<td>= Abhidharma-kosabh%syam T29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKB (E)</td>
<td>= English translation of Abhidharma-kosabh%syam</td>
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<td>Blmj</td>
<td>= Jin-gang-po-ra-bo-lo-mi-jing T8, No. 235</td>
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<td>Byj</td>
<td>= Zhi-chan-ping-bi-yao-jing T15 No. 620.</td>
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<td>Chanjing</td>
<td>= Da-mo tuo-lo-chan-jing T15 No. 618.</td>
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<td>Chu-jì,</td>
<td>Or CST = Sheng-yiu, Chu-san-tsang-chi-ji, T55, No. 2145</td>
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<td>Da-zhou-lu</td>
<td>= Ming-quan, Da-zhou-kan-ding-zhong-jing-mu-lu, T55, No. 2153</td>
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<td>DÁ</td>
<td>= Dirghāgama T1 No. 1</td>
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<td>D</td>
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<td>DA.</td>
<td>= Dighanikāya Atthakathā (Sumangalavilāsī) (PTS)</td>
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<td>DCBT.</td>
<td>= Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms</td>
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<td>EÌ</td>
<td>= Ekottarāgama T2 No. 125</td>
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<td>= Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise, T, 1509</td>
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<td>Gs</td>
<td>= Gradual Sayings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKSC</td>
<td>= Xu-kao-seng-chuan, T, 2510.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ilspm</td>
<td>= The Importance of the Law of Sitting in the Practice of Meditation (修習止觀坐法要)</td>
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<td>= Zhi-sheng, Khai-yuan-shih-kian-lu, T55, No. 2154</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ks.</td>
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<td>KSC.</td>
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<td>= Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāsā-śāstra T27</td>
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<td>Ny.</td>
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<td>= Pali Text Society</td>
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<td>RMS</td>
<td>= Records as the Mirror of the (Dhyāna) Schools (宗鏡錄), T48, No. 2016</td>
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<td>SÌ</td>
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<td>= Fa-jing, Sui-zhong-jing-mu-lu, T55, No. 2146</td>
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<td>Sui-lu(2)</td>
<td>= Yian-Zhong, Sui-Zhong-jing-mu-lu, T55, No 2147</td>
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<td>= Tao-xuan, Ta-than-nei-tien-lu, T55, No. 2149</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ta-ming-lu</td>
<td>= Ta-ming-san-tsan-shan-kiao-mu-lu</td>
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TbUdv(E) = English tr. of the Tibetan version of the Udānavarga
Tdj = Xiu-xing-tao-di-jing T15 No. 606.
Thu-ji = Ku-kin-i-kin-thu-ji, T55, No. 2151
Udv (C1) = Chu Yao Jing. T4, No. 212
Udv(C2) = Fa ji Yao Sung Jing, T4, No. 213
Vim = Vimuttimagga
Vin = Vinaya Pitaka
Vis = Visuddhimagga (figures: numbers of chapter & paragraphing in “The Path of Purification”, tr. by Bhikkhu ānāmoli publ. by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy)
Yf = Si-wei-lue-yao-fa T15 No. 617.
Yjj = Chan-fa-yao-jie-jing T15 No. 616
Yrf = Wu-men-chan-jing-yao-rong-fa T15 No. 619.
Zen = R.H. Blyth, Zen and Zen Classics
The Philosophical Perspectives in the Meditational practices of Tantric Buddhism.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Uma Shankar
SIES College of Arts, Sc & Com, Mumbai, India

‘Shunyata yasya yujyate, tasya sarvam cha yujyate”
that is “For whom emptiness is possible all is possible”
says, Arya Nagarjuna.

Introduction

Meditation is usually practiced since antiquity as a component of religious practices in monastic traditions both in the east and west. In India it is found in almost all philosophical schools in varied forms. It has its roots in our ancient tradition and treatises. Buddhist meditation focused on the meditative practices associated with the religion and philosophy of Buddhism. The ancient Buddhist texts have preserved the core meditational techniques but over the centuries they have proliferated and diversified through the teacher–student communication. The goal or the very pursuit of meditation was towards enlightenment or Nirvana.

To the beginners, Buddha taught the path of renunciation [for Theravadans], where the emphasis is on completely renouncing the passions and seeking a personal nirvana, that is the end to the cycle of uncontrolled birth-death and rebirth. To more advanced assembly of disciples, that is those who were well established in the path of renunciation of samsara, Buddha taught the Mahayana and the ideal of Bodhisattva, which emphasized great compassion for others. The Vajrayana or the tantric path was taught by Buddha to the assembly of those great Bodhisattva yogis who were well established on the path towards renunciation and great compassion.

Vajrayana has made itself attractive and popular by its interesting tenets, doctrines and practices which they had developed in the representation of images. Tantric Buddhism or Vajrayana is a complex, comprehensive and versatile system of Buddhist philosophy, it’s thought and practice evolved over several centuries. It derives its name from the centrality of the concept of ‘vajra’ in its symbolism. The Vajrayana or the ‘diamond vehicle’ is believed to have originated in India in the middle of the first millennium. The esoteric rituals and such rites distinguishes it from the other schools of Buddhism. The metaphysics of Yogachara and Madhyamika thought is very much behind the core aspect of Vajrayana. Tantric Buddhism is a name for such phenomenon which calls itself as Mantrayana, Vajrayana or Mantra Mahayana. The tantric version of Buddhism brought about a profound change in Buddhist values. Many scholars believe that the innate awakening in Vajrayana becomes the goal. The many schools of Vajrayana Buddhism have several highly complex systems of tantra that have been developed over many centuries. Those who practice this path have attained sufficient purity of mind to be able to ‘metabolize’ the poisons of lust and anger and to transform the energy of the passions into the wisdom of non-duality of subject and object. Due to the purity of
their minds, they were able to perceive the Buddha’s subtle form – the Sambhogakaya – to receive the teachings directly. Those who practiced Tantric Buddhism were referred as yogis, siddhas, mantrins, sadhakas and so on. Thus the word “tantric” for Buddhism taught in the tantras is not native to the tradition but certainly a borrowed term which has served its purpose. The tantric culture presupposes Raja Yoga and Hatha yoga. The initiates of this path were expected to keep their learning in secret. The secretive learning and understanding of the mantras and symbols were for those who willed to embark on this path voluntarily. The role of guru and the worship and propitiation of deities also follow.

It is imperative to understand the meaning, implication and connotation of meditation in the light of philosophy. Buddhism in general and Tantric Buddhism in particular has dwelled on the idea of mantras and symbols. It has been found that today even the non-Buddhists take up many forms of Buddhist meditation for various reasons. Though meditation as such has become popular yet the ancient connectivity with Tantrism is very interesting to explore.

Tibetan Buddhism exists in the form of four major orders – 1. The Nyingma-pa, 2. The Kagyu-pa, 3. The Sakya-pa and 4. The Geluk-pa. These are the sole schools of the ancient Indian Buddhist Tantrism. These four Tibetan orders contain in the persons of their gurus, in their scriptures and texts and in the living cycle of ritual art and practice. The entire set of instruction is known as the highest Yoga Tantra.

1. Nyingma-pa: The followers of this school practice Yoga Tantra in three phases called Maha Yoga, Anu Yoga and Ati Yoga (Dzokchen).
2. The Kagyu-pa are the descendants of Indian Mahasiddhas who practice and propogate various lineages of the six yogas that combine the essential practices of Tantra.
3. The Sakya-pa are the descendants of the Mahasiddhas like Virupa and Gayadhara.
4. The Geluk-pa are the followers who bring the lineage of Dalai Lamas. They lay stress on monasticism. They are known for dialectical and analytical skill. They follow a structured path laying a greater emphasis on a detailed study of Sutras and Tantras. They also practice Tantric meditation.

According to the Buddhist Tantra, the deities of the pantheons are all manifestations of the shunya. It is due to the Tantric Buddhism that Buddhism can boast of an extensive and varieties of Gods who were invoked for the purpose of seeking perfection and attainment of Siddhis. The deities were in various forms, colors and having invoked, they discharged multifarious functions. To Buddhists, the external world as such has no existence. Even the body with the sense organs is unreal. The real Noumenon is only shunya, which along with Karuna, constitute the Boddhichitta. In the text, Guhyasamaja, we find this idea of Buddhist pantheon being crystallized properly. There are references to mantras, mandalas, and their shaktis.

Tantrism is a transition from Buddhist philosophy to Buddhism as a religion. This introduction of Tantrism in Buddhism takes the highest form in Vajrayana. Tantra followed the pattern of cooperation with established religious institutions set by Mahayana. As with Mahayana, we presume that Tantra reflects social as well as religious changes. The Tantric monks would take the Bodhisattva vows and receive monastic ordination under the pre-Mahayana code. Those who practice Tantra would live in the same monastery with non-Tantric monks. Thus, Tantric Buddhism
became integrated into Buddhist high tradition even as the Siddhas continued to challenge the values of Buddhist monasticism. Tantra in general makes use of symbols, rituals and doctrinal elements which were found in the early Buddhism. The mystical formulas called mantras and Dharanis formed the central aspect of Tantrayana. This method of realizing the ultimate reality by means of esoteric practices and mantras is not peculiar to Buddhism, for Tantrism as a religious method was very much prevalent in ancient India.

Vajrayana could be used to describe the early documented manifestations of Tantric practices in India. It derives its name from the centrality of the concept, Vajra which means diamond, also characterized as solidity and brilliance. In other words, it is metaphor for hardness and destructiveness. Spiritually speaking, it represents the eternal, the innate state of Buddhahood possessed by all human beings and also the cutting edge of wisdom. From the standpoint of Tantric Buddhism, the voidness or shunya which is ultimate reality is not a negative fact but has a positive significance of substantial existence. The personification of this condition and power is Vajrasattva, a deity and an abstract principle. It is defined as follows:

By vajra is meant emptiness;
sattva means pure cognition.
The identity of these two is known
as the essence of vajrasattva.

This vajrasattva stands for the non-dual experience that transcends both emptiness and pure mind. The innate quality of non-dual is also represented by the concept of “the thought of awakening”. This innate awakening in Vajrayana becomes the objective for the seekers. In other words enlightenment is present in its totality and perfection in this human body, the thought of awakening is expressed as:

“The thought of awakening is known to be
Without beginning or end, quiescent
Free from being and nonbeing, powerful
Undivided in emptiness and compassion”.

Hindu Tantrism And Buddhist Tantrism

Tantrism in India has its root in Karmakanda. But later it went on to a higher level that is, it gave impetus to Buddhism. Vedic traditions and Buddhism have many similarities with respect to Tantrism, its method, the practices and all that follows. For both, ultimately the liberation is the goal. For the former, liberation is the actual emancipation of the soul to merge with the power. While for latter, in Mahayana, it is the emptying of the mind. The content of shunyata lies in the very emptying of the soul. In this sense, liberation has the same universality. Thus, meditation in Tantrism is the same as in both Hindu philosophy and in the Buddhist doctrine. We can describe the form and matter from the external point of view which implies, one has to diverse the form from the formless. As such they are not apart. Tantrism as such makes use of mantra and yantra which takes the form of shakti. This shakti merges into formless which is the emptiness of the mind. Perhaps, Tantrism takes a backdoor entry into the home of Madhyamika. Tantrism is that Madhyamika philosophy
which ended in Vajrayana in order to reach shunya. According to the Vajrayana tradition, at certain times the body and mind are in a very subtle state which can be used by advanced practitioners to transform the mind stream. Such luminal times are known in Tibetan Buddhism as Bardo states and include such transitional states very elevating during meditation, dreaming, sex and death. Lama Thubten Yeshe writes in his book, Introduction to Tantra: A Vision of Totality:

"Tantric meditational deities should not be confused with what different mythologies and religions might mean when they speak of gods and goddesses. Here, the deity we choose to identify with represents the essential qualities of the fully awakened experience latent within us. To use the language of psychology, such a deity is an archetype of our own deepest nature, our most profound level of consciousness. In tantra we focus our attention on such an archetypal image and identify with it in order to arouse the deepest, most profound aspects of our being and bring them into our present reality."

Vajrayana is using Tantrism and such practices for moving ahead in this journey passing through various siddhis. Regarding the mode of practice, it’s very similar in case of mantra chanting in Vajrayana as well as Shri Vidya upasana. There are few also who go into the practice of meditation to see both the aspects. Buddhist tantric practice is categorized as secret practice; this is to avoid misuse of the practices by misinformed people. One of the methods to keep this secrecy is that tantric initiation is required from a master or preceptor before any instructions can be received about the actual practice. During the initiation procedure in the highest class of tantra (such as the Kalachakra), students must take the tantric vows which commit them to such secrecy. Basically, one has to drop everything at the core of shunyata in Vajrayana. Similarly, everything has to merge in the Shiva-Shakti concept in Hindu tradition. The recitation of mantras results in certain change in the psyche.

Tantrism in both the traditions is very rich in symbols which are used in meditation and in the conduction of rituals. Indeed, the body itself is a symbol of the cosmos and the male & female bodies symbolise Shiva and Shakti for Hindus, or Prajna (Wisdom) and Upaya (Means) for Buddhists. Sexual union therefore becomes a symbol of liberation understood as the union of Shiva and Shakti or of Prajna and Upaya. In Hindu Tantrism Shakti is active female energy and Shiva is passive, male consciousness, whereas in Buddhist Tantrism Prajna is the passive female element and Upaya the active, male element. Other Tantric symbols are mantras, yantra mandalas (sacred diagrams) and mudras (ritual hand gestures). The Tantras also contain a symbolic language which associates the body with the male-female polarity in the cosmos. The shakthi is that energy which is worshipped and invoked through the practice of meditation. The main tantric practices can be summarized in the Four Purities:

1. Seeing one’s body as the body of the deity
2. Seeing one’s environment as the pure ground or mandala of the deity
3. Perceiving one’s enjoyments as bliss of the deity, free from attachment
4. Performing one’s actions only for the benefit of others (bodhichitta motivation, altruism)

As it is said in Buddhist writings:
“He who sees how things in the world, for there is ‘is not’,
He who sees how things decay and die in the world, for there is the ‘is’,
Truth is the middle!”

It is a simultaneous process as we see ‘is not’, it is and when we realize it is, it is not. It calls for a breakthrough and that is meditation. The tantric practices are meant to express this wondrous experience at least for a second. While watching this wild expansive nature, one can break through this ‘is’ and ‘is not’. The universe in all its glory is showing this every moment. Tantraism is an effort to do something to get into the proximity of this. As Kenneth Morgan writes in his book: “The Path of Buddha”, that ‘there is no real existence; all things are but appearance and are in truth empty. Voidness or emptiness is not nothingness nor annihilation, but that which stands right in the middle between affirmation and negation, existence and non-existence, eternity and annihilation.’

Meditation

Yoga as a system can be practiced independently. Each system in Indian philosophy owes much to Yoga. Buddhism and the Jaina doctrine have taken the help of Yoga, especially Yama and Niyama, which were structured by Patanjali. Tantric Buddhism and the Vedic tantric practices have adopted various forms of Yoga in their application of philosophy. Success lies in the amount of it, which has been borrowed. The Nirvikalpa Samadhi of Yoga is nothing but the emptying of all forms and modifications of mind, which is also the goal of Vajrayana. Throughout all the stages of meditation the practice of yoga is meant for utilizing the psychic energy for the use of spiritual powers of man. Tibetan tantric practices too are guarded against intellectual aspiration or materials benefits. It is believed that psychic powers obtained without moral aspects and spiritual intention and without humanitarian consideration through compassion and wisdom are likely to be vulgar, evil and destructive in its very purpose. Tantric practices do not divert the attention of the seekers to aim at such acquisitions of powers like floating in the air, transfer of consciousness or transforming oneself into other shapes etc. the target here is supreme enlightenment for the sake of all beings. The tantric mantras in Buddhism are equally loaded with meaning. For instance, the idea of ‘Padma’ is common in Vajrayana as well as in Kundalini Yoga.

The recitation of mantras may be in different languages but they all mean the same. The transition of Buddhist philosophy into Buddhist religion came about with the introduction of Tantrism in Buddhism, of which the highest form is Vajrayana. In doing this, Buddhism as a religion has incorporated several practices and rituals at regular intervals. In awe of Buddhism, Sam Harris calls it as the richest source of contemplative wisdom that any civilization has produced. He laments that the wisdom of the Buddha is currently trapped within the religion of Buddhism. The Buddhism as a philosophy, leans heavily on the fact that it is less dogmatic than most other religions. This argument, however, ignores mysticism. Through meditation, Siddhartha Gautama intimately experienced what is beyond subject and object, self and other, life and death. The enlightenment experience is the outcome of Buddhism. It’s said that the only way to understand Buddhism is to practice it. Through practice, one perceives its transformative power. Buddhism that remains in the realm of concepts and ideas is not Buddhism. Due to the need of the hour the robes, ritual and other trappings of religion that came onto vogue are did not corrupt Buddhism, as some imagine,
but they became expressions of it. Having taken birth in Indian soil and flourished for centuries it was influential to many other schools of thought with respect to the practical aspect of any philosophy. This shift was essential in order to get itself established in the India and to suit the minds of millions in India who were already exposed to tantric tradition. All these practices were meant to produce that environment in order to take a lead from religion to philosophy and ultimately back to the truth. The core of Buddhist teaching was neither non-scriptural, nor written by Buddha but the scattered truth was compiled by his disciples and got interpreted as philosophy of Buddha. Later, it got formulated along with several practices of which Vajrayana is the most significant as a method in the Tantric tradition. Many tantric practices may appear complicating the mind but having done that, there is a need to throw the mind. In this context, the relevance of meditation comes into focus.

Meditation has become the integral part in Buddhism too, in order to reach the highest goal. It needs the skill and personal guidance as everything cannot be gathered from written scriptures. The role of a teacher or a guru is therefore mandated to understand the subtleties regarding the skill and the capacity of the student to prepare him gradually for the inner journey. Learning meditation is compared to any activity which involves a skill. It could be compared to the skill of playing a musical instrument. It calls for him to tune the mind and play. It is sometimes compared to gardening as one cannot force the plant to grow but provide sufficient conditions and allow it to grow naturally. Buddhism as philosophy begins with a search for truth. The entire life and sojourn of Buddha is a testimony to this. It does not begin with any assumption or presupposition about God or any other reality or first cause. There is no claim of any kind revelation as such. Buddha as Siddhartha searched with direct insight and discovered the nature of cosmos and the cause for all suffering. Since he had a rationalistic approach he wanted man to rely on themselves and not use scriptures or texts or such as crutches. Buddhism to many scholars is not a religion in the sense that it is not a system of faith and worship. There are no dogmas to be believed and followed. Reason in general makes man to systematize and rationalize knowledge in order to find the truth.

Buddhists take their first refuge in Buddha. It is because he had unfathomable compassion for man’s weakness, sorrow, grief, disappointment and suffering. The Buddhists take their second refuge in Dhamma. One learns to practice Dhamma daily in one’s life. Realization is always possible only through practice. One of the important qualities of Dhamma is that it invites everyone to come and see for himself. As Buddha says, “He who honors me best who practices my teaching best.” The third refuge Buddhists take is the Sangha. It is a living stream through which Dhamma flows to humanity directly. It is like a bridge between man and absolute truth.

Guru yoga is the foundation of the Tantric sadhana which is the formal tantric meditative session. Although it is the foremost of the preliminaries, it forms the basic foundation for the more complex visualization and practices various stages of highest yoga tantra. Each tantra has its own specific guru yoga associated with the deity and mandala of that particular tantra. In Buddhism the tantras are taught in a sequential manner. For the beginners, whose power of visualization is not yet fully developed, simple sadhanas are provided which increase in scope and complexity as one moves to higher tantric levels. In the various levels of Tantra, one is expected to experience an inferential cognition of emptiness. It is in this ‘inner space’ of emptiness that the practitioner cancels out the ordinary appearance of self and the other and instead visualizes in vivid three dimensional details like a hologram projected by the mind, a perfect reality embodied as a divine being in a divine world.
The purpose of visualization is to block and negate our habitual sense of ordinariness about ourselves and our world and to prepare the mind to cognize reality as it is: perfect and pure. This is one of the principal purposes of tantra. Tantras are divided into 4 sects namely - Kriya tantra (action), Charya tantra (behavior), Yoga tantra and Maha-annuttara yoga tantra.

Kriya yoga: here there is great emphasis on austere external actions such as rituals, ablutions and on creating pure & clean environment, etc. Simple diet, fasting and recitation of mantras are practiced for the invocation. It is very similar to what Patanjali referred in his yoga sutras as yama and niyama. It includes soucha which stands for purity and both physical and mental level. Then there is a mention of astheya in yama that is non-stealing and ahimsa non-hurting both at physical and at mental-level. There are eight Mahayana precepts namely:

1. not to kill
2. not to steal
3. to be celibate
4. to speak no lie
5. to desist from intoxicants
6. to take only one meal
7. no seats made of animal skin
8. no use of perfume etc..

Charya tantra: Here the visualization of deities take place. These are complex and emphasis on internal meditative stabilization though austerities, fasting and such are also given.

Yoga tantra: Here the stress is on mainly internal meditative experience. Again as in yoga where the last three limbs of yoga namely: Dharana, Dhyana and Samadhi is practiced to enhance the process of obliterating the modifications of the mind. Here the complexity of the deities, mandalas, etc., become more intricate. Generally, wrathful forms become objects of meditation.

Highest yoga tantra: At this profoundest level of inner yoga, all deities are manifesting and symbolically in sexual union with respective consorts. A typical tantric deity of highest secret mantra would have the color of one of the five Buddha families to which it belongs. Deities of highest secret mantra are usually of three types –peaceful, wrathful, and very wrathful. As such all are manifestly and symbolically in union with respective consorts.

Role of a Guru

It is the Guru who decides the location deity, etc., after gauging the disciple’s emotional and intellectual caliber. Now the indivisible emptiness: luminosity, the naked mind is stripped and it dwells in the uncreated state i.e., the Bardo. Guru yoga is a practice that has many variations, but may be understood as a tantric devotional process whereby the practitioners unite their mind stream with the mind stream of the guru. The guru is engaged as yidam, as a nirmanakaya manifestation of a Buddha. The Guru or spiritual teacher is essential as a guide during tantric practice, as without his
assistance, blessings and grace, genuine progress is held to be impossible for all. The process of
guru yoga might entail visualization of an entire lineage of masters as an invocation of the lineage.
The form of Buddha one can best relate to is known as yidam (in Tibetan) or ishtadevata (in Sanskrit).
For the purpose of self-identification with a Buddha-form, Buddhist tantric techniques make use of
symbolism and visualization. Every Buddhist takes refuge regularly in the Three Jewels: Buddha,
Dharma, Sangha. The Vajrayanist adds guru also to this. That is because without a mentor or lama,
access to any of the special methods would be impossible. Secrecy and the commitment of
the student to the vajra guru are aspects of the samaya or sacred bond that protects both
the practitioner and the integrity of the teachings.

The Guru is Buddha, the Guru is Dhamma, the Guru is also Sangha - this reflects
the importance of the preceptor in the spiritual path for the disciple. The guru is considered even
more compassionate and more potent than the Buddha because we can have a direct relationship
with the guru. Vajrayana Buddhism is esoteric, in the sense that the transmission of certain
teachings only occurs directly from teacher to student during an initiation or empowerment and
cannot be simply learned from a book. Many techniques are also commonly said to be secret, but
some Vajrayana teachers have responded that secrecy itself is not important and only a side-effect
of the reality that the techniques have no validity outside the teacher-student lineage. In order to
engage in Vajrayana practice, a student should have received such an initiation or permission.
Offerings are usually accompanied by appropriate chanting of verses. It is done along in order to
arouse joyful and devout feelings which enhances the contemplation of the qualities of deity. It is
done as an offering of flowers too. The impermanence and ephemeral nature of human life is so well
brought in the following verse in Pali:

“This mass of flowers, fresh-hued, odorous and choice,
I offer at the blessed lotus-like feet of the Lord of Sages.
With diverse flowers, the Buddha/Dhamma/Sangha I revere;
And through this ‘merit’ may there be release.
Just as this flower fades, so my body goes towards destruction”.

This combines many things like joyous reverence, aspiration, veneration, and reflection on
the impermanence of human life.

In Buddhism, the chanting of mantras has become a vehicle for devotion. The idea of
meditation is the emptying of the mind which is similar to the yogic idea of Chittavritti Nirodha,
which is the cessation of mental modifications. At every stage, each thought must be abandoned.
The state of no-mindfulness is achieved when there is no awareness of the thought processes or
the immediate, prior moment of consciousness. We get a glimpse of it necessarily while absorbed in
any work like a musician who is lost in the music or an artist lost in the painting. In losing oneself
in such an activity, actually one finds oneself. The idea of no thought is not confined to a quiet place
or to a remote environment but can be attained amidst all daily activities. In this sense, Buddhist
meditation is most relevant and still remains a meaningful exercise in this techno-charged world.
When the mind is all scattered in various objects and in their manifested forms, thus making it more
cluttered, we need to get back to meaningful meditative practices.
This helps in the actual ‘dropping of thoughts’. Thus, there is a need to use the meditational techniques as a method with sincerity and perseverance. This shall enable us to live just every moment in its completeness. In other words, we shall learn to live just that moment of that activity. It is like while eating, we ‘just’ eat and not thinking of eating. Or while walking, it is ‘just’ walking and not thinking of walking. Similarly, while thinking it is just only thinking. This ‘no-thought’ cannot be concluded as something passive, inactive, dull or a lethargic disposition. But, instead it is full awareness, where the mind simply flows freely. It is direct and not cluttered with other thought forms. In this state, there is spontaneity and the beauty of living is felt every moment.

In spite of many controversies as to which system influenced the other what is interesting is the striking similarities in both the traditions which have stood to the test of time. The popular Hindu worship of shakthi in the form of ten manifestations known as dasa maha vidyas, there is mention of Tara. The others are Kali, Sodasi, Bhuvaneshwari, Bhairavi, Chinmasta, Dhumavathi, Bagala, Matangi, and Kamala. It is an accepted fact that Tara is of Buddhist origin taken as Hindu deity and along with the rituals and worship. The goal of spiritual practice within the Mahayana and Vajrayana traditions is to become a Buddha, i.e., attain complete enlightenment, whereas the goal for Theravada practice is specific - to become an arahant, i.e., attain the enlightenment and liberation of nirvana. Buddhist chanting is neither singing nor a monotonous hymn. With its variation in pitch and rhythm it brings about solemnity. Similar to the chanting in Hindu worship, irrespective of such variations using different keys, one can see the blending of all tones into a harmonious soothing whole. Since in both the traditions they use ancient languages such as Pali or Sanskrit, its all the more enchanting and adds to the sanctity. As Osho puts it simply “Yoga is suppression with awareness; tantra is indulgence with awareness.”

Conclusion

To conclude, Buddhism does not demand blind faith from its adherents. Here mere belief is dethroned and is substituted by confidence based on knowledge. A Buddhist seeks refuge in the Buddha because it was he who discovered the path of deliverance. As Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says, “Prayers take the character of private communications, selfish bargaining with God. It seeks for objects of earthly ambitions and inflames the sense of self. Meditation on the other hand is self-change.” Unlike other religions Buddhism does not believe in the Almighty god, or revelations, supernatural power or divine messengers and so on. There is neither monopoly of truth nor condemnation of other religions and faiths. Buddhism recognizes the infinite latent possibilities of man and teaches that man can gain deliverance from suffering by his own efforts independent of divine help or mediating priests.

Any philosophy to become a religion, the metaphysical stand must be kept intact, yet the message must be put in a pragmatic way. Buddhism too in all its forms and sects has kept the core truth that anything and everything is bound to decay and die. In other words the impermanence and change is the truth as such. Keeping Kshanikavada and anatmavada as its nucleus Vajrayana has moved cautiously to bring out the practicality of Buddhism through the form of meditation. Therefore even today the ripples that have formed in the beautiful lake of this religion are just the reminder to get back to the center. In this sense the meditation process of Buddhism is all the more relevant today as we are unable to understand the vicissitudes of the mind. The moment we realize that “this moment” is all that we have, we experience the eternity and that is shunyata.
Tantric Buddhism is just showing us this path which open to the intellectuals and to common folks alike. Living every moment is the quintessential of Buddhist philosophy. As Albert Einstein says, “The religion of the future will be a cosmic religion. It should transcend personal God and avoid dogma and theology. Covering both the natural and the spiritual, it should be based on a religious sense arising from the experience of all things natural and spiritual as a meaningful unity. Buddhism answers this description. If there is any religion that could cope with modern scientific needs it would be Buddhism.” The very essential and most influential aspect of Buddhism which has permeated through centuries and across the East Asian countries is meditation. The man today is caught in the web of mental modification and has become save to the whimsical nature of mind. Therefore it’s time to get back to such practices in order to control the mind and get the glimpse of eternity in every moment!
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2500 years of Buddhism
The International Association of Buddhist Universities (IABU)

Sponsored and Published by Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University